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Viewing cable 09TOKYO150, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/23/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO150 2009-01-23 08:04 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO3289
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0150/01 0230804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230804Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0208
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 4343
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 1997
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 5785
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9890
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 2556
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7352
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3380
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3401
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/23/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Secretary of State Clinton in telephone conversation with 
Foreign Minister Nakasone: "I attach importance to the abduction 
issue and share your thinking" (Nikkei) 
 
(2) Changing U.S foreign policy: To what extent will new 
administration apply pressure to North Korea? (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Shaky Japan-U.S. alliance: Obama and Japan (Part 1) - Like an 
old couple (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) Futenma working teams to report flight survey results (Ryukyu 
Shimpo) 
 
(5) Sales tax hike issue settled in ambiguous way due to concern 
about its impact on upcoming Lower House election: LDP adopts 
two-stage formula, giving priority to avoid creating gap in party 
(Mainichi) 
 
(6) Editorial: We concerned about insufficient debate on MSDF 
dispatch to Somalia (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Secretary of State Clinton in telephone conversation with 
Foreign Minister Nakasone: "I attach importance to the abduction 
issue and share your thinking" 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
Eve., January 23, 2009 
 
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone on the morning of the Jan. 23 
talked for approximately 15 minutes by phone with U.S. Secretary of 
State Clinton. Secretary Clinton expressed her understanding of the 
issue of Japanese having been abducted by North Korea, saying: "I 
attach importance to the abduction issue and share the thinking of 
the Japanese people. I would like the U.S. to cooperate with Japan 
in resolving this issue." Foreign Minister Nakasone replied, "The 
abduction issue is highest on our agenda, and I would like to see 
its resolution carried out together with the nuclear issue." This 
was the first cabinet-level discussion between the two countries 
since President Obama's inauguration. 
 
Both leaders agreed to cooperate toward maintaining the peace and 
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Secretary Clinton stressed 
the importance of the alliance relationship by saying, "The 
U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of America's Asia policy, and 
together we will deal with the various challenges the international 
community is facing." 
 
The two agreed to closely cooperate in such broad areas as 
stabilizing and assisting Afghanistan and Pakistan, the financial 
crisis, and climate change. On the realignment of U.S. forces in 
Japan, they confirmed the policy course of steadily implementing 
such parts of the agreement as the relocation of U.S. Marines on 
Okinawa to Guam, which will start in earnest in fiscal 2009. 
 
(2) Changing U.S foreign policy: To what extent will new 
administration apply pressure to North Korea? 
 
YOMIURI (Page 7) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00000150  002 OF 008 
 
 
January 23, 2009 
 
"To those who cling to power through the silencing of dissent, know 
that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your 
fist." U.S. President Barack Obama in his inaugural address on Jan. 
20 sent a message calling for dialogue even to dictators of 
oppressive states. He apparently had North Korea in mind. 
 
On the North Korean nuclear development issue, the situation became 
worse during the eight years of Bush administration. North Korea 
reportedly now possesses more plutonium to produce nuclear warheads 
and admits that it already has nuclear bombs. It is also suspected 
of pursuing a uranium-enrichment program. The Obama administration, 
which takes the view that the Bush administration's hard-line 
prompted the North to carry out a nuclear test, intends to pressure 
North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons programs based on a 
policy of dialogue. 
 
In a speech before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her 
confirmation hearing on Jan. 13, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
lauded the six-party talks as "a means to apply pressure to North 
Korea," adding: "We will give a chance (to North Korea) for 
bilateral talks." 
 
Eager to improve relations with the U.S., North Korea must be 
welcoming the new administration's policy of dialogue. Immediately 
after Obama was elected to be president, North Korea unofficially 
proposed sending its national symphony orchestra and Vice Foreign 
Minister Kim Gye Gwan to the U.S. Before starting bilateral talks, 
however, many scenes were witnessed in which they tried to apply 
pressure to each other through external statements. 
 
Clinton emphasized in the hearing: "We will promptly impose 
sanctions if the North does not respond to our call for its 
denuclearization." She indicated that if the North refused to accept 
a verification plan, the U.S. would continue the suspension of heavy 
oil assistance. On the renewed website of the White House, this 
message is posted: "In order to urge North Korea to abandon its 
nuclear weapons programs in a complete and verifiable way, we will 
use diplomacy backed by real incentives and real pressure," 
indicating the new administration will take a carrot-and-stick 
approach. 
 
Meanwhile, North Korea revealed through the media that it would not 
respond to Washington's call for denuclearization until the U.S. 
nuclear threat was removed, implying that economic aid and 
normalization of relations alone would be insufficient. 
 
A negotiator said: "If the U.S. stopped offering aid, North Korea 
would resume the operation of its disabled nuclear reactor." The 
source is paying close attention to whether the Obama administration 
would take a resolute approach to the North. The new administration 
includes many members in the Clinton administration, which was about 
to realize a presidential visit to North Korea. Given this, many 
observers take the view that North Korea might get only "carrot." 
 
According to a source close to North Korea, Pyongyang has welcomed 
the new administration's policy of dialogue, not because it aims to 
establish diplomatic ties with the U.S. but because it aims to play 
for time. The source said: "There will be no military option until 
the negotiations end. During that time, North Korea will be able to 
concentrate on forming a successor regime to that of President Kim 
 
TOKYO 00000150  003 OF 008 
 
 
Jong Il with health problems. The nation will also be able to 
improve its missile technology and earn income by selling products 
to other countries." 
 
If the policy of dialogue reaches a stalemate due to North Korea's 
delay strategy, "the Obama administration might take a hard-line 
policy one year after assuming office, with an eye on the off-year 
elections in 2010," according to an informed source. 
 
Even if the U.S. decides to slap sanctions against the North, 
though, its effect will be limited unless it falls in step with 
Japan, China and South Korea. The focus of attention is on how 
effectively the Obama administration's carrot-and-stick approach 
will work to persuade the North to unclench its fist. 
 
(3) Shaky Japan-U.S. alliance: Obama and Japan (Part 1) - Like an 
old couple 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Almost full) 
January 23, 2009 
 
The air in Washington D.C. was freezing cold on the morning of 
January 20. Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Ichiro Fujisaki, 61, 
while distributing disposable hand warmers to other ambassadors 
around him, waited patiently for the arrival of (Barack Obama) for 
his swearing-in ceremony that took place outdoors. 
 
Fujisaki's seat was number 130 in the diplomatic corps section. The 
seating was determined in the order of arrival at post. The seat of 
Fujisaki, who arrived at post last May, was about 100 meters away 
from Obama, who was to deliver his inaugural address. 
 
All countries were extremely eager to build close ties with the new 
U.S. Democratic administration that was launched after an eight-year 
hiatus. Contrary to the physical distance between his seat and the 
new U.S. President, Fujisaki, who had served as a minister-counselor 
at the embassy in Washington during the Clinton administration, felt 
a sense of closeness, thinking, "I have long known many officials 
responsible for Japan policy." 
 
Japan is not allowed to be totally consumed with optimism, however. 
"Self-centered 'me-ism' used to be prevalent in the United States, 
but the new President has now called for 'we-ism," Fujisaki noted. 
Japan-U.S. relations would not be immune to such change. 
 
Finding itself internationally isolated, the Bush administration in 
some respects gave special consideration to Japan that supported the 
Iraq war and other matters. The call for "we-ism" that can be 
rephrased as "international cooperation" could be taken to signify 
the new U.S. administration's intention to make greater demands of 
other countries, especially its allies. 
 
In reaction to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, the 
Foreign Ministry has come up with five challenges that must be 
addressed by Japan in cooperation with the United States: (1) 
deepening of the bilateral alliance, (2) securing peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, (3) the financial crisis, (4) 
the war on terror, and (5) global challenges (climate change, 
nuclear arms reduction, African aid). Those challenges have been 
conveyed to the United States. Japan made the move before being hit 
by a tough nut to crack. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000150  004 OF 008 
 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso, whose political base is weak due to 
frequent changes of prime ministers, remains unable to demonstrate 
strong leadership in security policy, over which the ruling bloc is 
split. Aso failed to make his presence felt in formulating measures 
against piracy in waters off Somalia, Africa. If the Democratic 
Party of Japan led by Ichiro Ozawa who advocates an "equal 
Japan-U.S. alliance" takes power, the country's security policy 
might change drastically. The government is half-hearted when it 
comes to security affairs, which constitutes the foundation of the 
bilateral alliance. This can partly explain why the Aso 
administration is eager to address such policy issues as the 
financial crisis and climate change, in which it takes pride. 
 
Engrossed in the transition of power, the United States is expected 
to be ill-prepared for the creation of a post-Kyoto Protocol 
framework which would come to a head in December this year. Japanese 
lawmakers are on their toes for this year's Lower House election. 
This makes it difficult to generate a path for Japan-U.S. 
cooperation. 
 
Center for Strategic and International Studies President John Hamre 
took this view about the current state of Japan-U.S. relations: 
"They are good but not exciting. They can be likened to the 
relationship between and old husband and wife who do not talk to 
each other even at a restaurant." 
 
The establishment of a new administration can provide a golden 
opportunity for reinvigorating an alliance. But Japan's ruling and 
opposition parties have constantly been at loggerheads and worn 
themselves out as a result. 
 
(4) Futenma working teams to report flight survey results 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
January 23, 2009 
 
Regarding the planned relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma 
Air Station, the government will hold a third meeting of its two 
working teams at the Cabinet Office on the afternoon of Jan. 27 with 
Okinawa's prefectural and municipal officials. One of the working 
teams is tasked with verifying the government's plan to build an 
alternative facility for Futenma airfield and assessing the newly 
planned facility's potential impact on its environs. The other 
working team is to discuss ways to remove the danger of Futenma 
airfield. The two working teams will meet for the first time in 
three months since they met at the Cabinet Office's Okinawa branch 
in October last year. In the scheduled meeting, the working teams 
will report the results of a fact-finding survey the government 
conducted last summer to look into the flight paths of U.S. military 
helicopters around Futenma airfield. 
 
The Okinawa Defense Bureau has set monitoring equipment at five 
points around Futenma airfield and looked into the flight paths of 
Futenma-based helicopters from August through September last year. 
The working team on Futenma's danger will report the results of its 
survey analysis. 
 
The working team on the government's construction plan and 
environmental assessment will explain the current state of an 
environmental impact assessment being conducted at the relocation 
site. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000150  005 OF 008 
 
 
The working teams are positioned under a consultative body on the 
relocation of Futenma airfield. The consultative body is made up of 
cabinet ministers from the government and officials from Okinawa 
Prefecture, including the governor and the heads of municipalities 
in the prefecture's northern districts. Meanwhile, the working teams 
are made up of working-level officials from the central government 
and Okinawa's prefectural and municipal governments, with the 
Defense Ministry Local Cooperation Bureau director general 
presiding. 
 
(5) Sales tax hike issue settled in ambiguous way due to concern 
about its impact on upcoming Lower House election: LDP adopts 
two-stage formula, giving priority to avoid creating gap in party 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
January 23, 2009 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) settled an internal battle over a 
sales tax hike, by adopting a two-stage formula of specifying in a 
supplementary provision of fiscal 2009 tax system reform-relate 
bills that necessary legal measures are to be taken by fiscal 2011, 
while stipulating the time of the increase in the tax in a separate 
bill. The settlement was reached in an ambiguous way as a result of 
priority having been given to the avoidance of internal discord. 
However, the outcome has exposed a growing trend of members 
maintaining a distance from Aso. It also gave the impression that 
Prime Minister Aso, who advocates a hike in the sales tax in fiscal 
2009 with an economic turnaround as the precondition, has given in. 
The path for a hike in the sales tax has now become unclear. 
 
Policy Research Council Chairman Kosuke Hori said at a meeting of 
the LDP Fiscal and Financial Affairs Commission held at the LDP 
headquarters on the morning of the 22nd, "I believe there are 
various objections to the decision. However, this is the result of 
full discussions. Please understand." Participants burst into 
applause. Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki, who has 
been opposing specifying a hike in the sale tax in three years' 
time, praised the decision after the meeting, "The adoption of a 
two-stage formula has considerably wiped away our concern." 
 
The two-stage formula of separating a process for preparations for 
the hike and the implementation of such surfaced when former Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura, chief organizer of the 
Machimura faction, and Ibuki faction Chairman Bunmei Ibuki conferred 
on the issue on the 15th. Hori compiled a compromise plan, based on 
that formula and hastily underwent final coordination. 
 
On the government's side, State Minister for Economic and Fiscal 
Policy Kaoru Yosano and several others called for the removal of the 
two-stage formula. However, Machimura has overcome the opposition, 
saying, "We cannot contain moves of mid-ranking and junior members." 
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe tried to persuade opponents. As 
part of such efforts, he met with former Special Advisor to the 
Prime Minister Hiroshige Seko. 
 
In the end, lawmaker's fear of an adverse effect of protracted 
internal confrontation on the upcoming election served as the 
decisive element in settling the issue. 
 
The government and the ruling camp are making all-out efforts for 
early passage of the fiscal 2008 second extra budget and the fiscal 
2009 budget in their effort to stimulate the economy. Amid the 
 
TOKYO 00000150  006 OF 008 
 
 
economic crisis growing even more serious, if the LDP engages in 
hurley-burley, people would turn their back on it. One senior member 
of a faction opposing the sales tax hike revealed, "If we had 
pressed further, the administration would have collapsed. Since now 
is not the time to do so, we stopped to do so." 
 
Lawmakers' anxieties over the upcoming election that they cannot go 
into the election on the basis of hiking the consumption tax 
triggered the battle over the consumption tax hike. However, it was 
also such anxieties that ended it. 
 
No path for recapitalizing nation's fiscal base in sight 
 
Now that the supplementary provision incorporates a two-stage 
formula for a hike in the sales tax, a path for hiking the sales tax 
starting in fiscal 2011 as advocated by Prime Minister Aso, has 
become even more difficult. 
 
Subcommission Chairman Hakuo Yanagisawa of the LDP Tax System 
Research Commission at a meeting of the LDP Fiscal and Financial 
Affairs Division on the 22nd said, "Whether tax system 
amendment-related bills and a consumption tax hike can be handled as 
a package or a two-stage formula, meaning putting off the actual 
increase of the tax, can be handled as a package depends on the 
economic situation." He stressed that there still remains a slim 
chance of hiking the sales tax in fiscal 2011. 
 
However, it is clear that the government has substantively 
backpedaled from the mid-term program, in which it strongly hinted 
at a sales tax hike in fiscal 2011, noting that legal measures 
necessary for drastic reform of the tax system, including the 
consumption tax, should be taken. 
 
If the mid-term program is to be implemented, it would be possible 
to consolidate related laws as a package, including a law 
stipulating a range of a hike before the end of fiscal 2010, so that 
a new consumption tax rate can be introduced in April 2011. Prime 
Minister Aso and the Finance Ministry had intended to deal with a 
case in which the economy continues to worsen, by establishing a 
flexible article. 
 
Under the two-stage formula, it may be possible to amend related 
laws necessary to raise the consumption tax within fiscal 2010. 
However, that is not enough to realize a consumption tax hike in 
fiscal 2011. That is because the formula is attached with a "fetter" 
that the timing and the range of the increase should be legislated, 
after the trend of the domestic and global economies are 
determined. 
 
Move to oust Aso still remains 
 
Following the settlement, Aso on the evening of the 22nd stressed to 
reporters, "My initial plan has been adopted. I am glad my proposal 
obtained understanding." However, there is no change in the fact 
that the prime minister is unpopular, which is the primary cause of 
concern felt by lawmakers in connection with the upcoming election. 
 
Members of the Group of Voluntary Lawmakers who Are Seeking 
Immediate Policy Realization, including former State Minister for 
Administrative Reform Toshimitsu Motegi, who is cautious about a 
consumption tax hike, met with Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda. 
They asked him to immediately launch a project team for 
 
TOKYO 00000150  007 OF 008 
 
 
administrative reform as a premise for a tax hike in parallel with 
Diet deliberations on bills related to amendment to the tax system. 
 
Radical-minded mid-ranking and junior LDP members want to oust Aso 
before the Lower House election. Such thinking will not go away. 
 
(6) Editorial: We concerned about insufficient debate on MSDF 
dispatch to Somalia 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
January 23, 2009 
 
The ruling parties approved a proposal to dispatch the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to take part in anti-piracy efforts off 
Somalia under the present law. As gunfights can be expected, the 
decision should have been made in a more cautious manner. There 
seems to be no doubt that thorough discussion was not conducted. In 
a normal situation, the Diet should have thoroughly vetted the 
issue. 
 
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, 
New Komeito yesterday gave the green light to send MSDF destroyers 
to waters off Somalia, in the eastern part Africa, based on a 
maritime police action provision in the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 
Law. They say that this is a stopgap measure until a new law is 
enacted. Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada will soon order the MSDF 
to prepare for the mission. 
 
A total of 20,000 vessels, including 2,000 Japanese ships, annually 
pass through Somalian waters, a main artery. Attacks by pirates with 
rockets and other artilleries have rapidly increased in these years, 
causing damage to 111 vessels. 
 
The international community has desperately tried to crack down on 
piracy based on a resolution adopted by the United Nations. China 
dispatched late last year warships to waters off the coast of 
Somalia. South Korea has decided on a dispatch. It is understandable 
for Japan to hurry to take such action, considering that it cannot 
just sit on the fence. 
 
However, is it possible to dispatch MSDF personnel under the present 
law? 
 
An order for maritime patrols is issued to the SDF when the Maritime 
Security Agency (MSA) cannot carry out a policing action. Two orders 
were issued in the past for maritime patrols in the Sea of Japan. 
The law does not stipulate any geographical restrictions. If the SDF 
can be dispatched to Africa, the SDF's scope of activity becomes 
unlimited. 
 
The ruling camp approved the action before thoroughly verifying the 
reasons for the MSA being unable to conduct policing action. We 
cannot help saying that a decision on the dispatch of MSDF ships was 
made beforehand. Cautious and sufficient argument is required for 
the SDF dispatch, which involves human lives. 
 
MSDF destroyers will protect Japanese-registered vessels and foreign 
ships with Japanese nationals and goods on board. Reportedly, the 
MSDF personnel will be allowed to use arms only for legitimate 
self-defense and emergency evacuation. 
 
There seemed be an atmosphere in the ruling camp that the case of 
 
TOKYO 00000150  008 OF 008 
 
 
the Indian Navy having sunk a Thai fishing trawler captured by 
pirates was regarded as emergency evacuation. We can't help feeling 
this is a rough-and-ready argument. 
 
Moreover, the Defense Ministry will formulate specific criteria for 
the use of arms. It is questionable to dump such specific issues as 
how to deal with situations that cannot be identified as legitimate 
self-defense or emergency evacuation on the lap of the Defense 
Ministry. It is not desirable in terms of civilian control. 
 
Besides the MSDF dispatch, there must be a variety of contributions 
Japan can provide such as offering know-how regarding anti-piracy 
measures and funding to neighboring countries. There remain many 
aspects of the pirate situation that we still do not know. These 
matters should be discussed at the Diet first. 
 
SDF personnel will find it troublesome if they are sent without 
these checks. 
 
ZUMWALT