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DE RUEHC #0322/01 0030401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030347Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 4942

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA ENRG NPT PREL KNNP TRGY KTIA
PARM, MNUC, PGOV 
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
 
¶1.  This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs 
15-17. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2. Summary: On December 30, 2008, the President signed 
the instrument of ratification for the Protocol 
Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for 
the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 
America ("the Additional Protocol").  He did so to 
bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards 
and thus to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to detect 
clandestine nuclear programs, and to promote the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security 
policy.  The United States will continue to encourage 
all states which have not done so to bring into force 
Additional Protocols of their own.  END SUMMARY 
 
---------- 
Objectives 
---------- 
 
¶3.  Objectives: 
 
--      To highlight the President's ratification and entry 
into force of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol; 
 
--      To urge host governments that have not done so to 
take the steps necessary to bring into force 
comprehensive safeguards agreements required by the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 
 
--      To urge host governments that have not done so to 
take the steps necessary to bring into force an 
Additional Protocol.  End Objectives. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶4.  Background:  To help guard against the spread of 
nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (the "NPT") mandates acceptance of 
safeguards to be implemented by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) by the non-nuclear-weapon states 
(NNWS) that are States Party.  These IAEA safeguards 
increase confidence and provide assurances that nuclear 
materials and technologies are not diverted from 
peaceful uses to weapons uses in non-nuclear-weapon 
states and provide a basis for international responses 
to nonproliferation violations.  The IAEA safeguards 
system plays an indispensable role in implementing the 
NPT, and in curbing nuclear proliferation and reducing 
the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. 
 
¶5.  The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States Party to 
accept Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in all 
of their peaceful nuclear activities.  The United 
States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT, is 
under no legal obligation to accept such safeguards. 
However, beginning with the U.S. Voluntary Offer 
Safeguards Agreement in 1977, it has been the policy of 
the United States to permit the full application of 
Agency safeguards, excluding only those facilities 
associated with activities with direct national security 
significance to the United States.  By submitting itself 
to the same safeguards on all of its civil nuclear 
facilities to which non-nuclear-weapon States Party are 
subject, the United States in 1967 intended to 
demonstrate that adherence to the NPT would not place 
other countries at a commercial disadvantage, either 
because of increased costs associated with safeguards or 
because of the risk of the compromise of proprietary 
information.  This offer was critical to gaining the 
acceptance of the NPT by countries such as Germany and 
Japan. 
¶6.  At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world 
learned that Iraq had clandestinely pursued an advanced 
program to develop nuclear weapons, despite the 
application of IAEA safeguards.  The international 
community recognized that the Agency's safeguards system 
needed to be strengthened in order to increase its 
 
STATE 00000322  002 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA 
ADDITIONAL PROTOC 
capability to detect secret nuclear programs.  The Model 
Additional Protocol for strengthening nuclear safeguards 
was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in 1997. 
An Additional Protocol based on this Model amends an 
existing safeguards agreement by requiring non-nuclear- 
weapon states to provide, inter alia, broader 
declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs 
and nuclear-related activities, and by expanding the 
access rights of the Agency. 
¶7.  During the negotiations of the Model Protocol, many 
non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT urged the 
United States, as the strongest proponent, to accept its 
provisions on a voluntary basis.  Following the example 
of its safeguards agreement, the United States stated 
during the negotiations that it would accept the 
provisions of the Model Protocol, subject to a National 
Security Exclusion.  The success in achieving a strong 
Model Protocol was critically dependent on this U.S. 
commitment.  The U.S. signature of the Additional 
Protocol was in turn a significant factor in the early 
decision by many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the 
Protocol. 
¶8.  The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol is a bilateral 
treaty that supplements and amends IAEA verification 
arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the 
United States of America of November 18, 1977, which 
entered into force on December 9, 1980.  The United 
States signed the Additional Protocol on June 12, 1998. 
The President submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002; 
the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification 
on March 31, 2004; and the required implementing 
legislation, i.e., United States Additional Protocol 
Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401), became law on 
December 18, 2006.  The President issued Executive Order 
13458 on February 4, 2008, and on December 30, 2008, the 
President signed the instrument of ratification for the 
Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United 
States of America and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United 
States of America ("The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol"). 
 
¶9.  The United States has long called for universal 
adoption of the Additional Protocol; notably, the 
President did so in a speech at the National Defense 
University on February 12, 2004.  Washington would like 
to use the occasion of the President's ratification of 
the Additional Protocol to continue to encourage NPT 
non-nuclear weapon states that have not yet done so to 
bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and 
Additional Protocols.  (The U.S.-IAEA Additional 
Protocol will enter into force on the date that the IAEA 
receives written notification from the United States 
that U.S. statutory and constitutional procedures for 
entry into force have been met.  The United States 
expects to make this notification shortly.) 
 
¶10.  The following states have Additional Protocols in 
force with the IAEA:  Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, and 
Uzbekistan. 
 
¶11.  The following states have signed an Additional 
Protocol with the IAEA, but not brought them into force: 
Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Gabon, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of 
Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, 
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, and 
Vietnam. 
 
¶12.  The following states have had their Additional 
Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors but 
 
STATE 00000322  003 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA 
ADDITIONAL PROTOC 
have taken no further action:  Algeria, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Cte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Republic of Moldova, Swaziland, and Timor-Leste. 
 
¶13.  The following NPT States Party have taken no action 
on an Additional Protocol:  Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kenya, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Maldives, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, 
Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United 
Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Republic of Yemen, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
¶14.  Thirty non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Party to 
the NPT have not yet brought into force a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required by the 
NPT.  Eleven of these NNWS have signed such agreements, 
but not brought them into force:  Andorra, Bahrain, 
Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Gabon, Mauritania, 
Montenegro, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  Six 
NNWS have had their comprehensive safeguards agreements 
approved by the Board of Governors but have not yet 
signed them and brought them into force:  Central 
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, 
Qatar, and Timor-Leste.  Thirteen NNWS have not yet 
submitted comprehensive safeguards agreements to the 
Board of Governors for its consideration:   Angola, Rep. 
of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Kenya, Liberia, Micronesia, Rwanda, S?o Tom and 
Principe, Somalia, and Vanuatu.  End Background. 
 
---------------- 
Action Requested 
---------------- 
 
¶15.  Posts are requested to bring the President's action 
to the attention of appropriate host government 
officials who are responsible for nuclear 
nonproliferation and IAEA matters.  Posts may draw upon 
the background above, as appropriate. 
 
¶16.  UNVIE, GENEVA, and USUN NEW YORK may draw upon 
these points as appropriate in meetings with 
counterparts from other missions.  All posts should 
deliver points in paragraph 17 below. 
 
¶17.  Points for all posts: 
 
-- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (the "NPT") requires non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material 
in all of their peaceful nuclear activities. 
 
-- The United States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party to 
the NPT, is under no obligation to accept such 
safeguards. 
 
-- Nonetheless, for over forty years, the United States 
has permitted the full application of IAEA safeguards, 
except for those facilities and activities excluded for 
national security reasons. 
 
-- It has been the policy of the Bush Administration to 
encourage all states which have not done so to bring 
into force Additional Protocols of their own. 
 
-- On December 30, 2008, President Bush signed the 
instrument of ratification for the U.S.-IAEA Additional 
Protocol, and the Protocol will enter into force when 
the United States notifies the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in writing that its statutory and 
constitutional requirements for entry into force had 
been met and that it is prepared to deposit its 
instrument of ratification. 
 
-- The President's ratification of this agreement 
reinforces longstanding U.S. support for the IAEA in the 
fight against nuclear proliferation. 
 
-- Specifically, this Additional Protocol expands the 
types of nuclear and nuclear-related locations and 
activities the United States will declare and, by 
permitting access to these locations and activities in 
 
STATE 00000322  004 OF 004 
 
 
-- The United States will continue to pursue the 
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply within the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group as the President called for in 
February 2004. 
 
--The United States stands ready to assist countries in 
their ratification and implementation of the Additional 
Protocol, with the goal of universal implementation of 
the Protocol. 
 
End points for all posts. 
 
¶18.  Minimize considered. 
RICE