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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0042/01 0071633
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 071633Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9777
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIC/ORG OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9961

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000042 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP (HARRIS, BLONG) AND DRL/NESCA 
(HICKEY) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER SA
SUBJECT: DAY AND NIGHT: SAUDI SHI'A SHARE GEOGRAPHY, BUT 
NOT OPINIONS 
 
REF: RIYADH 1868 
 
RIYADH 00000042  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: DCM David Rundell 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
---------- 
KEY POINTS 
---------- 
 
-- (U) Our recent meetings with Saudi Arabia's Shi'a groups 
in the Eastern Province (EP) revealed divergent attitudes 
toward their country. 
 
-- (U) Mainstream Shi'a, including municipal council members, 
identify themselves as Saudis first and Shi'a second. 
 
-- (U) Elsewhere, Hizballah's messages find fertile ground 
among younger Shi'a, frustrated by religious and economic 
discrimination.  They openly criticize the government and 
identify themselves as Shi'a first.  The same group 
acknowledge that today they have more employment 
opportunities at Aramco than they had ten years ago. 
 
-- (C) Signs of sympathy toward Hizballah among some EP Shi'a 
include recent street demonstrations and the open display of 
Hizballah flags and posters. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
(C) The meetings described below revealed stark contrasts in 
individual Shi'a worldviews.  Many established Shi'a citizens 
consider themselves loyal Saudis and work within existing 
institutions to better their lot, running businesses and 
serving on the municipal council.  In their midst exists a 
growing network of younger, more vocal Shi'a who harbor 
greater anti-government resentments.  They are Shi'a first, 
Saudi second.  This population's loyalty is up for grabs, and 
Hizballah's messages resonate with them.  Their response to 
Hassan Nasrallah's calls to protest Israel's attacks on Gaza 
was evidenced by two demonstrations in eleven days in Qatif. 
 
End Key Points and Comment 
 
------------------------ 
A DAYTIME VISIT TO QATIF 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (C) MEETING CIVIC LEADERS.  A large contingent of Shi'a 
leaders hosted Dhahran Consul General Kenny December 21 in 
Qatif, seizing the opportunity to impart varied agendas and 
points of view.  Qatif municipal council chairman Jafar M. 
Al-Shayab (protect) opened the meeting.  He proudly described 
the community's involvement with the council, which he 
estimated represents a population of 180,000.  Al-Shayab 
requested from the Consulate more speakers and visitor 
exchanges, hoping to send people to the U.S. "to speak about 
the situation here." 
 
¶2. (C) EXPLAINING IRAN.  Shi'a activist and writer Dr. Tawfiq 
al-Saif chronicled recent historical events and their impact 
on Eastern Province (EP) Shi'a.  He described Shi'ite Islam 
as a "passive school" until Iran's Islamic revolution and the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq.  He noted that Saudi Shi'a were 
"deeply affected by what happened in Iraq."  Al-Saif 
described Iranians as "conspiracy theorists" who view the 
world as unfriendly, remembering invasions from all sides 
throughout their history. 
 
¶3. (C) SAUDI CITIZEN FIRST, SHI'A SECOND.  Al-Saif posed a 
hypothetical question: Where would Saudi Shi'a stand if the 
U.S. invaded Iran?  He noted that Saudi Shi'a used to 
consider Iran "a paradise."  Then, they were permitted to 
travel there.  Opinions changed.  Religion aside, Al-Saif 
said his fellow Shi'a found their day-to-day life in the 
Kingdom much better than in Iran, and the travel actually 
strengthened their identity as Saudis.  He described Saudi 
Shi'a now as more calculating about where to align 
themselves. "No more dogma," he added.  Prior to our 
departure, the CG promised to continue this dialogue in 
future meetings of this nature. 
 
------------------ 
ONE NIGHT IN SAFWA 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) SMELLS LIKE SOUTH LEBANON.  Further north along the 
coastal oasis, in the majority-Shi'a community of Safwa, 
Emboffs paid a nighttime visit to a group of five younger 
Shi'a at the home of XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect). 
XXXXXXXXXXXX brother lives in the U.S. and founded the 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, formerly the XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
Safwa, like Qatif, lacks the smartly developed infrastructure 
of Riyadh or even Dhahran, with narrower streets and modest 
homes.  Al-Ahmed's spartan sitting area boasted two photos of 
Nasrallah hung in one corner and three rifles propped in 
another.  Upon Emboffs arrival, XXXXXXXXXXXX called together a 
group of colleagues who more openly shared the frustrations 
of EP Shi'a. 
 
¶5. (C) RELIGIOUS MINORITY.  In a free-ranging discussion, 
this younger group attributed their economic marginalization 
to religious discrimination.  In one of several examples, a 
medical student in the group described his ejection from a 
shopping center mosque, where he was called "kafir" 
(unbeliever) and told to leave.  "Why should I support the 
government when I am treated like this?" he asked. 
Nevertheless, they characterized EP Shi'a as able to 
distinguish between religion and politics.  Though they may 
look to Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran, Ali al-Sistani in Iraq or 
Mohammed Fadlallah in Lebanon for their religious guidance, 
many of the youth in particular look to Hezbollah as their 
political voice. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) ARRESTS, DETENTIONS.  XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) shared 
that he currently knew ten people who were being held in 
prison, indefinitely, without charge or trial.  He 
matter-of-factly described his own detention in detail.  He 
revisited his experiences from 1996, when authorities 
arrested him following the al-Khobar bombings, detaining him 
for three years.  XXXXXXXXXXXX recalled interrogations and harsh 
conditions, held in a small, unventilated cell and subjected 
to prolonged periods in stress positions.  Returning to 
current events, the group confirmed the December 19 Qatif 
demonstration (Reftel).  To their knowledge, authorities 
arrested at least six protesters in the days following the 
demonstration.  (Note:  In the week following this meeting, 
sources reported that the number of arrests stemming from the 
December 19 demonstration had increased to ten or more, 
including Kamal al-Ahmed.  End note.) 
 
¶7. (C/NF) THE "50/50 PRINCE."  While no love is lost toward 
the Saudi government or the al-Saud, the group showed respect 
for the King.  They instead blamed the "Wahhabis" who they 
claimed infiltrate the universities.  They directed their 
true ire at EP Governor Prince Mohamed bin Fahd (MBF).  Any 
new business, they claimed, will quickly learn that it must 
pay half of its profits to MBF.  Refusal will result in 
eventual closure of the business.  This allegedly impacts 
many Aramco suppliers.  As a result, locals have nicknamed 
MBF "the Fifty-Fifty Prince."  The fifty percent proportion 
is likely exaggeration for effect, but the comment reflects a 
belief among EP Shi'a that corruption is a significant issue 
in the province.  This group remains acutely aware of 
economic imbalances in the Kingdom, observing that in EP they 
are "stepping in oil" but very few reap the benefit. 
 
¶8. (C) SAUDI ARAMCO CONNECTION.  At least three of the group 
identified themselves as Aramco employees, which they say 
drives employment for most of Safwa.  They claimed that ten 
years ago a position at Aramco would not have been open to 
Shi'a.  Those present on this night represented the 
blue-collar portion of the workforce, with the position title 
of "operator." 
FRAKER