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RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHIK RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHNT #0100/01 0231148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231148Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0346
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0097
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0097
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TASHKENT 000100 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
SBU DELIBERATIVE PROCESS 
DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, PRM, AND G/TIP 
DEPT PASS TO DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ECON KIRF KTIP PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI RS KZ UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NEW STUDY ON LABOR MIGRATION 
 
REF: a) REF: TASHKENT 67 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: In December, the United Nations Development 
Program's (UNDP) office in Tashkent published a new study on labor 
migration from Uzbekistan based on surveys conducted in 2006 and 
¶2007.  While the study does not reflect the impact of the current 
financial crisis upon labor migration, it nevertheless provides an 
important historical overview of the phenomenon and the factors 
that drove it.  For many years, labor migration served as a social 
safety valve for the country, enabling the Uzbek government to 
export its excess labor (mainly unemployed young men) to its 
northern neighbors.  Many Uzbek families also became dependent on 
remittances sent from their relatives abroad.  With the recent 
cooling of the Russian and Kazakh economies due to the financial 
crisis and drop in energy prices, some observers fear that this 
social safety valve may now be closing (reftel).  Uzbek families 
who currently depend on remittances will be hit hard, and the 
countryside may see an increase in the number of unemployed, 
economically disfranchised young men, whose numbers might be 
further swelled by the government's recent agricultural reforms. 
End summary. 
 
 
 
LABOR MIGRATION: WHY HAVE ALL THE UZBEKS GONE? 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) Labor migration from Uzbekistan is both a product of the 
country's growing population and the government's sluggish economic 
reforms since independence, which have failed to provide 
adequately-paying employment for the country's relatively young 
population (nearly a third of Uzbeks are currently under 18 year of 
age).  While Uzbekistan suffered less of an economic depression 
immediately after independence than other post-Soviet countries, 
its economy has since grown much slower than the economies of its 
northern neighbors, Kazakhstan and Russia, which, until recently, 
were buoyed by high energy prices.  To find work with adequate 
salaries, many Uzbeks have little choice but to head north each 
year. 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) The economic pressures on ordinary Uzbeks has continued to 
grow year by year.  Official government statistics show that the 
daily per capita income in Uzbekistan averages only around 1.40 
dollars.  According to the World Bank, approximately 75 percent of 
the population lives below the poverty line, defined as earnings 
less than 2.15 dollars per day, while 25.8 percent of Uzbeks earn 
less than 110 dollars per day.  At the same time, the cost of 
living in Uzbekistan has grown steadily at 25 to 30 percent over 
the last five years.  While government figures show relatively low 
levels of unemployment (less than one percent), these figures hide 
the fact that many jobs in Uzbekistan are poorly paid, especially 
in rural areas.  Uzbek families tend to be large, and many adults 
support multiple dependents, including children and elderly 
parents. 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) Opportunities for legal migration exist and are increasing 
as the Uzbek government signs additional labor treaties with third 
countries.  For example, Uzbekistan signed labor agreements with 
Poland and Oman in 2008 and with Russia in 2007.  However, 
opportunities for Uzbeks to find legal employment abroad remain 
limited, and the number of legal migrants is still dwarfed by the 
numbers of migrants who work illegally in third countries. 
 
 
 
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOR MIGRATION FROM UZBEKISTAN 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) There are no official statistics, but according to the World 
 
TASHKENT 00000100  002 OF 006 
 
 
 
Bank, the number of migrants from Uzbekistan seeking permanent or 
temporary labor abroad may be as high as 3 million.  The boom in 
Uzbek labor migration abroad started roughly in 2000, when the 
economies of Russia and Kazakhstan began to stabilize as the result 
of rising energy prices.  By 2008 the number of destination 
countries for Uzbek labor migrants (both legal and illegal) had 
expanded, and now include not only former Soviet states, but also 
the European Union (Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain); 
the Middle East (UAE; Turkey); and Asia (Korea, Thailand). 
However, Russia and Kazakhstan remain the primary destination for 
the vast majority of Uzbek labor migrants.  Remittances from Uzbek 
labor migrants abroad have grown sharply over the last five years, 
though data is scarce.  According to the World Bank estimates, 
remittances from labor migrants abroad contribute roughly 9 percent 
of GDP, though some observers argue that the real volume might be 
twice as high. 
 
 
 
¶6. (U) Much labor migration from Uzbekistan is seasonal, with many 
workers leaving for Kazakhstan and Russia in the spring and summer 
each year and then returning to Uzbekistan in the winter.  However, 
the last few years reportedly have seen an increase in the number 
of Uzbek labor migrants who have settled permanently abroad. 
 
 
 
¶7. (U) Due to the recent worldwide financial crisis, drop in energy 
prices, and subsequent cooling of the Russian and Kazakh economies, 
many Uzbek labor migrants appear to have been laid off and have 
returned home.  While Uzbek labor migrants, especially those 
working in construction, traditionally head back to their families 
in the winter, anecdotal evidence suggests that fewer Uzbek 
laborers will head abroad again next year. 
 
 
 
NEW UNDP LABOR MIGRATION STUDY 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶8. (U) In December, UNDP and the Gender Program of the Swiss 
Embassy in Uzbekistan issued a new Russian-language study, "Labor 
Migration in the Republic of Uzbekistan: Social, Legal and Gender 
aspects," based on sociological surveys conducted with Uzbek labor 
migrants in 2006-2007.  As the research was conducted before the 
current financial crisis, its findings do not necessarily reflect 
the current situation.  Nevertheless, the report provides an 
important historic overview of labor migration from Uzbekistan and 
the factors that drove it. 
 
 
 
STUDY FINDS MANY UZBEK FAMILIES DEPENDENT ON REMITTANCES 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (U) The report offers some startling statistics.  According to 
survey data, about 30 percent of Uzbeks have considered seeking 
employment abroad at some point, while 30 to 40 percent of Uzbek 
families have at least one relative working abroad at any one time. 
54 percent of labor migrants reported supporting three or more 
dependants, while only 13 percent of the migrants stated that they 
were working primarily "for themselves."  The majority of migrants 
have between 2 and 5 dependants.  Most male labor migrants 
explained that they had made the decision to work abroad in 
consultation with their families.  Many men working abroad reported 
that they were saving money for a daughter's wedding, for a son's 
education, or to buy or expand a home.  Migrants observed that it 
is possible to find work in Uzbekistan, but such work did not pay 
enough for workers to accrue significant savings. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) The study found that the income of Uzbek families with 
 
TASHKENT 00000100  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
relatives working abroad was about 5 to 10 times higher than the 
incomes of other families.  Uzbek labor migrants abroad reportedly 
earn on average about 300 to 400 dollars a month.  In contrast, the 
same laborers could hope to earn a maximum of about 115 dollars per 
month in Uzbekistan.  Migrants reported sending about half of their 
earnings back to Uzbekistan as remittances.  The study also found 
that a significant portion of labor migrants were well-educated. 
As many as one-third of migrants have a university degree, while 
nearly two-thirds of them have completed either secondary or 
vocational school. 
 
 
 
MOST EXTERNAL LABOR MIGRANTS HEAD TO RUSSIA 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) According to the study, a majority of labor migrants from 
Uzbekistan head to Russia, while most of the remainder headed to 
Kazakhstan.  Male Uzbek migrants mainly work in construction or the 
retail trade and agriculture sectors.  Uzbek labor migrants do not 
need visas to enter Russia or Kazakhstan.  In addition, the study 
found that labor migration in the post-Soviet sphere is facilitated 
by close family and cultural ties between citizens of the former 
Soviet states (which, roughly 20 years ago, were part of the same 
country), common systems of transport and communications, similar 
education systems, and the use of Russian as a lingua franca. 
 
 
 
SOME UZBEK MIGRANTS DON'T SEEK TO RETURN 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) A majority of the Uzbek migrants surveyed reported working 
abroad for at least 3 years, while a few migrants reported working 
abroad for as long as 15 years.  Less than 8 percent of respondents 
said that they planned to permanently return home within six 
months.  23 percent of migrants stated that they had not been home 
in the last 18 months, with in some cases had led to the rupture of 
familial bonds.  28 percent of those interviewed reported they had 
no plans to return to Uzbekistan under any circumstances.  Many of 
those migrants had brought their families abroad with them or had 
started new families abroad (some Uzbek migrants allegedly maintain 
two families: one in Uzbekistan and the other where they work). 
Many of these migrants have applied for permanent residency and 
citizenship abroad, which, in recent years, has become easier to 
obtain in Kazakhstan and Russia. 
 
 
 
INTERNAL LABOR MIGRATION 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶13. (U) The report also surveyed internal labor migrants.  Many 
external labor migrants first migrated internally to obtain work 
experience and collect enough money to travel abroad.  Most 
internal immigrants come from rural regions, and almost 80 percent 
of internal migrants head to Tashkent.  Many internal labor 
migrants are unable to find permanent work, and instead look for 
short-term employment at local informal job markets (called 
"mardikors").  Internal labor migrants reported earning an average 
of about 85 dollars a month.  Internal labor migrants tend to be 
less educated than external labor migrants.  Nearly 90 percent of 
internal migrants lacked official registration where they worked 
(Uzbek law requires citizens to be legally registered where they 
reside).  Some external labor migrants explained that one of the 
reasons they decided to leave Uzbekistan was the difficulty of 
obtaining legal registration in Tashkent. 
 
TASHKENT 00000100  004 OF 006 
 
 
 
WOMEN MAKE UP NEARLY A QUARTER OF LABOR MIGRANTS 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
¶14. (U) Surprisingly, the study found that 23.2 percent of external 
and internal migrant workers were women.  In contrast to men, most 
female Uzbek migrants made the decision to leave home on their own, 
and nearly half of them were single.  Women with children who 
migrated came  home more often than men with children, but their 
absences were more disruptive for their families.  Female migrants 
largely worked as domestic servants or in the agriculture and food 
processing sectors.  Women migrants tended to be paid 30 percent 
less than men.  1.3 percent of women migrants surveyed reported 
engaging in prostitution.  Almost a third of female migrants 
interviewed explained that they had no intention to return home, 
mainly because Uzbek society and their families tend to look down 
upon them. 
 
 
 
MIGRANTS FACE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, HARRASSMENT 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶15. (U) As has been reported by other sources, the study found that 
Uzbek labor migrants in third countries routinely encountered 
difficulties with legal registration, finding adequate housing, and 
police harassment.  Compared to legal migrants, illegal Uzbek 
migrants are much more likely to be harassed by police and lack 
adequate housing.  On average, illegal external migrants reported 
working almost 10 hour a day (though some reported working as much 
as 18 hours a day) for 6 days a week.  Employers often provided 
them with food and accommodation, sometimes free of charge, but it 
was usually of poor quality.  Illegal labor migrants were 
frequently cheated by employers and were not paid or paid less than 
promised.  In some circumstances, illegal migrants became 
trafficking victims and were forced to work basically as slaves for 
their employers.  As victims were illegal migrants, they had few 
opportunities to appeal for aid from host country authorities. 
Despite these problems, many migrants said that they preferred not 
to sign official contracts in order to avoid payments of 
registration fees and taxes. 
 
 
 
RUSSIA MAY SEEK TO REDUCE INFLOW OF LABOR MIGRANTS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶16. (U) Russia currently accepts the second largest number of labor 
migrants in the world after the United States.  Foreign workers are 
estimated to contribute between 7 to 10 percent of the country's 
gross national product.  Meanwhile, remittances from Russia are the 
second largest source of external financing for many post-Soviet 
republics.  Before 2007, the legalization procedure for foreign 
labor migrants in Russia was extremely difficult and migrants 
routinely paid bribes to Russian law enforcement officials.  In 
2007, Russia simplified its migration legislation, which resulted 
in a significant increase in the percentage of registered migrants. 
Labor migrants in Russia are now issued "labor migration" cards, 
which enable them to switch employers, thus making them less 
vulnerable to unscrupulous employers who may attempt to seize their 
legal documents.  In 2007, Russia also signed a labor agreement 
with Uzbekistan, allowing over a thousand Uzbeks to find legal 
employment in Russia by September 2008 (although this still only 
represents a small fraction of the total number of Uzbeks working 
in Russia). 
 
 
 
¶17. (U) However, the recent financial crisis and decline in energy 
prices has hit the Russian economy hard.  According to some 
experts, about 4 million foreign labor migrants in Russia may lose 
 
TASHKENT 00000100  005 OF 006 
 
 
 
their jobs.  Russia also cut its quota of work permits for foreign 
workers, which stood at 3.4 million in 2008, by half in December. 
 
 
 
GREATER NUMBER OF MIGRANTS RETURNING TO UZBEKISTAN 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶18. (U) As many Uzbek labor migrants typically return home to 
Uzbekistan in winter, it is difficult to gauge yet whether the 
majority of migrants returning home now plan to stay in Uzbekistan 
next year or will attempt to seek work abroad again.  However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that greater number of Uzbek migrants 
have been laid off in Kazakhstan and Russia than in previous years. 
For example, in December, an independent website reported that an 
average of six to eight thousand Uzbek labor migrants were 
returning home each day form Kazakhstan and Russia, an apparent 
increase over previous years. 
 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL REFORM INCREASES RANKS OF THE UNEMPLOYED 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
 
¶19. (SBU) At the same time that fewer Uzbek labor migrants may be 
ale to find work abroad, the Uzbek government is pursuing 
agricultural reforms which may further increase the ranks of the 
unemployed.  In November, the Uzbek government issued a decree 
calling for the country's small farms to be amalgamated into larger 
farms.  Knowledgeable observers observed that provincial 
authorities in several regions of Uzbekistan are already using 
various mechanisms to take farmland away from small landholders 
(Note: Farmers do not own land in Uzbekistan, but lease it from the 
government for long periods of time.  End Note.)  Authorities are 
reportedly seizing land from small farmers for failing to meet 
state quotas for cotton and wheat, falling into debt, or for 
lacking sufficient expertise in agriculture.  Knowledgeable 
observers report that while some land seized from farmers is being 
given to wealthier farmers with political connections, farmland is 
also being given to the most productive farmers or those with 
significant agricultural experience. 
 
 
 
¶20. (SBU) While the government's reforms are aimed at increasing 
the agricultural sector's efficiency and productivity, they will 
also likely lead to an increase in the unemployed.  There are no 
firm estimates of the number of individual who have already been 
deprived of their farmland or how many more individual may lose 
their land next year.  In previous years, these now landless 
laborers might be expected to head abroad for work (in fact, many 
current labor migrants are reportedly persons who became unemployed 
after the privatization of collective farms several years ago.) 
However, now that migrant laborers have fewer opportunities abroad, 
it is unclear what these  landless individuals will do to support 
themselves and their families. 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶21. (SBU) While UNDP's survey does not reflect the impact of the 
current global financial crisis on labor migration from Uzbekistan; 
it nevertheless provides a useful historical overview of the 
phenomenon and the factors which drove it.  For many years, labor 
migration from Uzbekistan has served as a convenient social safety 
valve for the Uzbek government, which exported much of its excess 
labor to its neighbors.  However, that safety valve may now be 
closing.  While many Uzbek migrants traditionally return home in 
 
TASHKENT 00000100  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
the winter, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Uzbek labor 
migrants now face diminished job prospects abroad and may choose to 
stay in Uzbekistan next year.  Any loss of remittances from abroad 
will hit Uzbek families hard, many of whom are already struggling 
with rising staple prices.  An increase in the number of young, 
unemployed males in rural regions - whose numbers may be further 
swelled by the government's recent agricultural reforms - could 
lead to social unrest and rising crime rates.  While Uzbekistan 
remains stable and the situation is still far from a ticking time 
bomb, any increase in rural unemployment may eventually impact the 
country's long-term stability. 
 
 
 
BUTCHER 
NORLAND 
 
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