VZCZCXRO8880
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0094/01 0300846
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300846Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9110
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000094 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - JANUARY 30 
 
¶1.  (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of 
spot information from various sources.  This report is not 
exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be 
confirmed at this time. 
 
LRA Issues 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) MONUC reported that on January 27, LRA rebels killed 40 
civilians in the city of Meridi, a major city in southern Sudan.  A 
counterattack by the local population reportedly failed.  MONUC 
speculated that, once Okot Odhiambo had surrendered, his fighters 
may have gone on this rampage (Note: An unconfirmed press report 
alleges that Odhiambo has already surrendered to the UPDF.  End 
note). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) A senior MONUC official provided a briefing on a recent 
visit to Haut Uele, describing the situation as "a humanitarian 
catastrophe."  The LRA was keeping several armies at bay, inflicting 
terrible suffering on local populations.  The situation has been 
compounded because humanitarian groups are unable to reach affected 
areas; even within Dungu, humanitarian organizations must travel 
with MONUC escorts.  The LRA continues to prefer using machetes on 
victims to preserve low supplies of bullets.  The UPDF, according to 
MONUC, believes it will spend another 15 months fighting the LRA. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) A western diplomat, who had recently traveled to Dungu, 
told PolCouns that there has been a noticeable breakdown in FARDC 
discipline in Haut Uele since Operation Lightning Thunder began. 
FARDC soldiers, who arrived in increased numbers in the area on 
December 1, were initially disciplined.  However, recently, the 
FARDC has committed rapes, looting, and extortion in the area. 
MONUC and UPDF forces are not present in the city, restricting 
themselves to the MONUC base 10 kilometers from the city and the 
airport. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Moreover, the civilian population is terrified, expecting 
an attack on Dungu.  While this may be unlikely, our contact said 
that it is not impossible, given MONUC's reduced presence and the 
ability of the LRA to evoke fear.  The LRA's tactic of dividing up 
into smaller, more mobile units appears to be successful, according 
to our contact.  The civilian population and local politicians 
recognize the LRA poses a tremendous threat, but the population is 
obviously frustrated. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) A senior MONUC military officer in Kinshasa noted that the 
UPDF invitation to operate in DRC territory has been extended until 
February 6.  He also said that MONUC is reinforcing its presence in 
the area with Guatemalan special forces and a company of Moroccan 
soldiers.  They are working on road rehabilitation between Dungu and 
the town of Duru to the north, which could be used as a humanitarian 
corridor. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The hope is to use the Guatemalans as the backbone of a 
quick reaction force to address LRA problems, and use the Moroccan 
company to establish a Forward Operating Base at Duru.  Separately, 
MONUC has helped provide transportation to the FARDC, which 
reportedly has established a more extensive footprint in the area 
(Comment: Despite all of this, MONUC's contribution to the anti-LRA 
effort is clearly limited.  The organization does not have much of a 
presence in Haut Uele and is generally confined to the base at 
Dungu, with not much projection beyond that.  MONUC, overall, does 
not appear to have a good idea what the FARDC and UPDF are doing at 
any given moment in Haut Uele.  End comment). 
 
Joint FARDC/RDF Operation 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) There are persistent rumors that some women and children 
of FDLR combatants have left for safer areas.  FDLR forces continue 
to mass near Kashebe, Ntoto, and Bunyakiri in South Kivu.  MONUC 
opined the FDLR may be massing in these areas either to confront the 
joint operation directly or to prepare for a withdrawal to Maniema 
or Katanga, neither of which is mutually exclusive.  The FDLR is 
also reportedly ready to deploy up to eight battalions in two phases 
along the Kavuma-Kalehe axis in South Kivu. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) MONUC strategy focuses on containing the FDLR at the line 
between North and South Kivu.  MONUC cautioned that, because of the 
terrain, it will not be able to prevent all FDLR fighters from 
attempting to move from South to North Kivu.  MONUC highlighted the 
area near Shabunda as a particularly vulnerable area for potential 
FDLR reprisals.  Because it is not accessible by road, it would be 
particularly difficult for humanitarian and protection assistance to 
reach this area.  MONUC cautioned that it has been effectively shut 
 
KINSHASA 00000094  002 OF 002 
 
 
out of most details on operational planning. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) MONUC reported that the FARDC and RDF are close to 
finishing the process of closing off the Rwandan and Ugandan 
borders.  Offensive actions against the FDLR will commence in the 
following phase.  Seven FARDC brigades are committed to the 
operation.  The best estimate of current RDF numbers is 3-4,000 
(Note: RDF forces still refer to themselves as "special intelligence 
units."  End note).  Separately, MONUC will potentially provide 
logistical support (specifically, transportation, food, medical, 
fuel and airlift support) to the FARDC in the course of this 
operation, as well as training for newly integrated units. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment: What remains unclear is how victory is to be 
defined in this effort, whether that be wiping out the FDLR as a 
whole or ensuring that all are repatriated back to Rwanda; or the 
capture or killing of the top level commanders; or something else 
entirely.  End comment 
 
CNDP Issues 
----------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) A North Kivu source, with direct contacts to the Amani 
Process and good contacts to the CNDP and other armed groups, told 
PolCouns that Bosco remained reluctant to commit CNDP fighters to 
integration with the FARDC.  This explained why he showed up one 
hour late for a FARDC/CNDP integration ceremony at Rumangabo on 
January 29.  This source maintained that Nkunda had recently moved 
from Gisenyi to Kigali (Note: a senior MONUC official in Kinshasa 
reported the same information.  End note) and that he had directly 
contacted our source to confirm that he remained "in control" of the 
CNDP. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Our contact insisted that the GDRC had orchestrated the 
split between Bosco and Nkunda. According to our contact, Kigali had 
initially proposed Nkunda as the frce commander for the FARDC/RDF 
joint operation,but Kinshasa rejected this idea.  Kigali then 
prposed John Numbi instead, and the GDRC immediatelyaccepted. 
Part of the DRC-Rwandan deal allegedly ncluded the division of 
North Kivu along the lins of the Grand Nord and the Petit Nord, as 
well s ensuring a governmental position for Nkunda whenthe dust 
had settled.  Regarding the January 29 umangabo integration 
ceremony, our contact sai it was purely symbolic, "nothing more 
than a re-run of the failed mixage process."  The operation, 
according to our contact, is run by a very small circle of Rwandan 
and DRC officials. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) omment: At the very least, despite general plans 
escribed by MONUC for an initial "accelerated" intgration process 
for CNDP fighters followed by a ore measured "classic" process, 
exactly how thisall would work is unclear.  A senior MONUC officia 
in Kinshasa hinted at the idea that the CNDP ran and file (which 
apparently is 70-80 percent Hut) may not be on board with their 
commanders, whoare mostly Tutsi and who, according to the officia, 
have gone over to Bosco.  End comment 
 
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