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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, NEA, ISN, P 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL PGOV SY IR CY
SUBJECT: MONCHEGORSK: MFA SEEKING LEGAL OPINIONS, 
PRESIDENCY EVALUATING DISPOSITION OPTIONS 
 
REF: A. URBANCIC-FITZPATRICK EMAIL OF 30 JANUARY 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 18 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 73 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 75 
     ¶E. NICOSIA 78 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This telegram contains action requests; please see 
Paragraphs 3, 4, and 11. 
 
------------ 
Ship Status: 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) M/V Monchegorsk remains at anchorage in the Limassol 
port.  Cypriot maritime officials have conducted a cursory 
inspection, finding high explosives of obvious military 
usage.  They intend to inspect further the contents of 55 
crates on board -- possibly the same ones checked earlier by 
U.S. Navy personnel. 
 
---------------------------- 
MFA:  Legal Findings Desired 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Diplomatic Activity:  At 1015 hrs local (0315 DC), 
MFA Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) Nicolas Emiliou 
summoned the Ambassador for discussions on the M/V 
Monchegorsk; owing to a prior commitment, PolChief attended 
in his place.  Emiliou opened by noting Cyprus's great 
interest in alleged comments by CJCS ADM Mike Mullen that the 
U.S., after halting the Monchegorsk on the high seas, had let 
the vessel proceed after determining it had no legal grounds 
to detain it.  In preparing the MFA's own legal opinion as to 
the applicability of UN Security Council Resolutions 1747 and 
1803 to the materiel shipment, Emiliou wished first to see 
the USG's findings -- if possible, something more elaborate 
than the short non-papers the Embassy had delivered so far. 
 
¶4.  (C) The MFA diplomat claimed that 1747 was open to 
interpretation.  There was a difference of opinion on the 
Ministry's legal team, with some experts believing that OP 
5's call on states to prohibit the procurement of any arms or 
related materiel from Iran using their flag vessels related 
only to nuclear weapons-related materiel (since the entire 
resolution preamble, as well as OPs 1-4, dealt primarily with 
Iran's nuclear program.)  This was Syria's position, Emiliou 
noted.  In fact, Damascus had deployed a high-level envoy to 
Nicosia, the Syrian Deputy FM, who was applying significant 
pressure to allow the vessel to depart for Latakeia.  Emiliou 
again requested U.S. legal thinking, here, on why 1747 
applied for conventional (vice nuclear) materiel. 
 
¶5.  (C) Cypriot maritime officials had conducted a cursory 
check of the Monchegorsk and discovered significant 
quantities of high explosives that were clearly military in 
nature, Emiliou informed.  They would perform more detailed 
checks shortly, having identified 55 suspicious crates (Note: 
 likely those already inspected by U.S. personnel.)  Should 
the RoC's attorneys determine the cargo was subject to UNSC 
sanctions, the overarching Cypriot desire was to remove it 
soonest from the island, owing to "heavy pressure" from 
Damascus and Teheran.  Cyprus would require assistance from 
friendly nations in disposing of the materiel, Emiliou 
concluded. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Brits Ready to Assist, if Necessary 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador at 1200 hrs called on UK High Commissioner 
Peter Millet.  Millet informed that 18 hours earlier, he had 
received confusing instructions from a CENTCOM-based UK 
officer to intervene with the RoC on the Monchegorsk.  He had 
sat on the instructions, however, in order to get more 
clarity and to consult with us.  In response to USG 
brainstorming over the possibility of using the British 
Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in the disposition of the cargo, 
Millet noted some practical difficulties, but assured the 
SBAs could accept the cargo "both physically and 
politically."  London wanted this shipment interdicted as 
much as Washington, he assured, and he personally stood ready 
to approach the Cypriots on the matter. 
 
¶7.  (C) Akrotiri, the western SBA, could accommodate landing 
craft-sized vessels but nothing the size of the Monchegorsk, 
Millet explained.  Should the RoC want to move the cargo to 
the British base, it first would need to move it through 
Limassol port.  The SBA did bring ammunition and explosives 
through Limassol on weekend nights when there was little port 
traffic, under police escort, however. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Presidency:  UN Option Preferable to SBA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Ambassador at 1330 hrs contacted Presidency 
Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides (Ref A).  He 
restated U.S. appreciation for Cyprus recalling the ship, and 
assured that Washington was thinking creatively about an end 
state that both allowed the RoC to meet its UNSC obligations 
while also respecting Cypriot domestic political and foreign 
policy sensitivities.  Ambassador explained that USG experts 
so far had found no mechanism for affecting a handover of the 
Monchegorsk's cargo to elements of UNIFIL, an idea that 
Pantelides had floated a day earlier (Ref E).  Would Cyprus 
accept some type of transfer to a third party, such as the 
Brits via the SBAs, or even the French, whose naval 
relationship with Cyprus was strong? 
 
¶9.  (C) Cyprus plainly preferred a solution involving the 
French and UN than one using the SBAs, Pantelides responded 
(likely owing to the bases' political sensitivities here.) 
Yet RoC lawyers worried that any approach to a third country 
would be illegal under the UNSCRs -- how was Syria prohibited 
from receiving the cargo, for example, but not France or 
Britain?  Cyprus's favored tack remained one that provided UN 
cover to Cyprus to act.  As UNSCR 1803 called on member 
states to report to the Security Council, the Cypriots were 
envisioning the following way-forward: 
 
--   At the request of a Permanent Member of the UNSC (the 
United States), Cyprus, as flag nation of the Monchegorsk and 
exercising its UNSCR obligations, would report to the Council 
that it had hailed and inspected a vessel suspected of 
carrying illegal Iranian arms exports; 
 
--  Cyprus would include the findings of its inspection and 
its conclusion that the shipment seemingly violated UNSCRs 
1747 and 1803, and would ask the Council how to proceed. 
 
¶10.  (C) Ambassador committed to relaying Cyprus's thoughts 
to USG policy makers.  He saw a number of practical 
difficulties with the proposal, however, dealing primarily 
with Russia's stance at the Council.  It would be disastrous 
were the Russians to block action and leave the Council 
deadlocked, leaving the cargo marooned on the island and 
Cyprus subjected to increasing pressures from Iran and Syria. 
 For this proposal to have a chance of success, Moscow's 
support must be obtained beforehand.  Had Pantelides 
(formerly the RoC ambassador in Moscow) floated the idea with 
the Russians? Ambassador asked.  He had not, but noted the 
government was preparing to do so, likely in New York. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Official Cyprus is telling us their primary interest 
lies in fulfilling UNSC obligations and removing the cargo 
from the island, preferably under UN cover.  However, RoC 
political realities -- mainly, the desire to keep Moscow 
happy at all costs and prevent Damascus from retaliating by 
upgrading relations or links with the "illegal Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus" -- pose a countervailing demand 
that the vessel eventually reach Syria.  We therefore 
recommend that Washington keep this in mind as it evaluates 
this latest proposal that Cyprus has decided to explore with 
the Russians.  It is difficult to gauge from here what 
Moscow's position would be once the question reached the 
Council or Sanctions Committee.  In any case, the RoC is 
looking for an out, and the passage of time now increases the 
likelihood of an unfortunate government decision to allow the 
Monchegorsk to sail. 
Urbancic