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Viewing cable 09ANKARA273, TURKEY: 9TH ANNUAL TIP REPORT: TIP SITUATION,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA273 2009-02-20 14:45 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO8068
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAK #0273/01 0511445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201445Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8838
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000273 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR: G/TIP, G, INL, DRL, PRM, EUR/SE, EUR/PGI; DEPT 
FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KTIP KCRM PHUM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB
TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 9TH ANNUAL TIP REPORT: TIP SITUATION, 
SETTING THE SCENE, PREVENTION 
 
REF: A. 08 SECSTATE 132759 
     B. ANKARA 98 
     C. 08 ANKARA 2194 
     D. 08 ANKARA 1709 
     E. 08 ANKARA 610 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
2.  (U) Post's responses are keyed to ref A questions.  This 
is part 1 of 3 (septels).  Embassy point of contact is 
Anthony Renzulli, telephone 90-312-457-7178, fax 
90-312-468-4775.  Renzulli (FS-03) spent approximately 90 
hours in preparation of this report.  Deputy Political 
Counselor Chris Krafft (FS-02), Political Counselor Daniel 
O'Grady (FS-01), and DCM Douglas Silliman (FE-OC) each spent 
approximately two hours reviewing this report. 
 
TURKEY'S TIP SITUATION 
---------------------- 
 
A.  (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Turkish 
National Police (TNP), Jandarma, Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 
Ministry of Labor (MOL), IOM, and the two organizations 
operating the Istanbul and Ankara TIP shelters -- Human 
Resources Development Foundation (HRDF) and Foundation for 
Women's Solidarity (FWS), respectively -- are our primary 
sources of TIP information; these sources and their data are 
reliable.  We also maintain close contacts with researchers, 
academics and other experts following this issue.  Turkey's 
interagency taskforce on TIP has made significant strides in 
improving the documentation of trafficking.  Last year the 
GOT issued a second comprehensive annual report on combating 
TIP in Turkey.  The GOT in 2008 improved considerably the 
quality of its data collection and reporting on the 
investigation, prosecution and conviction of traffickers, 
including security officials. 
 
B.  (SBU) Turkey is a destination country for women 
trafficked internationally for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation and, to a lesser degree, forced labor.  Nearly 
all victims are trafficked from the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe.  The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) reported 118 victims rescued in 2008.  The source 
countries were:  Uzbekistan (30), Turkmenistan (25), Moldova 
(22), Kyrgyzstan (7), Georgia (7), Russia (7), Azerbaijan 
(6), Ukraine (5), Romania (3), Bulgaria (2), Kazakhstan (1), 
Belarus (1), Indonesia (1), Morocco (1).  Men are much more 
rarely trafficked to Turkey; there were no such incidents 
reported last year.  Of the 78 victims whose repatriation IOM 
assisted in 2008, four were under the age of 18.  Of this 
IOM-assisted group, 70 were trafficked for purposes sexual 
exploitation, two for labor exploitation, four for both, and 
two were cases of attempted exploitation.   The principal 
Turkish destinations for trafficked victims are Istanbul, 
Antalya, Izmir, Tekirdag (Thrace), and Trabzon.  There is a 
continued trend toward victims being trafficked to Turkey 
from Central Asian states, namely Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.  The number of reported victims from Russia 
decreased over the reporting period, but sources report that 
the number of women victimized for sexual exploitation or 
otherwise engaged in the commercial sex industry from Russia 
remains substantial (see ref B). 
 
No Turkish territory is outside the government's control. 
The reported incidence of internal trafficking is rare 
compared to international trafficking.  Social conditions in 
parts of rural Turkey -- poverty, illiteracy, domestic 
violence, and internal migration to urban areas -- are 
similar to those faced in source countries, suggesting that 
internal trafficking could still emerge as a problem in 
Turkey.  Nevertheless, the demand for trafficked victims -- 
for both sexual and labor exploitation -- is overwhelmingly 
for foreign victims, according to local experts. 
 
C.  (SBU) According to local experts, trafficking victims are 
generally trafficked into illegal brothels or are "leased" by 
clients and kept in private residences or hotels for a period 
of time.  The number of victims trafficked into Turkey's 
legal brothels is believed to be very small.  As in other 
countries, it is reported that traffickers have increasingly 
utilized less physically coercive means to exploit victims, 
i.e., paying small salaries or permitting victims to return 
home in exchange for new recruits (see TIP Situation, para E, 
 
ANKARA 00000273  002 OF 005 
 
 
below).  Turkish newspapers, however, reported physical abuse 
committed by traffickers against victims during the reporting 
period. 
 
D.  (U) Most victims are remedially-educated women aged 
18-30.  Most are believed to travel to Turkey voluntarily 
seeking employment in prostitution; a smaller percentage of 
victims are believed to arrive in Turkey for purposes of 
legal employment, tourism or marriage.  Some victims arrive 
in Turkey with the knowledge they will work legally or 
illegally as domestic servants; some of these victims are 
ultimately exploited for purposes of sexual exploitation. 
About forty percent of IOM-assisted victims during the rating 
period were mothers. 
 
E.  (SBU) The large majority of traffickers are Turkish (85 
percent of the apprehensions of suspected traffickers in 
2008, according to MFA data), though many recruiters are from 
source countries.  Women are instrumental in recruiting 
victims; boyfriends and phony employment agencies also play a 
role.  Force, passport capture/counterfeiting, and debt 
bondage for travel costs are trafficker methods TNP has 
identified.  TIP is primarily carried out by small networks 
of traffickers in Turkey and the source countries.  Turkish 
law enforcement authorities believe TIP is closely associated 
with organized and other transnational crime; law enforcement 
agencies represented at post (DEA and FBI) agree with that 
assessment but have not identified a particularly strong link 
between TIP and, for example, narco-trafficking in Turkey. 
Turkey has a liberal visa regime, making it relatively easy 
to traffic victims to Turkey or for at-risk women to enter 
Turkey.  In an effort to boost commercial ties in the region, 
Turkey unilaterally exempts Turkmen, and Uzbek nationals from 
visa requirements for visits to Turkey of thirty days or 
less.  Turkey waives, mutually, tourist visa requirements 
with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
Nationals from other source countries, like Russia and 
Ukraine, can obtain visas easily upon arrival at a Turkish 
port of entry. 
 
SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-TIP EFFORTS 
----------------------------- 
 
A.  (SBU) The GOT takes TIP seriously and has taken 
significant measures during the rating period to prevent 
trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute traffickers. 
 
B.  (SBU) MFA, Ministry of Interior (MOI -- includes TNP and 
Jandarma), and MOJ are the principal government agencies 
involved in anti-trafficking efforts.  The Ministry of Health 
(MOH) provides free health care to victims, and the Ankara 
municipal government furnishes space for the Ankara TIP 
shelter free of charge.  The interagency taskforce met every 
other month during the rating period (up from quarterly in 
previous years) and is led by Ambassador Kemal Gur, MFA 
Director General for Consular Affairs.  Numerous agencies, 
municipalities, IOM, the shelter administrators, and the 
European Commission (EC) participate in taskforce meetings 
(see Prevention, para C, below).  Our EC contacts tell us the 
GOT's interagency and NGO cooperation on TIP is at a high 
level, exceeding Turkish performance in other EU accession 
areas pertaining to justice and rule of law. 
 
C.  (SBU) Turkey is a developing country with a median GDP 
comparable to many source countries, situated at the 
crossroads of major East-West and North-South migration 
flows.  In 2008, over 25 million tourists visited Turkey, a 
13 percent increase over 2007.  At the same time, Turkey 
continues to face a serious cross-border (PKK) terrorism 
problem originating from northern Iraq, which resulted in the 
death of nearly 200 Turkish civilians and security officials 
in 2008.  The fight against terrorism commands a huge share 
of Turkey's law enforcement and prosecutorial resources. 
Despite these challenges, Turkey has mustered impressive 
organizational and financial resources to combat TIP -- far 
in excess, it argues, of neighboring source countries. 
 
One particular challenge the GOT faces in maintaining TIP 
statistics is the peculiar division of responsibility between 
TNP and Jandarma.  In Turkey, municipal law enforcement and 
ports of entry are TNP's responsibility, while rural areas, 
including most borders, are policed by the Jandarma.  Both 
agencies report to the Minister of Interior, but the TNP 
 
ANKARA 00000273  003 OF 005 
 
 
Foreigners Department retains the sole responsibility for 
victim identification.  Also, judicial data collection can be 
a problem, since statistics on prosecutions, convictions and 
sentencing must be collected from local courts in 81 
provinces.  As a general rule, judicial proceedings in Turkey 
are painfully slow.  Another challenge the GOT faces is how 
to efficiently and effectively utilize the significant 
foreign assistance it receives as an EU candidate state from 
European donors.  The GOT must ensure long-term resource gaps 
do not emerge as it implements short-term European-funded 
anti-TIP projects. 
 
Overall, corruption is not a problem in the fight against 
TIP.  However, the current economic crisis has hit Turkey 
particularly hard; the fiscal restraint Turkey is forced to 
impose in order to maintain economic stability is not 
conducive to expanding resources to combat TIP or to address 
other social and law enforcement problems.  Already the 
Istanbul governor informed the Istanbul municipality that it 
is no longer authorized to cover rental expenses for the NGO 
operating the Istanbul shelter, despite a protocol between 
the NGO operating the shelter (HRDF) and the city.  (The 
shelter continues to operate, with the rent funded directly 
by HRDF.)  Despite this atmosphere of fiscal restraint, the 
overall expense of, for example, ensuring adequate shelter 
for TIP victims is relatively small, estimated at about 
$400,000 per annum.  We believe the GOT has the resources to 
carry out this important task, but has been bureaucratically 
hamstrung (see ref C and Protection and Assistance to 
Victims, para B, septel). 
 
D.  (U) As noted above, in 2008 the GOT published a domestic, 
interagency, 2007 TIP report.  Both publicly and privately, 
including through active regional engagement, the GOT 
frequently and candidly shares with us and other countries 
and international organizations its assessment of domestic 
anti-trafficking efforts. 
 
PREVENTION 
---------- 
 
A.  (U) The government conducted an anti-trafficking 
information campaign during the reporting period (ref D). 
The nationwide campaign sought to increase awareness of the 
worldwide TIP scourge, including the labor exploitation 
component, and Turkey's efforts to combat it.  The campaign 
is ongoing and includes posters at airports and other 
transport hubs as well as television spots provided at no 
cost by private and state-run channels.  The campaign targets 
victims and potential victims by advertising prominently the 
"157" helpline.  It only targets indirectly the demand for 
trafficking. 
 
B.  (SBU) The TNP monitors legal and illegal air, sea and 
land-based migration patterns for evidence of trafficking. 
Jandarma officers stationed along Turkey's borders are 
trained to detect TIP.  Law enforcement has specialized, 
anti-TIP trained-teams operating at all border crossings. 
GOT officials do not have the authority to refuse visa 
applicants or turn away travelers crossing the border from 
known source countries simply because they are at risk of 
becoming victimized when they arrive in Turkey, i.e., are 
young, single women.  As noted in Turkey's TIP Situation, 
para E, above, Turkey has a liberal visa regime. 
 
C.  (SBU) As noted, there is an interagency GOT taskforce led 
by MFA Director General for Consular Affairs Ambassador Kemal 
Gur.  Gur expanded the taskforce in 2008 and directed that it 
meet every other month.  (It met quarterly during the 
previous reporting period.  The taskforce includes the 
following agencies, IGO and NGOs: 
 
1. MFA -- Chair of the National Taskforce 
2. MOJ - EU Directorate 
3. MOJ - Legislative Directorate 
4. MOJ - Penal Affairs Directorate 
5. MOJ - Criminal Registration and Statistics Directorate 
6. MOJ - Training Department 
7. MOJ - International Law and Foreign Relations Directorate 
8. Court of Cassation Presidency (Supreme Court) 
9. The Court of Appeals Presidency 
10. MOI - Jandarma General Command, Human Smuggling Crimes 
Department 
11. MOI - Coast Guard Command 
 
ANKARA 00000273  004 OF 005 
 
 
12. MOI - Foreign Relations and EU Coordination Department 
13. MOI - TNP, Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department 
14. MOI - TNP, Public Order Department 
15. MOI - TNP, Smuggling and Organized Crime Department 
16. MOI - General Directorate of Local Administrations 
17. MOF - Budget and Financial Control Directorate 
18. MOF - Council to Investigate Financial Crimes 
19. MOH - Treatment Services Directorate 
20. MOH - Foreign Relations Department and Services for 
Workers Abroad 
21. MOL - Labor Directorate 
22. MOL - Foreign Relations and Worker Services Abroad 
Directorate 
23. The Council of Higher Education 
24. Radio and Television Supreme Council 
25. EU Secretariat General - Political Affairs Department 
26. State Planning Organization Under Secretariat (Prime 
Ministry) 
27. Social Services and Child Protection Directorate (State 
Ministry) 
28. Status of Women Directorate (State Ministry) 
29. Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund (Prime Ministry) 
30. Human Rights Directorate (Prime Ministry) 
31. Turkish Statistics Institute 
32. Turkish Bar Associations 
23. Cankaya (Ankara) Sub-Governor - Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Foundation 
34. Ankara Metropolitan Municipality 
35. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
36. Trabzon Metropolitan Municipality 
37. Antalya Metropolitan Municipality 
38. Izmir Metropolitan Municipality 
39. Artvin Municipality 
40. Igdir Municipality 
41. European Commission Turkey Representative 
42. IOM Turkey Representative 
43. Human Resources Development Foundation (HRDF) 
44. Foundation for Women's Solidarity (FWS) 
 
Other municipalities and agencies, industry and professional 
associations, chambers of commerce, academics, etc., are 
often invited to taskforce meetings, depending on the agenda. 
 
D.  (SBU) The GOT has a national action plan to address TIP. 
The taskforce-participating agencies, NGOs, and IOM were 
involved in developing it.  It mandates close NGO, IGO and 
interagency cooperation.  The same agencies have drafted a 
new national action plan, currently awaiting the Interior 
Minister's signature and Prime Ministry-approval.  The new 
action plan will complement the ongoing two-year, 3 million 
Euro EU project aimed at shoring up sustainability in the 
fight against trafficking (ref E). 
 
E.  (SBU) The GOT commissioned a study of demand in Turkey 
(ref B), though the report has not yet been publicized.  The 
number of legal brothels operating is down under the current 
national government, the part of which also governs most of 
Turkey's large cities, including Istanbul.  However, our 
sources tell us that legal brothels do not contribute 
significantly to TIP. 
 
F.  (U) We have no evidence indicating Turkish nationals 
participate actively in international child sex tourism. 
 
G.  (SBU) Turkish military personnel participate in NATO 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) training, hosted by the 
Ankara-based PfP Training Center, on the fight against TIP. 
The training, also made available to other NATO and PfP 
country personnel, many from source countries, focuses on the 
differences between human smuggling and TIP, victim 
identification, intelligence and data collection, database 
management, investigation techniques, as well as the role of 
NGOs, international organizations and civil society, and NATO 
policy on human trafficking.  In addition, the PfP Training 
Center provides an annual one week course on TIP to Turkish 
unit command assigned to peacekeeping operations.  ***Post 
will report the number of Turkish military officials 
receiving the PfP training and the unit command training 
during the reporting period in a supplemental cable, septel. 
TIP training for forty NATO and PfP military officials is 
scheduled to take place at the Ankara Training Center during 
the last week of February 2009.*** 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
 
ANKARA 00000273  005 OF 005 
 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey