VZCZCXRO4929
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0081/01 0261109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261109Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9094
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000081 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: LRA OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER - THE VIEW FROM 
KINSHASA 
 
REFS: A) Kinshasa 46  B) Kinshasa 20  C) 08 Kinshasa 1146 
and Previous 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: This cable provides an overview of information 
with respect to issues surrounding Operation Lightning Thunder 
against the LRA, since military action began in December 2008.  It 
highlights LRA atrocities committed against the civilian population 
following and preceding the operation, the attendant humanitarian 
response, local press coverage, and MONUC's role.  End Summary. 
 
 
DRC Extends Invitation to UPDF 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) On January 22, the DRC extended its invitation to the UPDF 
to remain in the DRC to conduct military operations against the LRA, 
according to press reports.  The extension, which is valid for 21 
days, may be extended again, if needed. 
 
Humanitarian Overview 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Head of OCHA for the DRC recently provided post with 
an internal summary of LRA atrocities against Congolese civilians, 
which covers a period between mid-September 2008 and mid-January 
¶2009. 
 
-- Numbers of attacks: The LRA attacked 36 locations during the 
period; 16 of these attacks have taken place since Christmas 2008. 
 
-- Civilian deaths: The total estimated number of civilian deaths is 
569 persons. 
 
-- Wounded/injured civilians: According to OCHA, the number of 
wounded/injured civilians has been grossly under-reported, 
especially in the aftermath of the attacks during and after 
Christmas 2008 in the Faradje and Doruma areas.  In the attacks 
which have taken place between December 2008 and January 2009, LRA 
combatants have utilized machetes extensively, due to the loss of 
weaponry in the wake of UPDF operations.  Various sources have 
confirmed to OCHA cases of decapitation, machete wounds, physical 
torture and rape. 
 
-- Abduction of civilians: The number of abductions reported during 
this period stands at 427 civilians. However, OCHA believes the 
actual number must be considerably higher, given that in the run-up 
to September 2008 approximately 400 civilian abductions had been 
reported.  The attacks of September-October 2008 represented a 
turning point in the modalities of LRA operations in the DRC.  In 
previous raids (April-May 2008 and the previous 2006-2007 period), 
civilians were abducted mostly as porters and instances of release 
were more common. 
 
-- Internal displacement: To date, OCHA estimates that roughly 
104,000 persons are displaced in approximately 16-20 different 
locations in the territory of Haut Uele. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) OCHA cautions that, in general, the numbers of civilian 
casualties and abductions have been extremely difficult to verify as 
attacks occur in remote locations, which are difficult to access and 
have extremely poor communications infrastructure.  They also note 
that family separation during displacement and successive 
displacement renders it difficult to estimate accurately the number 
of abductions.  Separately, UNHCR estimates that the LRA has killed 
620 people since September 2008 and that approximately 115,000 
people remain displaced. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Head of OCHA told post that the focus is on health and 
relief aid distributions, i.e., non-food items.  The patterns of 
recent attacks are a major concern for humanitarian organizations, 
as they believe aid (especially food aid) may attract LRA combatants 
in search of sustenance and other goods. Nevertheless, they continue 
working on strengthening the response and the establishment of "safe 
aid areas." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Separately, the USAID DART team reported that humanitarian 
organizations attempting to deliver and distribute aid to IDPs and 
other vulnerable populations in the province continue to face 
significant logistical obstacles due to insecurity and poor road 
conditions.  The team also reported that the distribution of 
non-food items in Dungu by UNICEF and implementing partners remained 
suspended as of January 14 due to ongoing tensions between IDPs and 
the local population.  At the same time, UNHCR and implementing 
partners will aim to reach 100,000 IDPs who have not received 
 
KINSHASA 00000081  002 OF 003 
 
 
assistance since September 2008. 
 
 
DRC Press Coverage 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (U) Local press coverage of Operation Lightning Thunder has 
focused principally on the modalities of the operation and LRA 
follow-on atrocities against the civilian population.  From our 
viewpoint, there is very little public attention on the operation. 
Nevertheless, there have been some articles reflecting discontent. 
The January 7, 2009 edition of the independent La Reference Plus 
carried an op-ed from a former member of the DRC parliament, 
Jeannine Aiwa, entitled "The Government Has Blessed LRA Massacres 
Since 2005."  Aiwa claimed that the LRA entered the DRC in 2004 at 
the request of the government, following contact with an LRA 
representative in the United States.  According to the author, LRA 
fighters have remained active in the region due to the complicity of 
government insiders.  Aiwa stressed that the FARDC has been 
incapable of driving the LRA out of DRC territory. 
 
¶8.  (U) Additionally, the January 7, 2009 edition of the independent 
Le Potentiel contains an article entitled "Mixed Results of Military 
Operations Against LRA in Dungu."  It points out that the presence 
of the Ugandan army in Orientale Province may signal another foreign 
occupation of the DRC.  Benoit Kinalego, Chairman of the Dungu-based 
Justice and Peace Diocesan Commission, characterized the LRA attacks 
as a consequence of a lack of a coherent strategy on the part of the 
GDRC.  Kinshasa authorities, he continued, needed to develop a more 
consistent approach to the LRA issue, while the government should 
strengthen the FARDC contingent on the ground  (Note: The recent 
entry of Rwandan soldiers into the DRC to fight the FDLR has, 
unsurprisingly, also generated a great deal of press coverage which 
is likely to overshadow reporting on the Ugandan presence.  End 
note). 
 
 
MONUC's Role 
------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) According to a MONUC military source, the organization has 
principally been providing logistic support to the FARDC in the 
context of the operation against the LRA.  This support includes 
limited transportation for FARDC soldiers and vehicles to the field, 
a certain medevac capability, and provision of a certain amount of 
dry rations, fuel, and water purification capabilities.  The MONUC 
base in Dungu has also been reinforced with one Moroccan battalion, 
and additional MONUC forces were also reportedly deployed to 
Faradje.  Additionally, UPDF soldiers have also used the MONUC base 
at Dungu during the operation. 
 
 
Summary of LRA Actions in DRC 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The following points are particular highlights from 
recent editions of post's daily Eastern DRC Notes cable report. 
Interested readers may consult these reports for further details on 
LRA-related issues, to include particular instances of LRA attacks 
in the DRC from December 2008-January 2009. 
 
-- MONUC's Ituri Brigade recently reported that there are 1,200 UPDF 
soldiers in the DRC and that the UPDF has deployed to South Sudan 
(ref A). 
 
-- MONUC recently reported a total of 38 LRA fighters killed and 
eight captured.  A separate set of 21 LRA combatants have apparently 
surrendered to "other forces" (undefined, but not UPDF or FARDC) 
(ref A). 
 
-- MONUC and Human Rights Watch provided information that some 
villages in LRA-afflicted areas have organized self-defense forces 
in conjunction with the FARDC.  These forces have on at least two 
occasions beaten back the LRA.  One incident resulted in three LRA 
fighters killed and five killed in another (ref A). 
 
-- According to MONUC, the UPDF believes that Kony is still in 
Garamba Park and that the LRA consists of 600 combatants and 200 
dependents (Ref B). 
 
-- A local NGO leader told Post on December 22 (ref C) that the LRA 
had "lost lots of human and material resources" during the initial 
attack.  Imam Abd Shakur Shukrani, leader of the Bunia Muslim 
community, told post that the LRA had been dislodged from many 
positions from which they had harassed the local population. 
 
KINSHASA 00000081  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
However, he also predicted follow-on LRA reprisals, noting that the 
remaining LRA elements had dispersed over a large area, with many 
locals expecting retaliation.  Shukrani said that the LRA had 
distributed pamphlets in which it warned that the group would attack 
MONUC and exact harsher treatment on the local population. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The GDRC's decision to allow the UPDF, unarguably a more 
formidable fighting force than the FARDC, to attack the LRA was 
courageous.  The extreme remoteness of the area has obscured to the 
average Congolese the extent and development of the operation, as 
well as the heinous LRA reprisals.  Support for Lightning Thunder in 
the DRC remains ambivalent - there is a recognition that the FARDC 
needed outside assistance to try to rid the DRC of the LRA scourge. 
On the other hand, there is a growing, albeit undefined, unease with 
continued LRA atrocities on DRC soil.  In any case, the LRA, in DRC 
public and governmental opinion, takes a backseat to the 
ever-changing drama in the Kivus. 
 
GARVELINK