Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ANKARA269, TURKEY: PROPOSAL FOR NADR-FUNDED COUNTER-NARCO-TERRORISM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ANKARA269.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA269 2009-02-20 11:47 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0269/01 0511147
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201147Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8833
INFO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
UNCLAS ANKARA 000269 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PROPOSAL FOR NADR-FUNDED COUNTER-NARCO-TERRORISM 
PROJECT 
 
REF:  08 State 128554 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Drug trafficking is known to be a significant 
source of revenue for the Kongra-Gel/PKK terrorist organization. 
Disrupting this revenue source is a major USG goal.  The following 
proposal is designed to facilitate closer interagency cooperation 
among Turkish law enforcement agencies that fight narco-terrorism 
and between those agencies and their northern Iraqi counterparts. 
End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Embassy Ankara requests $200,000 in Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Projects (NADR) funds (reftel) 
to support this project. This proposal has the concurrence of 
Embassy Baghdad and the Regional Counterterrorism Coordinator. 
 
Project Title 
------------- 
3.   (SBU) Operation Jump Start: Facilitating Turkey-Iraq 
Cooperation against Narco-Terrorist Drug Trafficking Organizations 
and Those that Facilitate their Illicit Activities. 
 
 
Implementing Agency 
------------------- 
4.  (SBU) Drug Enforcement Administration and other Mission 
elements. 
 
Background 
---------- 
5. (SBU) Drug trafficking is known to be a significant source of 
revenue for the Kongra-Gel/PKK terrorist organization. Disrupting 
this revenue source is a major USG goal.  Currently, DEA-Turkey has 
a well-established multi-decade relationship with the relevant 
Turkish law enforcement agencies.  In early 2007, DEA-Turkey 
established interagency ties with the Kurdish Security Service (KSS) 
of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq; these 
have slowly developed over the past two years. 
 
6. (SBU) A comprehensive and effective campaign against the 
Kongra-Gel/PKK will require strong cross-border law enforcement 
assistance and cooperation.  At this time, however, contact and 
cooperation both among Turkish law enforcement agencies themselves 
and between Turkish and Iraqi law enforcement officials, including 
those of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), is negligible. 
Neither the Turkish National Police (TNP) nor the KSS fully 
understand the value and power of internationally cooperative, 
intelligence driven, complex narcotics and money laundering 
investigations.  The proposed program will attempt to address these 
concerns. 
 
Project Details 
--------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The project is designed to develop multilateral interagency 
relationships among DEA and key regional law enforcement partners: 
in Turkey, the Turkish National Police (TNP), Turkish Jandarma and 
Turkish Customs Service, and in Iraq, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
and the Kurdish Regional Government's (KRG) Kurdish Security Service 
(KSS). 
 
8. (SBU) The strategy to achieve this is two-pronged.  First, DEA 
would establish a secure off-site facility in southeast Turkey near 
the Iraqi border (in Silopi or Habur) to allow the routine 
deployment of DEA special agents into one of the main areas of 
Kongra-Gel/PKK activity.  As security allows, DEA would seek to 
establish a mirror off-site across the border in the KRG (Zakho or 
Dohuk) to provide the same benefits to the KSS.  The facilities have 
minimal requirements:  a secure working and billeting space with 
power, water and phone line that can be provided by upgrading an 
existing structure or using a containerized housing unit. 
 
The establishment of an off-site facility will accomplish the 
following goals. 
 
- - Demonstrate U.S. commitment to pursuing the Kongra-Gel/PKK. 
 
-- Allow DEA agents to interact regularly with their law enforcement 
counterparts to build rapport and strengthen ties.  Additionally, 
having a "neutral" off-site away from their respective headquarters 
will significantly improve DEA's ability to foster better working 
relations among the Police, Jandarma and Customs. 
 
-- Provide DEA agents and their counterparts the ability to better 
collect timely and useable intelligence, and recruit and direct 
confidential sources against the Kongra-Gel/PKK. 
 
-- Allow DEA agents to more effectively lead and coordinate 
Kongra-Gel/PKK investigative activities with its counterparts. 
 
-- Provide field mentoring and on-the-job training for law 
enforcement counterparts through regular investigative interaction 
 
with DEA agents. 
 
-- Having a presence on both sides of the border would improve DEA's 
ability to facilitate cross-border relations between Turkish law 
enforcement agencies and the KSS. 
 
9. (SBU) The second prong of DEA's strategy is to jumpstart 
cross-border interagency cooperation through training.  Our goal 
would be to train 30 officers (15 from each side of the boarder) 
through DEA-led and managed training programs with representatives 
from Turkish and Iraqi law enforcement.  This tri-lateral effort 
will include joint training in anti-terror operations, to include 
increasing awareness of the role of "shadow facilitators."   This 
program will not only help break down barriers between agencies, but 
will also facilitate freer information sharing and better 
coordination of joint investigative strategies and goals. 
 
10. (SBU) We would also provide equipment required by the training. 
 
Cost Estimate 
------------ 
11.  (SBU) In support of these initiatives, DEA-Turkey is requesting 
$200,000 of FY09 NADR funds.  We estimate requiring roughly $150,000 
for dual use operational /training facilities, and $50,000 for 
equipment. 
 
Coordinating Office and POC 
--------------------------- 
12.  (SBU) DEA-Ankara is the coordinating office.  Embassy Point of 
Contact is DEA Assistant Regional Director Thomas J. Senecal at: 
SenecalTJ@state.gov, or +90-312-457-7229.