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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000084 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR KRAAIMOORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: ON THE EVE OF RAAN ELECTIONS 
 
REF: 2008 MANAGUA 1517 
 
Classified By: Amb. Robert J. Callahan for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY: On the eve of the North Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (RAAN) January 18 municipal elections, contacts 
described conditions as tense.  The Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) party ran an aggressive, well-funded 
campaign, while other parties, such as the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC), and the Miskito Indian Yatama 
party (Yatama), lack similar resources.  Opposition unity 
movements were underway in Waspam but had faltered in Puerto 
Cabezas.  Liberals alleged election law violations by the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) and election observers from 
the Bilwi Ecumenical Pastors' Council lacked the resources 
and training to be successful.  Finally, there were reports 
that FSLN sympathizers had sent a truck full of pre-marked 
ballots to the region and that shock groups would be ready to 
"defend the vote" on election night.  In short, the FSLN has 
covered its bases to assure election results that will most 
benefit the party.  END SUMMARY 
 
COWS, PIGS, CHICKENS, PINATAS, AND STOVES FOR VOTES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) On January 8 and 9, EmbOff traveled to the RAAN to 
assess conditions ahead of the January 18 municipal 
elections.  As previously reported (reftel), FSLN party 
leaders were aggressively using government programs and small 
loans to attract cross-over voters and keep existing party 
members faithful.  RAAN contacts told us that Citizen Power 
Council (CPCs) and FSLN party leaders specifically directed 
the government's "zero hunger" program in the RAAN, 
distributing free cows, pigs, and food stuffs to targeted 
audiences instead of the neediest people.  During the week of 
Christmas the FSLN candidates in Puerto Cabezas gave out free 
chickens, cooking stoves and gas tanks as well as Christmas 
pinatas and toys, all paid for with government funds, to 
potential voters. 
 
¶3. (C) Other candidates from the PLC or the regional Pamyuk 
party barely had enough funds to pay for the gas in order to 
visit outlying communities.  Instead, Liberal candidates 
relied on grass-roots canvassing and public rallies to 
solicit votes.  Puerto Cabezas PLC mayor candidate Orson 
"Blas" Coleman used his daily Miskito-language radio program 
to advance his campaign and recruited surrogates to visit 
outlying communities.  Since the Waspam PLC mayor candidate 
did not have access to radio (reftel) he personally traveled 
to communities along the Rio Coco River and further inland to 
campaign.  Liberal candidates in Rosita filed complaints with 
the municipal election council (CEM) that cedulas from the 
CES had only been delivered to FSLN supporters, and that 
government buildings and vehicles were illegally used by the 
FSLN candidates during the campaign.  Similar complaints were 
filed in other municipalities during the November 2008 
municipal elections held in the rest of Nicaragua.  (NOTE: 
Cedulas are the Nicaraguan national ID registration cards 
that a voter must present in order to vote during an 
election.  END NOTE) 
 
 
ROADBLOCKS GONE, VIOLENCE LATER? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) Beginning in late December, national media reported roadblocks outside the two major towns of Waspam and Bilwi and at strategic crossroads in the RAAN. However, by January 8, when EmbOff traveled to the Miskito Indian communities of Sisin, Santa Marta and Auya Pinhi, the roadblock in Sisin was gone. The people in these communities were upset with the FSLN government and their Yatama leaders. Some of the roadblocks were set up by various individuals, mostly Yatama supporters, who publicly complained that the FSLN needed to share the benefits of the "zero hunger" program fairly, instead of distributing them only to FSLN party members. Privately, at least some of these Yatama-supported roadblocks were meant to call the central government's attention to Yatama's political power in the region. Our contacts told us that Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera flew to Managua and demanded that the Ortega government "fix" the election to let the Yatama party win in its traditional strongholds (Puerto Cabezas, Prinzapolka, and Waspam) and give immunity to three Yatama politicians, including the current Puerto Cabezas mayor, Waspam mayor and the RAAN regional governor. All three individuals have allegedly misappropriated thousands of dollars in Hurricane Felix relief funds and materials. (COMMENT: The majority of the roadblocks disappeared before January 8, signaling that some agreement apparently had been reached between Yatama and government leaders, most likely an agreement on immunity. END COMMENT)
 
¶5. (C) Despite the disappearance of the roadblocks, our 
contacts told us that the mood was tense in the region. 
Catholic Church leader in Bilwi, Father Rodolfo French, 
expressed his grave concern that there would be violence 
after the election is over.  He believes that if the FSLN 
lose in Puerto Cabezas, there would be more violence than if 
the PLC and Yatama lose.  Liberal contacts told us that they 
were willing to organize protests and shock groups if the 
vote was "stolen" from them. 
 
 
UNITY MOVEMENT ENDS IN PUERTO CABEZAS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (C) In the final week of the campaign, local political 
leaders and candidates called for the opposition to unite in 
support of PLC mayor candidate Blas.  As previously reported 
(reftel) the Resistance Party of Nicaragua (PRN) candidate 
Alvaro Ramirez announced his support to Blas without formally 
withdrawing from the race.  Ramirez told EmbOff that after 
his announcement, national PRN officials denounced his action 
and forced the regional election council to replace his name 
on the ballot with another PRN candidate.  On January 6, the 
vice mayor candidate from the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 
(ALN) party, Baptist minister Leonard Coulson, announced his 
support for Blas.  It was widely believed that the ALN mayor 
candidate and former Contra fighter, Victor Alvarado, would 
follow suit.  However, Alvarado explained to EmbOff that he 
would not withdraw because he believed that it was "God's 
will that he win" and that "Blas is as bad as other corrupt 
Yatama leaders - Brooklyn Rivera, Steadman Fagoth." 
Reportedly, during the 2006 presidential election, Blas 
convinced Alvarado to contribute $4,000 to the ALN Eduardo 
Montealegre campaign and was subsequently punished by the 
FSLN-controlled regional government by withholding his 
fishing license for two years.  Alvarado's personal vendetta 
against Blas could divide the Liberal vote a bit and make it 
easier for the FSLN to perpetrate election fraud. 
 
 
UNPREPARED OBSERVERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) As with the November 2008 municipal elections in the 
rest of the country, the lack of accredited and trained 
observers remains a concern.  EmbOff met with members of the 
Moravian Church who participate in the Bilwi Ecumenical 
Pastor's Council to discuss their preparation to observe the 
elections.  They explained that during an Ecumenical Pastor's 
Council meeting in December, all of the Puerto Cabezas 
mayoral candidates expressed their deep concerns about 
avoiding the same election fraud and violence that had 
paralyzed the rest of the country.  Alvarado, the ALN 
candidate, proposed that church leaders serve as election 
monitors and members of the council agreed.  None of the 
members of the council had any previous experience or 
training as election monitors.  Since the observation would 
be limited to the 30 main voting centers (JVRs) in Bilwi, 
they believed that there would be sufficient members to meet 
the task; however, they complained that they did not have the 
financial resources to fund the effort by themselves. 
 
¶8. (C) EmbOff also met with the Center for the Development of 
the Atlantic Coast (Cedehca) an FSLN-affiliated NGO also 
planning to conduct election observation.  Cedehca reported 
they were also in financial trouble with their funding 
source, Diakonia de Suecia, and are seeking new funding to 
support their observation efforts.  Cedehca told us that 
their plan was to team up one experienced election monitor 
and a youth volunteer with a Ecumenical Council observer, and 
that they would hold a one-day training seminar before the 
election.  On the eve of the election the Ecumenical Council 
had not received official written accreditation from the CSE. 
 
 
¶9. (C) As reported previously (reftel), nationally recognized election observation groups, Etica y Transparency and IPADE, had asked for accreditation to observe the RAAN election. It was never granted by the CSE; however, IPADE announced that they would still send some observers to the region on the day of the election. Catholic Church leader Father Rodolfo French reported that the Catholic Church does not want to monitor the elections because it fears that any position church election monitors take would be manipulated by the winners or losers in the election.
 
 
SOPHISTICATED PRE-MEDITATED FRAUD 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (C)  The RAAN has historically had high voter 
absenteeism, thus making manipulation easier.  However, the 
opposition believed it was energized and that people in the 
countryside would vote.  Our contacts told us that the city 
of Bilwi generally favored the FSLN candidates and the Puerto 
Cabezas rural areas favored the PLC candidates, making 
turnout key.  A three-day radio call-in opinion poll held PLC 
candidate Blas ahead of the ALN, Yatama and FSLN candidates 
in head to head match-ups.  However, as occurred in the 
earlier municipal elections, it appears the FSLN and the CSE 
have organized well in advance to secure their victory.  We 
heard consistent reports of a truck, departing from Managua, 
full of boxes of pre-marked ballots for the FSLN being 
delivered to the region.  Allegedly, these pre-marked ballots 
would correspond with the election results that the CSE will 
announce on election night - guaranteeing an FSLN victory in 
most of the races, and in particular, Puerto Cabezas. 
Similarly, the FSLN has apparently organized shock groups to 
"defend the vote" on election night, as they did elsewhere in 
November to discourage opposition protests. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶11. (C)  The FSLN leadership has learned from the previous 
municipal election not to leave anything to chance.  Their 
public and private activities show that they won't make the 
same mistakes with the upcoming January 18 RAAN municipal 
elections.  They appear to have divided the opposition to 
reduce its strength in Puerto Cabezas and facilitate 
manipulation of the outcome.  They have neutered the power of 
their election allies Yatama, guaranteeing that this 
potentially powerful political movement will not be a major 
factor in the election.  Election observers, if they are even 
permitted to observe, are unprepared, though their presence 
will give the impression, at least locally, of a transparent 
election process.  And to make sure the election goes exactly 
to plan, the FSLN may have already sent pre-marked ballots to 
substitute real ballots at the voting centers.  In a region 
that suffers from extremely high unemployment because of a 
collapsing fishing industry and crushing poverty because of 
the after effects of a devastating hurricane, the FSLN may 
finally be able to secure its political control over an area 
that generated some of its fiercest opposition during the 
Contra civil war. 
CALLAHAN