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Viewing cable 09BEIJING383, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND DEMARCHE PRC ON FIJI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING383 2009-02-13 11:18 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO1441
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0383 0441118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131118Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2285
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9654
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 0083
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0641
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 000383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2029 
TAGS: PREL EAID ETRD CH FI AS NZ
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND DEMARCHE PRC ON FIJI 
VISIT 
 
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Aubrey Carlson. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  On the eve of PRC Vice President Xi 
Jinping's February 8-9 trip to Fiji, Australia and New 
Zealand expressed concern to the MFA that such a visit would 
send the wrong message in light of international efforts to 
urge the government in Suva to carry out democratic reforms, 
according to Beijing-based Australian diplomats.  The MFA 
downplayed the Xi visit, calling it a transit stop on the way 
to Latin America.  In the event, however, the two sides 
signed new develop assistance agreements during the stopover, 
further frustrating the Australians and New Zealanders.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Australian Embassy Political Officer Gedaliah Afterman 
(protect) told PolOff February 11 that the ambassadors of 
both Australia and New Zealand demarched the MFA separately 
to express concern that Vice President Xi's February 8-9 
visit to Fiji would set back international efforts to 
persuade the leadership in Fiji, who came to power after a 
coup in 2006, to reform.  The Australian Ambassador told VFM 
He Yafei that China should join international efforts led by 
the Pacific Forum to push Fiji toward democratic reform, but 
instead it seemed that China was using the opportunity to 
deepen ties with the country just when other countries were 
pulling back. 
 
3. (C) According to our Australian colleague, VFM He 
responded that Vice President Xi's visit would only be a 
transit stopover on the way to Latin America.  As it turned 
out, however, China signed several development assistance 
deals in Fiji during the visit, and Xi met with President 
Iloilo and Prime Minister Bainimarama.  While Afterman 
suggested the value of the development deals was more 
symbolic than economic, he said that Australia and New 
Zealand were frustrated that these agreements and high-level 
meetings went further in sending the wrong message to Suva. 
 
4. (C) Afterman said that the Chinese sought to obscure plans 
for Xi's stop in Fiji by omitting the onward destination of 
Xi's aircraft in the Chinese Government's application to the 
New Zealand Government to transit New Zealand airspace.  He 
said the Australians were alerted to Xi's plans shortly 
before the visit when Chinese officials applied for visas to 
transit Australia on their way to Suva. 
 
5. (C) In a February 13 conversation with PolMinCouns, 
Australian Embassy PolCouns Robert Fergusson (protect) 
reiterated much of the above and added that his Embassy was 
awaiting possible instruction to go back to the MFA and 
complain about the Fiji visit and its 
more-than-just-a-transit substance.  Fergusson said the 
Chinese were observers at the Pacific Forum meeting at which 
the difficult-to-reach consensus was developed to push the 
Fiji Government toward reform.  Although not a party to the 
consensus, the PRC would have known the Xi visit and its 
results would be contrary to the hard-won Pacific Forum 
consensus. 
PICCUTA