Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09TAIPEI67, H5N2 OUTBREAK TESTS TAIWAN'S PREPAREDNESS TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TAIPEI67.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TAIPEI67 2009-01-16 09:12 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXRO8594
PP RUEHAST RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHTM
RUEHTRO RUEHVC
DE RUEHIN #0067/01 0160912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160912Z JAN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0759
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 2720
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000067 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OES/S/IHB, HHS FOR OGHA STEIGER, BHAT AND ABDOO; 
FAS/OSTA HAMILTON, BEAN; FAS/OCRA RADLER, BEILLARD, 
FAS/OFSO BREHM; APHIS/IS CAPLEN; APHIS/VS JAMES-PRESTON, 
ISAAC; 
USTR FOR STRATFORD AND ALTBACH 
USDOC FOR 3132/USFCS/OIO/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV TSPL TBIO ECON SOCI KSCA ETRD PGOV TW
SUBJECT: H5N2 OUTBREAK TESTS TAIWAN'S PREPAREDNESS TO 
COMBAT BIRD FLU 
 
 1. (SBU)  SUMMARY. A low-pathogenic H5N2 virus outbreak, 
discovered on a Kaohsiung chicken farm in October 2008, but 
not reported for two months, underscores the need for 
transparency at the Council of Agriculture (COA) regarding 
virus outbreaks among poultry and animals. The authorities' 
slow response has generated concern from the public and the 
health community, although test results show that the virus 
was of low pathogenicity.  On December 20, following tests 
confirming the H5N2 virus as a low-pathogenic type, Taiwan 
then notified the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
of the findings.  However,  pending completed tests on the 76 
chicken farms to prove it is virus-free, Taiwan remains on 
the H5N2 Avian Influenza list of OIE, and Japan has banned 
Taiwan poultry imports.  The incident has hurt public trust 
in the ability of the authorities to keep it informed of 
virus outbreaks, and has dealt the poultry industry a heavy 
blow. END SUMMARY 
 
PUBLIC NOT NOTIFIED OF OUTBREAK 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  On January 14, ESTHoff met with COA's Bureau of 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine office 
(BAPHIQ) to get an update on the H5N2 bird flu outbreak. 
According to COA, on October 21, three dead chickens were 
found at the Luchu poultry farm in Kaohsiung.  The farm's 
owners notified the Kaohsiung County Animal Disease Control 
Center to conduct sampling and testing.  On October 23, the 
county sent experts to inspect 76 poultry farms within a 
three kilometer radius, and a movement ban was imposed on 
chickens from one poultry farm to another.  From October 21 
to November 7, 230 chickens out of a population of 18,000 
died from the H5N2 virus; a death rate not unusual for a 
population of that size. COA officials told us that the dead 
chickens were first tested on November 12, and results 
indicated a high pathogenic strain of H5N2.  However, the low 
rate of mortality made them skeptical of this initial test, 
and further testing was scheduled. (Note: In 2004, a 
low-pathogenic H5N2 outbreak affected many chicken farms in 
central Taiwan, and the mortality rate was much higher).  No 
press statements were issued at this stage, and the public 
was unaware of the outbreak. COA officials told us they did 
not release any information on the outbreak because test 
results were not yet available, and that it takes from 19-40 
days to complete standard testing procedures. 
 
JAPAN BANS TAIWAN POULTRY IMPORTS 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU)  On November 14, all 18,000 birds at the Luchu 
poultry farm, where the initial outbreak took place, were 
destroyed.  On December 17, the media broke the story, 
resulting in a public outcry and to Japan's banning Taiwan 
poultry imports the same day.  Since Taiwan exports about 
5,000 tons of ducks to Japan (90 percent of its duck meat 
exports), the economic loss from the ban is estimated at more 
than NT 1 billion (USD 3 million). On December 20, a second 
test on live-but-sickly chickens at the Luchu farm finally 
confirmed that the H5N2 was of low pathogenicity. On that 
day, COA officially notified OIE of the results. OIE requires 
a member to be placed in "AI free status" only after a 90-day 
zero-AI infection period.  To comply with this requirement, 
COA officials said COA would have to take 40 samples from 
each of the 76 poultry farms from December to February and 
show negative results. If and when that occurs, COA will then 
request that Taiwan be taken off the list of H5N2-affected 
jurisdictions. Only then will Japan allow Taiwan poultry to 
be imported again. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
4. (SBU)  In withholding information about the H5N2 virus for 
nearly two months, the COA acted at variance with the  basic 
tenets of the OIE, which requires transparency in public 
notification of such an event.  While COA officials claim 
they were cautious about releasing data on the H5N2 outbreak 
because there was no conclusive evidence of the pathogenicity 
of the virus, the public only found out when the news media 
 
TAIPEI 00000067  002 OF 002 
 
 
broke the story.  COA wanted to protect Taiwan's poultry 
industry and had concerns about paying an indemnity to 
producers. This strategy lowered public trust in COA's 
ability to protect the public interest, and proved unable to 
avert serious economic consequences for the Taiwan poultry 
industry.  END COMMENT 
SYOUNG