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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM95, GOS/JEM CLASHES, AERIAL BOMBING SOUTH OF EL FASHER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM95 2009-01-26 14:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5139
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0095 0261423
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261423Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2770
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000095 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS/JEM CLASHES, AERIAL BOMBING SOUTH OF EL FASHER 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 92 
B) KHARTOUM 83 
 
1. (SBU) Apparently in an effort to r%pel JEM vEhicles, GOS 
airplanes conducted aerial bombings January 26 in areas south of El 
Fasher, capital of North Darfur state.  The bombing occurred in 
close proximity to Zam Zam IDP camp, approximately 20 km from the 
North Darfur capital.  UN and NGO sources have confirmed that no 
bombs were dropped on Zam Zam camp, contrary to early rumors.  Zam 
Zam camp has traditionally been a Zaghawa stronghold of SLM/MM 
leader Minni Minawi.  Minawi's phones were turned off throughout the 
day (Minawi is currently in El Fasher). 
 
2. (SBU) UNAMID reported that the GOS bombed an area approximately 
20 km southwest of El Fasher beginning at 11:30 a.m., reportedly to 
impede the movement of a 100-vehicle JEM convoy toward Zam Zam camp, 
according to UNAMID's GOS sources.  By mid-afternoon, there were no 
reports of bombings, fighting or casualties within Zam Zam IDP camp 
(which houses approximately 54,000 IDPs) but estimates of 
causalities have yet to emerge from rural areas.  INGOs operating in 
the area reported large numbers of IDPs fleeing the fighting from 
areas south of El Fasher. 
 
3. (SBU) Verifiable information at this early stage is elusive (as 
usual immediately following an escalation in violence, and NGO/UN 
lockdown, there is currently a plethora of contradictory 
information).  However, several sources have indicated that a 
significant JEM convoy numbering up to 200 (or 100 according to 
other sources) vehicles was returning from last week's clashes with 
SLA/MM in Muhajeriya and Gereida, in South Darfur, when a SAF 
military convoy attacked the rebel formation eight to ten kilometers 
s/uth of Zam Zam camp.  A UNDSS national officer reported clashes 
between JEM and GOS forces in the villages of Launa, Katal, Wadaa, 
Abu Deleieg and Dar Al Salaam, all located east of Zam Zam IDP 
camp. 
 
4. (SBU) INGOs and UN agencies shuttered their offices for the day 
as Sudanese authorities quickly positioned armed personnel carriers 
and tanks at various points in town fearing a long-expected rebel 
assault on the city.  MIGs, MI-24 helicopter gunships, and Antonov 
improvised bombers were reported departing El Fasher airport 
throughout the morning.  At noon Sudanese authorities closed El 
Fasher airport to commercial flights and asked all UN personnel to 
leave the airport for security reasons.  UNAMID personnel and a 
large delegation from DFID visitors remain locked down at the UNAMID 
compound.  No official American personnel are curently in El 
Fasher, as a result of the Embassy's policy of only sending official 
personnel to Darfur for short visits.  However, the Embassy does 
havelocal FSN staff in El Fasher at our temporary residences. 
 
5. (SBU) The Embassy issued a warden message to all American 
citizens in Sudan the afternoon of January 26 informing them of this 
most recent bombing and the closure of the airport in El Fasher. 
Post will continue to monitor the situation and will provide a more 
expansive report as more information becomes available. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: As reported in reftels, the bold attempt, 
beginning on January 15, by the JEM rebel group to expand its sway 
deep inside Darfur at the expense of the GOS and of rival Darfuri 
rebel groups (especially Minawi's SLM), has now lead to generalized 
bombing by SAF to blunt this effort. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ