R 231101Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3863
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TAGS: SENV EAID AMGT XW BY RW ET
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT VITAL TO NILE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF ADDIS ABABA 3038 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) The Nile River runs through ten countries, whose populations 
depend on its waters for their livelihood. It is a shared, multi-state 
river basin characterized by water scarcity, poverty, rapid population, 
and a long history of dispute and instability. Sound and equitable 
management of the Nile is complicated by a web of historical, political, 
environmental, economical, cultural, and technical challenges. In 
February 1999, the ten Nile Basin countries (Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Eritrea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Uganda) created 
the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to develop the Nile Basin in a 
cooperative manner, to share its socioeconomic benefits, and to promote 
regional peace and security.  As the NBI countries continue to grapple 
with contentious negotiations, the entire initiative appears to have 
reached a tipping point.  Given that the issue of the Nile has the 
potential to incite conflict between Egypt and the Nile countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, more needs to be done to highlight and enhance the 
NBI's confidence-building mechanisms throughout the region.  At this 
crossroads, there is value for increased U.S. engagement that includes 
additional support for the NBI process within the framework of Sudan 
sanctions. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶2. (U) Management of the Nile's resources is complicated, in part, by 
the legacy of the region's colonial past. Under a 1929 Treaty between 
Egypt and Britain and the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the 
Nile Waters between Egypt and Sudan, Egypt -- and Sudan to a lesser 
degree -- acquired exclusive rights over the Nile's use. Accordingly, 
Egypt assumed the right to veto any construction projects on the Nile 
that would adversely affect its interests, and it reserved the right to 
undertake Nile-related projects without the consent of upper riparian 
states. Moreover, the 1959 agreement unambiguously established the 
specific rights and volumetric quantities allocated to Egypt and Sudan; 
55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) and 18.5bcm, respectively.  These 
agreements are criticized and contested by upstream countries, however, 
because of their colonial legacy (all of the upstream countries, with the 
exception of Ethiopia, were colonies of European powers at the time), the 
non-inclusive and monopolist nature of their provisions, and the embedded 
perceived inequity in terms of water allocation. 
 
¶3. (U) While upstream countries are trying to negotiate, through the NBI 
process, on how best to abrogate what they regard as outdated and invalid 
colonial treaties, Egypt has repeatedly warned that any unilateral change 
in the 1929 and 1959 Nile Basin Treaties would be a breach of 
international law.  Egypt and Sudan assert that any future upstream uses 
of the Nile waters must not harm the "current uses and rights" of the 
downstream countries, as defined by the 1959 Agreement, emphasizing that 
the current water allocations are considered to be non-negotiable. The 
upper riparians outright reject the inclusion of the words "and rights" 
as a de facto recognition of what they view as invalid, onerous, 
illegitimate colonial-era treaties. Because the Sudanese currently use 
only 13.5 bcm of their 18.5 bcm maximum under the 1959 treaty, they seek 
assurances that they will maintain their "rights" for future access of up 
to 18.5 bcm.  Yet with mounting environmental pressures straining the 
Nile's existing resources (deforestation, land degradation, 
desertification, climate change, pollution, increased populations), all 
NBI countries recognize that the current lack of a unified and systematic 
and efficient approach to the management of the Nile's resources will be 
to the detriment to all riparian countries' development efforts, poverty 
alleviation initiatives, and health and food security plans.  As such, 
they have united within the NBI context to address their complex colonial 
legacy. 
 
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NBI - NEGOTIATION REALITIES 
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¶4. (U) The Nile Basin Initiative has served to provide the political 
space necessary for the riparian countries to begin to coordinate and 
negotiate compromises that could lead to a binding, collective agreement 
for managing the Nile's resources.  Despite the protracted conflict of 
interests in the Basin, the Nile riparian states have moved from open 
diplomatic conflict towards a more cooperative hydro-political 
configuration over the last decade.  Ultimately, however, in order for 
all countries to come to the table willing to negotiate a compromise 
concerning Nile water allocations and utilization in good faith for the 
benefit of all riparians, there will have to be a fundamental shift in 
politics as usual.  First and foremost, this will entail a unilateral 
acceptance that Egypt must emerge from negotiations with "a good deal." 
All realize that change must be agreed upon collectively, but that 
success will be strongly contingent upon Egypt's express consent. 
Secondly, there must be solid recognition that all governments must be 
able to effectively "sell" any agreement to their constituents; that no 
politician will accept any end product that can be touted by opposition 
groups at home as a "sell out." 
 
 
¶5. (U) Equally important is an understanding that the debate is more 
sophisticated than a legal dispute over the meaning of a few contested 
words in one sub-paragraph of the 38-Article CFA, that it represents 
more than a dispute over specific water allocation numbers, and that it 
is not merely a disagreement over efficient water resource management. 
Rather, particularly in the case of Egypt, control of the Nile is 
inexorably linked to a perception of national security and cultural 
identity.  For example, Egypt boasts more hydrologists than all the 
remaining riparian countries put together and therefore fully 
understands that damming Lake Tana for irrigation purposes in Ethiopia 
would result in less water loss to Egypt than is now experienced by 
evaporation at the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Numerous other upstream 
development schemes, such as irrigation and hydro-dams, if properly 
implemented and executed, would have little to no effect on the amount 
of water Egypt currently receives and utilizes.  Given that water is a 
stretchable commodity when harnessed efficiently and effectively (by 
instituting mechanisms to improve productivity, by adopting improved 
technologies to enhance water flows, by pursuing climate change 
adaptation measures, by reversing land degradation trends and siltation, 
etc.), a solution that placates Egypt's need for a secure water future 
can translate to a win-win situation for the entire basin of more than 
300 million people.  Upstream development and Egypt's water security are 
clearly not mutually exclusive concepts.  Key to overcoming political 
stalemate, however, will be to eliminate this misperception of a zero 
sum game. 
 
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MISTRUST PERSISTS 
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¶6. (U) After a decade of building trust through cooperation under the 
NBI framework, with much notable success at the highest levels that 
include the negotiation of trade deals between countries that prior to 
the NBI process would have difficulty with even the most basic 
communication, a palpable deficit persists within the mindsets of the 
public throughout the region.  For example, extensive irrigation 
projects in Egypt will require enormous quantities of water that the 
upstream riparian nations oppose because of a fear that these plans 
will sequester their own ambitions for agriculture and hydro-electrical 
projects. While Egypt continues to harness the resources of the Nile, 
Cairo's position on upstream development has traditionally been that 
the upper riparian states are not as dependent on the waters of the Nile 
for agricultural purposes because they receive plentiful rainfall and 
are not reliant on irrigation for crop production. Despite this 
perception on the part of Egypt, Uganda, for example, is engaged in 
studying several projects that associated with the development of its 
hydroelectric potential and Kenya and Tanzania are interested in tapping 
the water of Lake Victoria, the second largest freshwater lake in the 
world and one of the main sources of the Nile.  Ethiopia is using less 
than five percent of its 3.5 million hectare potential for irrigation, 
despite the fact that the Blue Nile, which originates in the Ethiopian 
Highlands, contributes over 80% of the Nile waters that eventually reach 
Egypt. 
 
¶7. (U) Given the fact that public perception directly effects a 
politician's room for political maneuverability, and it is the NBI 
countries' respective governments that must sell any Nile deal to their 
publics or face political suicide at home, public perception is a vital 
component to negotiating a successful resolution on the Nile.  The World 
Bank is gearing up to launch a media assault initiative through the NBI 
to inform the people in the region on the broad-scope benefits of a Nile 
resolution.  The message will not only highlight the fact that the water 
security of Egypt and Sudan and upstream Nile development are not 
mutually exclusive, but that the win-win scenario of a resolution would 
entail enhanced food and energy security; biodiversity protection; better 
overall environment stewardship; improved livelihoods; increased 
standards of living; poverty alleviation; expanded regional trade, 
growth, and development that would provide Egypt with robust, new 
markets for its companies; and the promotion of regional peace and 
security.  While the World Bank may be taking the lead in this 
information campaign, ultimately it is the responsibility of all 
stakeholders to shape the parameters of the debate and frame the mindsets 
of the public. 
 
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NBI PROCESS: PROMOTES TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
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¶8. (U) With an objective of promoting trust, capacity building, and 
creating an enabling environment for investment, the NBI process has 
numerous success stories to promote that extend far beyond the confines 
of actual NBI-related issues.  For example, since the NBI was formed, 
trade between Egypt and Ethiopia has nearly doubled year on end, with 
some high-profile trade agreements in important agricultural commodities 
such as beef. Even more striking is a recent historical development in 
the relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt.  According to a World Bank 
official, the two are currently exploring the possibility of embarking 
on joint ventures that include upstream development of the Blue Nile in 
Ethiopia with potential World Bank investment.  In the very recent past, 
Egypt would have reacted belligerently to any plans for development of 
the upstream Nile. Ultimately, given that increased trade fosters 
interdependency, which in turn traditionally engenders stability, this 
is a promising trend and a valuable confidence-building tool to advance. 
 
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COMMENT - VALUE IN U.S. ENGAGEMENT 
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¶9. (U) A World Bank official recently referred to the Nile region as a 
time bomb with a fuse of unknown length.  After years of Cooperative 
Framework Agreement negotiations to establish the legal mechanism that 
will govern the management of the Nile, a resolution is hanging in the 
balance.  To date, the U.S. has not played a particularly meaningful 
role in Nile negotiations, primarily due to legislative constraints 
that prohibit any USG assistance that would benefit the government of 
Sudan. Although these constraints have precluded our ability to 
contribute to the Nile Basin Trust Fund (the World Bank-managed facility 
that supports the NBI initiative), the U.S. has taken opportunities to 
provide small-scale assistance in areas that do not render us afoul of 
the legislative Sudan sanctions.  At this crucial juncture in Nile 
negotiations where we face the real possibility of a failed Nile 
solution - a situation that has the potential to incite conflict between 
Egypt and the Nile countries of Sub-Saharan Africa - more needs to be 
done to highlight and enhance the NBI's confidence-building mechanisms 
throughout the region. Capitalizing on the new slate created by a 
political transition in Washington, and with the stated support from 
World Bank top officials, the U.S. should consider increased engagement 
with the NBI process within the framework of Sudan sanctions. 
 
 
YAMAMOTO