P R 141616Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
INFO PAGE 02        STATE   003691  141623Z
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KYIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 003691 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE KSCA PARM PREL MNUC ETTC TSPA UP BR
 
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO UKRAINIAN QUESTIONS CONCERNING USG 
SUPPORT FOR  UKRAINIAN-BRASILIAN SLV JOINT VENTURE AT 
ALCANTARA (C) 
 
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 001652 
     ¶B. 05 STATE 141756 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
Reason:  1.5 (B), (D). 
 
¶1.  (U)  This is an action request.  Embassy Brasilia, please 
see paragraph 7. 
 
¶2.  (C)  BACKGROUND:  REF A reports that the Ukrainian 
Embassy in Brasilia is urging the U.S. to reconsider its 
position on support for the Ukrainian-Brazilian Tsyklon Space 
Launch Project and allow the launch of U.S. satellites from 
Brazil's Alcantara launch site on the Tsyklon (Cyclone) 
launch vehicle.  As noted REF B, the U.S. will not authorize 
the launch of U.S. satellites or foreign satellites with 
U.S.-licensed components from Alcantara until the U.S.-Brazil 
Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA), which Brazil has yet 
to ratify, enters into effect.  Additionally, while the U.S. 
is prepared to support the joint Ukrainian-Brazilian project 
once the U.S.-Brazil TSA becomes active, it does not support 
Brazil's indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV) program. 
 
¶3.  (C)  ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND FOR POSTS' INFORMATION ONLY: 
For several years, Brazil and Ukraine have been seeking to 
establish a launch facility for the Ukrainian Tsyklon 
(Cyclone) SLV at Alcantara.  The two countries have signed an 
umbrella space agreement and a Technology Safeguards 
Agreement to facilitate this project, but neither country has 
had the funds needed to establish a Tsyklon launch facility. 
A key impediment to funding is the current inability to 
launch U.S. satellites (and non-U.S. satellites with 
U.S.-licensed components) from Alcantara. 
 
¶4.  The U.S. currently does not permit launches of U.S. 
satellites or foreign satellites with U.S.-licensed 
components from Alcantara because of our longstanding policy 
not to "encourage" Brazil's SLV program (or other 
MTCR-country SLV programs the U.S. did not support before the 
advent of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987). 
However, in 1999 the U.S. decided that it would be prepared 
to permit such launches from Alcantara on Tsyklon (as well as 
on U.S. SLVs) if Brazil would conclude a TSA with the U.S. 
that would both protect against unauthorized technology 
transfer and provide a credible basis for the U.S. to 
maintain that permitting such launches would not "encourage" 
Brazil's own SLV program. 
 
¶5.  Such a TSA was negotiated and signed in April 2000. 
Entry into force, however, required ratification by the 
Brazilian Senate (for the U.S., the TSA is an Executive 
Agreement), which refused to ratify the TSA, citing 
sovereignty concerns.  In November 2003, Brazil indicated it 
was ready to initiate discussions with the U.S. on 
renegotiating the April 2000 TSA to address its Congress' 
concerns and permit ratification.  Since then, Brazil has 
sporadically sought U.S. views on various informal 
renegotiation proposals.  The latest such Brazilian effort 
occurred in September 2005, when the GOB asked whether the 
USG would be prepared to resolve certain issues by means of a 
mutually agreed public, unilateral declaration by the GOB. 
We responded in November 2005 that we would be prepared to 
work on this basis, as long as the total TSA package 
preserves sufficient technical and legal safeguards, 
including on the political level, to address our 
proliferation concerns.  We also indicated that if Brazil 
wished to pu 
rsue this issue, it should get back to us with a formal 
renegotiation request, including specifics on the wording of 
the unilateral declaration.  Brazil has not raised the issue 
since that November 2005 discussion. 
 
¶6.  (C)  PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: In response to REF A request, we 
want to remind Ukrainian officials that the U.S. does not 
oppose establishing a Tsyklon launch site at Alcantara, as 
long as that activity does not result in the transfer of 
rocket technology to Brazil and that U.S. policy on support 
for this effort has not changed.  Specifically, the U.S. will 
be prepared to permit Tsyklon to launch U.S. satellites, and 
foreign satellites with U.S. licensed components, from 
Alcantara once our bilateral TSA with Brazil enters into 
effect. 
 
¶7.  (C)  ACTION REQUEST: Request Embassy Brasilia respond to 
Ukrainian Embassy queries concerning the Ukrainian-Brazilian 
space launch joint venture at Alcantara, making the following 
points: 
 
--As we have discussed previously with your government, the 
U.S. will be prepared to support the Ukrainian-Brazilian 
space launch joint venture at Alcantara once our bilateral 
Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) with Brazil enters into 
effect. 
 
--However, until the TSA becomes active, the U.S. will 
not/not be prepared to permit Tsyklon to launch U.S. 
satellites and foreign satellites with U.S.-licensed 
components from Alcantara. 
 
--The TSA was signed in 2000, but Brazil has been unable to 
ratify it to date. 
 
If pressed for further information on the status of our TSA 
with Brazil, post should urge Ukrainian officials to discuss 
the issue with their Brazilian partners. 
 
NOTE:  Embassy Kyiv may doubletrack this response with host 
government officials as appropriate.  END NOTE. 
 
¶8.  (U) Washington POCs are ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham 
(Phone: 202-647-4931) and ISN/MTR Kennedy Wilson (Phone: 
202-647-1747).  Please slug any reporting on this issue for 
ISN/MTR and WHA/BSC. 
RICE 
 
 
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