VZCZCXRO1455
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0379/01 0441140
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131140Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1692
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 000379 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING 
STRONGMAN? 
 
Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
------------------------ 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (C) With the strong performance of the Da'wa Party in the 
January 31 provincial council elections, Prime Minister 
Maliki will claim a public mandate.  While many media 
analyses have tended to overstate this case (as Maliki won no 
more than 38 percent in two provinces, and less elsewhere) it 
is clear that the elections mark a significant improvement in 
the Prime Minister's political fortunes, and that Da'wa can 
legitimately claim to have displaced the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI) as the country's preeminent Shi'a 
political party.  During his first two years in office, 
Maliki was broadly assailed by critics as a weak and 
ineffectual prime minister, ill-equipped by background and 
experience to govern an increasingly violent Iraq and 
incapable of imposing order on a chaotic GOI to confront the 
country's myriad challenges.  Now, at the start of 2009, with 
an increasingly stable (if still violent and volatile) Iraq, 
Maliki is assailed by those same critics -- leading Sunni and 
Kurdish politicians, as well as other Shi'a coalition 
partners -- as an aspiring strongman bent on imposing a 
classic Arab autocracy on Iraq. 
 
¶2. (C) Maliki's personality and way of conducting business 
has contributed to the present accusations of an emerging 
"new Saddam."  While his political foes are quite open about 
their desire to see him ousted (providing more than adequate 
reason for paranoia on the PM's part), Maliki is a product of 
his Da'wa secret cell experience and tends to view everyone 
and everything with instinctive suspicion.  This worldview is 
fed by his small and closed circle of Da'wa advisors.  In 
terms of governance and security, Maliki has moved in an 
accelerated manner following his direction of government 
efforts in spring/summer of 2008 to quell Sadrist challenges 
in Basra and elsewhere to reestablish a strong Baghdad 
center.  While the ends are positive -- enhanced national 
security and stability are welcome-- the means are being 
subjected to increasing question.  The concentration of 
authority in Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief 
(OCINC), the establishment of an elite security force - with 
its own judges and detention facilities - that reports 
directly to the PM, the creation of a security force command 
that short-circuits provincial authority, a willingness in 
some cases to use strong-arm tactics against political 
adversaries, and patronage networks to co-opt others all 
follow a very familiar pattern of Arab world leadership. 
 
¶3. (C) That said, Nouri Al-Maliki is no Saddam Hussein.  He 
shares neither Saddam's brutality nor his penchant for 
international military adventurism.  Moreover, while Maliki's 
thinking and actions are undoubtedly informed by the Shi'a 
experience, he himself sees his conduct as national rather 
than sectarian-inspired.  His nationalism is very much at 
issue in his relations with Iran.  Having fled from Iran to 
Syria during the Saddam era to avoid falling under Tehran's 
sway (as he believes occurred with Shi'a arch-rival ISCI), 
Maliki's suspicious outlook includes a dark assessment of 
Iran's ambitions toward Iraq. 
 
¶4.  (C) A key question posed by Maliki's evolving hold on 
levers of political and security power is whether the PM is 
becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all 
authority to his hand or whether Maliki is attempting to 
rebalance political and security authority back to the center 
Qrebalance political and security authority back to the center 
after five-plus years of intended and unintended dispersal to 
(and in some cases seizure by) actors and power structures 
outside Baghdad.  We believe the answer lies closer to the 
latter than the former.  This process will likely come into 
sharper focus with the seating of the newly-elected 
provincial councils and implementation of the provincial 
powers law (which grants significant new power to the 
provinces).  And the PM's efforts will be met with resistance 
by those, such as the Kurds and Maliki's Shi'a rivals, who 
would argue that the post-Saddam national consensus (and 
indeed the Iraqi constitution) requires substantial devolved 
power to the provinces and regions. 
 
¶5. (C) While responsibility for the lack of political 
consensus is broadly shared among Iraq's leaders from all 
groups, the PM needs to set the tone.  Here, Maliki has shown 
that he is either unwilling or unable to take the lead in the 
give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the 
Government's policies among competing power blocs. 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister has appeared willing to 
confront his adversaries with force, as illustrated by the 
near-confrontation between the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga in 
northern Diyala province last September.  Working within this 
context, the U.S. should continue to emphasize support for 
Iraqi institutions over individuals as our bilateral 
relationship matures, and must maintain a strong focus on 
keeping Iraq's main groups committed to a peaceful, 
negotiated, process to resolve contentious "national vision" 
issues such as power-sharing, disputed borders, the 
appropriate division of power between the central and 
provincial/regional governments, hydrocarbons, and security. 
End summary and introduction. 
 
-------------------- 
Winter of Discontent 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) First seen as weak, ineffective, and ill-informed 
about the political and security structures put in place 
since Saddam's fall (Maliki was not a participant in the 
governing bodies set up during the CPA), Prime Minister 
Maliki was by the fall of 2008 being widely criticized - by 
leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and other Sunni 
politicians, by the Kurdish political leadership, and by 
fellow Shi'a from outside Maliki's Da'wa Party -- as 
autocratic and excessively ambitious, with the long-term aim 
of becoming a new strong man dictator.  The "political reform 
resolution," passed by parliament in conjunction with its 
approval of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and Strategic 
Framework Agreement on November 27, 2008 (reftel), amounted 
to a manifesto of grievances against the Prime Minister that 
had been growing among his coalition partners, and the 
opposition, throughout the year. 
 
¶7. (U) The document urged the Maliki Government to adhere to 
the Constitution, to commit to a democratic federal system, 
to share power with the legislature, to professionalize and 
depoliticize the security forces, to guarantee a free 
judiciary, disband "unconstitutional structures" within the 
government, and release prisoners eligible for amnesty or 
held without due process, among other demands. 
 
--------------------- 
Maliki's (Small) Circle 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) A common complaint about Maliki is his failure to 
consult with leaders of other power blocs and his excessive 
reliance on a small inner circle for advice.  These habits 
certainly stem from Maliki's background, which includes more 
than two decades as an operative of the Islamic Da'wa Party, 
which conducted clandestine activities, including 
assassination attempts against Saddam and senior regime 
officials, during the 1970s and 80s.  (Saddam's intelligence 
service, for good measure, targeted Da'wa operatives for 
assassination abroad.) 
 
¶9. (C) Maliki first joined Da'wa as a student at Baghdad 
University in the 1960s.  His ties to the group forced him to 
flee Iraq in 1979, and live in exile first in Iran, then in 
Syria, where he represented the party until Saddam's fall in 
Q03.  Today, most of Maliki's inner circle of advisors share 
his Da'wa background.  They include: 
 
-- Tariq Najm Abdullah, Maliki's Chief of Staff, who was 
active in Da'wa's London chapter in the 1990s.  Abdullah's 
cool and taciturn demeanor seems to exemplify critics' 
characterization of the Maliki government.  Critics within 
the GOI have dubbed him the "shadow Prime Minister" and some 
claim he sometimes countermands Maliki's written 
instructions; 
 
-- Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior advisor, also from Da'wa's 
London chapter, is often at Maliki's side.  The PM tasked him 
with leading the Security Agreement negotiations after 
essentially firing the Iraqi MFA negotiating team, which 
Maliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden 
QMaliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden 
to Foreign Minister Zebari - a bitter adversary; 
 
-- Ghati al-Rikabi (aka Abu Mujahed - a first cousin of 
Sadiq), is an advisor and general fixer in Maliki's office; 
 
-- Ali al-Adib, who now heads Da'wa's parliamentary caucus, 
represented the party during exile years in Iran.  He 
sometimes represents Maliki in GOI meetings and in visits to 
the provinces; 
 
-- Sami al-Askeri is a nominally independent MP close to 
Maliki.  The PM appointed him to lead GOI efforts to bring 
Sadrists and Shi'a extremists into mainstream politics; 
 
-- Hassan Sunayd is a Da'wa MP who had been an advisor to PM 
Ja'afari.  A poet, he was jailed and tortured by Saddam.  He 
is perhaps the most liberal and pragmatic member of Maliki's 
circle; 
 
-- Ahmed al-Maliki, the Prime Minister's son and head of his 
private office. He is rumored to have strained relations with 
the Rikabis; 
 
-- Mowafaq al-Rubaiye, now the influential National Security 
Advisor, had been an associate of Ahmed al-Chalabi in 
London's Iraqi National Congress.  Though Maliki apparently 
values Rubaiye's counsel on certain issues, he is widely seen 
as an unscrupulous self-promoter and Maliki himself has 
openly excluded Rubaiye from engagement in some issues -- 
including the Strategic Framework (SFA) and 
Security Agreement (SOFA) negotiations. 
 
¶10. (C) Maliki appears loath to delegate sensitive political 
tasks to persons outside this group, with the net effect of 
hampering the GOI's capacity and stunting its institutional 
development.  The most recent example of this phenomenon we 
have observed has been the difficulty the GOI has had in 
standing up bilateral committees to work with the U.S. in 
implementing the Security Agreement and the SFA. 
 
¶11. (C) Explaining the GOI delays and apparent disarray on 
implementing the agreements, Sadiq al-Rikabi recently 
confided to PMIN that he and his colleagues in Maliki's 
circle were simply tired (and apparently tapped out). 
Discussing an economic project with a senior USG official in 
late December, Maliki complained, "If I don't get personally 
involved, nothing happens." Clearly, Maliki's subordinates 
have not been encouraged or empowered to take decisions on 
their own - symptomatic of sclerotic bureaucracies across the 
region. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
This Paranoid Really Does Have Enemies 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Maliki's reluctance to delegate authority reflects 
both an urge to control and a distrust of those outside his 
circle.  In meetings with Embassy officials, Maliki regularly 
voices concern about plots against him.  The Prime Minister 
seems particularly fixated on the activities of Ba'thist 
former regime elements in Syria and Jordan.  More damagingly, 
the PM's deep suspicion of the Iraqi Army's leadership as 
Sunni Ba'athist and the source of potential coup-plotting has 
only partially been tempered over the course of the past two 
years.  Similarly, Maliki shows a tendency to associate all 
Sunni (and more broadly, Arab) opposition to his policies 
with Ba'athist irredentism.  This manifests itself in his 
strained relationships with Iraqi Sunni political figures 
such as Tawafuq/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi.  It is also 
visible in his (mistaken) dismissal of Iraq's externally 
displaced as Sunnis who have not come to terms with 
post-Saddam democratic Shi'a majoritarian rule.  Maliki's 
sectarian suspicion also shapes his view of the Saudis and 
other Arab neighbors as unaccepting of Shi'a in governance. 
Maliki staunchly denies -- and we agree -- that he is 
motivated by overt sectarian bias.  Rather, we see Maliki's 
worldview as deeply informed by the Shi'a historical 
experience.  Unfortunately, the consequences in terms of his 
willingness and ability to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis and the 
broader Sunni world are effectively the same. 
 
¶13. (C) This said, the Prime Minister correctly sees rivals 
across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, sectarian and political 
leaderships as bent on his ouster.  From the Kurdish 
leadership (including KRG President Barzani, FM Zebari, and 
Deputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI 
QDeputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI 
head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (and Vice President Adel Abd 
al-Mehdi) and Sunni leader Vice President al-Hashimi, there 
has been an unbroken and quite open criticism of Maliki's 
leadership and proclaimed desire to see him ousted through a 
parliamentary vote of no confidence.  (This effort has been 
hampered by fear of the political vacuum that would follow 
Maliki's fall: There is no consensus among those who want to 
bring him down about who/what should follow.  Nevertheless, 
the current impasse over a successor to ousted Parliamentary 
Speaker Mashhadani is seen by some as a split between those 
who favor a no confidence vote in the Prime Minister and 
those who support Maliki.) 
 
-------------------- 
Stove-Piped Security 
-------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Maliki has set up security structures that report 
directly to the Prime Minister's Office, arguing that rather 
than parallel lines of authority he is exercising the 
legitimate authority of Commander in Chief.  Indeed, the 
Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) has been the object 
of particular criticism over the past year as security 
responsibilities have been taken in practice from Iraqi 
security commanders and subordinated to OCINC 
decision-making.  The Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB) and its 
Iraqi Special Operations Force fall entirely outside of 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
chains of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's 
Office.  Designed, trained and equipped by U.S. Special 
Forces under the Multi National Security Transition Command - 
Iraq (MNSTC-I), the CTB was originally conceived to fall 
under MOD authority.  Instead, the Prime Minister's Office 
has assumed direct control of the CTB, and Maliki is reported 
to be personally involved in both the CTB's targeting process 
and its operational direction.  Critics believe his 
motivation was to create a politicized force that could 
protect his regime.  Maliki's defenders argue he was 
compelled to set up the CTB -- and the OCINC -- to get a 
handle on an unwieldy security bureaucracy at a time of 
national crisis, pointing to the need for the PM's direct 
intervention at the head of Iraqi security forces in Basrah, 
Sadr City, Maysan and elsewhere over the course of 2008.  We 
believe both interpretations are correct.  Maliki genuinely 
sees his personal leadership and control as essential to 
advance security and stability but has also directed assets 
under his control to reinforce his political position. 
 
¶15. (C) The CTB maintains not only its own armed operations 
units, but also its own detention facilities (principally the 
ill-reputed facility at Camp Honor - within the International 
Zone) and even has on staff its own judges to customize 
arrest warrants.  Iraqi MOD interlocutors, and Maliki's 
political rivals, have both expressed to Emboffs their alarm 
over the extent of the PM's personal control over the CTB, 
which has already apparently been misused as a political 
rather than security instrument (see para 17, below).  Like a 
number of GOI entities, the CTB is technically 
extra-constitutional, although the Prime Minister is pressing 
Parliament to approve a bill that would legalize its 
activities. 
 
¶16. (C) Another controversial innovation has been the 
establishment of Provincial Operations Centers, which 
consolidate command of all ISF operations within their areas 
of responsibility, a concept which originated with the 2007 
Baghdad Security Plan.  The model has since been replicated 
in Basra, Diyala, Karbala, and Ninewa.  Operations commands 
all report directly to the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander in 
Baghdad, bypassing provincial governors, who often are not 
only cut out of planning and operational direction, but may 
not even be current on what the ISF are doing in their 
provinces.  We know that Maliki often goes directly to Ground 
Forces Commander Ali Gheidan, or to lower-level division 
commanders, or with operations-level commanders such as 
General Abud Qanbar in Baghdad with specific instructions. 
 
------------------------------- 
Diyala Province: Smite Thy Foes 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) The ISF's "Operation Benevolent Diyala," launched in 
August 2008, was quickly decried by the province's Sunni 
political establishment as a sectarian power play directed by 
Maliki.  Given the province has been one of Iraq's most 
unstable since 2004 -- with Al-Qaida menacing the center and 
north of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over 
Qnorth of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over 
from Sadr City in Diyala's southwest flank -- a robust 
security operation was badly needed.  However, of 1200 
individuals detained by the end of 2008, 1150 were Sunnis, 
including many local leaders of the "Sons of Iraq" armed 
neighborhood watches partnered with the Coalition Forces, and 
many local affiliates of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. 
 
¶18. (C) Sunni grievances grew after August 18, 2008, when 
Maliki's CTB raided the provincial government center in 
Ba'qouba and seized two of Diyala's most prominent Sunni 
political leaders, in the process killing (apparently by 
accident) an aide to the governor.  Both the national and 
Diyala provincial leaderships of the Iraqi Islamic Party have 
told us they are convinced Operation Benevolent Diyala was 
partly, if not principally, a partisan political operation. 
The Diyala operation severely strained ties, which were never 
good to begin with, between Maliki and Vice President 
Hashimi, national chair of the IIP.  Any political benefit 
Maliki might have hoped to gain by means of the security 
operation in Diyala appears to have backfired:  The Sunni 
Tawafuq list (IIP and its allies) placed first in Diyala in 
the Jan. 31 provincial elections - winning almost four times 
as many votes as Da'wa. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Kurdish Standoff -- Poxes on Both Houses 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) The PM's centralization of control over security 
forces, exaggerated sense of confidence in his own leadership 
and judgment (a product of the security successes of 
spring/summer 2008), his profound distrust of Kurdish 
motives, and progressive Kurdish moves to expand influence 
south of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) region came 
to a threatening head in September 2008, when Maliki ordered 
Iraqi Army units to deploy in Khanaqin, a Kurdish enclave in 
Diyala.  Technically below the green line separating the KRG 
from "Iraq proper," Khanaqin, with an almost entirely Kurdish 
population, had been uneventfully occupied by the Peshmerga 
since 2003.  A tense standoff between the IA and Peshmerga 
ensued, with Maliki insisting that the Constitution gave him 
authority to deploy the Army anywhere within Iraq's borders 
and the Kurds arguing that he was being unnecessarily 
provocative in a peaceful (and disputed) corner of the 
province. Maliki's orders to reinforce the IA's positions 
with a tank company suggested to some that he was spoiling 
for a fight with the Kurds.  Had the two sides come to blows, 
it could have spread along the green line to Kirkuk and Mosul 
and would have likely posed a grave threat to Iraq's 
viability as a unified state.  While the crisis was defused 
following U.S. intervention and brokering by VP Abd al-Mehdi, 
the fundamental dispute that prompted it remains unresolved. 
Most importantly, the Khanaqin incident fed each party's 
distrust of the other.  KRG President Barzani is especially 
distrustful of Maliki's intentions. 
 
------------ 
Overreaching 
------------ 
 
¶20. (C) Maliki's willingness to confront the battle-tested 
Peshmerga suggested that he had no doubt whatsoever about the 
Iraqi Army's fighting capacity.  Maliki famously declared, in 
the summer of 2007, that his forces were ready to secure the 
country and that coalition forces could leave any time they 
wanted.  Maliki's inflated assessment of his forces' 
capabilities was obvious in March 2008, when he ordered the 
Iraqi Army to move into Basra and eject the Sadrist militias 
and street gangs who had tacit control of the city and its 
strategic ports.  While the operation ultimately succeeded, 
and indeed began the process of establishing GOI authority 
over areas formally dominated by Sadrist militias and the 
Iranian-backed Special Groups, its first week was marked by 
logistical chaos and serious setbacks on the battlefield. 
The tide only turned when Coalition Forces, whom Maliki had 
characteristically not consulted in advance, launched a major 
resupply and support effort. 
 
--------------------------- 
If You Can't Defeat, Co-opt 
--------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Despite Maliki's demonstrated willingness to use 
force to advance his political position and strengthen 
central authority, as in Diyala or Basra, he has also worked 
intensively to develop and expand patronage networks.  One of 
the principal vehicles in this effort has been tribal support 
councils (TSCs). Originally designed to consolidate tribal 
support for security operations in Basra and Maysan 
provinces, their mandate subsequently expanded to include IDP 
returns, sectarian reconciliation, and economic development. 
Feeding critics' suspicions that the TSCs were set up to 
strengthen Baghdad's reach into the provinces, distribute 
patronage, and develop loyalty to Maliki, the Prime 
Minister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up 
QMinister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up 
TSC's across the south and eventually most of Iraq (ref B), 
without apparent regard to the actual needs of different 
localities. 
 
¶22. (C) The merits of the TSC model are open for debate: 
Maliki's supporters argue that TSCs are efficient mechanisms 
for dispensing resources from the center to the periphery and 
for empowering tribes as elements of stability and natural 
partners for rural development.  Regardless, the TSCs have 
been perceived by ISCI, Maliki's principal Shi'a coalition 
partner, as a direct bid to undermine the provincial 
governments it controlled and seize the loyalties of its core 
constituents.  Certainly, Maliki's TSCs have further 
alienated ISCI from the Prime Minister. (In the fall, KRG 
President Barzani also lashed out at Maliki over nascent TSCs 
in Kirkuk and Mosul, viewing them as an open challenge to 
Kurdish interests in disputed territories.) 
 
-----------------------------  
But In The Success Column ... 
----------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Despite the considerable controversy Maliki's 
approach has generated, there is no doubt that Iraq's overall 
security situation has improved dramatically on his watch. 
He overcame formidable domestic opposition, and intense 
pressure from Iran, to shepherd the Security Agreement and 
SFA through parliament.  Even most of his sharpest critics 
concede he showed courage in confronting the Shi'a extremist 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in the spring of 2008.  There is 
consensus that Muqtada al-Sadr and the JAM have had their 
wings clipped, and while not wiped off Iraq's political map, 
they no longer pose anywhere near the threat they did 
2004-07. 
 
¶24. (C) Indeed, Maliki and Da'wa have been working 
diligently, and with apparent success, to court the 
disarrayed Sadrists and bring them closer to the political 
mainstream (and even groom them as potential coalition 
partners).  Maliki's gambit to crush the JAM earned him the 
grudging appreciation of many Sunnis and moderate Shi'a who 
had previously seen him as a JAM enabler.  Maliki is 
particularly popular in Basra, which had been terrorized by 
Sadrist militias and criminal spinoffs prior to the March 
2008 operation against them.  Maliki's "State of Law" 
electoral list achieved first place showings in Baghdad and 
eight of Iraq's nine southern provinces (voters punished the 
Da'wa incumbent in Karbala, however). 
 
¶25. (C) Maliki has also exceeded expectations to date in his 
handling of the integration of the mainly Sunni Sons of 
Iraq/Awakening Movement into the Iraqi Security Forces.  Many 
had feared that he would not honor the SOI salary system set 
up by coalition forces and would instead arrest and purge SOI 
leaders.  While the transition in Baghdad province went 
smoothly, signs have been less encouraging in Diyala, and the 
GOI's commitment to find work for the 80 percent of SOI not 
absorbed into the ISF remains mainly hypothetical.  On the 
whole, Maliki has thus far honored his commitment to take on 
and continue the SOI program. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Conclusion: U.S. Interest in a Strengthened Center, But ... 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶26. (C) The critical progress on security and stability made 
over the past year, while underpinned by the U.S. military 
surge, owes much to Maliki's leadership and restoration of 
central government authority.  It is in the interests of the 
U.S. to see that process of strengthened central authority 
continue, but in a manner that is sustainable, based on 
institutions rather than personalities, and reflecting a 
consensus national vision among Iraq's main ethnic/sectarian 
groups.  In this regard, the PM's deep distrust of virtually 
all other actors on the Iraqi (and regional) scene undercuts 
his -- and our -- efforts to reinforce the still-fragile 
institutional gains of the past two years.  We have pressed 
the PM and other political leaders to deal seriously with the 
range of grievances that separate them and to move forward on 
the various reform agendas articulated in the August 2007 
leaders' declaration.  However, Maliki sought to parry the 
opposition's various grievances with the establishment of 
five multi-party committees to resolve longstanding impasses 
on security and defense, hydrocarbons, power sharing, budget, 
and disputed territories.  While the other parties delegated 
different representatives to the committees, Maliki 
characteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and 
Qcharacteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and 
his overworked Da'wa inner circle on all five.  To date, the 
committees have met only infrequently and have made little 
visible progress. 
 
¶27. (C) Maliki's position may not be indefinitely 
sustainable.  Tellingly, Maliki's parliamentary critics 
continue to emphasize the CoR "political reform document" 
rather than the five committees, as their preferred vehicle 
for change.  Maliki's government remains dysfunctional on 
many levels.  He has a strained relationship with Foreign 
Minister Zebari (who openly refers to KRG President Barzani 
as his boss) and is known to dislike and distrust Interior 
Minister Bolani (who has started his own political party). 
He rarely convenes the Executive Council (composed of the 
President, the two Vice Presidents, the KRG President, and 
the Prime Minister).  His defenders argue the role of Iraq's 
President and Vice Presidents  is more protocol than 
executive.  With the Kurds, the mainstream Sunnis, and even 
non-Da'wa Shi'a coalition partners largely alienated, it may 
be a matter of time before dislike of Maliki and the growing 
threat to their particular interests finally unites the PM's 
foes and overcomes their fundamental disagreement about who 
and what would replace Maliki after a successful 
no-confidence vote. 
 
¶28. (C) The results of the January 31 provincial elections, 
however, with strong showings by Maliki's State of Law/Da'wa 
list in nine of 14 participating provinces has clearly given 
the Prime Minister momentum, allowing him to claim a tangible 
base of public support, at least in Baghdad and Iraq's south. 
 While this success has likely taken some wind from the sails 
of proponents of a no-confidence vote, Maliki's adversaries 
might also calculate that they must act before the national 
elections, expected at the end of 2009, to forestall an 
irreversible consolidation of power. 
 
¶29. (C) Faced with this situation, we should continue to 
emphasize our support for institutions rather than 
individuals, and for processes rather than personalities, 
even as we are mindful that Iraqi politics will remain 
personalized and divided for the foreseeable future.  In this 
regard, the U.S. is not without assets in attempting to shape 
Maliki's actions.  The process of negotiating the SFA/SA with 
the PM and his team demonstrated the importance Maliki 
attaches to building a strong relationship with the U.S. and 
his ability to deliver on key issues.  His advisors have 
shared with us anxiety over the position the new 
Administration will take toward the PM and have sought 
reassurance that the ties forged last year will continue.  We 
should press the PM on institution and political consensus 
building as key to sustaining and advancing our relationship 
-- and support. 
 
CROCKER