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Viewing cable 09MEXICO212, MEXICO'S PRI JOCKEYS FOR JULY VOTE WITH AN EYE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MEXICO212 2009-01-26 22:38 2011-05-24 10:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles:
http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/el-mandatario-mexiquense-financia-empresas-encuestadoras-que-den-resultados-a-su-favor
R 262238Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4824
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
HQ USNORTHCOM
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
188895
2009-01-26 22:38:00
09MEXICO212
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

R 262238Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4824
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
HQ USNORTHCOM
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000212 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO'S PRI JOCKEYS FOR JULY VOTE WITH AN EYE 
TOWARD 2012  
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. 
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) 
is confident six months out from the vote that it stands to 
make significant gains in July's federal legislative and 
gubernatorial elections, even as PRI luminaries approach the 
electoral contest with an eye toward the next presidential 
bid.  Most observers see party president Beatriz Paredes, 
Mexico State Governor Enrique Pena Nieto, and PRI Senate 
leader Manlio Fabio Beltrones as the three most likely 
presidential candidates, with Pena Nieto needing to prove 
that his personal popularity can translate into stronger 
electoral results and support for the PRI.  The party is 
already increasing its attacks on the Calderon government and 
his National Action Party (PAN).  Regardless of the electoral 
outcome, it is almost certain that from here on out, PRI's 
policymaking and campaigning will be primarily geared toward 
recapturing the Mexican presidency.  End Summary. 
 
State of Play 
------------- 
 
2. (C) The PRI continues to be confident that it stands to 
make significant gains in July's federal legislative and 
gubernatorial elections.  Some analysts suggest that, while 
less likely, with enough victories in the winner-take-all 
votes, the PRI could be granted an absolute majority through 
the distribution of proportional representation seats. 
Director General of the Chamber of Deputies' Center for 
Social Studies and Public Opinion (CESOP) and former advisor 
to PRI Senate leadership, Carlos Casillas, told Poloff on 
January 15 that the PRI is probably most likely to win about 
215 seats, and Luis Rubio from the Center of Investigation 
for the Development of Mexico (CIDAC) agreed that the PRI is 
virtually guaranteed at least 210 seats.  Rubio also noted 
that while he sees PRI as unlikely to win an absolute 
majority, it is not completely out of the question since the 
party would have to win only 42% of the vote--with 
alliances--in order to be allotted enough proportional 
representation slots to push them over 250 seats.  (Note: The 
PRI currently has 106 seats in the Chamber, while the PAN has 
207 and the PRD has 127. End Note.) 
 
3. (C) PRI also hopes to make gains in the gubernatorial 
races.  PRI Director for International Relations Ceslo 
Delgado told Poloff on January 20 that of the six 
governorships up for grabs, the party hopes to maintain its 
grip on Sonora, Campeche, Colima and Nuevo Leon, while 
perhaps picking up Queretero or, less likely, San Luis 
Potosi.  Both Queretero and San Luis Potosi are considered 
PAN states--Queretero has been governed by the PAN since 1997 
and the party has prospered in San Luis Potosi under PAN 
Governor Jesus Marcelo de los Santos--but corruption scandals 
plaguing the current Queretero governor and PAN infighting in 
San Luis Potosi could open the door to a PRI challenger, 
according to Casillas and other local observers. 
 
4. (C) Analysts have pointed to the PAN and PRD as being slow 
off the mark in preparing for the July elections. Luis Rubio 
opined that President Calderon seems to be doing little to 
directly organize the PAN's electoral effort.  Splits within 
the party between ideological and pragmatic factions also are 
paralyzing the party, and PAN leadership has yet to prove 
that it is developing a coherent campaign strategy for the 40 
to 50 swing districts it has to win in order to obtain the 
168 seats it needs to be able to check the PRI in congress. 
The bitterly fought internal power struggles within the PRD 
will almost certainly prevent the party from effectively 
campaigning in the runup to the elections, and the still 
unresolved issue of 2006 presidential candidate Andres Manuel 
Lopez Obrador's place in the party is alienating potential 
voters.  Rubio opined that the PRD may only be able to secure 
between 80-85 districts.  The PRD is also a virtual 
non-factor in the gubernatorial elections, which will turn 
into two-way races as the PAN and PRI battle for the posts. 
 
Internal PRI Positioning 
------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Some PRI heavyweights are eyeing the 2009 electoral 
season with the next presidential election in mind, and 
potential candidates are already looking to position 
themselves to advantage in 2012.  Most observers see party 
president Beatriz Paredes, Mexico State Governor Enrique Pena 
Nieto, and PRI Senate leader Manlio Fabio Beltrones as the 
three most likely presidential candidates, with PRI Chamber 
of Deputies Coordinator Emilio Gamboa and several state 
governors (including the Governors of Veracruz and Sonora) 
also harboring their own hopes.  Casillas and PRI-affiliated 
analyst Jose Alcalde both noted that Paredes is likely to 
take one of the plurinominal federal deputy seats, but 
Casillas reported that she may reconsider.  Paredes almost 
certainly would only be willing to be a deputy if she were 
guaranteed to lead the PRI congressional bloc, which would 
require that she relinquish the party presidency.  If she 
were to resign, the party's Secretary General and close ally 
to Pena Nieto, Jesus Murillo Karam would assume the 
presidency, thus strengthening the Mexico State Governor's 
position.  Nevertheless, even if Paredes chooses to serve out 
her term as president, her allies almost certainly will fill 
the majority of seats allocated to the party by proportional 
representation, and she will thus manage the most powerful 
PRI deputies in congress. 
 
6. (C) Beltrones and Gamboa are also probably trying to 
strengthen their positions by influencing the candidate 
selection process, with a likely focus on the gubernatorial 
races given the power PRI governors still have in managing 
party affairs in their states.  Party insiders suggest that 
Beltrones, for example, is attempting to see his ally be 
named as the gubernatorial candidate in Sonora. Gamboa and 
other party leaders publicly backed pre-candidate for the San 
Luis Potosi governorship, Jesus Ramirez Strobos, in the 
primary race against winner Fernando Toranzo Fernandez, 
rumored to be Paredes' pick.  Analysts suggest that internal 
bickering over candidate selection will continue to be 
fraught until the candidate selection process concludes. 
 
Big Year for Pena Nieto 
----------------------- 
 
7. (C) PRI is looking to Pena Nieto to prove in this year's 
elections that his personal popularity can translate into 
stronger electoral results and support for the PRI in Mexico 
State.  Carlos Flores Rico, currently the Director General 
for the party's "Territorial Movement," told Poloff in 
December that the party has not fared particularly well under 
Pena Nieto in Mexico State, and most analysts suggest that 
the PRI's prospects remain at best uncertain in July's vote. 
CESOP is projecting PAN to win some 11 seats in the state, 
with PRI ending up with 13 and the PRD with 16.  This would 
be an increase from PRI's current 7 directly elected deputies 
(PAN having 11, PRD 20, and Convergencia 2), but perhaps not 
the dramatic increase party luminaries would need to see in 
order to be convinced that public support for Pena Nieto can 
be chalked up to more than attraction to his charisma and 
youth.  Perhaps unlike in previous electoral contests, Pena 
Nieto is focused on the July elections--he has launched 
significant public works projects in areas targeted for 
votes, and analysts and PRI party leaders alike have 
repeatedly expressed to Poloff their belief that he is paying 
media outlets under the table for favorable news coverage, as 
well as potentially financing pollsters to sway survey 
results. 
 
Campaign Heating Up 
------------------- 
 
8. (C) PRI is focusing its campaign by attacking the PAN and 
President Calderon on economic, security, and corruption 
matters, while hoping to win support from disaffected PRD 
voters by appealing to their "social democratic" 
sensibilities.  Delgado told Poloff that PRI will focus 
negative campaigning on the PAN's neglect of the agricultural 
sector, deteriorating economic conditions, and that the PAN 
is "no less corrupt than the PRI was."  Local press is 
already honing in on what seems to be an increasingly 
acrimonious relationship between the PRI and PAN as Paredes 
and PAN Senator Santiago Creel have traded barbs over the 
past week on issues ranging from candidate selection 
mechanisms to governance and progress on reforms. 
 
9. (C) PRI's criticisms of its rival may have some legs--PAN 
Secretary for International Relations Juan Bosco Tinoco told 
PolCouns on January 23 that he is very concerned that 
Mexicans may be increasingly receptive to opposition attempts 
to blame President Calderon for worsening economic 
conditions, which may strengthen PRI prospects.  Bosco noted 
that recent focus groups conducted by the party indicate that 
people are becoming more frustrated that the Calderon 
administration has not done more mitigate the local effects 
of the worldwide economic downturn, whereas focus groups last 
fall indicated that people understood the problem to be a 
global phenomenon rather than the result of mismanagement 
from the government.  Most analysts predict a more 
acrimonious legislative session when it starts next month, 
and some suggest that PRI may secure significant compromises 
from the PAN on proposed laws such as police reorganization. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) The electoral landscape could change dramatically in 
the months of campaigning that lie ahead--for example, 
internal PRI politicking as potential presidential candidates 
seek to best position themselves for a 2012 bid could sow 
divisions during the candidate selection process for the 
legislative and gubernatorial contests.  Real divisiveness 
within the party probably will be held at bay through the 
July elections, however, even as rifts exist that could serve 
to once again rend the party as the presidential contest 
nears. 
 
11. (C) Analysts have suggested that the PRI, particularly if 
it were to secure a majority, will approach the next 
legislature aggressively and in pure campaign mode. 
Observers note that PRI probably would seek to pass laws 
recentralizing authority with an eye toward winning the 
presidency in 2012, looking, for example, to impose more 
controls on the private sector, changes to budget procedures, 
funneling greater resources to the agricultural sector, and 
imposing more controls over PEMEX.  It is almost certain that 
between now and the end of the current Sexenio, PRI's 
policymaking and campaigning will be almost exclusively 
guided by the goal of re-capturing the Mexican presidency and 
the internal power struggles that accompany such a bid. 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
 
BASSETT