VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0240/01 0550529
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240529Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3270
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 5433
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1465
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0983
RHMFISS/COMSIXTHFLT  IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 
TAGS: MARR PREL PARM TU GR
SUBJECT: MFA PRESSES U.S. TO WITHDRAW FROM NAVAL EXERCISE 
 
REF: A) ANKARA 278 B) GOODMAN-SPECKHARD E-MAIL 
     2/21/2009 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAN SPECKHARD.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  On February 23, MFA Secretary 
General Agathocles summoned Ambassador Speckhard to tell him 
that, in the GOG's view, the U.S. should not to participate 
in the upcoming naval exercise "Egemen."  Non-participation 
would send an important signal to Turkey that it needed to 
work with Greece to work through Aegean issues.  The two 
countries needed to get back to resolving their differences 
through negotiations which had become dormant following the 
failure of the Annan plan in 2004.  Ambassador Speckhard 
underscored that it was normal for the U.S. to participate in 
multilateral exercises and the Greeks should not see this as 
an effort to take sides in Aegean disputes.  The U.S. 
respected Greece's sovereign territory and would do so in any 
exercise we were involved in.  The Ambassador urged the GOG 
to raise its concerns directly with the exercise co-planners, 
Turkey and the UK.  Ambassador Speckhard urged Agathocles not 
to define "success" as U.S. non-participation; rather, 
success should be defined as insuring that Greece's 
legitimate concerns were addressed.  Agathocles agreed. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Agathocles' swift acceptance of our definition of 
success suggests that, by getting the details right, they 
would have no objection to the exercise going ahead.  We 
continue to believe that, on SAR, it would be a mistake to 
exercise a procedure that would undermine the principle of 
coordination that is important in real cases.  While we 
understand the exegencies of military planning, we should 
ensure that the details are in place and in line with our 
principles -- even if it were to delay the exercise until all 
the fine points are worked out.  We agree with Ankara that 
cancellation would only heighten tensions in the Aegean.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
GREECE URGES U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM EGEMEN . . . 
 
3..  (C)  Agathocles avoided technical details ("which you 
know very well"), focusing instead on the exercise's 
political impact.  He argued that Turkey was taking the 
opportunity to get the U.S. and others involved in a dispute 
over sovereighty in the Aegean.  There had been little 
progress on these issues, and this exercise would only make 
it harder in future.  As it was not a NATO exercise, he urged 
the U.S., UK, and Dutch not to participate.  Their withdrawal 
would send a signal to Turkey that it needed to discuss 
Aegean issues with the GOG.  He bemoaned the fact that the 
progress made in the past was all but halted following the 
failed Annan effort in Cyprus in 2004.  Agathocles noted that 
he had also called the UK and Dutch ambassadors and would see 
them later in the day. 
 
. . . BUT AGREES THAT THE GOAL IS GETTING THE KEY ISSUES RIGHT 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ambassador Speckhard relayed ref b points, stressing 
respect for Greece's sovereign territory and that Greece's 
concerns were most appropriately raised with the exercise's 
co-planners, Turkey and the UK.  He urged Agathocles not to 
create a scenario where anything short of cancellation or 
withdrawal was perceived as a GOG failure.  It would be more 
productive to work with the exercise planners to ensure that 
Greece's two key concerns with the exercise -- sovereignty 
and SAR issues -- were addressed.  That might mean delaying 
the start of the exercise until the details were right. 
Cancelling altogether could simply heighten tensions, and 
have a destabilizing effect in the Aegean. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Agathocles took the point, stressing the importance 
of not violating Greek sovereignty or moving forward with the 
SAR portion of the exercise without coordination with Greece 
given its FIR responsibility.  He reiterated the need to 
"send  a signal" to Turkey that Greece was prepared to 
negotiate in a serious way.  If things went on as they were, 
it would be difficult for Greece to take a positive approach 
to EU decisions on Turkey's accession at the end of the year. 
 On the SAR portion of the exercise, Agathocles questioned 
whether a U.S. helicopter was involved, which would be a 
problem.  Ambassador Speckhard agreed to check, but thought 
no U.S. air assets were involved.  Agathocles seemed resigned 
to Turkish violations of the disputed 6-10 nm Greek 
defination of their airspace, but would be more upset if 
other allies took the opportunity of this exercise to 
reinforce differences on this point. 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador Speckhard again urged Agathocles not to 
have "non-participation" by the U.S. be the goal.  The goal 
should be to get the details of the exercise right. 
Agathocles agreed, and belived he could convince Bakoyiannis 
that they would have achieved "success" if the exercise 
respected Greece's territorial integrity and coordinated 
appropriately on SAR/FIR issues. 
 
MCCARTHY