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Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI145, UAE PLANS BIG SPLASH TO OPEN FRENCH NAVAL PRESENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABUDHABI145 2009-02-10 03:59 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXRO6846
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0145 0410359
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100359Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2113
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1038
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0083
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS ABU DHABI 000145 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS FR AE
SUBJECT: UAE PLANS BIG SPLASH TO OPEN FRENCH NAVAL PRESENCE 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; please protect accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The UAE leadership will send a loud message with 
the May opening of a French naval facility in Abu Dhabi, amplified by 
the presence of headliners like French President Sarkozy.  Adding a 
new military presence to the strategic equation reasserts the UAE's 
welcome to Western partners.  Sarkozy's calendar apparently 
determined the date of the event, and his visit is likely to address 
nuclear, economic, and cultural cooperation as well.  An associated 
conference may bring other big names to the party.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Locally based think tank INEGMA (Institute for Near East 
and Gulf Military Analysis) may have assumed it had a small 
ceremonial project to arrange when it was charged with planning the 
May 25, 2009 opening of a new (250-man initially) French naval 
presence in Abu Dhabi, but the group learned that the UAE leadership 
seeks a large event to send a clear message: Abu Dhabi is 
diversifying its military cooperation with Western powers as part of 
an overall security strategy.  Three primary audiences for this 
message may be UAE nationals across the seven Emirates (who should 
expect more Western presence even as the nation struggles to define 
its national identity in the midst of an 80% foreign population), the 
larger Gulf (including Iran), and the USG (not the sole "defender"). 
The UAE continues to value Western military capabilities and sees 
advantages in diversification.  (Note:  The UAE already hosts the US 
and a handful of other contingents of various sizes.  End note.) 
 
3.  (SBU) Underscoring the centrality of messaging, the UAEG (or more 
specifically, Abu Dhabi) set the date of this event based on the 
availability of French President Sarkozy, not on completion or 
operation of the naval facilities.  With Sarkozy's calendar 
clarified, the UAE declared that the base would be "ready" on time. 
With 600-plus attendees to include French dignitaries, NATO brass 
(perhaps the SecGen), and representatives of other regional and 
European nations, the stage is set for pomp and ceremony. 
 
4.  (SBU) Of course, Sarkozy usually visits with more than one 
message, so beyond base openings there will likely be movement on 
nuclear cooperation and other economic ties.  (Note:  May fits the 
rough time frame the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation will be 
receiving final bids on a $30 billion plus nuclear technology tender, 
which French firm Areva is actively pursuing.  End note.)  Sarkozy 
will also reportedly use the trip to break ground on the new Louvre 
planned for Saadiyat Island, which the French Embassy is proud to 
assert has not been impacted by the economic downturn.  (Note: The 
military presence, Louvre, and nuclear plans are all initiatives of 
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.  End note.) 
 
5.  (SBU) INEGMA is also preparing a conference on "Enhancing 
Maritime Security through Broader Cooperation" as a drawing card for 
many of the traveling dignitaries, to feature Sarkozy as a keynote 
speaker, joined potentially by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer and perhaps inviting the CENTCOM Commander. 
OLSON