VZCZCXRO3186
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0118/01 0571153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261153Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0069
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0018
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0493

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000118 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
DEPT FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID CH ECON EIND ETRD EINT ML
SUBJECT: A CHINESE BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER NIGER 
 
REF: BAMAKO 00104 
 
1.(SBU)  Summary: Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Mali 
from February 12-13, his second stop on a five nation tour. 
Although only in Mali for 24 hours, his visit dominated the 
Malian media, which had ample opportunity to recap the long 
list of Chinese investments in the country.  While in Bamako, 
Hu met with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure, signed 
several bilateral agreements, and laid the cornerstone for 
Bamako's third bridge, an approximately 70 million dollar 
project purported to be China's largest aid development 
project in West Africa.  Hu finished his trip to Mali by 
inaugurating an anti-malaria clinic in the nearby town of 
Kati.  Mali lacks the natural resources that typically 
attract Chinese interest in other parts of Africa, leaving 
western diplomats in Bamako left to guess just what China is 
getting in return for its investments in Mali.  As China 
seeks to reshape its image as a responsible global citizen 
and conscientious investor in Africa, the answer may be 
rather straightforward: good will and a leg up in Mali's 
growing manufacturing, construction, and consumer goods 
markets.  Either way, China's courtship of Mali continues to 
expand, and Malian reaction to the Jintao trip made it clear 
that Chinese aid is winning China a great deal of gratitude 
and influence in Mali.  As if to prove the point, on February 
25 the Malian government ratified a USD 60 million loan 
agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China to finance the 
reconstruction of the Chinese-owned SUKALA sugar refinery, 
with potentially serious implications for a U.S. and South 
African sugar refinery venture that has received nearly USD 2 
million from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) 
and USAID.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
The Third Bridge Over the River Niger 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.(SBU)  Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived in Bamako on 
February 12, his second stop on a five-nation tour.  At an 
afternoon meeting with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure, 
the Chinese premier stated that China's solidarity with Mali 
extended to "good times and bad," and signed a number of 
cooperative bilateral agreements in the areas of health, 
education, and infrastructure, the details of which have not 
yet been published.  In addition, Hu announced the creation 
of 34 new scholarship opportunities for Malian students to 
study in China. 
 
3.(SBU)  On February 13, Hu and President Toure laid the 
cornerstone for the "Bridge of Chinese-Malian Friendship" 
which, once completed, will be Bamako's third and longest 
bridge across the Niger River.  The estimated price tag of 
the 1.7 mile long structure is 34-37 billion FCFA (68-74 
million USD) and is billed as the largest Chinese aid 
development project in West Africa.  Bamako's first bridge is 
a two lane structure built during the early 1960s.  The 
second bridge over the Niger, the four lane King Fahd Bridge, 
was built by Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.  The Chinese bridge 
is intended to alleviate Bamako's significant traffic 
congestion and provide heavy trucks with a route into Bamako 
that does not direct them through the heart of the city. 
 
4.(SBU)  According to the Malian press, the bridge is 
scheduled to be completed in September 2010, a date that 
coincides with Mali's celebration of fifty years of 
independence.  However, the Chinese have told the embassy 
that the contract under which the bridge is being built is 
three years in length, although the Malian government is 
pressuring the Chinese to finish in two. 
 
5.(SBU)  The bridge project, which was initially proposed at 
the China-Africa Summit held in Beijing in November 2006, 
will be completed by the Chinese engineering firm, China 
Geshouba Group Corporation (CGGC).  It is the largest of a 
long list of Chinese infrastructure projects in Mali.  A 
sample of some of the structures the Chinese have built or 
are building includes: 4 stadiums (in Bamako, San, Koutiala, 
and Bougouni), 10 women's and children's shelters (in Bamako 
and regional capitals), 2 rural schools (in Mopti and 
Sikasso), a sugar refinery, the International Conference 
Center in Bamako, the Secretariat General of the Presidency, 
a new hospital, a textile mill, and the memorial to Mali's 
first president, Modibo Keita. 
 
6.(SBU)  The Chinese infrastructure investments come during a 
time when bilateral trade between China and Mali is expanding 
significantly.  According to Malian government publications, 
 
BAMAKO 00000118  002 OF 002 
 
 
bilateral trade between Mali and China grew from 83 billion 
FCFA (166 million USD) in 2004 to 101 billion FCFA (212 
million USD) in 2008.  By comparison, Mali's bilateral trade 
with the U.S. totaled USD 42 million in 2007, according to 
AGOA figures.  Mali primarily imports electronics, green tea, 
and light industrial products from China, while its primary 
export to China is cotton.  Hu finished his trip to Mali by 
participating in the inauguration of a new anti-malarial 
clinic at the hospital in Kati, near Bamako.  The clinic was 
also the product of Chinese funding, and will regularly 
receive free anti-malarial medicines from China. 
 
---------------------- 
Mali Returns the Favor 
---------------------- 
 
7.(SBU) On February 25, the Malian Council of Ministers 
ratified an agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China 
originally negotiated and signed in Bamako on November 26, 
¶2008.  Under the agreement, the Export-Import Bank of China 
will provide a 500 million yuan (roughly USD 60 million) loan 
to finance the expansion of the SUKALA sugar refinery, which 
is 60 percent owned by the Chinese government and 40 percent 
owned by Mali.  SUKALA has been pressuring the Malian 
government to reallocate to SUKALA land that the Malian 
government has already ceded to the Louisiana based Schaffer 
Global Group and its South African partner, Ilovo, to 
construct a modern sugar refinery next door to SUKALA's sugar 
cane operations.  Since the Schaffer project was initiated in 
1999, USTDA and USAID have provided nearly USD 2 million to 
support feasibility studies and sugar cane testing.  Plans to 
expand SUKALA have been around for years, but it was never 
clear whether SUKALA really intended to increase its 
operations or was simply trying to counter Schaffer's much 
more viable and competitive business model (reftel).  The 
February 25 announcement by the Malian government seemingly 
indicates that China and Mali are serious about expanding the 
SUKALA refinery, with potentially serious ramifications for 
Schaffer and Ilovo. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Comment: A Bridge, But to What End? 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.(SBU)  Hu's trip provided an occasion for much celebration 
in the Malian press over Malian-Chinese friendship.  China 
was the fourth country to recognize Malian independence in 
1960 (the U.S. was the second) and every Malian President has 
made a pilgrimage to Beijing.  President Toure has made the 
trip three times, most recently for the Olympics.  The 
official program for Hu's visit published by the Office of 
the Presidency attributes good Chinese-Malian relations to 
sustained high level contacts and exchanges, as well as 
Mali's unwavering support for China on the question of 
Taiwan.  The document specifies, "Mali remains completely 
dedicated to a united and indivisible People's Republic of 
China," a sentiment echoed by ATT's address at the bridge 
project opening ceremony. 
 
9.(SBU)  China's infrastructure investments in Mali are 
significant.  Given the small size of Mali's economy, these 
investments go a long way.  During Hu's visit, President 
Toure remarked that, "all the great accomplishments in Mali 
bear the mark of China."  Since Mali has no significant 
natural resources to offer - Mali's gold is already spoken 
for by other investors and there are no known Chinese firms 
among those scouring northern Mali for possible oil or 
uranium reserves - the inclusion of Mali in President Hu's 
itinerary seemed calibrated to counter the prevailing image 
of a China guilty of elevating its drive for African natural 
resources over concerns for human rights and good governance. 
 By highlighting its support for one of Africa's leading 
democratic performers, China not only further endeared itself 
to Mali but signaled that its African diplomacy is more 
complex than a simple cost-benefit calculation. 
MILOVANOVIC