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RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0156/01 0371530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3492
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7359
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6064
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7661
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0838
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9046
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7232
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3494
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 BRASILIA 000156 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, S/CT, INL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034 
TAGS: PTER EFIN PREL PGOV SNAR KTFN PA AR BR
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: MAKING THE 3 PLUS 1 
WORK 
 
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 000504 
     ¶B. 08 STATE 671 
     ¶C. 08 BRASILIA 001264 
     ¶D. 08 BRASILIA 001664 
     ¶E. 05 ASUNCION 001363 
     ¶F. 04 BRASILIA 01291 
     ¶G. 08 BRASILIA 43 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The 3 Plus 1 Mechanism on Security in the 
Triborder Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay 
remains, six years after its initial plenary session, the 
only instrument available to discuss counterterrorism (CT) 
with regional partners at the policy level.  Given the 
likelihood that the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) will reject 
new policy-level proposals for regional security cooperation 
as the GOB focuses on building up a regional security 
architecture in South America that does not include the 
United States (i.e., Mercosul working groups on security, 
UNASUL, South American Defense Council), re-invigorating the 
3 Plus 1 becomes all the more necessary, both as a means of 
achieving meaningful policy-level commitments from Brazil on 
this important issue and as a way of maintaining a foothold 
in regional security discussions. The United States' turn to 
host the upcoming 3 Plus 1 offers the best opportunity since 
the initial plenary to shift the dynamics of the mechanism in 
a way that ensures its effectiveness and our broader security 
interests in the region. Taking advantage of greater GOB 
openness to the new U.S. Administration, a concerted USG 
strategy to implement this new approach that includes careful 
inter-agency preparation and high-level participation could 
lay the groundwork for the GOB to accept expanding the scope 
of the 3 Plus 1 -- substantively, geographically, or both -- 
to make it a more effective regional security dialogue.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
3 Plus 1 and the Brazilian Catch-22 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) The history of the 3 Plus 1 suggests that it will 
require careful planning and execution to make it a truly 
effective forum for cooperation.  The Brazilians have been 
consistent in limiting discussions of topics that are not 
within the established and narrow confines of the 3 Plus 1 
(only counter-terrorism, only TBA), and have made it nearly 
impossible for the USG to propose projects for the four 3 
Plus 1 partners to undertake jointly.  The Brazilian catch-22 
works this way: The GOB refuses to discuss anything but TBA 
terrorism in the 3 Plus 1.  Although the GOB knows that the 3 
Plus 1 is not a forum for sharing intelligence and, as a 
result, that there is a limit to how much the USG can provide 
regarding terrorism-related activities in the region, it uses 
our reticence to share information in this forum to assert 
that there is no evidence of terrorist activity in the TBA 
and that, if such evidence does exist, the United States is 
refusing to show it.  (Note: It is not clear the extent to 
which MRE authorities, who lead Brazil's 3 Plus 1 delegation, 
are aware of the intelligence sharing between other GOB and 
USG agencies, or of the intelligence regarding TBA activities 
that is in the possession of their own agencies.  End note.) 
It therefore dismisses the existence of terrorist activity in 
the TBA and shuts down most discussions that are explicitly 
focused on addressing terrorism-related activities. 
 
¶3. (C) Brazil also parries our efforts by complaining about 
the supposed sullying of the TBA's reputation, which they say 
undermines their efforts to promote it as a tourist 
destination.  At the same time, when the United States 
proposes to discuss security issues that are broader than the 
TBA, Brazil refuses to discuss them precisely because the 
issues do not fit the mission of the 3 Plus 1, which is to 
discuss issues pertaining to the TBA.  For example, at the 
January 2008 plenary in Asuncion, Brazil shut down U.S. 
efforts to discuss protection of food supplies because the 
issue of food security is not a "TBA problem", but "a 
universal problem that all countries face." More appropriate 
 
BRASILIA 00000156  002 OF 007 
 
 
forums exist to discuss that topic, according to Itamaraty. 
 
----------------------- 
The Value of 3 Plus 1 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Despite these difficulties, from Mission Brazil's 
perspective, even under present circumstances, the 3 Plus 1 
mechanism serves several important purposes. 
 
-- Policy-level dialogue: Although law enforcement 
cooperation with Brazil has always been excellent and fluid 
at the operational level, 3 Plus 1 is the only sub-regional 
discussion on these issues in which we participate at a 
policy level.  As in other areas, Itamaraty continues to 
resist engaging with the United States in regional 
discussions at the policy level on security issues, even as 
regional cooperation with Brazil at the operational level is 
growing.  As Brazil becomes more confident in its regional 
leadership, Itamaraty is becoming more comfortable telling 
the United States that our presence is not needed.  As a 
result, we believe it likely that Itamaraty will reject USG 
proposals to establish new regional fora to address security 
issues and, if sufficiently concerned about U.S. initiatives, 
might make an effort to quash our excellent operational 
cooperation.  This attitude and concern give added value to 
working from within the 3 Plus 1, where we already have 
Brazil buy-in for the United States to participate. 
 
-- Networking: Members of the Mission's Law Enforcement 
Working Group (LEWG, which includes DEA, DHS (ICE, CBP, and 
USSS), DOJ (FBI, RLA), DOD (DAO, MLO), and State) who have 
attended the 3 Plus 1 sessions see value in the networking 
possibilities created through mechanism.  For them, it is an 
unparalleled networking opportunity for the four countries, 
each of which usually brings a cohort of officials from their 
intelligence, law enforcement, and financial agencies, and 
LEWG members report that useful discussions occur on the 
margins of the plenary. 
 
-- Accountability: The 3 Plus 1 ensures that some 
accountability exists among the partners, and this could be 
exploited further.  For example, a perennial topic of 
discussion is the establishment and staffing of the Joint 
Intelligence Center in Foz de Iguacu, an initiative that, we 
understand, was first proposed during a 3 Plus 1 plenary. 
Having announced it at the 3 Plus 1, the Brazilians now have 
set up a benchmark for themselves that they feel obligated to 
report and deliver on.   Although there remain problems with 
staffing of the center, it is unlikely that absent the 
pressure point that annual 3 Plus 1 meetings represent, that 
Brazil or the other partners would have found the wherewithal 
to hammer out the legal and diplomatic agreements to create 
it.  Another element of accountability that we have not fully 
exploited relates to compliance with UN resolutions mandating 
member states to update their anti-terrorism and terrorism 
finance legislation (which neither Brazil nor Paraguay have 
done).  During the January 2008 plenary in Asuncion, Brazil 
made vague statements about several bills dealing with CT 
that were various at stages of the legislative process, but 
we know that at the time they made those statements the GOB 
had already decided to shelve an anti-terrorism bill it had 
spent several years drafting (ref a).  The 3 Plus 1 allows us 
the opportunity to question Brazil and the other partners as 
to what progress they have made to comply with basic 
international norms, and to remind them of their 
international obligations. 
 
-- Information sharing: Even though we rarely come to 
agreement on new joint initiatives, the Brazilian delegations 
do brief on what are, essentially, law enforcement measures 
undertaken by them, such as new surveillance technologies 
that have been installed, new police and customs facilities 
that are being built, measures to patrol the riverine 
frontiers and the Itaipu lake, and the number of interdiction 
operations performed by the Brazilian Federal Police. 
Mission believes much of this information is valuable for 
understanding what the GOB is doing independently and jointly 
 
BRASILIA 00000156  003 OF 007 
 
 
with its neighbors, not all of which is information we 
receive through other contacts or in the vetted and open way 
in which it is reported at the 3 Plus 1. 
 
-- Moral suasion: Brazilian government officials repeatedly 
cite their participation in the 3 Plus 1 as a measure of 
their commitment to combat terrorist activity in the region. 
During a November 2008 conference on CT jointly held in 
Brasilia and hosted by the UNODC and the Brazilian 
government, the head of Brazil's financial intelligence unit 
(COAF) and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency's chief of CT 
analysis both called the 3 Plus 1 an effective mechanism.  To 
the extent that the GOB puts value on the 3 Plus 1, it 
provides some leverage to encourage Brazil to be a positive 
partner. 
 
¶5. (C) As a result of these benefits, Mission Brazil believes 
the 3 Plus 1 mechanism should be maintained.  But we also 
need to look for ways to make it more effective.  We see two 
main options for improving the mechanism: a somewhat simpler 
but less satisfactory evolution to a broader TBA agenda, or a 
more difficult and ambitious effort at restructuring the 3 
Plus 1 into a country-wide counter-crime forum.  Both of 
these would be consistent with the ideas presented at the 
most recent Regional Security Initiative conference (ref b). 
In either case, we would need to think through our approach 
to Brazil carefully, make use of the advantages we will have 
this year as host, and play on what we expect will be a 
desire on the part of the GOB to show goodwill toward the new 
U.S. administration in order to have a good chance at 
officially re-focusing the mechanism into a broader 
geographic and substantive instrument. 
 
--------------------- 
Option 1: Evolution 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The first possible direction is to begin a push to 
substantively expand the focus of the 3 Plus 1, to make it, 
in essence, the most effective Triboder Area-focused 
mechanism it can possibly be.  This would entail pushing the 
3 Plus 1 fully into the transnational crime milieu.  Mission 
believes there is sufficient precedent for encouraging an 
evolution toward broader transnational crime matters. 
 
¶7. (C) The 3 Plus 1 is an outgrowth of the Tripartite Command 
of the TBA, an Argentine, Brazilian and Paraguayan effort to 
counter the use of the TBA by organized crime and terrorist 
groups that was established in 1996.  After the September 11 
attacks, the TBA countries invited the United States to 
participate in a sister mechanism to the Tripartite Command, 
the 3 Plus 1.   Although the Tripartite Command was focused 
broadly on transnational crime and terrorism, the 3 Plus 1, 
at U.S. insistence focused exclusively on terrorism and 
terrorist financing, overshadowing and diminishing the TBA 
countries' focus on other areas of criminality.    In fact, a 
1998 agreement between the Tripartite Command called for the 
TBA countries to intensify the fight against terrorism, 
smuggling (of contraband, arms, people), money laundering, 
and drug trafficking. 
 
¶8. (C) Furthermore, a review of the history of the 3 Plus 1 
reveals a number of instances were the Brazilians have pushed 
to include items related to illicit criminal activity in 
various 3 Plus 1 meetings.  Some of these items include: 
organized criminal activity, cross-border movement of cash, 
controlling the borders, drug and arms trafficking, 
counterfeit goods, and improved cross-border customs.  For 
example, during the 2004 plenary the three partners 
emphasized the need to continue using the 3 Plus 1 platform 
to reinforce the fight against organized, transnational 
crime.  Heading the Brazilian delegation, then head of the 
Ministry of External Relations' (Itamaraty) Office of 
Transnational Crime (COCIT), Marcus Pinta Gama emphasized the 
need for greater cooperation among the partners in joint 
monitoring of air cargo, improved coordination in controlling 
cross-border movement of cash, and improved joint customs and 
immigration operations.  The story was repeated during a 
 
BRASILIA 00000156  004 OF 007 
 
 
non-plenary meeting of the 3 Plus 1 countries which took 
place in Asuncion in October 2005 to discuss transborder 
movement of bulk cash and the illicit use of charities and 
again in the late-2005 plenary, when Brazil proposed agenda 
items that included drugs and arms trafficking, money 
laundering, and border controls.  The US delegation, 
supported by the Argentine and Paraguayan delegations, 
actually pared down this agenda to focus it more heavily on 
explicit terrorism-related items. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Option 2: A more ambitious expansion 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) A second possible direction for the 3 Plus 1 would be 
to make an effort to expand beyond its narrow focus on the 
Triborder area and on CT to cover the entire territory of the 
partners over a broader range of issues.   An even more 
ambitious step would be to invite surrounding nations to 
participate, initially as "observers." 
 
¶10. (C) An effort to set a broader agenda could begin by 
getting the 3  Plus 1 partners to re-commit to combating all 
of the crimes listed in the 1998 agreement (making explicit 
reference to the agreement in the process), while offering 
increased USG technical and perhaps logistical support to 
improve and better coordinate their efforts in those areas. 
It is critical, if the path of an expanded agenda that 
includes transnational criminal activity in the entire 
territory of the partners is followed, that we can justify to 
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, that there is a concrete U.S. 
interest in these issues.  In the Brazilian view, if there is 
smuggling activity between Paraguay and Brazil that is a 
bilateral problem for the two countries to solve.  Being able 
to justify our interest in discussing the broader set of 
transnational crime issues will require sharing information 
that reveals how international criminal activity taking place 
in the region is affecting U.S. interests.  This could be 
dealt with by tasking an intelligence community assessment 
that is releasable to the partners prior to the 3 Plus 1, 
even if such an assessment were not itself part of the 
discussion during the plenary for security reasons. 
 
¶11. (C) Under either option, some possible additional topics 
could include, but not be limited to: 
 
-- Critical Infrastructure Protection: This is a perennial 
topic of discussion.  It would serve the purpose of 
continuing to follow up on the Secretary Chertoff visit (ref 
c).  Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) head General Felix 
may be in Washington at the same time as the 3 Plus 1 is 
taking place, and, if he could be persuaded to attend parts 
of the 3 Plus 1, this and other topics he discussed with DHS 
Secretary Chertoff could represent fruitful topics for 
discussion. 
 
-- Treasury,s proposal for a Financial Threat Assessment: A 
worthwhile proposal that has not been followed up on since it 
was brought up at the last 3 Plus 1 in Asuncion. 
 
-- Crossborder kidnapping: An area of particular concern to 
Asuncion. 
 
-- Internationalization of gang activity: The growing, and 
increasingly transnational, threat of Brazilian prison gangs. 
 This will be a tricky proposition, but a seed could be 
planted for future discussion.  In this vein, it would be 
useful to know whether there is an Intelligence Community 
assessment, or one could be written, examining the 
international links of the Brazilian prison gangs (Primeiro 
Commando da Capital (PCC) and Commando Vermelho (CV) and its 
international links.  If a U.S. connection is found, this 
could become a legitimate topic of discussion under the 3 
Plus 1 rubric. 
 
-- Maritime smuggling and trafficking activity: See post's 
annual terrorism report submission (ref d). 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000156  005 OF 007 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 Strategy for Moving Forward is Necessary 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Success at expanding the 3 Plus 1 will require a 
careful diplomatic strategy.   Brazil is in a comfortable 
position now -- it gets the benefits of 3 plus 1 without 
having to make commitments -- so it will be reluctant to 
accept broad changes to the mechanism.  In order to overcome 
this expected resistance, we must be tactically savvy and 
employ a wider range of tools that we are not now using. 
 
-- High-level U.S. participation: This is a must.  Brazil 
should see that the 3 Plus 1 is a high priority for the 
United States in the context of the region and that we are 
committed to making it work.  In addition, high-level 
participation will likely raise the level of Brazilian 
participation, with the salutary effect of ensuring that one 
of our most difficult interlocutors in the Brazilian Foreign 
Ministry, current COCIT chief Virginia Toniatti, is not head 
of the Brazilian delegation.  Not only has she proven 
resistant to cooperation with the United States on any number 
of issues of mutual concern outside of the 3 Plus 1, but her 
rank of minister, allows her to refuse to agree to proposals 
at the 3 Plus 1 meetings by claiming, plausibly, that she has 
no authorization to agree to them.  An ambassadorial or 
higher head of the U.S. delegation might cause Brazil to send 
an equivalent official who does not carry the same negative 
baggage. 
 
-- Homework: The US Del needs to be prepared to call Brazil 
on its generalities and contradictions in its statements and 
positions.  Brazil has yet to pass either anti-terrorism or 
terrorism finance legislation, and a prepared USDel can 
attempt to get more specific answers on record than vague 
generalities about "bills that are in various stages of the 
legislative process."  Adequate preparation can prevent 
Brazil from playing the spoiler, as they did during the 2008 
plenary, refusing to discuss Trade Transparency Units (TTU), 
despite the fact that TTU's had been discussed at previous 3 
Plus 1 meetings, during which all the partners had shown keen 
interest in the U.S. program (ref e). 
 
--  Inter-agency Planning: A robust inter-agency preparatory 
process that includes posts will help ensure that both 
specific proposals and the way in which they are to be 
presented have been fully discussed and agreed upon, and that 
we avoid surprises that make cooperation more difficult.  The 
2006 Treasury designations just prior to the 3 Plus 1 plenary 
that year spoiled our CT dialogue with Brazil at the policy 
level for at least a year, during which time Brazilian 
officials missed no opportunity to chide the United States 
for our "unilateralist" approach to the designations.  If the 
United States is proposing a topic for discussion that is not 
traditionally thought of as falling under the CT rubric, we 
will need to make the case early with the Brazilians and--as 
previously noted-- be able to justify why such a topic is a 
matter of U.S. concern or how it fits into the 3 Plus 1. 
Mission recommends an annual post-3 Plus 1 internal USG 
meeting (with the 3 posts included) not more than three 
months after the plenary to determine how to do follow-up and 
to plan the year-ahead agenda leading up to the next 3 Plus 1 
 
-- Patience: We should not expect to be able to accomplish 
the goal of broadening the 3 Plus 1 at the next 3 plus 1.  We 
should expect to plant some seeds prior to this plenary 
through Ambassador-level meetings; advance some at the 
plenary itself; and continue with the push at subsequent 
follow-up meetings. 
 
-- Alternate proposals: We must consider the possibility that 
Itamaraty will initially reject expanding the 3 Plus 1.  It 
will be necessary to float new ideas.  Mission has discussed 
the following:  To challenge Brazil's (largely manufactured) 
outrage about the demonization of the region, the United 
States could float the idea that "Triborder" be struck from 
the 3 Plus 1's official name (or suggest to either Argentina 
or Paraguay to do so).    Another possible way to challenge 
 
BRASILIA 00000156  006 OF 007 
 
 
Brazil's outrage is to propose that Uruguay and Chile be 
included in a future 3 Plus 1, initially as observers, in 
order to ameliorate the undue focus on the TBA.  The idea of 
including Chile and Uruguay in the 3 Plus 1 was originally 
proposed by the former head of the COCIT, Minister (now 
Ambassador) Marcos Pinta Gama (ref f).  Although Pinta Gama 
proposed it in different setting, it could nevertheless be 
noted that Brazil had been open to the idea in the past. 
Although the Mission can accept the 3 plus 1 as is, more 
careful efforts to re-evaluate our strategy on a regular 
basis might yield additional options for advancing our 
interests through the 3 Plus 1. 
 
-- Interim Visits: Mission recommends either a non-plenary 
gathering as outlined below, or visits to the individual 
posts by S/CT representatives as a way to push our goals and 
signal a renewed and expanded commitment to the 3 Plus 1. 
The United States could propose to hold sub-plenary sessions 
at the mid-year point on more narrowly tailored themes. 
These took place in the past:  in August 2005, a sub-plenary 
was held in Asuncion to discuss illicit use of charities and 
bulk cash smuggling across borders. Such meetings have tended 
to be at the technical level, and as a result carry less 
political baggage.  But since 2005, no sub-plenary meetings 
have been held.  Brazil once proposed to hold a sub-plenary 
on joint monitoring of air cargo moving through the TBA (an 
initiative they later backed off from).  The United States 
could propose, for example, to host a sub-plenary to discuss 
internationalization of gangs in light of our own experience 
in dealing with Central American gangs in our country.  Such 
a sub-plenary could have participation from Portuguese 
officials, perhaps as observers, where there are indications 
that Brazilian gangs may be gaining a foothold. 
 
-- Follow-up:  Regaining momentum will require USG effort on 
a year-round basis.  There is little to be gained from making 
proposals at the 3 Plus 1 that are later dropped or 
forgotten.  Treasury's excellent proposal to conduct a joint 
illicit finance threat assessment was brought up at the 2008 
3 Plus 1 in Asuncion.  Unfortunately, with no advance notice, 
it was initially rejected, and no effort was made to act on 
Mission's suggestions that we work it in capitals after the 
meeting.  Such an assessment could have laid the foundation 
for a semi-formal bilateral dialogue in between plenaries and 
in future 3  Plus 1 meetings. 
 
-------------------------- 
If You've Got It, Use It 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) The 3 Plus 1 as currently constituted is flawed 
structurally because of its specific focus on the Triborder 
Area, which narrows potential areas of discussions with the 
partners, and its now almost exclusive focus on an issue that 
Brazil sees as distinctly secondary, counterterrorism. 
Ultimately, in Mission's view, it makes little sense to have 
a mechanism to discuss CT or broader transnational crime 
issues by focusing on a small bit of territory that, no 
matter how problematic, is a small part of a broader security 
problem in the region.  Mission notes that the CT problem in 
Brazil, not to mention the transnational crime problem, is 
not confined to the TBA, and that other areas in Brazil, such 
as Sao Paulo, are of at least equal concern to the TBA (ref 
g).  Brazil, however, currently sits in the driver's seat; it 
gets to say it participates in the 3 Plus 1 without letting 
the mechanism produce much of a positive agenda. 
 
¶14. (C) That said, as Brazilian efforts to build up a 
regional security architecture with a Brazilian imprimatur-- 
such as Mercosul working groups on CT and transnational 
crime, UNASUL, and the South American Defense Council -- 
crowd out U.S. leadership and involvement in regional 
security discussions, the 3 Plus 1 provides a useful starting 
point and is our only existing foot in the door at the 
regional level.  By exploiting the natural advantages offered 
from hosting the 3 Plus 1 and using the expected goodwill 
from the Brazilian government toward the new U.S. 
administration, we have the best opportunity to re-invigorate 
 
BRASILIA 00000156  007 OF 007 
 
 
this forum and advance our broader security interests in the 
region. 
 
 
 
SOBEL