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C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAN SPECKHARD.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Greek FM Dora Bakoyiannis will use her 
visit to Washington to define, publicly and privately, 
Greece's relations with the Obama administration.  A 
charismatic yet practical politician, Bakoyiannis relishes 
her job as Foreign Minister, and will offer to work with us 
on a broad range of multilateral issues.  As OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office, she has moved swiftly out of the gate, 
pressing creative proposals to maintain an OSCE presence in 
Georgia and achieving a technical rollover of OSCE's Georgia 
Military Monitors that keeps them on the ground through June. 
 She will offer to use her contacts with leaders in the 
Middle East to assist our efforts in the region.  And she 
will cite Greece's ratification this week of NATO accession 
protocols for Croatia and Albania as a sign of their 
commitment to the Alliance and its expansion.  She will also 
use the opportunity to press for swift action on their most 
wanted deliverable:  inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program. 
We also see this as an opportunity to reinvigorate and 
reorient our bilateral relationship.  That means urging 
additional Greek contributions to NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, encouraging energy diversity, and urging Greece 
to resolve its disagreements with Turkey quietly and 
bilaterally.  Finally, we should urge the GOG to continue to 
work within the UN process to resolve its dispute with the 
Republic of Macedonia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NEW ADMINISTRATION, NEW MOMENTUM 
 
¶2.  (C)  PM Karamanlis' recent cabinet reshuffle left Dora 
Bakoyiannis at the helm of the MFA, a job she has held for 
nearly three years.  The daughter of former PM Mitsotakis, 
she is his strongest potential rival for the New Democracy 
party's leadership (she consistently polls as Greece's most 
popular politician), yet (despite near-endless press 
speculation) she and Karamanlis have worked together 
cooperatively.  They need to.  Karamanlis' government was 
re-elected with two-seat Parliamentary majority in September 
2007 that has since shrunk to a one-seat majority.  The 
government has taken additional body blows since then: 
alleged involvement in various scandals, sinking economic 
growth, and criticism over its handling of December's police 
shooting of an Athens teenager and the extensive rioting that 
followed.  The rioting has been followed by a resurgence of 
domestic terrorism, which Dora takes personally; her first 
husband was killed by the terrorist group November 17. 
 
¶3.  (C)  New Democracy has fallen 3-4 points behind its main 
opposition, socialist PASOK, in opinion polls (though PM 
Karamanlis personally outpolls opposition PM-in-waiting 
George Papandreou by about the same margin).  Looking for 
electoral advantage, Bakoyiannis will spin her visit to 
Washington as signaling a new era of cooperation, both on 
bilateral and multilateral issues.  Greeks have 
overwhelmingly welcomed the Obama administration; Bakoyiannis 
will be looking for "takeaways" that demonstrate our ability 
to work with the Karamanlis government.  However, that  will 
require some hard work from Greece as well. 
 
VISA WAIVER:  GREECE'S BILATERAL GOAL 
 
¶4.  (C)  For Greece, inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program 
tops, by far, every other issue in our bilateral 
relationship. Yet their own footdragging means they have 
missed the boat not once, but twice; they are the only member 
of the original EU 15 not to participate.  Two out of three 
key pieces (the HSPD-6 Agreement and VWP MOU) are either in 
place or nearly complete.  The third, the agreement on 
Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) was under 
review in the Ministries of Justice and Interior since 
October.  We finally received Greek comments on February 20. 
The Secretary can assure Dora that we will examine it 
rapidly, and intend to work together to meet DHS requirements 
as rapidly as possible. 
 
 
PROMOTING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION:  IN NATO AND AFGHANISTAN 
. . . 
 
¶5.  (C)  Greece has contributed 638 troops to NATO operations 
in Kosovo, 140 to NATO operations in Afghanistan. 50 to 
NATO's counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean and 
45 to the EU's military mission in Bosnia.  Greece also 
contributes directly to U.S. military operations in the 
Middle East and Mediterranean through the U.S. base at Souda 
Bay, Crete.  But we are pressing our most NATO-skeptic ally 
for more, particularly in Afghanistan -- including additional 
trainers, heavy lift helicopters, and funds to sustain an 
enhanced Afghan National Army.  We have also asked them to 
lift a self-imposed caveat restricting Greek forces to the 
Kabul region, and have informal indications that may be in 
the works.  On February 17, the Greek Parliament ratified 
Albania and Croatia's accession protocols; the Secretary will 
want to congratulate Bakoyiannis on this important step. 
 
. . . IN OSCE . . . 
 
¶6.  (C)  Greece took on the chairmanship of the OSCE in 
January, and has moved quickly and effectively out of the 
gate. FM Bakoyiannis has already travelled to Vienna, 
Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Georgia, and Russia in her capacity 
as OSCE  Chairman-in-Office.  Under her direction, Greek 
diplomats have crafted proposals (still under review) to 
maintain a long-term OSCE presence in Georgia, and have 
achieved a technical rollover of the OSCE Military Monitors 
in Georgia through June 30, 2009.  The Secretary can commend 
Bakoyiannis' commitment to the OSCE, her work so far, and 
suggest we cooperate closely throughout the year.  The 
Secretary may also want to highlight our interest in the 
OSCE's human rights work, including with Roma communities and 
against human trafficking.  Bakoyiannis is keenly interested 
in hearing the U.S. take on Russian suggestions related to 
European security. 
 
. . . IN THE AEGEAN . . . 
 
¶7.  (C)  Greece sees an uptick in "provocations" by Turkey in 
the Aegean, including overflights.  Bakoyiannis will 
underscore the Karamanlis government's commitment to good 
relations with Turkey (Karamanlis' visit to Ankara last year 
is the first in fifty years), but will express concern that 
the Turkish "deep state" has impeded PM Erdogan's ability to 
deliver on better Turkish-Greek relations.  Bakoyiannis will 
likely to seek the Secretary's help with Turkey in reducing 
these "provocations."  We have encouraged the GOG to respond 
in a low-key manner and with restraint to any perceived 
"provocations" and to raise concerns directly with Turkish 
counterparts. 
 
. . . . IN THE BALKANS . . . 
 
¶8.  (C)  Greece sees the Balkans as its backyard, and is a 
major investor in the region.  That is one reason why Greece 
has put forward the candidacy of their Ambassador to the 
United States, Ambassador Mallias, for EUSR (also High 
Representive) in Bosnia.  We have told them that we prefer 
the UK candidate (Sir Emyr Jones Parry).  Nevertheless, we 
expect Bakoyiannis may make at least a pro forma pitch for 
him.  Greece has not yet recognized Kosovo but during her 
February visit to Kosovo, Bakoyiannis publicly emphasized 
that she had come as a "neighbor, and friend," as well as 
OSCE CIO.  Greece is also contributing personnel to the 
International Civilian Office and its strongest NATO troop 
contribution is to KFOR.  Greece also continues to take a 
constructive role in promoting a European orientation for 
Serbia. 
 
¶9.  (C)  A key issue, for both Greece and for us, is 
Macedonia.  Greece continues to believe that our recognition 
of the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name in 
2004 was a betrayal of our bilateral relationship.  The 
Karamanlis government feels it took a major step forward when 
it agreed that a composite name could include the word 
Macedonia -- and are aggrieved by the Gruevski government's 
actions (such as a recent renaming of a planned highway built 
with EU, including Greek, funds after Alexander the Great). 
Greece's refusal to approve Macedonia's NATO invitation in 
2008 despite the provisions of the Greek/Macedonia Interim 
Accord was a major source of disagreement.  UN led 
negotiations continue.  Bakoyiannis will likely urge us to 
press the GoM for flexibility. 
 
. . . IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . . 
 
¶10.  (C)  Bakoyiannis is interested in Middle East issues, 
and has developed contacts with a number of leaders in the 
region.  She may offer her good offices to assist in 
promoting dialogue there.  Greece has an Embassy in Iran, and 
Bakoyiannis may also offer to facilitate dialogue there.  She 
has been a strong promoter of dialogue among women leaders, 
and will likely invite the Secretary to participate in a 
conference to be held in Athens in April on Women Against 
Terrorism (held uner the auspices of the Women Leaders' 
Working Group). 
 
. . . ON CYPRUS . . . 
 
¶11.  (C)  Bakoyiannis recently discussed Cyprus with Codel 
Durbin, and will support efforts by the leaders of both 
communities to find a settlement.  She shares the Karamanlis 
government's commitment to EU entry for Turkey, and knows 
that a resolution of the Cyprus issue is essential for 
Turkey's candidacy to move forward.  Yet Greek support for 
Cyprus' own position in EU fora is expected, both in Athens 
and in Nicosia.  In addition, Bakoyiannis will reiterate that 
Turkey must meet all EU criteria, and cannot choose among 
them "a la carte." 
 
. . . ON ENERGY DIVERSITY . . . 
 
¶12.  (C)  We should encourage Greece to promote energy 
diversity, including within the EU.  Currently, Gazprom 
suplies approximately 90 percent of Greece's pipeline-sourced 
natural gas supplies.  Alternatives include the 
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline that will receive Caspian 
gas, as well as increased reliance on LGN and 
interconnections between European energy infrastructure. 
 
 
. . . AND THE ECONOMY 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  The global economic crisis is beginning to have 
an impact on Greece's real economy.  Growth slowed to 3.0 
percent in 2008, and the government projects it will slow 
even further in 2009 to 1.1 percent.  While it is only one of 
a handful of Eurozone countries projected to have any growth 
in 2009, the slowdown is exposing some weaknesses in the 
Greek economy; large current account (14.5 percent of GDP in 
2008) and fiscal deficits (3.7 percent of GDP in 2008) and a 
high level of public debt (94.6 percent of GDP in 2008) 
constrain the GOG's flexibility to develop expenditure 
programs that can mitigate the slowdwn. 
 
 
 
SPECKHARD