VZCZCXRO4771
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0078/01 0260722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260722Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9090
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000078 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - JANUARY 23: NKUNDA CAPTURED 
IN RWANDA 
 
¶1.  (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of 
spot information from various sources.  This report is not 
exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be 
confirmed at this time. 
 
Nkunda Captured 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Multiple press sources reported that Nkunda was captured 
on Rwandan territory late evening January 22.  A spokesperson for 
the DRC/Rwanda "joint operations command" announced that Nkunda was 
arrested as he fled to Rwanda after having attempted to repel a 
joint Rwandan/Congolese force with three of his battalions at 
Bunagana.  Goma PolOff noted that there are two scenarios 
circulating regarding Nkunda's fate: the first is that he was 
"arrested" (in the full sense of the term); the second is that he is 
voluntarily discussing next steps with Rwandan officials.  (Comment: 
the difference between the two scenarios may in fact be very 
minimal.  End Comment.) 
 
 
Rwandan Forces in the DRC 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Goma PolOff reported that estimates of the number of 
Rwandan soldiers now in the DRC range from 3,000-7,000.  MONUC has 
confirmed the presence of RDF personnel along the 
Rumangabo-Kinyandoni axis and the Rumangabo-Mushake axis.  RDF 
troops are also present in Tongo, where residents are apparently 
feeding them.  Reports that the RDF may have reached towns to the 
north and south of Masisi have not been confirmed.  MONUC reports 
that Rwandan forces are lightly armed and traveling on foot.  Most 
reports indicate they are moving alone, without accompanying FARDC 
or CNDP forces. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MONUC speculates that clashes with the FDLR may happen 
first near Kinyandoni (north of Kiwanja), where FDLR and Mai Mai 
forces are active.  Some contacts with sources within the FDLR, 
however, believe the group will avoid contact and fade into the 
forest, as they did when CNDP forces advanced through the area in 
late 2008.  Some sources speculate that Rwanda hopes the threat of 
combat will convince up to 50 percent of the FDLR to defect without 
kinetic engagement. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) A Belgian Embassy contact told post that he had heard 
unconfirmed reports that the FDLR had engaged with FARDC forces in 
Shabunda, a city in northwestern South Kivu, near the Maniema 
border.  The speculation was that, if the reports were true, the 
FDLR might attempt to distract/attack FARDC positions far away from 
the anticipated theater of operations in Masisi and Rutshuru. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) All FARDC roadblocks have been lifted, so MONUC finally 
has unhindered access to the north from Goma, after a "humiliating" 
cap on its movement by the FARDC.  NGOs are also able to freely 
travel northwards.  Journalists were able to move as far north as 
Rumangabo on January 22, and expect further freedom of movement on 
January 23.  FARDC and some CNDP movements through Goma and its 
airport have increased, but the city remains calm. 
 
 
Integrating the CNDP and PARECO 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The FARDC and CNDP are integrating their forces through a 
process that DRC General Numbi described as "integrate while we 
operate" as opposed to "integrate then operate."  He told MONUC 
commanders that this can occur in two ways.  The first is individual 
integration of CNDP elements, which come forward spontaneously. 
According to Numbi, 20 CNDP officers already stepped forward to 
integrate immediately into the FARDC.  The second is a collective 
integration of CNDP units.  A newly-formed joint FARDC-CNDP 
Integration Commission, with MONUC participation, will develop the 
mechanics for this process.  The commission will decide on 
principles and modalities of execution of the planned integration 
and will hold its first meeting on January 23. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) General Numbi estimated that 20 percent of the CNDP are 
"not signed up" to the alliance with the FARDC (which he later 
reduced to an estimate of five percent).  MONUC reported tensions 
between the two forces in Rutshuru, where residents reportedly 
welcomed the FARDC (Note: Some sources estimate that Ntaganda did 
not bring as many commanders or fighters into the alliance with the 
FARDC as hoped, leaving Numbi and Rwanda the job of "persuading" 
recalcitrants.  End Note).  General Numbi believes CNDP fighters 
 
KINSHASA 00000078  002 OF 003 
 
 
equal approximately 3,000, far lower than most estimates.  These 
forces would be integrated with the two non-integrated FARDC 
brigades present in North Kivu.  The plan is to then send these 
units to the Nyaleke training center for a three-month training 
program (Note: This could preclude their participation in the 
operation against the FDLR.  End Note). 
 
¶9.  (SBU) PARECO (Lafontaine and Mugabo wings) elements have also 
agreed to participate in the integration exercise.  However, many of 
them have no prior military training.  It is likely therefore that 
they will first receive training and will not participate in the 
joint anti-FDLR operations. 
 
 
MONUC Actions 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) MONUC forces in North Kivu are focusing on protection of 
civilians.  MONUC planners have identified three primary sites where 
combat could generate large IDP flows: Nyamlima, Pinga and Masisi. 
MONUC plans to divert forces currently in Goma to those areas, but 
MONUC commanders readily acknowledge that their forces are 
inadequate to prevent mass killings, if the FDLR retaliates against 
civilians.  MONUC's North Kivu brigade has held discussions with the 
brigade commander for South Kivu, and will produce similar plans for 
that province. 
 
 
Repatriation: A Continuing Option 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  In a demonstration that repatriation remains a viable 
option for the FDLR, the MONUC DDRRR Unit traveled by helicopter to 
Kasiki, North Kivu on January 22 and returned with 11 ex-combatants 
and dependents of the FDLR-RUD.  They are representatives of a 
larger group of RUD ex-combatants who remain cantoned at Kasiki. 
The 11 will participate in a one-two week "go and see" visit to 
Rwanda, returning to Kasiki to report on their findings. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) While the numbers are not large, the International 
Facilitation team, in conjunction with the GDRC and GoR 
representatives on the JMG-TF, hope this visit will demonstrate the 
continued viability of repatriation as an option for foreign 
combatants who are weary of conflict.  The success of the operation, 
after months of wrangling about demands and logistical details, is 
concrete evidence of a broad spirit of cooperation. 
 
 
Future of Nairobi Talks 
----------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In many ways, the CNDP has been sidelined, but UN 
advisors still see a role for the Nairobi talks, scheduled to resume 
on January 25.  A senior political advisor noted that the UNSYG 
appointed Obasanjo as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, and not just 
as a mediator on the CNDP rebellion.  MONUC expects Obasanjo and 
Mkapa to continue to play a role in negotiating Nkunda's future role 
(or exit), and managing issues connected with evolving events.  A 
contact at MONUC Kinshasa told post that Kabila still supports the 
talks, although our MONUC contact questioned what a Bosco-led CNDP 
delegation would negotiate with the GDRC.  Obasanjo might not be 
present for resumption of the Nairobi talks. 
 
 
Public/Parliamentary Actions and PR Issues 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Media sources in Bukavu report that many local residents 
and South Kivu members of the National Assembly are opposed to 
operations against the FDLR (Note: While the FDLR is not popular, 
there are reports of FDLR movements in South Kivu, and residents may 
fear retaliation.  End Note).  Residents of Goma and Rutshuru have 
also criticized Rwandan involvement, and fear a return to the 
practices of the RCD provincial government.  The current operation 
is widely seen as Kabila's initiative.  The president is no longer 
popular in Goma, and if the operation against the FDLR fails, or if 
the Rwandans do not leave quickly, his standing will sink further, 
according to one local analyst. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) At the same time, voices in Kinshasa (Parliament, civil 
society, and the press) appear to be even more critical of the RDF 
presence, according to MONUC headquarters.  The Chairman of the 
National Assembly's External Relations committee told MONUC that 
there Kivu deputies are discontent, to the extent that some are 
considering leaving the governing coalition.  The GDRC, according to 
 
KINSHASA 00000078  003 OF 003 
 
 
our MONUC contacts, has not done a good job of communicating the 
purpose of the Rwandan presence.  As an example, the government 
spokesperson continues to insist that the Rwandan presence in 
Eastern DRC only consists of Rwandanintelligence officers.  This PR 
vacuum has been illed by opposition, Parliament, and community 
laders. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Two senior MONUC officials me January 22 with the 
President of North Kivu Parliament, Mai Mai leaders, and Walikale 
community leaders.  The message from all three groups was the same: 
all were unhappy they were not consulted on this operation 
beforehand; all are worried about possible humanitarian 
consequences; but all nevertheless want to sign up for the anti-FDLR 
effort. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Nkunda's detention is a good news story that provides 
further evidence of the apparently excellent cooperation between the 
GDRC and GoR in the course of this operation - each side is getting 
what it wants for the moment.  Nkunda's ultimate fate remains 
unclear: the GDRC would most likely request his extradition to stand 
trial on charges of mutiny; exile to a third-country is another 
possibility that has been discussed over the years. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Bosco Ntaganda's fate remains a troubling question as 
well.  His apparent willingness to allow CNDP forces to be quickly 
integrated into the FARDC would seem to point to a concrete deal 
worked out beforehand with the GDRC.  In fact, General Numbi told 
MONUC that the Minister of Justice has traveled to The Hague to take 
up the matter with the ICC.  He reportedly underscored the 
desirability of the ICC suspending the arrest warrant given the 
positive role that Ntaganda has played in ending the CNDP rebellion. 
 
 
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