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C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: LEFT WING DON QUIJOTE TILTS AT CLOSED 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  A "symbolic" effort to open the Panamanian Political 
system is how Juan Jovane described his independent campaign 
for president. Jovane told POLOFF on November 25 that while 
he did not expect to be allowed to run, he wanted to open the 
system up to independent candidates who could mount popular 
left-wing campaigns in the future. Jovane described the 
ability of independents to run for the highest office as 
critical to the democratic stability of Panama, that might 
otherwise become vulnerable to violent or anti-democratic 
movements in the future. He noted his campaign had split the 
left into democratic and non-democratic blocks. Separately, 
Professor Olmedo Beluche noted on December 5 that Jovane's 
campaign could help Balbina Herrera's campaign, by 
positioning her more to the center of the ideological 
spectrum. End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
A Symbolic Campaign 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  University of Panama Economics Professor Juan Jovane 
- a former advisor to the Sandinistas, former head of the 
Panamanian Social Security System, and a left-wing leader - 
has launched an independent campaign for President. Backed by 
a diverse array of left-wing groups, Jovane is challenging a 
1983 amendment to the Panamanian electoral law that restricts 
the right to run for president to representatives of "legally 
recognized political parties." Jovane told POLOFF November 25 
that he knew he would not be allowed to run in the May 3 
presidential elections. He said his real aim was to force a 
reform of the electoral law to allow independent candidates 
to run for president in the future. Jovane asserted that such 
a key reform would allow the democratic elements of the left 
to integrate themselves into the political system. He further 
asserted that the requirements for registering a political 
party in Panama were so onerous that only the rich could 
afford to meet them, thus disenfranchising those who would 
vote for popular left-wing parties.  (Note: To register a 
political party in Panama, a prospective party must get the 
signatures of 4% of the electoral roles, approximately 60,000 
people at present, while meeting strict requirements as to 
geographic distribution. Additionally, those individuals who 
register must sign up at Electoral Tribunal (TE) offices as 
the registration books may only rarely be taken into the 
field. Also, registration cannot already be members of other 
parties, meaning that new registrations must come from the 
ranks of unregistered independents. End Note)  Jovane said he 
had been approached by members of the Panamanista Party to 
work with them, but had refused because he was trying to make 
a point, not a deal. Jovane said he had spoken to TE Judge 
Gerardo Solis, who said that his petition would be taken up 
when the political parties and the TE met to consider reforms 
to the electoral code, which normally happens the year after 
each election. Jovane said he did not trust this process, 
because it was the political parties themselves who ran it, 
and he was trying to undermine their control of the system. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Olmedo Beluche, one of Jovane's main supporters and 
President of the Popular Alternative Party (PAP), a self 
described "Bolivarian" party that has not yet acquired enough 
signatures to be legalized, told POLOFF December 5 that the 
PAP was the most organized group in the "ideologically broad" 
coalition supporting Jovane. He said the Jovane campaign was 
challenging Article 233 of the Electoral Law, that dated from 
1983 and required that candidates for president represent 
legally recognized parties. He explained that recent 
electoral reforms had opened up the possibility of 
independents to run for mayor and National Assembly deputy, 
but not for the presidency. Beluche said they were 
challenging the law everywhere they could: by asking the TE 
to rule that Jovane's candidacy was legal; by getting the 
Supreme Court to declare the rule unconstitutional; and by 
asking the National Assembly to change the law. (Note: On 
December 16, the TE rejected Jovane's request to register his 
andidacy in a two-to-one vote. Solis was the dissenting 
 
vote. The Supreme Court challenge was admitted by the Court, 
but arguments have not been heard yet. There has been no 
movement in the National Assembly, nor is there likely to be 
any movement. End Note) He said their best hope was that the 
Supreme Court would throw the law out. That would require the 
TE to set the rules for independent candidates, probably 
involving a certain number of signatures. Beluche was 
confident that they could get the signatures and would be 
able to actually launch a campaign. He said that they would 
concentrate their campaign on the need to liberalize the 
rules for forming political parties, which might help the 
PAP, and the rules and assistance for the participation of 
independents in election. 
 
--------------------------------- 
The Dangers of Political Sclerosis 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Jovane said the restriction on independents running 
for president was dangerous, because it prevented new ideas 
from entering the political arena. Without any new or popular 
ideas to vote for, people ended up voting "against" 
candidates as an act of protest. Jovane argued that this 
phenomena explained the constant alternation in power after 
every election. He asserted that this situation could 
eventually give rise to a radical movement that would 
challenge the closed political system in an anti-democratic 
or violent manner. Jovane said he saw his candidacy as an 
opportunity to prevent that outcome by offering a "grand 
pact;" Jovane would encourage the "people" to support 
democratic change, in return for which the traditional 
parties would agree to an electoral law reform that would 
make it possible for progressive candidates to participate in 
the elections as independents. Jovane asserted that his 
campaign had divided the Panamanian left by calling for 
participation in the democratic process, with the PAP, the 
General Center of Panamanian Workers (CGTP) labor union, and 
various intellectual and activists supporting him. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Balbina - Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Asked about the campaign of Revolutionary Democratic 
Party (PRD) presidential candidate Balbina Herrera, Jovane 
said she had real problems due to the fact that the 
progressives neither trusted her or believed she was really 
progressive, while the right-wing did not trust her either, 
fearing she was progressive. He said Balbina had failed to 
define herself politically, allowing her enemies on either 
side to discredit her as leftist and as a centrist 
respectively. Beluche said he had heard rumors that some 
members of the PRD believed a Jovane candidacy could help 
Herrera's campaign. With Jovane in the race, Herrera would no 
longer be the most left wing candidate, helping her position 
herself more to the center. Beluche said some in the PRD also 
believed that Jovane might drain protest votes from 
Martinelli, helping Herrera if the election were close. 
Beluche asserted, however, that Jovane might also undermine 
the PRD's de facto hold on the left-wing vote, weakening the 
party in the future. 
 
------ 
Naive? 
------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  Political analyst Alfredo Castillero, a moderate 
opposition commentator, told POLOFF November 26 that Jovane 
was an "interesting person", with whom one could have a very 
interesting discussion about economics, but added that he was 
politically "nave" in his left wing politics, and especially 
about the degree to which his "companeros" had the same 
reformist agenda as he did. He said all anyone needed to do 
to make Jovane his friend was to raise his fist in the 
socialist salute.  Castillero said Jovane had been 
"incompetent" as administrator of the Social Security System, 
and had appointed leftists though out the administration with 
more concern for their political credentials than for their 
competence. 
 
------------------------ 
The Anti-Democratic Left 
 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  The radical organizations grouped in the National 
Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights 
(FRENADESO), including the radical construction workers union 
SUNTRACS, are not supporting Jovane's campaign. In numerous 
opinion pieces in La Estrella, the Panama City daily 
broadsheet, FRENADESO Coordinator and SUNTRACS Secretary 
General Genaro Lopez has attacked all the candidates, 
including Herrera, and has called for abstention in the 
election and a popular mobilization in favor of a Constituent 
Assembly. Referring to FRENADESO and SUNTRACS, Jovane called 
their idea of a popular insurrection in Panama "silly." 
 
¶8.  (C)  Castillero asserted that the supposedly distinct 
organizations that made up FRENADESO, including SUNTRACS, the 
Federation of Revolutionary Students-29 (FER-29), and the 
Panamanian Popular Coordinator of Human Rights (COPDEHUPA) 
were all actually run by the same leadership, and had evolved 
from the National Liberation Movement-29 (MLN-29), formed 
from Maoist and Castroist organizations in the 1970s. 
Castillero said he realized all the organizations had 
interlocking leaderships when he sought their input on a 
human rights report. He said the real power in the movement 
now rests with SUNTRACS, due to its role as a construction 
worker union in the midst of a construction boom and the fact 
that it has deep pockets drawing on two percent of every 
union member's pay check.  He said SUNTRACS had ample funds 
and could engage in effective civil disobedience due to its 
ability to mobilize workers for street protests and 
demonstrations. Jovane criticized SUNTRACS for not taking 
into account that the global crisis would probably result in 
a slow down in the construction industry, and a reduced 
capacity for popular mobilization among construction workers. 
University of Panama Professor Antonio Mendez, also a leader 
of the PAP, told POLOFF December 5 the same story of the 
evolution of these groups, calling them dogmatic, 
doctrinaire, and alienated from reality. He said they were 
only interested in grand gestures such as general strikes and 
road closings, but were unable to follow them up to create 
any lasting changes. He said many of the democratic left-wing 
leadership had abandoned FRENADESO over this issue in the 
past. In a July 23 meeting Beluche had implied that these 
groups, and not the PAP, were receiving Venezuelan financing. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Jovane is a strange figure in Panama's politics. A 
quiet and thoughtful man in person, he has a political 
reputation among Panama's elites akin to Lenin. Castillero's 
analysis of him as a radical naive is far closer to the 
truth.  Nevertheless, his campaign has been given a lot of 
coverage by the media, who have treated him as a 
disinterested campaigner on behalf of political reform. The 
restriction against independent presidential candidates seems 
to have little overt support anymore, and it seems likely it 
will be cast aside in the future, either by the Supreme Court 
or by the National Assembly. This is not likely to take place 
before the election, however, as a radical change in the 
rules this late in the electoral process would tend to 
undermine the credibility of the process. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Jovane's warning that the Panamanian political 
system needs to provide a democratic opening to the left is 
not getting a lot of media attention. Panama's political 
parties have no real policy differences among themselves, 
other then how to treat the Omar Torrijos/Antonio Noriega 
period. Martinelli's campaign based on change is a one trick 
pony, similar to the change pony President Torrijos rode once 
in 2004. A credible and moderate left wing alternative is a 
glaring weakness in the political fabric that could, in the 
middle term, strengthen the hand of undemocratic elements 
like FRENADESO/SUNTRACS. The passionate denunciation of these 
groups by Mendez, from a very left-wing perspective, 
indicates the danger Jovane, Beluche and Mendez (all of whom 
are well paid college professors) see if no credible 
democratic left-wing alternative is allowed to develop in 
Panama. Castillero made a direct correlation between 
Venezuela's political system prior to Chavez, and Panama's 
current party centric system, as an indication of where 
 
things could go. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Jovane's analysis of what ails Herrera is spot on. 
Herrera has failed to define herself throughout the campaign 
on purpose, hoping to be all things to all people. She wanted 
to lock up the left-wing vote with her radical past, and the 
independent centrist vote with her steady bureaucratic 
trajectory since the reinstatement of democracy. Instead, she 
has been discredited among the left for her steady 
bureaucratic trajectory, and among the independent centrists 
due to her radical past. The damage is now too great for a 
Jovane candidacy to help push her image to the center. His 
candidacy, and the further radical FRENADESO/SUNTRACS 
opposition to it, does make the argument that Herrera is 
"Chavez in a skirt" seem absurd. Beluche's PAP is the only 
openly Bolivarian party, and FRENADESO/SUNTRACS are the 
mostly covert collaborators with Chavez. All denounce Herrera 
as an establishment figure with no credible social 
credentials. 
STEPHENSON