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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI116, SOMALIA - Community Resistance Against Al-Shabaab

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI116 2009-01-21 13:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO1474
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0116/01 0211357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211357Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8272
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0349
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Community Resistance Against Al-Shabaab 
 
REF: A) 08 Nairobi 2900  B) Nairobi 107 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Local residents and militias in Galgaduud Region 
are bracing for an al-Shabaab reprisal attack to recapture the towns 
of Guriel and Dhusamareb.  Between December 27 and 30, a 
community-based resistance movement defeated al-Shabaab in battles 
that killed several top commanders of the insurgent group (Ref A). 
On January 16, key leaders from Galgaduud told us that elders and 
religious leaders mobilized militias to counter the al-Shabaab 
threat.  These community based armed groups maintain control over 
Guriel and Dusamareb.  The leaders appealed for urgent humanitarian 
assistance for thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
outside the towns where clashes occurred.  They also requested 
financial support to avert an imminent al-Shabaab counter attack. 
The moderate group Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) continues to rally 
support against al-Shabaab in both Galgaduud and Mogadishu. 
Communities continue to rally behind the ASWJ moniker, though the 
group itself does not claim to have a fighting force.  The 
Mogadishu-based ASWJ spokesman told us the network of religious 
scholars and their adherents are seeking partnerships with the U.S. 
to fight al-Shabaab and violent extremism.  The influence of ASWJ 
religious leaders continues to be credited with playing a key role 
in maintaining the peace in Somalia's capital and to subverting 
al-Shabaab's strategy to tighten the noose on Mogadishu by 
controlling surrounding regions.  End Summary. 
 
Victory Over al-Shabaab Threatened 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Community-based militias in Galgaduud Region continue to 
control the towns of Guriel and Dhusamareb after a decisive victory 
in over al-Shabaab between December 27 and 30 (Ref A).  During the 
battles, several al-Shabaab top commanders were killed and now the 
communities fear reprisal attacks.  Some the al-Shabaab commanders 
reportedly killed in the clashes include General Mohamed Yusuf Nur 
(Hawiye/Sheikhal), commander in chief, Mohamed Said "Tima 
Jilaa"(Hawiye/Murasade), chief of staff, Abdullahi "Fanah" 
(Darod/Ogadeni), field commander and trainer, Kanja Waweru 
"Seyfulaah al-Kiywaani" (Kenyan), and Ruben Shumpert "Amir Abdul 
Muhaimeen" (American).  According to multiple sources, al-Shabaab is 
in the process of re-organizing and training in El Bur, also in 
Galgaduud Region, to launch a counter-offensive in Guriel and 
Dhusamareb. 
 
3.  (SBU) On January 16, we met with key Galgaduud political leaders 
including General Mohamed Nuur Galaal, Acting Chairman of the Ayr 
political committee and a well-respected military general under Siad 
Barre.  Galaal served as a military commander in the Transitional 
National Government (TNG) and presidential security advisor to the 
TNG president.  One of the other representatives was Salad Osman, 
member of the Ayr political committee and former minister and MP 
within the TNG Somali politician in pre-1991 government where he 
served as a member of parliament for 12 years.  The Hawiye/Haber 
Gedir/Ayr leaders told us the decisive victories in Guriel and 
Dhusamareb over al-Shabaab were won by a combined force of Ayr 
militias belonging to former clan administrations, and youth 
recruited from surrounding rural areas.  They estimated that 
approximately 500 militia fought against al-Shabaab in Dhusamareb 
and another 800 in Guriel where fighting was most intense. 
 
4.  (SBU) According to the Ayr leaders, the popular uprising 
occurred after local ASWJ clerics and clan elders agreed to fight 
against al-Shabaab's targeted violence and its imposition of 
"foreign teachings and non-Somali Islamic traditions" on the 
community.  The community resistance was precipitated by 
al-Shabaab's forceful expulsion of local administrations formed by 
resident communities.  They told us the militias were stood up after 
elders urgently appealed to local youth and the "camel herders" who 
are "natural warriors and fighters for hire."  However, the 
representatives stressed to us that the forces were not formally 
organized and they have no means for sustainment.  While at present 
these militias continue to control Guriel and Dhusamareb, they said 
that without outside support "it is a matter of time before 
al-Shabaab attacks and moves back in." 
 
Appeal for Humanitarian Aid, 
Immediate Response 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) While the armed militias are in the towns, most of the 
 
NAIROBI 00000116  002 OF 003 
 
 
residents have fled into neighboring rural areas.  The clashes in 
Galgaduud produced thousands of IDPs.  They told us that those who 
were displaced from their homes live in squalid conditions in the 
outskirts of the towns and that the majority of the people in 
Galgaduud region are those who came to the region in an attempt to 
escape from violence in Mogadishu.  With the recent round of 
violence, they are displaced from their homes yet again.  The 
community leaders appealed to us for urgent humanitarian assistance 
for these IDPs.  They told us that since al-Shabaab was forced to 
flee the area, they are in the position (at least in the near term) 
to ensure access for and urgent aid delivery.  This humanitarian 
relief will restore hope and trust in the new local administrations 
formed in Dusamareb and Guriel, they said. 
 
6.  (SBU) We followed up with the World Food Program (WFP) to 
encourage the relief organization to address the needs of this 
community.  The WFP representative told us that their information 
indicates that the majority of the IDPs 
went back to their homes in Dusamareb and Guriel.  WFP is targeting 
the two towns because of the ongoing humanitarian emergency, as 
defined by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU).  At present, a 
double ration of food is on its way to both towns targeting over 
48,000 recipients in Gueril and over 51,648 in Dusamareb.  We 
contacted the Ayr leaders to inform them of the upcoming delivery, 
and they expressed deep appreciation for U.S. efforts in the region. 
 
 
Moderate Islamic Network Keeping Peace 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The victories in Dhusamareb were attributed to the moderate 
ASWJ group.  ASWJ is the name adopted by members of the Sufi sect 
promoting the moderate brand of Islam to which a majority of Somalis 
belong.  It is not a fighting force, but a network that has been 
instrumental in recent community uprisings against al-Shabaab. 
(Note: Reftel discusses our recent engagement with the group).  On 
January 17, we talked with the Mogadishu-based ASWJ executive 
committee who confirmed to us that theirs is not an armed group.  In 
recent weeks, a number of groups, including the community-based 
militias in Galgaduud and Gedo regions   claimed to be fighting 
against al-Shabaab in the name of ASWJ.  Widely reported media 
stories have linked al-Shabaab loses to ASWJ).  Following these 
claims, ASWJ issued a public statement to clarify that it is not a 
fighting force but does advocate for the return to traditional 
religious practice. 
 
8.  (SBU) Sheikh Abdiqadir Somow, ASWJ Spokesman and acting chairman 
told us that ASWJ opposes al-Shabaab because of their "corrupt" view 
of Islam and oppressive ways and that ASWJ is willing to defend a 
"Somali" brand of Islam at all costs.  Somow said ASWJ will continue 
to condemn al-Shabaab, sensitizing local communities about the risks 
of involvement with the insurgent group.  Sheikh Somow told us that 
ASWJ is composed of 250 central and 13 executive committee members 
and its adherents represent 95 percent of Somalia's population.  In 
recent weeks, many groups, both unarmed and armed, have identified 
themselves with ASWJ and Somow aid they are doing their best to 
positively channel the momentum behind this sentiment. 
 
Engaging the Djibouti Process 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Sheikh Somow told us their clerics have been deeply engaged 
in raising public awareness and support for peace in Mogadishu (Ref 
B).  He requested partnership with the US Government and financial 
support to further enable the network to counter al-Shabaab and its 
negative influence.  He said ASWJ intends to intensify anti-violence 
messages in mosques, public gatherings and through the media but are 
faced with resource constraints.  When we asked about ASWJ's 
relationship with the Djibouti process, Somow said they welcomed 
Sheikh Sharif when he returned to Mogadishu and urged followers to 
peacefully engage with the ARS leader.  Somow told us he personally 
mobilized community support for the Djibouti agreement, though many 
do not see its application at the local level. 
 
10.  (SBU) We also asked the representatives from Dhusamareb about 
the Djibouti process and they initially responded that for them, the 
Djibouti process is positive, but is not grounded in the daily 
realities on the ground.  While there are representatives 
participating in the discussions from the region, they are removed 
from the present dangers in Dusamareb and Guriel.  At the same time, 
 
NAIROBI 00000116  003 OF 003 
 
 
they highlighted that al-Shabaab's defeat prevented the group from 
gaining influence, thus opening space for dialogue and 
reconciliation.  In a January 19 conversation with Deputy Prime 
Minister Ahmed Abdisalam Adan, he told us that he has been in close 
contact with the community leaders in Dusamareb and Guriel and is 
planning to stand up a local joint security sub-committee in each of 
the communities that will interface with other local and regional 
sub-committees, eventually coordinating with the Joint Security 
Committee. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The recent community-level engagement to combat 
al-Shabaab in Galgaduud and efforts secure peace in Mogadishu by 
ASWJ and others is promising.  However, all of our interlocutors 
emphasized the tenuous nature of this peace and some expect that it 
might be the calm before a storm.  They all warned that al-Shabaab 
is preparing to strike back, and though their general position may 
be weakened in the wake of the ongoing Ethiopian withdrawal, many 
asserted that the insurgent group has the resources to launch a 
considerable attack.  In Mogadishu, however, our contacts told us 
that al-Shabaab has weak footing.  After a recent strike on AMISOM, 
community leaders warned that they would deal directly with anyone 
launching an attack against the African mission, stating clearly 
that AMISOM forces do not equate to Ethiopian forces.  Post will 
continue to engage with ASWJ and other community-based groups. 
 
RANNEBERGER