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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD493, BAGHDAD TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS RESPONSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD493 2009-02-25 15:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO2243
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0493/01 0561514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251514Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1869
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0446
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2108
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0010
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0008
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0089
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0070
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0036
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0007
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0501
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0023
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0026
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 000493 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR G/TIP, G-ACBLANK, INL, DRL, PRM, AND NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KTIP KWMN PHUM ELAB KCRM KFRD PREF SMIG
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS RESPONSES 
 
REF: A. STATE 132759 
     B. BAGHDAD 328 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary and recommendations:  This is Post's 
summary of trafficking in persons (TIP) activities for the 
period April 2008-February 2009.  Some progress has been 
noted since the previous report in that a few GOI officials 
privately acknowledge the existence of a TIP problem.  In 
addition, the Council of Ministers Secretariat (CoMSec) Legal 
Advisor's Office is drafting a comprehensive anti-TIP law. 
Post strongly recommends that Iraq continue to be treated as 
a special case during this rating period and not be 
tier-ranked.  The GOI's ability to effectively investigate 
and prosecute TIP offenders and to assist victims is hindered 
by lack of institutional capacity and expertise.  Despite 
scoring substantial security gains, Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) continue to be fully engaged in fighting the 
insurgency, and this will continue to be their strategic 
priority.  In addition, the GOI has a full slate of 
high-priority legislation to pass in the near term, including 
a new national elections law, a hydrocarbons law, 
constitutional amendments and a resolution of the Kirkuk 
issue.  It is Post's assessment that the above bills are the 
GOI's appropriate primary near-term legislative priorities. 
End summary and recommendations. 
 
2.  (U)  The responses in this paragraph are keyed to the 
questions in ref A paragraph 24. 
 
(A)  Sources of information about TIP in Iraq are NGOs, some 
GOI ministries, media reports, USG agencies and USG 
contractors.  NGOs generally offer anecdotal evidence and 
usually cannot cite specific cases.  Furthermore, many Iraqi 
NGOs lack a clear understanding of what constitutes human 
trafficking and are therefore unable to identify or track 
cases.  Some GOI officials acknowledge a TIP problem, but 
confirm there are no official statistics and that no GOI 
agencies currently track information on TIP. An anti-TIP law 
currently being drafted by the Legal Advisors' Office of the 
CoMSec provides for tracking and documenting of TIP cases, 
coordinated among relevant GOI ministries. 
 
(B)  Iraq is both an origin and destination country for 
international trafficking for men, women and children.  There 
has been a credible report of women trafficked by the 
director of a women's shelter in Kurdistan, which was 
subsequently closed.  Young women were most often trafficked 
within Iraq, but also to the Gulf states (Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the UAE), and Jordan and Syria for the purpose of forced 
marriage or prostitution and/or domestic servitude. 
Reportedly, some laborers and domestic workers are tricked by 
labor brokers in their home countries into believing they 
were getting jobs in one of the Gulf states or Jordan, but 
then find themselves in Iraq with little choice but work on 
terms resembling forced labor.  Others are aware they are 
Qterms resembling forced labor.  Others are aware they are 
coming to Iraq, but once in-country find that their  terms of 
employment are quite different than what was promised.  On 
April 23, 42 Bangladeshis were repatriated with the help of 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) after 
being trafficked into the country ostensibly for work.  Those 
who returned estimated that about 10,000 more Bangladeshis 
were still in the country without jobs or proper 
documentation and claimed that agents seized passports from 
workers in and around Kurdistan.  On August 14, press reports 
indicated that 43 Nepalis were repatriated after allegedly 
coming to Iraq for work, but upon arrival had their passports 
seized and were forced to live in one hotel room. 
 
Men from Nepal, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka are 
sometimes brought to Iraq by free-lance labor brokers at the 
behest of contracting companies, but find upon arrival find 
that the jobs they expected (often for USG subcontractors) 
are contingent on contracts that have not yet been awarded 
 
BAGHDAD 00000493  002 OF 007 
 
 
and may never be.  In this case they may be held by the 
contracting company without pay and in living conditions far 
below those stipulated by international labor law.  In 
December, IOM began investigating the cases of nearly 1,000 
third country nationals (TCNs) who had been subjected to such 
conditions and forced to live (without jobs or compensation) 
for months in makeshift camps near the Baghdad International 
Airport.  These TCNs came to Iraq with the expectation that 
they would have a job working for a USG contractor.  IOM 
facilitated the repatriation of many of these TCNs, while the 
rest eventually found employment. 
 
(C)  Victims are trafficked into involuntary domestic 
servitude, forced labor, forced marriage, and prostitution. 
 
(D)  Iraqi and non-Iraqi women are at high risk for 
trafficking. Among foreign workers, adult men and women may 
be at equal risk, as there are many male foreigners working 
in conditions that resemble trafficking. 
 
(E)  Traffickers are predominantly male, but sometimes female 
family members traffic their own offspring or relatives. 
(This happens, for example, in the context of forced 
marriages.)  Traffickers include both large crime groups and 
small family-based groups, including businesses such as 
employment agencies and women's beauty salons.  An NGO in 
Kurdistan reports that young women may frequent such salons 
and are encouraged to accrue debt for treatments.  When they 
cannot pay the accumulated bills, the salon owners constrain 
them to work in prostitution to pay off the debt.  The women 
are vulnerable because their families do not know they were 
running up debts. The owner may also threaten to inform the 
police as a way to collect the money.  Some jewelry shop 
owners engage in similar practices.  A legal advisor to the 
CoMSec noted that poverty and unemployment force some Iraqis 
to either become TIP victims themselves, or to facilitate TIP 
with regard to family members.  For example, a poor family 
may give a daughter in marriage to someone who takes the girl 
out of the country, most typically to one of the Gulf states, 
where she may be forced into prostitution and/or domestic 
servitude. 
 
3.  (U)  The responses in this paragraph are keyed to the 
questions in reftel paragraph 24. 
 
(A)  The GOI does not officially recognize TIP as a problem, 
but increased awareness and concern of some Ministry of Human 
Rights (MoHR), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA), 
and Ministry of the Interior (MoI) officials, and officials 
in the CoMSeC over the past year led to the drafting of an 
ambitious anti-TIP law which addresses the investigation and 
prosecution of TIP offenders, provides for stiff sentences 
and fines if they are convicted, and assistance and 
rehabilitation measures for victims.  (Note: Post's Office of 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs is reviewing the law and 
QConstitutional and Legal Affairs is reviewing the law and 
offering commentary and technical assistance; both are 
welcomed by the chief drafter.  End note.)  The chief drafter 
has predicted it would take a year to enact the law. 
 
Article 6 of the draft law specifies the ways the government 
is obligated to assist victims, including by providing 
medical care, and legal counseling. The law also stipulates 
that victims must be provided with shelter appropriate to 
their sex and age group, physical and mental rehabilitation, 
and educational and job training opportunities.  As for 
foreign TIP victims, the law requires that the authorities 
provide them with language and legal assistance and 
facilitate their repatriation. 
 
Article 7 of the draft law calls for establishment of a 
"Higher Committee on Human Trafficking" to be headed by a 
Deputy Prime Minister and include representatives from the 
following ministries: Interior, Migration and Displacement, 
 
BAGHDAD 00000493  003 OF 007 
 
 
Foreign Affairs, Justice, Health, Labor and Social Affairs, 
Human Rights, Finance, and from the national intelligence 
agencies.  The Committee would report to the CoM and be 
tasked with developing plans and programs to combat TIP, make 
recommendations to combat human trafficking and follow up on 
their implementation, coordinate efforts to help victims. 
Provincial sub-committees would be formed and include 
representatives of all of the aforementioned ministries. 
 
(B)  No GOI agencies are currently involved in specifically 
anti-TIP efforts.  A senior MoI official recently stated that 
the GOI does not track or investigate TIP as a separate 
crime, which makes it difficult to gauge the extent of the 
problem.  The official added that the lack of law enforcement 
concerning TIP is due to the fact that Iraq continues to have 
a "war mentality" in which murder, kidnapping and corruption 
are the overwhelming concerns and crimes such as TIP and drug 
trafficking receive little or no attention. 
 
(C)  The GOI has limited ability to fully enforce the law 
anywhere in the country, making the challenge of addressing 
human trafficking extremely difficult.  Unofficial sources 
claim government corruption is high.  Funding for police and 
ministries was inadequate to take on more than fulfilling 
basic functional needs.  The chief drafter of the 
aforementioned anti-TIP law emphasized that the GOI has only 
weak control of Iraq's borders with its neighbors and 
administrative corruption at border crossings aggravates the 
problem.  The GOI has not yet allocated any funds to 
specifically assist victims of trafficking, but also did not 
effectively manage other programs that assist victims of 
general human rights abuses.  For example, while there are a 
few women's shelters in the north (Kurdistan region), Baghdad 
and the rest of the country have none.  Patriarchy and 
discriminatory attitudes toward women and girls also hinder 
effective anti-TIP action. 
 
(D)  The GOI does not systematically monitor its 
anti-trafficking efforts on any front. 
 
4.  (U)  The responses in this paragraph are keyed to the 
questions in reftel paragraph 25. 
 
(A)  Iraq does not currently have any laws that specifically 
address TIP.  Article 37(3) of the Iraqi Constitution 
prohibits "forced labor, slavery, slave trade, trafficking in 
women or children, and sex trade."  The law is not specific 
in its application to internal or external forms of 
trafficking.  CoMSeC is currently drafting a comprehensive 
anti-human trafficking law (see para 3(A)), which provides 
for stiff penalties (including the death sentence, if the 
trafficking victim should die as a consequence of being 
trafficked), for anyone who engages in or facilitates TIP. 
 
Trafficking is not directly addressed in the 1969 Iraqi Penal 
Code, however there are at least a handful of articles that 
QCode, however there are at least a handful of articles that 
could be applied in certain circumstances.  Article 399 of 
the Penal Code punishes "any person who incites a boy or girl 
under the age of 18 to indulge in fornication or resort to 
prostitution as a profession or assists him or her to do so." 
 
Articles 421, 422, and 423 of the Penal Code prohibit 
unlawful seizure, kidnapping, and detention.  Notably, The 
Code prohibits not only seizure, kidnapping, and detention by 
force, but also by deception.  Article 425 punishes "any 
person who provides a location for unlawful detention or 
imprisonment while being aware of the fact." 
 
Article 320 of the Penal Code might be used to punish public 
officials who employ trafficked persons. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no trafficking cases were tried 
under any law during the reporting period. 
 
BAGHDAD 00000493  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
(B)  Article 399 of the Penal Code stipulates a prison 
sentence not to exceed ten years for "Incitement to 
Prostitution and Fornication" when the victim is under the 
age of 18.  Article 393 lists aggravating factors, such as 
the victim's age, the number of perpetrators, the victim's 
virginity, the relationship between the offender and the 
victim, and whether the victim died, became pregnant, or 
contracted a sexually transmitted disease as a result of the 
act.  If such factors exist, it appears that the court has 
the authority to increase the sentence. 
 
Although not specific to trafficking for sexual exploitation, 
Articles 421, 422, and 423, which cover unlawful seizure, 
kidnapping, and detention could have implications for 
traffickers.  Sentences called for in these articles vary 
depending on the age and gender of the victim, but generally 
range between a maximum of 10-15 years.  Aggravating 
circumstances, such as deception, can increase the sentence, 
and any case involving sexual intercourse with the victim can 
result in life imprisonment or death.  Article 425 calls for 
a period of imprisonment not to exceed seven years for anyone 
who provides a location for unlawful detention. 
 
(C)  Article 320 of the Penal Code calls for a prison 
sentence not to exceed 10 years for public officials who 
employ "slave labor" or who retain employee wages unlawfully. 
 However, this crime is only applicable to public officials 
and agents, and is therefore unlikely to be broadly 
applicable against labor recruiters or labor agents.  There 
appear to be no criminal laws specifically pertaining to 
labor recruiters or labor agents. 
 
In December, the Kurdistan media reported that the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister held a meeting to 
discuss a request by the KRG Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (MoLSA) to regulate entry of foreign workers into the 
Kurdistan region and monitor their treatment.  According to 
the report, several employers who had been violating workers' 
rights had been arrested. A lawyer working for an NGO 
commented that some lower-level people may have been arrested 
in order to make an example of them.  A follow-up inquiry 
with the KRG MoLSA (by the same lawyer) revealed that some 
illegally operating employment agencies had received 
warnings, and that MoLSA had issued a regulation requiring 
such agencies to obtain MoLSA approval before being permitted 
to bring in foreign workers.  The KRG MoLSA official added 
that the KRG plans to draft a more comprehensive labor law 
that will also apply to foreign workers. 
 
(D)  Rape is prohibited by Article 393 of the Penal Code; its 
penalty is life imprisonment or a period determined by the 
Iraqi court.  This penalty is stricter than that for those 
who commit sexual exploitation. 
 
(E)  The GOI did not prosecute any cases against human 
Q(E)  The GOI did not prosecute any cases against human 
trafficking offenders during the reporting period. 
 
(F)  The GOI did not provide any specialized training for 
government officials to increase their ability to recognize, 
investigate, or prosecute instances of trafficking. 
 
(G)  The GOI did not cooperate with other governments in the 
investigation of trafficking cases. 
 
(H)  The GOI did not extradite any persons charged with 
trafficking in other countries.  The government is prohibited 
from extraditing Iraqi citizens by Article 21(1) of the 
Constitution. 
 
(I)  There is some anecdotal evidence of involvement in or 
tolerance of TIP by KRG officials.  An NGO source in 
Kurdistan reported that a women's shelter in Erbil was closed 
 
BAGHDAD 00000493  005 OF 007 
 
 
because the director was accused of trafficking.  According 
to the NGO source, an official KRG investigation into the 
matter was suppressed because high-level KRG involvement 
could have been revealed.  The director of the shelter 
reportedly left the country. 
 
Anecdotal evidence also exists regarding possible involvement 
of Iraqi immigration officials in the seizing of TCN 
passports at Baghdad International Airport. 
 
(J)  No GOI officials have been investigated or prosecuted 
for involvement in TIP.  If the KRG has taken any sort of 
action to halt officials' alleged facilitation of TIP (as 
mentioned in (I)), the nature and extent of such actions have 
not been made public. 
 
(K)  The act of prostitution is criminal in Iraq.  Brothel 
owners can be prosecuted under Article 425 in the Iraqi penal 
code under certain circumstances.  Pimps can be prosecuted 
under Article 399.  There are no laws prohibiting 
solicitation. 
 
(L)  This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
(M)  Iraq continued to attract little tourism.  Religious 
pilgrimages continued to be the major portion of tourism. 
There were no reports of sex tourism within Iraq. 
 
5.  (SBU)  The responses in this paragraph correspond with 
those questions in reftel paragraph 26. 
 
(A)  The GOI did not assist foreign victims of trafficking by 
providing permanent residency status or other relief from 
deportation. 
 
(B)  The GOI did not have victim care facilities which are 
accessible to trafficking victims.  The country did not have 
specialized facilities dedicated to helping victims of 
trafficking.  The GOI did not offer legal, medical, or 
psychological services to victims.  While foreign victims may 
have access to shelters, they have no protection under Iraqi 
laws.  There are currently six shelters in Iraq, all in the 
north (Kirkuk, Sulaimaniyah, Duhok, Erbil), which provide 
shelter to female victims of gender-based violence (GBV) or 
those threatened by GBV.  They receive some support from the 
KRG. 
 
(C)  The GOI did not provide funding or other forms of 
support to foreign or domestic NGOs or international 
organizations for services to trafficking victims. 
 
(D)  There was no system for law enforcement or social 
services personnel to identify trafficking victims or to 
refer them to protective custody. 
 
(E)  This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
(F)  Post has no knowledge of the GOI prosecuting any cases 
against human trafficking offenders.  A few NGOs alleged that 
the arrest of 90 women in the Kurdish region indicated 
trafficking from small towns.  The KRG has not yet arrested 
anyone for pimping. 
 
(G)  The GOI does not encourage victims to assist in the 
investigation or prosecution of trafficking.  There was no 
victims' restitution program. 
 
(H)  The government did not provide protection for victims. 
Q(H)  The government did not provide protection for victims. 
The government does not provide shelter, housing benefits, or 
other resources to victims in rebuilding their lives.  Minors 
were placed in women's or juvenile prisons. 
 
(I)  The government did not provide any specialized training 
 
BAGHDAD 00000493  006 OF 007 
 
 
for government officials to identify trafficking victims, 
whether adult or juvenile.  It does not provide training on 
protections and assistance to its embassies and consulates in 
foreign countries that are destination or transit countries. 
It does not urge those embassies and consulates to develop 
ongoing relationships with NGOs and IOs that serve trafficked 
victims. 
 
(J)  The GOI did not provide assistance to repatriated 
nationals who have been victims of trafficking. 
 
(K--SBU)  A few non-governmental and international 
organizations (noted below) assisted trafficked victims and 
do not wish to be publicly identified for fear of persecution. 
 
The Asuda Organization for Combating Violence Against Women 
provided some assistance to trafficking victims. It runs a 
shelter in Sulaymaniyah and continued to provide some 
training and rehabilitation programs. It is not supported 
financially by the GOI. 
 
American NGO Heartland Alliance provides legal and social 
protection service to trafficking victims and is monitoring 
trafficking in persons in the north of Iraq - Sulaimaniya, 
Erbil, Duhok, and Kirkuk, as well as Baghdad and Basra. 
Heartland is funded by the USG and private donors, and 
receives no financial or material support from the GOI. 
 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) also 
closely monitored reports of trafficking within Iraq. 
Although it is based out of Amman, Jordan, IOM's local staff 
works within Iraq to document the scope of trafficking 
victims.  The IOM has also assisted third country nationals 
who had been trafficked to Iraq by returning them to their 
country of origin. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The responses in this paragraph correspond with 
those questions in reftel paragraph 27. 
 
(A)  Except for a handful of officials, the GOI was unaware 
of the scope of the TIP problem within Iraq.  Therefore, it 
does not publicly acknowledge that TIP is a problem.  Local 
governments have repeatedly insisted that trafficking is not 
a problem within their jurisdiction.  There were no 
government-run anti-trafficking campaigns or information 
disseminated by the GOI.  Though the Ministry of Human Rights 
and the Ministry of State for Women's Affairs have in the 
past both expressed interest in running such a campaign, 
neither has done so due to budgetary constraints and a lack 
of cooperation within the GOI.  (Note:  The Minister of State 
for Women's Affairs resigned on February 5, citing her 
ministry's lack of resources and miniscule budget--ref B. End 
note.) 
 
(C)  There was no formal relationship between GOI officials 
and organizations within the civil society community on TIP 
issues. 
 
(B)  There was no formal monitoring of immigration or 
emigration patterns for evidence of trafficking.  A 
significant level of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
refugees moving within Iraq and across its borders made this 
Qrefugees moving within Iraq and across its borders made this 
a significantly difficult task.  Law enforcement officials 
did not screen for victims of trafficking.  The borders of 
Iraq remained generally unsecured, due to understaffing and 
limited patrol outside of border entry points. 
 
(C)  There was no mechanism for cooperation or coordination 
among agencies within the GOI.  There was no working group or 
task force that focused on TIP issues. (Note:  The only 
indication of coordination among agencies within the GOI is 
the anti-TIP law drafting project.  The ComSec Legal 
Advisor's office indicated that the MoI and MoLSA were 
 
BAGHDAD 00000493  007 OF 007 
 
 
consulted in the drafting process.  End note.) The Commission 
on Public Integrity was tasked with investigating cases of 
official corruption. 
 
(D)  The GOI does not have a national plan of action to 
address TIP. 
 
(E)  The GOI has not taken any significant measures to create 
an awareness program that educates clients of the sex trade 
or potential sex trafficking victims nor one that targets 
those who create the demand for the sex trade. 
 
(F)  This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
(G)  This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Post's TIP Officer is Claire Le Claire.  Her 
telephone number is (240) 553-0581-3019.  Her e-mail address 
is LeClaireC@state.gov. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Poloff spent 40 hours preparing this report. 
BUTENIS