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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR KRAAIMOORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: RAAN ELECTIONS AS PREDICTED - FSLN WINS 
MOST RACES 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 84 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 79 
     ¶C. 08 MANAGUA 1517 
     ¶D. 08 MANAGUA 1383 
     ¶E. 08 MANAGUA 1367 
     ¶F. 08 MANAGUA 1136 
 
Classified By: Amb. Robert J. Callahan for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY: On January 19 the Supreme Election Council 
(CSE) declared the Sandinista National Liberation  Front 
(FSLN) party victor in four of the seven municipalities in 
the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) - Bonanza, 
Rosita, Waspam and regional capital Puerto Cabezas.  As 
expected, the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) won in Siuna 
and Mulukuku, and the Miskito Indian Yatama (Yatama) regional 
party won in Prinzipolka (see Reftel A & C).  On election day 
absenteeism was high but there were few reports of violence. 
However, there were several credible allegations of election 
fraud and irregularities in each municipality that revealed a 
new level of sophistication and coordination, and were 
difficult to detect by election observers.  The FSLN victory 
in the Yatama-strongholds of Puerto Cabezas and Waspam was 
particularly troubling for Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera and 
may signal the end of his control over the party (see Reftel 
B & F). END SUMMARY 
 
------------------------ 
THE CSE OFFICIAL RESULTS 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) With 97 percent of the vote count, the CSE declared 
on January 19 that the FSLN party has won four of the seven 
municipalities in the RAAN.  The remaining three 
municipalities were split by the PLC and Yatama.  In Bonanza, 
historically a Sandinista stronghold, the FSLN won with 64 
percent of the vote, followed by 35 percent for the PLC.  In 
Rosita, the FSLN won with 56 percent of the vote, followed by 
42 for the PLC candidates.  In Waspam and regional capital 
Puerto Cabezas, areas dominated by the Yatama party, the FSLN 
won with 40 and 36 percent respectively, followed by Yatama 
with 33 and 31 percent respectively, and the PLC candidates 
with 25 and 28 percent respectively.  In Siuna and Mulukuku, 
historically Liberal strongholds, the PLC won with 57 and 56 
percent respectively, followed by the FSLN with 41 and 23 
percent.  In Prinzipolka, Yatama won with 46 percent, the 
remaining votes went to the FSLN (28 percent) and PLC (23 
percent).  The Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party 
captured approximately 19 percent of the vote in Mulukuku and 
three percent in Puerto Cabezas.  Other regional parties, 
such as the Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN), Atlantic Coast 
Regional Party (PAMUC) and Alternative for Change (AC) party 
also fielded candidates in the election, but captured less 
than two percent of the vote combined in most of the contests. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
HIGH ABSENTISM, LOW VIOLENCE, ON ELECTION DAY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  As previously reported (see Reftel C, D and E) 
absenteeism was expected to be high, and the CSE announced 
that roughly 50 percent, or approximately 84 thousand voters 
of the 170 thousand registered voters, participated on the 
day of the election.  Mauricio Zuniga, executive director of 
the Institute for Democracy and Development (IPADE), 
confirmed the CSE assessment of lower turnout.  Zuniga told 
the press that the RAAN historically has lower voter turn-out 
for elections, in part because of the extreme poverty of the 
region.  According to Zuniga, voters were dissatisfied with 
the candidates and lacked the motivation to come out in 
force, particularly the Yatama supporters. 
 
¶4. (C) Election observers from IPADE, Etica y Transparencia, 
and the Center for the Development of the Atlantic Coast 
(Cedehca) reported that voting centers generally opened on 
time, with minimal delays, and that only a few voting centers 
closed early.  Of the two voting centers in Bilwi that closed 
early, large crowds gathered outside and demanded that they 
be reopened.  There were also some polling stations that 
tried unsuccessfully to close with people still in line. 
IPADE reported to the media that the election proceeded 
peacefully; however, there were a few incidents of violence. 
The media reported that a group of armed men approached a 
voting station in Mulukuku, but that there was no 
 
MANAGUA 00000103  002 OF 004 
 
 
confrontation.  In Puerto Cabezas, our contacts told us that 
the ALN candidate, Victor Alvarado (see Reftel A), confronted 
and punched Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera in the back after 
pre-marked ballots were discovered at a voting station.  In 
general, election day violence was diminished by the presence 
of over 1,500 riot police and military personnel that 
maintained public order throughout large cities in the RAAN. 
 
---------------------------- 
CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED FRAUD 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Despite the generally peaceful election day and the 
presence of election observers outside of many of the polling 
stations, there were irregularities that occurred in all of 
the municipalities, including allegations of election fraud. 
Unlike the fraud that occurred in the November 9 municipal 
elections in the rest of Nicaragua, the RAAN municipal 
election fraud was carefully planned and orchestrated by the 
FSLN to be difficult to detect by election observers outside 
of the polling stations.  In fact, our contacts tell us that 
most of the fraud took place well before election day through 
the careful control of the lists of eligible voters and their 
cedulas, the Nicaraguan national identity document issued by 
the CSE and required for voting.  Even if a voter was 
pre-registered to vote, polling station officials would not 
permit entrance without presenting a valid cedula. 
 
¶6. (C) As reported previously (see Reftel C), FSLN controlled 
Citizen Power Council (CPC) members staffed most of the voter 
registration tables on November 9, during the verification 
process.  Our contacts believe that CPC operatives noted 
party affiliation during the verification process in order to 
control who would be able to vote in the January election. 
Voters sympathetic to Liberal or Yatama candidates did not 
receive new cedulas in time to vote, whereas FSLN 
sympathizers received their cedulas well in advance of the 
election.  One contact told us that an estimated 4,000 
cedulas were purposely not delivered to Liberal voters in the 
Sandy Bay communities of Puerto Cabezas.  Other voters who 
had previously registered for a change of polling station on 
November 9 could not find their names on the CSE prepared 
electoral list on Election Day - some traveled to multiple 
polling stations trying to locate their names, and in the end 
gave up in frustration without voting.  There were also 
credible reports that the FSLN-controlled CSE illegally 
included the names on voter lists and issued cedulas to 
under-age voters from FSLN families. 
 
¶7. (C) Another irregularity that both the PLC and Yatama 
candidates denounced was non-residents voting in the RAAN 
elections.  Our contacts reported that at least five buses 
from neighboring Matagalpa brought in voters to polling 
stations in Mulukuku.  Puerto Cabezas PLC candidate Osorno 
"Comandante Blas" Coleman told the press that the Sandinistas 
bused in some 700 party supporters from different 
municipalities to vote in Puerto Cabezas.  (NOTE: For these 
non-RAAN residents to vote, CSE officials purposely included 
their names and cedula numbers on the list of eligible 
voters. END NOTE)  There were also reports that many of the 
1,500 military and police personnel transferred from the 
Pacific coast to provide election security also voted in the 
RAAN elections.  Nicaraguan election rules allow members of 
the military to vote at any polling station without requiring 
that they pre-register to be on the list of eligible voters. 
In Puerto Cabezas alone, our contacts estimate that 
approximately 250 military and police personnel voted. 
(COMMENT: The same thing occurred during the November 9 
election, when large groups of military or police personnel 
voted at specific polling stations to favor FSLN candidates 
and use up ballots intended for registered voters in the 
polling district.  It is quite possible that some of these 
military voters could have voted in both the November 9 and 
January 18 elections.  END COMMENT) 
 
¶8. (C) Near some voting stations CPC members gave out rice, 
sugar, and other food stuffs to voters in exchange for signed 
promises to vote for FSLN candidates.  The lack of basic 
civic education regarding secret ballots in elections 
prevented many RAAN voters from voting their conscience after 
accepting the FSLN handouts.  Meanwhile, inside some voting 
centers CPC members harassed voters and Liberal party 
election monitors, threatening them with expulsion by the 
CPC-staffed electoral police.  Our contacts told us that FSLN 
 
MANAGUA 00000103  003 OF 004 
 
 
member Steadman Fagoth was in Rio Coco in Waspam bribing 
election officials with C$3,000 ($150 USD) to falsify results 
to favor FSLN candidates.  Finally, there were reports from 
our contacts and in the media of pre-marked election ballots 
for FSLN and Yatama candidates discovered at polling stations 
in Bilwi and Waspam. 
 
--------------------------- 
THE REAL WINNERS AND LOSERS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In 2004 municipal elections, the FSLN actually won in 
two RAAN municipalities, Bonanza and Puerto Cabezas. 
However, Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera staged protests and 
negotiated directly with FSLN until Daniel Ortega conceded to 
let Yatama take Puerto Cabezas.  The remaining RAAN 
municipalities were split between the PLC and Yatama, leaving 
Yatama with three municipalities, the PLC with three, and the 
FSLN with one.  Our contacts told us that the 2006 
presidential election motivated Ortega to sign his infamous 
"pacto" with Rivera in May 2006 to share both political and 
economic control of the Atlantic coast.  The decision to form 
a Yatama-FSLN alliance cost Rivera tremendous political 
capital among his Miskito Indian base; many indigenous and 
former Contra leaders, such as Osorno Blas Coleman, Alfonso 
Smith, Jimmy Hernandez and Filepe Mitchell left Rivera's 
inner circle and split the Yatama party into different 
factions, such as the Yatama-No-Sandinista group led by Blas 
(see Reftel F).  The Yatama-FSLN pacto effectively gave the 
FSLN greater control over RAAN's municipalities and its 
regional council, while preserving the illusion that Yatama 
dominated the region. 
 
¶10. (C) The current election results have destroyed the 
illusion that Yatama controls the region.  In this election, 
the PLC lost Rosita to the FSLN, but Yatama lost both Puerto 
Cabezas and Waspam to the FSLN, putting in an awkward third 
place.  Rivera has refused to accept CSE results in Waspam 
and Puerto Cabezas, claiming that the elections were "dirty," 
and has called on his supporters to take action.  The results 
were clearly embarrassing to Rivera and have created further 
challenges to his leadership.  Our contacts told us that 
Rivera felt betrayed by the FSLN and expected them to 
manipulate results to favor a Yatama victory in Puerto 
Cabezas and Waspam, even though the Yatama candidates were 
unpopular.  In the end, our contacts believe that Rivera 
would negotiate with the FSLN to get at least Waspam back, 
but from a weakened position. 
 
¶11. (C) Rivera is not the only loser in this election.  Blas 
has also lost prestige by losing another election and coming 
in third behind Yatama.  During the campaign, he used his 
daily Miskito radio program as a bully pulpit to attack 
primarily other Liberals instead of the Sandinistas, and 
reinforced his image as a military-person and not a 
politician who could reach out and build a coalition.  It is 
widely believed that his behavior in the campaign followed by 
this loss would diminish his authority as the main leader 
within the Yatama-No-Sandinista group (See Reftel F). 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) As expected the FSLN manipulated the voting process 
to favor its candidates over Liberals and even their 
erstwhile Yatama allies during the RAAN municipal elections. 
The FSLN election fraud showed greater sophistication and 
coordination between the CSE and local CPCs and FSLN party 
leaders, particularly in the way that cedulas and eligible 
voter lists were controlled.  In doing so, the FSLN could 
allow some election observation while avoiding the messy 
fraud of the November 9 elections where the opposition could 
show voting center counts signed by their party election 
monitors that did not match CSE announced results.  Only 
fully accreditated, independent election monitors, who had 
free access inside the voting centers, would have been able 
to detect the sophisticated fraud in this election.  Neither 
IPADE nor Etica election observers were accreditated by the 
CSE, and we believe that Cedehca election observers were 
biased for the FSLN in their observations. 
 
¶13. (C) The election results put FSLN candidates in control 
of the majority of the RAAN municipalities, which was a huge 
 
MANAGUA 00000103  004 OF 004 
 
 
blow to the Yatama indigenous party, led by Brooklyn Rivera. 
We believe that there may be episodes of post-election 
violence if negotiations between Yatama and FSLN break down 
over the final status of Waspam; but in the end the FSLN 
would give Waspam to Yatama just as it gave Puerto Cabezas to 
them after the 2004 elections in order to maintain their 
political and economic alliance in the Atlantic Coast. 
Returning Waspam to Yatama would help to slow the 
hemorrhaging of the Yatama base away from Rivera. 
Unfortunately, Comandante Blas' loss and his comments to the 
press that he and his nemesis Rivera have the same enemy and 
should join forces to contest the results confuse the calls 
for new leadership within the Yatama base.  The FSLN has 
worked over time to eliminate and subsume its opposition; 
this election revealed that it may be actively working to 
create the conditions for Yatama to collapse and cease to be 
relevant in the region.  The next Regional Council elections 
set for March 2010 will demonstrate whether Yatama can 
regroup in time to prevent the FSLN from overwhelming, and 
perhaps destroying it. 
 
 
CALLAHAN