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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/13/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Comments on Ambassador Schieffer's interview by editorial writer 
Tsuyoshi Sunohara (Nikkei) 
 
(2) New Obama administration and Japan-U.S. alliance (Sankei) 
 
(3) Shaky alliance-5 years on the battlefield (Part 4): SDF depends 
on U.S. military for emergency rescue (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) Lineup of Asia policymaking team in Obama administration 
reflects strong expectations of Japan (Part 3) (Asahi) 
 
(5) Rescuing foreign ships by MSDF impossible under existing law 
(Asahi) 
 
(6) Koichi Kato's third force vision deadlocked (Sankei) 
 
(7) Editorial: Doubts about cash-benefit plan deepening (Mainichi) 
 
(8) TOP HEADLINES 
 
(9) EDITORIALS 
 
(10) Prime Minister's schedule, January 11 (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Comments on Ambassador Schieffer's interview by editorial writer 
Tsuyoshi Sunohara 
 
NIKKEI (Page 9) (Full) 
January 10, 2009 
 
He has had no career in Washington politics like such VIP 
ambassadors as Mansfield and Foley. He did not have academic 
experience like Reischauer, nor did he have the backing of the 
bureaucracy like Armacost. The only one he could rely on was a 
friend who happened to be the top leader of the land, the U.S. 
president. 
 
Among all the many U.S. ambassadors to Japan to have appeared on 
scene in the postwar period, there has never been one with such a 
unique presence like Thomas Schieffer. From that fact alone, the 
Schieffer era should be subject to study with great interest by 
future generations of historians. His tenure overlapped with the end 
of U.S. unipolar world, set off by the Iraq war, as well as with the 
period of political paralysis in Japan. At times, he reputedly acted 
as a kind of crisis-management control tower, according to a senior 
State Department official. The important mission of this ambassador 
without doubt was greater than any predecessor before him. 
 
Despite such unfavorable circumstances, Ambassador Schieffer 
continued to play an active role in "institutionalizing" the 
alliance. He took on as his own mission the building of a bilateral 
relationship that did not rely on such personal ties as those 
between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
(Ron-Yasu) or between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. In 
such a relationship, the axis of cooperation and trust would be 
sharply in focus, no matter who was seated at the center of power. 
 
Even now, during the final days of the Bush administration, how 
 
TOKYO 00000066  002 OF 010 
 
 
ironic it is that Ambassador Schieffer still serves as the sole 
anchor on the American side to prevent the alliance from drifting. 
 
"I don't want the U.S.-Japan alliance to become a political issue." 
That was the last message that Ambassador Schieffer left behind, his 
aim always being to have "an alliance relationship of the highest 
quality." How will Japanese politicians - their eyes focused only on 
politics and elections - actually take this message? 
 
(2) New Obama administration and Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Excerpts) 
January 13, 2009 
 
By Toshio Watanabe, president of Takushoku University 
 
U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will soon launch his 
administration, but his administration's Asia policy remains 
unclear. What bothers me is the Democratic Party's platform, issued 
during the presidential race. Although the platform showed the 
party's determination to firmly maintain U.S. ties with such allies 
as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, it also revealed the party's 
intention to create a new multilateral framework in Asia that would 
go beyond the current bilateral agreements. 
 
If this new multilateral framework means turning the six-party talks 
on North Korea announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice into 
a new security framework, the Japan-U.S. alliance, the bedrock of 
Japan's foreign policy, might suffer. 
 
If the Japan-U.S. alliance weakens in the increasingly tense 
geopolitical atmosphere surrounding the Far East, evidenced by 
China's growing military buildup, North Korea's nuclear testing, and 
South Korea's conciliatory policy toward the North, I fear that 
Japan, aided by an already inward-looking public opinion, might be 
cast adrift in a global sea. 
 
Japan should deal with matters based on an awareness that alliances 
rest on common interests and cannot survive once such interests 
disappear. In the ever changing international situation, there is no 
alliance that lasts forever. 
 
The Washington System was launched as a result of coordination of 
interests among world powers at the Washington Conference that took 
place two years after the Paris Peace Conference following the end 
of World War I. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War and the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance significantly contributed for the following 
two decades to Japan's security. These fell by the wayside in 
exchange for a treaty among Japan, Britain, the United States and 
France. 
 
An alliance does not exist between countries with no shared 
interests. It is also a hegemonic state's behavioral pattern to 
force even an alliance between third countries that conflicts with 
its interests to be scrapped. We must keep in mind that this 
behavioral pattern still holds true for a hegemonic state today. 
 
Following the collapse of the Cold War structure, where mutual 
interests lie between Japan and the United States have become clear. 
It was fortunate that Japan has opened the door for logistical 
support and the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces on 
reconstruction assistance missions in the wake of 9/11 terrorist 
 
TOKYO 00000066  003 OF 010 
 
 
attacks on the United States. But the matter's crux lies in the 
government's reluctance to change its unique interpretation that 
although Japan has the right to collective self-defense, it is not 
allowed to exercise it. 
 
There are no legal restrictions on the use of the right. The 
government's insistence that Japan is not allowed to use the right 
must come from its policy intent rather than its legal intent. 
 
The government's interpretation can be changed, but the problem is 
that Japanese political leaders have no mettle to do so. The Council 
for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation for National Defense, 
established under the former Abe administration, presented its final 
report to former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in June last year. The 
report has been put aside indefinitely. 
 
Many Japanese people cannot conceal their dislike toward the United 
States for the delisting of North Korea as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, which was followed by the U.S.-originated financial 
crisis. Voices critical of the United States are growing in Japan. 
But before criticizing its ally, Japan should do first what it 
should do. 
 
(3) Shaky alliance-5 years on the battlefield (Part 4): SDF depends 
on U.S. military for emergency rescue 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 23, 2008 
 
The Air Self-Defense Force has now wound up its airlift mission in 
Iraq. The ASDF mission there is particularly notable as the 
Self-Defense Forces' first-ever backup of international security 
operations. The SDF's international cooperation began with the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force's dispatch of a minesweeping squadron to 
the Persian Gulf in 1991, and the SDF used to be tasked with 
activities for postwar settlement or reconstruction assistance. 
However, the SDF's activities this time have left new footprints in 
its overseas missions. 
 
All ASDF members boarding C-130 cargo planes in Iraq were called in 
to the headquarters of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) at Yokota in Tokyo 
before their departure from Japan. In Iraq, an ASDF C-130 transport 
in flight could come under attack from an armed group and would have 
to make an emergency landing. In that eventuality, the ASDF, which 
cannot rescue its C-130 crew, has no choice but to ask the U.S. 
military for their rescue. The ASDF procured U.S. military satellite 
rescue radio systems, and its Iraq mission crew received training 
from U.S. military personnel for emergency responses, such as how to 
identify friends and foes. 
 
There is a radio manual for the multinational forces in Iraq. The 
ASDF crew had to master the radio manual, or they could not fly over 
Iraq. For example, if one of an ASDF C-130's crew improperly emits 
radio waves in the event of an emergency landing, their whereabouts 
can be located by armed insurgents. In that case, the C-130 could 
fall into the hands of insurgents. Moreover, the ASDF crew there 
could be attacked. The ASDF had anticipated even such a situation. 
"We prepared guidelines for how to act until the U.S. military comes 
to rescue," one ASDF staff officer confessed. 
 
After the Iraq dispatch, U.S. military information available through 
the multinational forces' headquarters became the lifeline for the 
 
TOKYO 00000066  004 OF 010 
 
 
ASDF's activities in Iraq. 
 
The U.S. military clearly sorted out its information that was only 
for British and Australian forces, which have been acting in concert 
with U.S. forces, and not for other multinational force members. 
Japan is not treated favorably there just because Japan is an ally 
of the United States. The multinational forces' activities in Iraq 
are affected by human relations and a sense of solidarity, so Japan 
and all other countries participating in the multinational forces 
have sent a number of echelon officers to the headquarters for 
information. One ASDF staff officer said: "If not for information 
about security and mop-up operations, we can't set even a flight 
route. This means we can do nothing over there." 
 
Last October, the U.S. military suddenly stopped providing 
information to the ASDF about military operations in Baghdad and its 
environs. What lies behind this-according to a senior official of 
the Defense Ministry-is that the MSDF was going to be recalled from 
the Indian Ocean because the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law 
could not be extended. It was obviously the United States' 
retaliation, as the official noted. 
 
The ASDF made a protest to the U.S. Defense Department. At the same 
time, the ASDF decided to suspend its airlift services for a week. 
The ASDF C-130 planes in Iraq were almost always operational. U.S. 
military and other multinational force transport planes were less 
operational due to repair or for some other reasons. The U.S. 
military soon gave up to the ASDF that went on strike. "As a 
result," an ASDF staff officer recalled, "they figured out the 
ASDF's high reliability again." 
 
Iraq is where the ASDF backed up the multinational forces for the 
first time, and the ASDF carried out its given task there almost 
perfectly. In Afghanistan, the war on terror is going on. The ASDF 
will likely be asked again to airlift supplies there. 
 
"Even though you are in a noncombat area, you can never be safe. 
It's dangerous. That's why the Self-Defense Forces will be sent 
there. I want the government to explain this, and we want the 
government to get public understanding and support." With this, Lt. 
Gen. Kunio Orita, who has commanded the ASDF's Iraq mission, 
concluded the five years. 
 
(4) Lineup of Asia policymaking team in Obama administration 
reflects strong expectations of Japan (Part 3) 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 9, 2009 
 
(Yoichi Kato, Washington) 
 
U.S. expects Japan to play supplementary role 
 
What policy will the incoming Obama administration take toward Japan 
and how will it different from the policy of the Bush 
administration? Sources related to the incoming administration 
explained what will change and what will not change as followed. 
 
What is expected to remain unchanged is the stance of giving 
priority to the Japan-U.S. alliance. An informed source emphasized 
that the Obama administration will not take a stance of prioritizing 
China and treating Japan lightly as the Clinton administration had. 
 
TOKYO 00000066  005 OF 010 
 
 
The source meant that since the U.S. would find it difficult to 
effectively carry out its Asia diplomacy without Japan, it would 
have to be patient, despite the chaotic state of Japanese politics. 
It seems unlikely that major changes will take place in alliance 
management for the time being. Some have said that the incoming 
administration intends to move forward with the plans agreed on 
between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa and to transfer Marines 
in Okinawa to Guam. 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S.' current foreign policy that focuses only on 
military power is expected to change into a policy that taps a 
variety of diplomatic tools. This is in line with the argument by 
Joseph Nye for a change to "smart power," a combination of military 
power and soft power as a diplomatic tool. 
 
In an essay Nye contributed to the Asahi Shimbun last June, he gave 
this explanation about what approach (then presidential candidate) 
Obama might take to security relations with Japan: "He would like to 
further deepen and widen the U.S.-Japan relationship, going beyond 
the current framework of bilateral security arrangements." Nye added 
that Japan and the U.S. might take the lead in forming a new 
multinational framework. What the U.S. then seems to be considering 
is a plan to create a framework for multilevel dialogue in various 
regions of the world. 
 
The Bush administration's approach to environmental issues also is 
expected to significantly change. The U.S. would then urge Japan to 
play a leading role, as Nye has noted: "We would expect Japan to 
play a global coordinating role regarding the use of international 
public assets (such as stable international relations and open 
economic frameworks)." 
 
The Obama administration as a whole expects Japan to have the 
confidence to come up with ideas that the U.S. had not thought of, 
and to play a role that the U.S. would not be able to perform. They 
apparently expect Japan to emerge from being a lesser ally and 
become a partner on an equal footing so that the two countries would 
be able to build a complementary, effective relationship. 
 
(5) Rescuing foreign ships by MSDF impossible under existing law 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
January 8, 2009 
 
What would happen should the government decide to dispatch Maritime 
Self-Defense Force warships (to waters off Somalia as part of 
anti-piracy efforts)? 
 
Under one scenario, a British commercial freighter was attacked by 
pirates in waters off Somalia at midnight in March 2009. A MSDF 
escort vessel that was navigating near the spot in response to an 
order for maritime patrol action was asked by radio to help its crew 
members. But the captain of the escort ship, upon confirming that no 
Japanese citizens or goods were on board, replied: "Regrettably, our 
ship cannot render any assistance. 
 
Under a provision for maritime patrols in Article 82 of the 
Self-Defense Force Law, SDF troops are not allowed to take action 
against pirates attacking foreign commercial freighters. The purpose 
of the provision is to protect the lives and assets of Japanese 
nationals. 
 
TOKYO 00000066  006 OF 010 
 
 
 
A government source explained: "If the existing law is applied for 
the time being, such a situation would be unavoidable. The presence 
of Japanese naval vessels should work as a deterrent." But an 
ex-defense minister voiced concern: "If our troops do not take 
action to protect foreign ships, Japan will inevitably be 
criticized. I wonder if such action can be defined as an 
international contribution." 
 
Even if a new law is enacted for SDF troops to protect foreign 
ships, the issue of use of weapons by SDF troops is expected to 
trigger controversy. 
 
In August 2009, a MSDF escort vessel was accompanying a Japanese 
commercial freighter in waters off Somalia. An unidentified ship 
suddenly approached them. The escort vessel made an inquiry by 
radio, but the unidentified ship made no response and suddenly fired 
a shell. The escort vessel responded to the attack with machine gun 
fire that caused an explosion and the ship to sink, killing 20 
pirates. 
 
The Constitution prohibits Japan from war with other nations and the 
use of armed force. The government takes the view that cracking down 
on piracy is categorized as police action and does not fall under 
the use of armed force. 
 
In maritime security patrols, the police and Japan Coast Guard are 
allowed to fire warning shops and to return fire only in such cases 
as legitimate self-defense and emergency evacuation. Under the new 
legislation, firing of weapons is allowed as necessary to stop 
attacks by pirates. This is because the pirates will be heavily 
armed with rocket launchers and machine guns. 
 
SDF troops assigned overseas, however, have never killed any 
foreigner with weapons. If the government decides to allow the use 
of force, some might pose questions about the compatibility with 
Article 9 of the Constitution, which allows the right of 
self-defense to the minimum necessary level. Mistaking a Thai 
fishing boat as a pirate ship off Somalia, the Indian Navy fired at 
it and sank the boat. Similar cases might occur in the future. 
 
However, it is necessary to ensure the safety of SDF troops, so 
introducing clear-cut weapon-use rules is absolutely necessary. 
 
(6) Koichi Kato's third force vision deadlocked 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Abridged) 
January 12, 2009 
 
Shigeyuki Mizuuchi 
 
Former Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Koichi Kato has 
toned down his attempt to trigger political realignment. That is 
because the Aso cabinet's support ratings have plummeted recently 
and also because it has become difficult to realize his plan to 
launch a third force to topple the power structures of the LDP and 
the Democratic Party of Japan prior to the next Lower House 
election. Even former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki, a close 
friend of Kato, has begun to admit that it may take a number of 
Lower House elections before political realignment is possible. Kato 
seems unable to determine when to make his move to trigger 
(political realignment). 
 
TOKYO 00000066  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
On Jan. 10, Kato attended a New Year party in Sakata, Yamagata 
Prefecture, held by his support group. In the party, Kato criticized 
the DPJ for the first time in a long time, saying: 
 
"The DPJ consists of former Japan Socialist Party and LDP members 
and new candidates who could not join the LDP. The DPJ is like an 
LDP reflector (always opposing its policies) rather than a party 
that can do anything. Next year, there might be simultaneous 
elections for both chambers of the Diet. The political world may be 
realigned after a couple of Lower House elections over the next two 
or three years." 
 
The hall was void of posters of the LDP or Prime Minister Taro Aso. 
This reflects Kato's view that since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
his successor Yasuo Fukuda have walked off the job, the LDP's loss 
of ability to govern has become apparent and that supporters' view 
toward the party has become severe. 
 
Hearing Kato's critical comment on the DPJ, an attendant said to 
himself: "Has the wind shifted?" 
 
Rejecting a request to support Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister 
Kaoru Yosano in last September's LDP presidential election, Kato's 
stance indicated that he was not willing to prolong the life of the 
LDP. Frequently in contact with liberal members of the LDP and 
opposition parties, Kato has explored ways to break up the LDP and 
the DPJ by forming a third force. 
 
In mid-December, Kato, Yamasaki, DPJ Deputy President Naoto Kan, and 
the People's New Party Deputy Representative Shizuka Kamei 
frequently appeared on television programs as if to pave the way for 
political realignment. 
 
A liberal LDP lawmaker said, "Last fall, I was asked by Mr. Kamei, 
who shared Mr. Kato's wishes, to join the envisaged new party." 
 
But Kato has become cautious now that support rates for the Aso 
cabinet have nosedived. 
 
The DPJ has become upbeat, and President Ichiro Ozawa has urged 
anti-Aso LDP members to bolt the party to join the DPJ. 
 
Although former Administrative Reform Minister Yoshimi Watanabe is 
expected to leave the LDP, most party members remain cautious about 
bolting the party before the next Lower House election. A former 
cabinet minister predicted: "No one will follow Kato and Yamasaki, 
neither of whom left the party following the so-called Kato 
rebellion in 2000." 
 
Yamasaki, while attending a New Year's party of lawmakers from 
Kyushu on the night of Jan. 6, said: "I have had a change of heart 
and will work hard under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro 
Aso." 
 
Keeping a low profile before the next Lower House election, Kato for 
the time being plans to study post-election options for political 
realignment in cooperation with Yamasaki. 
 
(7) Editorial: Doubts about cash-benefit plan deepening 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00000066  008 OF 010 
 
 
January 9, 2009 
 
As we expected, doubts are welling up about the government's 
cash-handout plan. 
 
Diet debate has moved into full swing with interpellations underway 
in the House of Representatives Budget Committee on the second 
supplementary budget for fiscal 2008. Prime Minister Taro Aso, in 
explaining the purpose of the flat-sum cash-payout plan included in 
the budget, said that in order to stimulate the economy, high-income 
earners should also receive the handouts and spend the cash. He 
avoided clarifying whether he himself would take the handout, even 
though he previously said that he would not. 
 
Since the prime minister, who is responsible for the plan, cannot 
even make his position clear, how can he explain the need for it to 
the public? The ruling parties intend to reject the opposition's 
request to remove the cash-payout plan from the supplementary 
budget. If the ruling coalition ends up forcing a vote on the 
budget, chaos will reign in the Diet, sidetracking debate on a 
package of economic measures. It goes without saying that the 
situation is critical. 
 
We had to tilt our head in doubt when Aso answered questions by 
Naoto Kan, deputy president of the main opposition Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ). Citing the economic situation as a reason, Aso 
argued that the cash-handout program is needed now more than ever to 
stimulate consumption. He also stated that it would be desirable for 
high-income owners to receive the cash-payments, although he 
previously had been critical of such. 
 
The Aso administration cannot seem to decide whether the cash-payout 
program is part of its social security policy or an 
economic-stimulating measure. In addition, the administration has 
dumped the issue of whether to place income restrictions on the laps 
of local governments to decide. Aso's assertion that the 
cash-benefit plan is aimed to stimulate the economy indicates that 
the cash-benefit plan is half-baked. Since he has changed the 
purpose of the program, he should scrap the plan to dump the income 
matter on local governments. 
 
What we simply cannot understand, more than anything is Aso's 
refusal to answer the question whether he will receive a 
cash-payment, saying that he will make a decision after the budget 
clears the Diet. Although he underscored that decisions should be 
made by individuals, he is in a position different from other 
individuals as the prime minister who dreamed up the program. He is 
the one who once proudly expressed his intention to refuse a 
cash-handout, even before presenting the budget to the Diet. He has 
altered his position on the cash-benefit program because Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda urged the 
government to unify views so that lawmakers will be able to receive 
cash-handouts and because Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura 
then sided with Hosoda. Aso said: "The economic situation has 
substantially changed." But the government and ruling coalition have 
only shifted their response. 
 
Debate on the key issue of jobs has yet to move forward. Although 
the House of Councillors unanimously adopted a resolution calling on 
the government and businesses to keep people on the payrolls, such a 
measure is ineffective. Moreover, it was preceded by horse-trading 
between the ruling and opposition camps over the wording. It goes 
 
TOKYO 00000066  009 OF 010 
 
 
without saying that such political maneuvering is quite different 
from the alarm that the public feels. 
 
The ruling camp aims to get the second supplementary budget through 
the Lower House on Jan. 13. If the opposition is ignored, the Diet 
will fall into confusion, and this will hurt deliberations on the 
state budget for fiscal 2009. In order to prevent further distrust 
in politics, Prime Minister Aso should accept the opposition's 
proposal of excluding the cash-payout program from the second extra 
budget for fiscal 2008. 
 
(8) TOP HEADLINES 
 
Asahi: 
Nishimura Construction suspected of giving 200 million yen to 
ex-Bangkok official 
 
Mainichi: 
Aso, Lee meet in Seoul, seek "new era" for relations 
 
Yomiuri, Sankei and Tokyo Shimbun: 
Aso, Lee agree to enhance cooperation between Japan, South Korea, 
U.S. to address North Korea issues; Cooperation on financial crisis 
also confirmed 
 
Nikkei: 
Market upheaval driving individuals back to bank deposits; Balance 
of time deposits increased 5.6 PERCENT  from last year 
 
Akahata: 
"Dispatch-worker village" executive committee urges government, 
corporations to fulfill their responsibilities 
 
(9) EDITORIALS 
 
Asahi: 
(1) Japan and South Korea: Greater cooperation in international 
scene urged 
(2) New civil servant system essential 
 
Mainichi: 
(1) Japan-South Korea summit: Mature relationship vital 
(2) International Year of Astronomy 2009 
 
Yomiuri: 
(1) Japan, South Korea must strengthen ties 
(2) Brain science requires basic research 
 
Nikkei: 
(1) Employment to test Obama administration's ability 
(2) A new era for Japan-South Korea relations 
 
Sankei: 
(1) Solid partnership essential for Japan, South Korea 
(2) Diabetics need improved diet and physical exercises 
 
Tokyo Shimbun: 
(1) Green New Deal requires specific strategy 
(2) Victims should be allowed to be called to the witness stand 
 
Akahata: 
(1) Children and education: JCP determined to make year 2009 a year 
 
TOKYO 00000066  010 OF 010 
 
 
to question politics and bring hope to public 
 
(10) Prime Minister's schedule, January 11 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 12, 2009 
 
09:29 
Departed for Seoul to hold meeting with South Korea President Lee 
Myung Bak. 
 
Noon 
Arrived at ROK Air Force base in Seoul. Offered flowers at the 
national cemetery. Attended luncheon party-hosted by four South 
Korean economic organizations. 
 
Afternoon 
Visited Hangyang University's fusion technology center. Took part in 
gathering of Japanese and South Korean high-school students and 
exchanged views with them. 
 
Night 
Held informal talks with President Lee at Blue House (presidential 
office). Held along with Lee with business leaders from two 
countries. Attended dinner party hosted by Lee. Stated at Lotte 
Hotel. 
 
Prime Minister's schedule, January 12 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
 
January 13, 2009 
 
Morning 
Held summit meeting with President Lee at Blue House. Held joint 
press conference. Met at Lotte Hotel with ROK-Japan 
Parliamentarians' League Chairman Lee Sang Duk. 
 
Afternoon 
Left ROK Air Force base in Seoul. 
 
15:27 
Arrived at Haneda Airport. 
 
15:34 
Met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto and Cabinet Public 
Relations Secretary Ogawa. 
 
16:53 
Appeared on Fuji TV program. 
 
18:24 
Signed in to report his return at Imperial Palace. 
 
18:40 
Met with Matsumoto at Okura Hotel. 
 
20:50 
Returned to his private residence Kamiyama-cho. 
 
SCHIEFFER