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C O N F I D E N T I A L SAO PAULO 000027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, PM, PM/DTTC, AND PM/RSAT 
DEFENSE FOR DEPSECDEF, USDP, USD AT&L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL ETTC MARR BR
SUBJECT: FX2:  VIEWS FROM AVIBRAS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 41 
     ¶B. SAO PAULO 19 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF JAMES STORY FOR REASON 1.5 B AND D 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  On January 12, the Ambassador met with 
Sami Yousseff Hassuani, the President of Defense Contractor 
AVIBRAS, to discuss the company's views on the current 
Brazilian fighter competition.  Hassuani stated that the 
final decision on the fighter will be largely a political 
determination based on the ability of Brazilian Air Force 
engineers and defense contractors to add domestic technology 
to the platform.  He underscored that AVIBRAS is uniquely 
capable of designing, testing, and integrating weapons 
platforms onto the F-18 which could fulfill what he sees as 
the key to selling the F-18 in Brazil.  Hassuani offered to 
weigh in with Defense Minister Jobim, but believes 
politically pressure at a higher level will be crucial for a 
successful bid.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The January 12 meeting between the Ambassador and 
Sami Youseff Hassuani, President of Defense Contractor 
AVIBRAS, offered a wide-ranging discussion regarding the 
overall state of Brazil's "military industrial complex" as 
well as the role AVIBRAS plays in providing military hardware 
to the Brazilian government and for international export. 
While AVIBRAS is relatively small by international standards, 
fluctuating between 100-250 million USD in revenues, they 
have developed air to ground rocket and missile systems that 
have already been deployed on US manufactured aircraft such 
as government of Colombia Blackhawk helicopters. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Hassuani articulated the three keys to a successful 
bid for this program:  1)  a good product, 2) clarity in the 
rules and how access to technology will be granted, and 3) 
political support.  Boeing, from his perspective, has to 
clear the second and third of these three key areas. 
Hassuani said that while it is clear the F-18 is the best 
performing and best tested system, this could actually hurt 
the bid as it is "obvious the Brazilian Air Force wants an 
independent role in helping to develop some of the 
technologies for the plane."  He also stated that AVIBRAS is 
uniquely positioned to integrate Brazilian made weapons 
systems onto the platform. 
 
¶4.  (C)  As noted ref A, politically, Hassuani sees the role 
of the Brazilian Air Force (particularly Brazilian Air Force 
Chief Juniti Saito) as being paramount in importance. 
However, he also sees an internal division between pilots and 
engineers in the Air Force where there is a philosophical 
debate over what is in Brazil's national interest:  a proven 
fighter capable of multiple missions or an un-proven platform 
such as the Gripen upon which Brazil can plus up a relatively 
small defense industry.  Hassuani stated that even if the 
debate was resolved in favor of the F-18, the inability to 
add indigenous technology to the fighter could "doom its 
sale". 
 
¶5.  (C)  Moving forward, Hassuani readily agreed to the 
Ambassador's suggestion that AVIBRAS needs to make it clear 
that they are not only capable of integrating their weapons 
platforms onto the F-18, but that it is in the best interest 
of the company.  Hassuani indicated that he meets regularly 
with Defense Minister Jobim (approximately 10 times in 2008) 
and would voice his support for the F-18.  He also stated 
that AVIBRAS would engage directly with the Brazilian Air 
Force in an attempt to persuade them to find in favor of the 
F-18; however, his ability to engage with President Lula on 
this topic is minimal. 
 
¶6.  (C)  COMMENT:  Hassuani and his company, AVIBRAS, are 
well-positioned to work with any of the various platforms 
under discussion.  While he indicated a preference for the 
F-18 during this meeting, it remains unclear as to what 
extent Hassuani will be willing to engage with Minister Jobim 
and Air Force Chief Saito.  Given the fact that we recently 
conducted a Blue Lantern check with this company (ref B), and 
AVIBRAS has a number of export licenses from the US waiting 
on verification, Hassuani may be more forthcoming, as regards 
his lobbying efforts, in principle than he will be in 
practice.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶7.  (U)  This cable was cleared by Ambassador Sobel. 
WHITE