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Viewing cable 09ADDISABABA495, ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE-SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ADDISABABA495 2009-02-27 09:03 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
R 270903Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3922
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
FBI WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 000495 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/TIA/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE-SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE 
QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) SPRING 2009 
 
REF: 09 STATE 13029 
 
           ------------------------------------- 
1.  (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
          ------------------------------------- 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY 
CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN 
DEMONSTRATIONS? 
 
-Yes, there is a sizable Muslim population throughout 
Ethiopia as well as ethnic Somalis.  Generally there is very 
little, if any, anti-American sentiment among the majority of 
the population in Ethiopia. Only small segments of the 
general population within Ethiopia are prone to extremism. 
There have not been any anti-American demonstrations in 
Ethiopia for the past several years. 
 
B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE 
COUNTRY OVER THE PAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
-No 
 
C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
-No "anti-American" demonstrations have taken place. In July 
2008, a group of approximately 120 local nationals arrived at 
the front gate of the chancery during business hours and held 
a peaceful rally regarding the political situation in 
Eritrea.  This group was accompanied by local police, read 
statements, and departed the area after approximately 30 
minutes. This group visited several other Addis Ababa 
locations on the same day, to include the UN, AU, EU and 
other diplomatic missions, in an effort to draw international 
attention and support to the situation in Eritrea. 
 
D.  WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN 
DEMONSTRATION? 
 
-N/A 
 
E.  ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY 
DOMESTIC ISSUES? 
 
-N/A, there have not been any anti-American demonstrations in 
Ethiopia during the past year. 
 
F.  ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY PEACEFUL OR VIOLENT? 
 
-In November 2005, there were demonstrations/riots throughout 
Addis Ababa in response to dissatisfaction concerning local 
elections. 
The Ethiopian police and security services responded with 
force to quell the situation.  Approximately 200 Ethiopian 
civilians were reported to have been killed in Addis Ababa. 
There have not been any notable violent demonstrations in 
Ethiopia during the past year. 
 
G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO 
USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES. 
 
-No, the above demonstrations and riots primarily focused on 
GOE facilities.  Some passing USG vehicles were struck by 
projectiles and sustained minor damage.  There has not been 
any property damage or injuries to USG interests during the 
past year as the result of demonstrations. 
 
H.  IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS EVER PENETRATED OUR 
SECURITY PERIMETER LINE? 
 
-No 
 
I.  HAVE THERE BEEN ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE 
PAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
-No 
 
J.  HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
-No.  The Embassy is located in close proximity (1/2 mile 
radius) to several educational institutions and GOE 
facilities.  The 2005 demonstrations/riots in response to 
dissatisfaction regarding local elections occurred within 
this radius. In early 2007, student demonstrations (not 
directed at the USG) at Addis Ababa University (located on 
the same road as the Embassy) hindered Embassy personnel 
coming/departing the compound.  No Embassy locations or 
personnel were directly involved or adversely impacted by 
this situation. 
 
K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? 
 
-N/A.  No anti-American demonstrations within the past year. 
 
L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 
 
-With the exception of the anti-GOE demonstrations in 
November 2005 and Addis Ababa University student 
demonstrations in early 2007, demonstrations and large public 
gatherings in Addis Ababa tend to be peaceful and well 
controlled. 
 
M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO 
USG PROPERTY? 
 
-No.  See Item G above. 
 
          ------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
          ------------------------- 
 
A.  IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR 
INTRASTATE CONFLICT? 
 
In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew their troops from Somalia. 
It is too soon to tell what effect this will have on 
Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also engaged in a border dispute with 
Eritrea. In August of 2008, the United Nations Mission for 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) ceased operations, primarily as 
a result of inability to resolve this dispute in an effective 
manner.  UNMEE's departure has had little to no notable 
impact on the general security situation within Ethiopia. 
However, the absence of international observers at the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea border eliminates a mitigating (albeit 
ineffective) party to reduce the possibility of conflict in 
an area with significant tensions and troop presence on both 
sides of the border.  There have been allegations by the 
Ethiopian Government that the Eritrean Government has planned 
or supported terrorist attacks within Ethiopia as well as 
provided support to various anti-Ethiopian groups. The 
Ethiopian government is also currently engaged in an active 
counter-insurgency campaign throughout the Ogaden region, where 
they have encountered difficulties with various ethnic and 
opposition groups. Ethiopia is also experiencing difficulties 
with internal opposition groups; some are armed and have 
conducted hostile attacks (bombings) within Ethiopia during the 
past year, targeting Ethiopian interests. 
 
B.  IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC 
REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? 
 
-Conflict is primarily limited to the most southeastern area 
(Somali-Ogaden region) and the northern regions 
(Ethiopia-Eritrea border) of Ethiopia. During the past year 
there were several (approximately 13) notable bombing 
incidents in Ethiopia, most likely attributed to internal 
opposition groups. This was a recurrence of a trend of 40 to 
50 similar bombing incidents that occurred in Addis Ababa 
during the period of April 2005 and November 2006.  A notable 
change is the latest bombings were the targeting of crowded 
venues during business hours carried out in a manner to 
ensure greater causalities. 
 
C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? 
 
-There are no U.S. diplomatic facilities located outside of 
Addis Ababa. Combined Joint Task Force for Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) does maintain a presence (uniformed U.S.DOD 
service personnel) and facility in Dire Dawa (South/East 
Ethiopia) and also a civil affairs team in Awassa (South). 
The Embassy maintains five official locations (Embassy, USAID 
CDC, Peace Corps office building and GSO/Warehouse) and 
approximately 116 residential locations spread out over a 
7-mile radius within Addis Ababa. Some of these locations are 
located in close proximity to the 2005 and 2006 
demonstrations and bombings, although none were directly 
targeted or involved. Mission personnel travel on a daily 
basis the road where the May 20, 2008, bombing of a local 
mini bus occurred, resulting in the death/injury of several 
passengers (including one non-official American citizen). 
Mission personnel also frequent the area of Addis Ababa where 
the two April 14, 2008 gas station bombings occurred. 
Several bombings have occurred near the "Merkato Market", which 
is a restricted area for mission personnel. 
 
D. HAVE ANY FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS 
SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? 
 
-No.  Although some groups associated with the conflict 
involving Somalia and Eritrea are not necessarily favorable 
towards Americans, overt anti-American sentiment rarely 
manifests itself in Ethiopia. 
 
 
          ------------------------- 
3.  (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
          ------------------------- 
 
A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL TRAINED? 
 
-Although Ethiopian law enforcement and security services 
fall short of meeting western standards in regards to 
training, they are reasonably competent and professional in 
comparison to other countries in the region and will provide 
all available resources/assistance within their capacity. 
 
B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE 
ELABORATE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. 
 
- The GOE security services have received training from the 
USG, to include: 
 
- Leadership development, 
 
- Major case management, 
 
- Travel documents, 
 
- Counterfeiting, 
 
- Land border security, 
 
- Protective security detail operations, 
 
- Cyber-crimes, 
 
- Post-blast investigation, 
 
- Physical security of vital installations, 
 
- Preventing attacks on soft targets, and 
 
- A variety of courses provided by the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana. 
 
During the past year an Ethiopian police officer graduated 
from the FBI National Academy. 
 
Ethiopians tend to be enthusiastic students and eager to 
learn. The training provided was appreciated and well 
received by the host country government and the individual 
students. Future training opportunities provided to the GOE 
will be worthwhile, appreciated, and applied to good purpose. 
 
C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS 
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION WITHIN THEIR AGENCIES? 
 
-As in most African nations, there is some corruption within 
the GOE's law enforcement and security services. Unlike many 
African countries, the level of corruption among GOE security 
and law enforcement services does not stymie efforts to 
enforce the law, and ensure general security and public 
safety.  Corruption within Ethiopia can be characterized as 
petty and cronyism. 
 
D. ARE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF 
DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? 
 
-Generally GOE intelligence services are reasonably 
professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions. The 
GOE claimed to foil a terrorist attack by Eritreans targeting 
the African Union Summit in December 2006.  During 2008 the GOE 
claimed to foil at least two separate terrorist attacks within 
Addis Ababa by internal opposition groups. 
 
E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. 
EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? 
 
-The GOE intelligence and law enforcement services tend to be 
cooperative to the Embassy's request for information and 
support, within the limitations of their resources and 
abilities. 
 
F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN 
RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO 
SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? 
 
-Yes.  In response to threats to its internal security posed 
by extremist elements based in Somalia, in late 2006 the GOE 
launched military operations into Somalia and diminished the 
capabilities of various individuals and organizations 
involved in terrorism.  During 2007, the GOE claimed to 
uncover and foil at least two terrorist operations targeting 
Addis Ababa by internal opposition and Eritrean groups. The 
GOE also reports they have detained some of those responsible 
for the 2008 bombings.  In relation to threat information 
targeting the capitol city Addis Ababa in late 2008, the GOE 
significantly improved their security posture, and claims to 
have arrested several people involved with attack planning. 
 
G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND 
ALLOCATION  OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE 
SECURITY? 
 
-Yes, the Ethiopian government has always proven themselves 
to be cooperative, professional, and capable in accommodating 
any request for protective security.  When the U.S. Embassy 
was named as a possible target for attacks in 2008, the GOE 
increased police presence at Embassy locations. 
 
H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR 
AIRPORTS (EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD/AVERAGE, POOR)? 
 
-Relative to other countries on the continent, security at 
Ethiopia's major airports is GOOD.  Access control and 
security screening measures are vigorously enforced. 
 
I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATIONS CONTROL 
AGENCIES? 
 
-Customs and immigration controls at Ethiopia's major 
airports and land border crossing are good. 
 
-Ethiopia lacks the resources to adequately ensure the 
security of its large land borders, especially in 
desolate/remote areas. 
 
-In response to concerns to its security, the GOE has 
established and operates security checkpoints on all major 
roads leading to Addis Ababa. Most commercial, and some 
private, vehicles are stopped and subject to inspection. 
While this effort is better than nothing and has yielded 
some success, it is impossible to reasonably inspect all 
vehicles, goods and individuals coming to Addis Ababa. 
 
-The GOE has expressed concern to Embassy officials regarding 
the integrity of border security on its border with Somalia. 
There are reports of trading routes that circumvent major 
roads and established checkpoints. 
 
-The Embassy has encountered problems on a regular basis 
involving the integrity of Ethiopian passports and identity 
documents.  It is not difficult for individuals inclined to 
do so, to obtain fraudulent passports and identity documents. 
 
J.  HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? 
 
-Ethiopia has a vast border, neighboring five other African 
nations (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya). 
Border patrol forces are reasonably effective at major/formal 
border crossing areas. 
However, a significant portion of Ethiopia's land borders are 
assessed as open and porous. 
 
          --------------------------------------------- - 
4.  (SBU) INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST 
          GROUPS 
          --------------------------------------------- - 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY INDIGENOUS ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN 
COUNTRY? 
 
-No.  After the December 2006 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, 
Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab extremist groups publicly declared 
Ethiopia to be a viable target. 
 
B.  IF YES, HOW MANY?  PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
-N/A 
 
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE 
LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
-No 
 
D. WHERE ANY OF THESE ATTACKS LETHAL? 
 
-N/A 
 
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY OR 
RELATED U.S. TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR 
DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? 
 
-N/A 
 
H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? 
 
-N/A 
          --------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
          --------------------------------- 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT 
ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? 
 
-No.  There are several indigenous groups active in Ethiopia 
considered by the GOE to be terrorist organizations (Ogaden 
National Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front) that are not 
formally recognized by the USG as terrorist organizations. 
These groups have been reported to carry out attacks on 
Ethiopian interests and are of concern to the GOE. 
 
B. IF YES, HOW MANY?  PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
-See above 
 
C.  HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE 
LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
-During the past 12 months there have not been any attacks in 
Ethiopia targeting American interests. 
 
-In 2007 the ONLF carried out an attack against a Chinese oil 
drilling facility in the Ogaden region, resulting in the 
deaths of approximately 75 civilians.  This attack was 
carried out after the ONLF issued warnings that foreigners 
who ventured into the Ogaden/Somali region to exploit natural 
resources would be targeted.  During the past year at least 
two international U.S. oil companies (including one that 
employs American citizens) have expressed intentions of 
prospecting for oil in this region. 
 
D. WHERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? 
 
-See above. 
 
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY OR U.S. 
RELATED TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
G.  HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR 
DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? 
 
-The ONLF has primarily carried out attacks in the Ogaden 
region. 
 
-There is speculation that either the ONLF or OLF is 
responsible for the several bombings that occurred in Addis 
Ababa. 
 
H.  IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? 
 
-N/A 
         --------------------------------- 
6. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
         --------------------------------- 
 
A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT 
ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? 
 
-Yes 
 
B.  IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
-Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) - considered by the GOE to be a 
terrorist group. 
 
-Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) - considered by the 
GOE to be a terrorist group. 
 
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS 
WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? 
 
-Yes.  In 2007 the GOE claimed to have foiled a terrorist 
attack by Eritrean terrorist groups targeting the African 
Union summit in Addis Ababa. During a period 2005 and 2006 
and again in 2008 Addis Ababa experienced a series of 
bombings attributed to the OLF.  In 1996, AIAI placed and 
detonated bombs at two large hotels and attempted to 
assassinate the GOE Minister of Transportation in Addis 
Ababa. These incidents took place near U.S diplomatic 
facilities and on routes regularly traveled by Mission 
personnel. 
 
D. ARE THERE ANY SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) 
IN COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE 
ORGANIZATIONS? 
 
-Unknown 
 
E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY 
THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 
 
-Ethiopia hosts a large ethnic Somali population, some of 
whom are possibly inclined to support extremists groups 
affected by the previous Ethiopia military operations into 
Somalia. 
 
F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT AND SCOPE OF 
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, 
SUDAN, ETC.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN 
TERRORIST ACTS? 
 
-There have not been any anti-American terrorist attacks in 
Ethiopia in recent history. If the above hostile intelligence 
services are present in country, they do not appear to be 
actively targeting us. 
 
G.  HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND 
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE 
TERRORIST ELEMENTS? 
 
-Weapons and explosives are readily available in Somalia, and 
could be easily smuggled into Ethiopia through the vast, 
open, and porous land border. 
 
-There has been information Eritrea has provided weapons and 
explosives to various groups that do not view Ethiopia 
favorably. 
 
-Weapons and explosives are available within Ethiopia through 
underground suppliers.  On a recent trip to a local market, 
Embassy personnel reported observing live hand grenades and 
unexploded ordinances for sale at a market stall. 
 
- Weapons and explosives are also available within Kenya, 
Sudan, and Djibouti through underground sources and could be 
smuggled into Ethiopia through the vast, open, and porous land 
borders. 
 
-The bombings that occurred during 2005 to 2008 reportedly 
primarily involved C-4 type explosives. 
 
YAMAMOTO