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Viewing cable 09BEIJING498, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, NORTH KOREA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING498 2009-02-26 09:38 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO3021
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0498 0570938
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260938Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2530
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS BEIJING 000498 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/CM, EAP/PA, EAP/PD, C 
HQ PACOM FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR (J007) 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR CH
 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, NORTH KOREA 
 
-------------------- 
  Editorial Quotes 
-------------------- 
 
1. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
 
"Shelving stereotypes a must for cooperation" 
 
The official English-language newspaper China Daily (02/06): 
"...Concerted cooperation between China and the U.S. depends 
fundamentally on whether the two countries can transcend the 
stereotypes mentally of international relations. According to 
traditional international political theory, fierce competition and 
even rivalry typically surface between the old hegemony and the 
emerging powers. In today's world, where the U.S.' authority is on 
the decline, there are no reasons why the U.S. should not keep a 
precautionary watch over the emerging Asian giant....As the world's 
largest and third largest economies, Washington and Beijing should 
adopt a longer perspective in dealing with each other and should 
shoulder increasing responsibility for the construction of a stable 
world order." 
 
2. NORTH KOREA 
 
"Lacking the bottom line traps the U.S. in North Korea's difficult 
nuclear issues." 
 
The official Communist Party international news publication Global 
Times (Huanqiu Shibao)(02/26): "Recently North Korea launched a 
satellite. They are making good use of the U.S. transition period. 
The Obama administration's bottom line on North Korea's nuclear 
issue is not clear. North Korea is taking the chance and adopting a 
strategy of 'two steps forward and one step back.' In this way North 
Korea can gain more time for its nuclear plan. The Bush 
administration failed on the North Korea policy primarily because it 
did not establish a bottom line and therefore lost touch with its 
goals and principles. What's more, the Bush administration had a 
one-sided wish that it could lead North Korea to give up their 
nuclear plan by buying it from them. The Six Party Talks are still 
the best way to realize the denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula. The U.S. believes the Six-Party Talks' task is finding a 
way to compensate North Korea in exchange for their giving up of 
their nuclear program. However, they do realize that North Korea 
does not pursue a result from the talks, but just values the 
process. This fully shows the U.S. is being strange about North 
Korea's policy. After decades, one should know North Korea is firm 
about the goal of becoming a country possessing nuclear programs. 
How the Obama administration will deal with this issue will 
influence the future of the peninsula." 
 
PICCUTA