O 151710Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4035
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000031 
 
 
S/WCI FOR GOREY AND RICCI 
OSD FOR DONOFRIO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM SW
SUBJECT: GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: SWEDES OUTLINE PROCESS, WAIT 
FOR "SIGNAL" FROM NEW ADMINISTRATION 
 
REF: A. GOREY-DONOFRIO-KOEHLER E-MAIL 01/13/09 
     ¶B. 08 STOCKHOLM 781 
     ¶C. 08 STOCKHOLM 722 
     ¶D. 07 STOCKHOLM 368 
     ¶E. 05 STOCKHOLM 1589 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: Sweden will not decide "right away" whether 
it will accept Guantanamo detainees but will likely make a 
decision if it gets a "signal" from the Obama Administration, 
MFA State Secretary Belfrage told DCM on January 14.  Sweden 
would need to think carefully about accepting ethnic Uighurs 
because of potential Chinese reactions.  In any case, added 
Belfrage, he thought he had heard that Germany would be 
accepting 17 Uighurs from Guantanamo for resettlement. 
 
¶2. (S) Separately, Emboffs have learned that any Swedish 
agreement to accept Guantanamo detainees will require the 
support of the Government, the independent refugee agency 
(Swedish Migration Board or SMB), and the Swedish Security 
Services (SAPO).  An upcoming parliamentary debate on January 
20 )- as well as the January 26 meeting of the GAERC -- will 
shed light on the Swedish government's willingness to 
facilitate the process.  The independent SMB ultimately has 
the authority to adjudicate individual resettlement cases 
based on specific legal requirements.  Post contacts indicate 
that Guantanamo detainees likely conform to the Swedish legal 
definition for refugee.  SAPO also reviews all refugee cases 
and could block the resettlement of Guantanamo detainees 
determined to be a security threat either on the basis of 
their individual background or on the basis of the reaction 
of specific minority communities in Sweden to their presence. 
 End Summary. 
 
Waiting for a Signal from Obama Administration 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (S) During a January 14 farewell lunch for the Ambassador, 
DCM raised with MFA State Secretary Frank Belfrage (minister 
equivalent) Sweden's willingness to accept Guantanamo 
detainees and handed over a packet of five representative 
cases for consideration (Ref A).  Belfrage said the 
government was giving serious consideration to the matter. 
However, Sweden will not decide "right away" whether it will 
accept Guantanamo detainees but will likely make a decision 
only if it gets a "signal" from the Obama administration.  On 
Uighurs per se, Sweden would need to think carefully about 
potential Chinese reactions, Belfrage said.  In any case, 
added Belfrage, he thought he had heard that Germany would be 
accepting "17 Uighurs" from Guantanamo for resettlement. 
 
Sweden's Position to Be Clarified in Late January 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (S) Earlier in the week, Emboffs held a number of meetings 
with MFA and SMB interlocutors after a press spokesman for 
Prime Minister Reinfeldt stated publicly on January 4 that 
Sweden had not received a formal request from the USG to 
accept detainees from Guantanamo.  Noting multiple earlier 
requests (Refs B-E and previous), Emboffs asked for 
clarification.  On January 12, the MFA Americas Desk 
director, Ambassador Maria Lundqvist, assured POL Counselor 
that the MFA understood that earlier USG requests had been 
formal and official, and she cited a "misunderstanding" as 
the reason for the press spokesman's comments.  She added 
that Swedish position would become clearer after January 20, 
when Migration Minister Tobias Billstrom is scheduled to 
reply to a December 2008 question from the opposition Social 
Democrats on the government's stance on Guantanamo detainees. 
 The Swedes will also discuss the issue in preparation for 
scheduled discussion on the topic at the January 25-26 GAERC 
meeting. 
 
Understanding the Swedish Process for Resettlement 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (S) Pol Counselor and Emboff met later on January 12 with 
the SMB,s Chief of the Asylum and Refugee Unit, Oscar 
Ekblad, to discuss precisely how the USG could make a formal 
and official request for resettlement of Guantanamo 
detainees.  (Note: Ekblad,s unit would be responsible for 
adjudicating any cases involving the Guantanamo detainees). 
Ekblad stated that the SMB is an independent government body 
that adjudicates all claims for asylum and resettlement in 
Sweden.  To be considered formally, cases must be referred to 
the SMB in one of three ways: 
 
-- UNHCR: Ekblad noted that vast majority of refugee cases 
are referred to the SMB through UNHCR, and said that this was 
the "regular channel."  He stated that if UNHCR were to 
request SMB consideration of specific Guantanamo detainees, 
SMB would adjudicate individuals purely on the merits of the 
case. 
 
-- Special referrals from Swedish missions abroad: Ekblad 
said that there have been a small number of refugee cases 
referred through Swedish embassies overseas.  In such cases, 
the Embassy refers the case to the MFA, which if in agreement 
forwards the case onward to the SMB for adjudication.  Ekblad 
was careful to note that once the case was officially 
referred to the SMB, government officials could no longer 
influence the outcome.  Refugee cases would be adjudicated by 
one of the five officers working for Ekblad using the Swedish 
Alien's Act of March 2006 as well as the principles of the 
1951 UN Refugee Convention.  When pressed on the Guantanamo 
detainees, Ekblad stated that he believed these individuals 
likely conform to the Swedish legal definition for refugee. 
 
-- Referrals directly from the Swedish government: Ekblad 
said that although there was no prescribed mechanism in 
place, the Government could issue special instructions to the 
SMB to consider specific groups of persons, such as 
Guantanamo detainees, for resettlement in Sweden.  Ekblad 
said this would be a "political decision by the government" 
and would likely involve a consultative process between 
government officials and the SMB. 
 
¶6. (C) When pressed on whether the USG's previous four 
requests to Swedish authorities on Guantanamo refugees had 
been formal, Ekblad said the SMB was bound by Swedish 
administrative law to respond to all requests, but if a 
request was not referred through one of the three channels 
described above, then it would be denied for "technical" 
reasons, i.e., not denied on the merits of the specific case. 
 Ekblad stated that is why our November 2008 request for 
resettlement of Detainee 049 was denied (ref C). 
 
¶7. (S) Ekblad also reported that the Swedish government, 
working in conjunction with UNHCR, would finalize the 
geographic allocation of Sweden's refugee quota for 2009 the 
week of January 19, 2009.  Ekblad stated that Sweden has 
approved 1900 slots for migrants for 2009.  He added that he 
thought half of these would be reserved for Iraqi refugees 
and some 500-600 split among refugees from the Horn of 
Africa, Iran, Malaysia, and Thailand -- with 300-400 slots 
left open for "emergency cases" (i.e., referrals from Swedish 
embassies).  Ekblad said that if approved, Guantanamo 
detainees would likely be handled within this allocated 
emergency quota. 
 
Swedish Threat Assessment Could Hinder Resettlement 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. (S) Ekblad emphasized that the Swedish Security Services 
(SAPO) reviews all resettlement cases and that they 
effectively have a veto power.  (As noted in reftels E and F, 
previous Guantanamo resettlement requests were denied in part 
on the basis of security concerns over specific individuals.) 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (S) In addition to the personal backgrounds of potential 
refugees, we assess that SAPO would also be concerned over 
specific classes of persons who might be become "instant 
heroes" in certain Swedish minority communities because their 
status as former Guantanamo detainees.  Ethnic Somalis, for 
example, would likely receive special status in Sweden's 
minority Somali communities in Rinkeby and elsewhere.  Ethnic 
Uighurs or Uzbeks, on the other hand, would have no such 
minority community base here. End Comment. 
 
 
WOOD