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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD317, VISAS FOR IRAQIS - A STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD317 2009-02-07 05:15 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0317 0380515
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070515Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1598
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC//INTD/CTD/CT WATCH//
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000317 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CMGT PREL
SUBJECT:  VISAS FOR IRAQIS - A STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY 
 
TO DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW AND UNDERSECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT FROM 
AMBASSADOR CROCKER 
 
REF: 08 BAGHDAD 3537 
 
1. (U) As we proceed to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement, 
the United States faces a significant obstacle to achieving its 
objective of an Iraq that is a stable ally with effective 
institutions accountable to its people. That obstacle is the 120 to 
150-day wait time required of most Iraqi visa applicants. 
 
2. (U) The SFA's Joint Coordinating Committees are off and running. 
For example, this week, seven Presidents of Iraqi universities 
arrived in Washington for meetings with U.S. counterparts to create 
educational partnerships. In January, representatives of 25 American 
universities came to Iraq to recruit students.  This fall, the first 
several hundred of an eventual 6-7,000 Iraqis per year will come to 
U.S. universities on government scholarships.  In addition, the 
Government of Iraqi has budgeted 2.5 million dollars to match USG 
funding for Iraqi student Fulbright scholarships. 
 
3. (U) These exchanges go to the heart of what America seeks to 
achieve in Iraq:  long-term institutional linkages that anchor Iraq 
firmly in the West and establish the basis for an enduring 
partnership. We are poised for failure, however, because we cannot 
bring Iraqis - and especially students and exchange visitors - to 
the United States in a timely way. 
 
4. (U) Current regulations require that 90-95% of all Iraqi visa 
applications be submitted for a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO). 
This includes all student visa applicants. While the Visa Office has 
made efforts to clear F-student applicants in under two months, many 
F applicants take considerably longer. Government scholarship 
students applying for J-visas also face waits of 4-5 months or more. 
Fulbright student candidates, our highest priority, routinely have 
to wait 5 months or more for clearances. There is no way that any 
student in the world can receive college admissions and all the 
requisite paperwork four months or more in advance of the date of 
travel. SAO wait times also heavily impact Cultural Exchange 
programs. USG sponsored J-applicants must wait 3-5 months for SAO 
clearance. Given the challenges of the Iraq environment, it is 
nearly impossible to budget for, recruit and interview candidates 
and still allow enough time for SAO clearance before program start 
dates. 
 
7. (U) We have the opportunity to bring thousands of young Iraqis 
every year for university degrees in the United States, and in doing 
so, build the long term partnership we have never had with Iraq.  We 
risk losing that opportunity due to our visa regulations.  Iraq is a 
strategic partner, yet we impose visa restrictions on them that we 
do not on adversaries such as Iran, North Korea and Syria.  F-1 visa 
applicants from these states do not require a mandatory SAO, and the 
triggers are narrower. 
 
8.  (U) It is in our national interest that we remove F-1 visa 
applicants from the mandatory SAO triggers and prioritize all Iraqi 
F-1 student and J-1 exchange visitor visa applicants. The SAO 
triggers for Baath Party membership, GoI employment and military 
service also need to be rationalized to discretely target true 
security threats, as opposed to being so broad they envelop 95% of 
applicants. 
 
9. (U) As I leave Iraq, these measures would put our bilateral 
relationship on a surer footing for the future and help secure 
Iraq's longer-term stability. 
 
CROCKER