VZCZCXRO4536
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0091/01 0251330
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251330Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2760
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000091 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID SOCI KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE DUE TO LACK OF 
FUNDING AND OTHER SUPPORT 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 50 
B) KHARTOUM 22 
C) 08 KHARTOUM 1824 
D) 08 KHARTOUM 1786 
E) 08 KHARTOUM 1767 
F) 08 KHARTOUM 859 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
¶1. (SBU) According to Administrator Arop Mayok, the Abyei Interim 
Administration (AIA) has made little progress in securing funding 
since Mayok's meeting with CDA Fernandez in early December (ref A). 
Four months after it was established, the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) still has provided the AIA with only one million 
Sudanese pounds (appx. USD 500,000) to carry out its work.  As a 
result, some Administration officials have threatened to resign from 
their posts.  Despite Administrator Mayok's persistence in tracking 
down top Presidency and Ministry of Finance officials to resolve the 
funding problem, the regime seems reluctant to provide the financial 
and logistical support it promised when the June 2008 Abyei Roadmap 
was signed (ref B).  Mayok believes the NCP agreed to the Abyei 
Roadmap only under severe international pressure but now does not 
have the intention of implementing it.  Another explanation is that 
the GNU, which is now experiencing a liquidity crisis, is delaying 
all disbursements as long as possible.  Mayok warns that without 
money to rebuild Abyei and provide basic services to its people 
(including returnees), the thousands displaced during the Abyei 
fighting in May 2008 will be discouraged from returning, and local 
resentment against the AIA will build.  End summary. 
 
STATUS OF THE AIA'S FUNDING LACKS CLARITY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2. (SBU) On December 28, Abyei Interim Administrator Arop Mayok 
lamented to USAIDoff that the Presidency had missed the December 17 
deadline for approving the Abyei area budget.  This has paralyzed 
the AIA at a time when residents' expectations are high.  The delay 
continued through January 14, causing Mayok to travel to Khartoum to 
meet with Government of National Unity (GNU) Ministry of Finance 
officials.  In Khartoum, Mayok also met with GNU First Vice 
President (FVP) Salva Kiir Mayardit, who was there for an ICC Crisis 
Management Meeting, to highlight the problem.  Subsequently, Kiir 
discussed the issue with GNU President Al-Bashir and urged that the 
Finance Ministry release the funds to the Administration.  On 15 
January, Kiir told CDA Fernandez that Bashir ordered the Ministry of 
Finance to release the Administration's initial budget and the two 
percent of oil revenue devoted to the Ngok Dinka on 14 January (ref 
C), but Kiir could not confirm that the funds had actually been 
released. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In Khartoum, Mayok received mixed messages about the status 
of the Administration's funding.  On January 14, an official at the 
Ministry of Presidential Affairs told Mayok that seven million 
Sudanese pounds (SDG) had been deposited into the Administration's 
account for the Ngok Dinka (part of the two percent of Abyei oil 
revenues provided to the Ngok Dinka under terms of the Abyei 
Roadmap).  He also was told that the Presidency had submitted a 
letter to the Finance Ministry to release the Administration's 
initial budget and ten vehicles.  When Mayok checked the account, he 
found that only one million SDG had been deposited (of the two 
million SDG initial budget).  On January 19, the Under Secretary for 
the Finance Ministry told Mayok that the AIA now would receive only 
one million SDG (rather than the two million promised) and that the 
Administration would not manage the two percent of oil revenue 
devoted to the Ngok Dinka.  Although the Abyei Roadmap stipulates 
that the Administration should be the guarantor of the Ngok Dinka 
money, the Finance Ministry Under Secretary claimed that the 
Administration has no right to the revenue because it is for the 
development of the area. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mayok told emboffs on January 20 that he fought back about 
the two percent for the Dinka, telling the Under Secretary that it 
should not be part of the national budget, but should instead be 
safeguarded by the AIA until the Dinka tribal chiefs decide how the 
money should be utilized.  (Comment: Oje reason it is so easy for 
the GNU to delay payment of the two percent of Abyei oil revenues 
for the Ngok Dinka is that the CPA does not state clearly to whom 
the two percent should be paid  - whether tribal chiefs or an 
administrative body such as the AIA. End comment.)  Despite his 
reasoning, Mayok said that the Under Secretary was "insistent" that 
the AIA should not receive the Dinka community development funds. 
Mayok also said that the AIA's 2008 emergency budget (requested at 
seven million SDG) and its full 2009 budget (requested at 285 
million SDG) were not discussed and have likely not been decided 
upon by the GNU. 
 
¶5. (U) The GNU Presidency promised that it would transfer the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000091  002 OF 004 
 
 
following financial and operational support when the AIA was 
established:  (1) ten vehicles to deploy to Abyei and two million 
Sudanese pounds (SDP) for operations to initially set up the 
administration (decided upon between the Presidency and the AIA in 
September 2008;) (2) two percent of Abyei oil revenue for the Ngok 
Dinka community (as stipulated in the CPA;) (3) an emergency budget 
for 2008, consisting of funding for salaries and operations as 
stipulated in the Abyei Roadmap+ and (4) a full budget for 2009. 
The Abyei Administration developed and submitted the emergency 
budget request (seven million SDG) for 2008 and the full budget 
request (285 million SDG) for 2009 to the Presidency in late 
November.  (Comment: The 285 million SDG budget reportedly includes 
funding for law enforcement, a function now carried out by the Joint 
Integrated Police Units. This may be one reason why this budget has 
not yet been approved - in addition to the fact that the GNU is 
having serious liquidity problems. End comment.) 
 
FRUSTRATION MOUNTS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
¶6. (SBU) In a 20 January meeting with emboffs, a dejected Mayok 
likened the Administration's task to setting up a farm without any 
tools.  "How can you clear the land and prepare it without even one 
garden hoe?" he asked.  When poloff asked Mayok what the AIA would 
do with the meager one million SDP in its account, Mayok said if he 
had known that the Finance Ministry would only transfer that amount, 
he would have stopped the transfer from occurring.  "For reasons 
unknown to us, they only transferred one million pounds," he said. 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Mayok explained that the AIA is supposed to handle the IDP 
return program, but that it lacks the money to do so adequately. 
People are returning on an individual basis, which is causing many 
problems, said Mayok.  "Nothing is organized" because neither the 
AIA nor the relief agencies have the full funding to set up an 
organized program.  "I have told the relief agencies to do the best 
that they can for now," said Mayok.  "If the returnees do not get 
good services, it will discourage others from returning," he 
explained.  "For us [the AIA], there is a lot of frustration.  We 
have been working for four months without any money from the 
Presidency," said the Administrator.  The Presidency is "idle," 
complained Mayok. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Mayok said he doubts the Presidency's (meaning, of course, 
Bashir and Taha, not Salva Kiir) sincerity and seriousness in 
implementing the Abyei Road Map.  He believes that the CPA 
signatories were pressured to sign June 2008 agreement, but that the 
GNU is not interested in implementing the agreement.  He explained 
to emboffs that there "must be a political agenda" behind the the 
GNU's refusal to finance the Administration.  "If there has been a 
change of heart by one of the partners (NCP or SPLM), then we need 
to talk about it," said Mayok.  Mayok said he hoped GoSS VP Riek 
Machar and GoSS Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng 
would travel to Khartoum on January 21 to pursue the issue. 
However, ConGen Juba poloffs confirmed that Machar and Biong Deng 
were in Juba on 21 January, and that neither planned to travel to 
Khartoum to discuss Abyei with their NCP counterparts.  Biong Deng 
remarked to poloff that as far as he is concerned, "mechanisms for 
fund transfer are clear, and that there need be no discussion about 
it; only implementation" of what was agreed. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Emboff asked Mayok whether the GNU's declining oil revenues 
(ref. D) contributed to its failure to fund the AIA.  "Even if oil 
prices are down, why are others still getting their budgets and we 
are not?," Mayok replied, repeating that the funding delays reflect 
a political agenda.  "If this is the issue, then it would have to be 
made clear that this is the case.  Furthermore, cuts could not be 
applied selectively, but would have to be made proportionally," he 
said. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Administrator remarked that the AIA is only working at 
a policy level (not an implementation level) due to its lack of 
funds.  "We cannot recruit staff because we haven't received a 
budget," he said.  According to Mayok, the AIA currently is 
receiving administrative help from volunteers.  Despite the 
overwhelming challenges, Mayok said that the AIA has not yet "given 
up."  While rumors of administration officials saying they are going 
to resign continue in the media, Mayok said "it will be a personal 
decision for our members - whether they choose to stay or leave." 
Mayok said he had spoken with Administration members and asked them 
not to leave (and also not to make statements to the media about 
resigning even if they were thinking of doing so.)  Mayok told staff 
that their resignations would demonstrate that the NCP had won. 
 
SITUATION ON THE GROUND 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11. (SBU) Mayok said that with the help of unpaid volunteers, the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000091  003 OF 004 
 
 
AIA has created an IDP-returnee reception center.  At first, the 
returnees were allowed to stay for one to two weeks at the center, 
but due to the AIA's lack of resources, returnees are now taken 
straight to their villages after arriving at the center.  Mayok said 
that 800 IDP families returned to the Abyei area in December 2008. 
He added that another convoy of returnees was on its way to the area 
as of 20 January.  He confirmed to emboffs that thousands of IDPs 
from the Abyei area still remain in Agok. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Mayok told emboff that the AIA has managed to get the 
Abyei Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) relocated outside of Abyei town 
(ref E). Currently, only the Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) 
remains in the town center.  "I am not happy with the JIU; it has 
always been a source of insecurity for the area," Mayok asserted. 
He told emboffs that there is still tension between the JIU and JIPU 
following their violent December 12 clash (ref F). Arop described 
the SAF/SPLA forces within the JIU as "just mixed," rather than 
integrated.  "You can clearly see the line of division in the force, 
and this is very dangerous," he continued.  Proper integration is a 
process that requires joint training, he added.  (Comment: UNMIS has 
provided joint training for the JIUs, but in reality it will be very 
difficult to fully merge SAF and SPLA forces. End comment.) 
 
SAF STILL IN DIFRA, SPLA STILL IN AGOK 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶13. (SBU) Mayok said that a small SPLA logistical unit remains in 
Agok, and some SAF troops were still in the oil-rich town of Difra. 
According to Mayok, the UN has asked SAF to redeploy out of Difra, 
and SAF Headquarters have ordered this unit to withdraw.  On January 
21, the UN head of Office for Abyei told econoff that the two sides 
had agreed in principle to a mutual withdrawal.  21 SAF soldiers had 
withdrawn from Difra on January 20.  After initially claiming that 
the remaining ten soldiers would stay behind until stores could be 
removed, the SAF then said that they would remain until the SPLA had 
completely evacuated Agok.  UN monitors planned to confirm the SPLA 
withdrawal, then press the SAF to follow suit. 
 
STATE MINSTER HAROUN PAINTS A DIFFERENT PICTURE 
- - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶14. (SBU) On 25 January, Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC) 
Chairman Ambassador Derek Plumbly told emboffs that GNU State 
Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Haroun (also the NCP's chief 
negotiator on Abyei and an ICC indictee) offered him a rather upbeat 
assessment of the AIA funding issue during the week of 18 January. 
During Plumbly's meeting with the notorious janjaweed recruiter 
turned GNU official, Haroun claimed that the Ministry of Finance's 
delay in providing the AIA's budget was attributable to the length 
of time it had taken to agree the composition of the AIA and the 
lack of experience of those appointed when it came to drawing up 
budgets.  According to Haroun, a work team was set up in Khartoum at 
the request of the Presidency to help Administrator Arop draw up 
budget bids. Minister Haroun told Plumbly that he expects final 
figures for the AIA budget to be available within the next two 
weeks. 
 
¶15. (SBU) When Plumbly pressed Haroun harder on the budget delay, 
Haroun claimed that two million SDP and ten vehicles had already 
been allocated to the AIA on an emergency basis.  Furthermore, the 
Presidency had instructed GNU ministries to draw upon their own 
funds to initiate projects in the Abyei area, he said.  The State 
Minister provided the AEC Chairman with a list of proposed GNU 
actions on Abyei, which include provisions for the ministries to use 
Unity Fund resources to implement programs in Abyei, such as for the 
Ministry of the Interior to provide cars for the police. Haroun told 
Plumbly that "things are moving," and that the donor community would 
see action on some of these issues by 23 or 24 January.  Plumbly 
told Haroun that these difficulties would have been mitigated if the 
money allocated to the Dinka and the Misseriya under the wealth 
sharing arrangement in the Abyei Road Map had been transferred to 
the AIA.  Minister Haroun said that instructions had been issued for 
these monies to be paid to the interim administration, in the case 
of the Dinka 2 percent, and to a fund for the development of the 
Misseriya in Western Kordofan to be administered by the Governor of 
Southern Kordofan. (Comment:  If the GNU intends for national 
ministries to receive Unity Fund resources in order to contribute to 
the rebuilding of Abyei, there is significantly less of a chance 
that Abyei will receive the full funding it was allotted.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) Haroun's attitude on the Abyei funding issue contrasted 
starkly with GNU Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor's analysis of 
the problem.  Alor told Plumbly on 22 January that "there is no 
breakthrough" on the Abyei funding crisis and "the idea is to let 
you believe something is happening." 
 
OTHER POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS 
 
KHARTOUM 00000091  004 OF 004 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶17. (SBU) UN mapping of Southern Kordofan shows many other conflict 
points along the North-South border in addition to Abyei.  In 
December 2008, USAIDoff and UN staff overlaid maps of contested 
border areas with maps of oil concessions and recent SAF and SPLA 
military buildups.  Not surprisingly, all three line up very 
closely.  In the west of Southern Kordofan state and along the 
southern border of Darfur, where oil concessions extend, there is a 
high concentration of SPLA and SAF soldiers on either side of the 
border.  The volatile Higlig/Kharasana areas between Southern 
Kordofan state and Abyei Area present the same situation.  The SAF 
and SPLA are also heavily deployed in the eastern section of 
southern Kordofan state, extending into Upper Nile state as far as 
the western corner of Blue Nile state. And, of course, JEM's 
interest in expanding its operations to the oil fields is well 
known. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶18. (SBU) Administrator Mayok was visibly less optimistic than in 
his meeting with the Charge on December 6.  The GoS' continued 
failure to transfer the oil revenues promised in the Roadmap 
agreement prevents the AIA from functioning and threatens to damage 
its fragile credibility with the local population.  The NCP is 
treating the Abyei Administration in the same shoddy manner it 
treats other bodies created through similar, nationally-brokered 
agreements, which it does not take seriously, leaving 
well-intentioned local leaders to be undermined slowly as they fail 
to deliver. That being said, GNU official Haroun claimed that 
progress is being made on the transfer of finances to the AIA and 
that GNU ministries are being instructed to contribute to the 
rebuilding of Abyei.  While senior NCP officials within the GNU must 
be pressed to disburse the necessary funds, Mayok must also move 
forward with his work with the one million SDG (USD $500,000) that 
he has secured.  This should at least allow for the payment of 
modest salaries to AIA officials. Rather than looking ahead to how 
he can use the money once it is received (in part or in full), he 
seems more caught up with the principle of receiving all that was 
promised instead of moving forward with what the Administration has 
already obtained. The SPLM also must engage more fully in pressing 
the NCP on the question of the two percent of Abyei oil wealth for 
the Ngok Dinka.  If Salva Kiir does indeed want this money 
transferred to the AIA, he should state that publicly and press for 
its disbursement at a time when the NCP is "on its best behavior" as 
it seeks SPLM cover for a united front against the ICC.  Meanwhile 
Mayok and his administration had better begin planning for projects 
on which to lavish hundreds of millions of SDG, in consultation with 
the Ngok Dinka chiefs.  Post will continue to press GNU and NCP 
officials to release the funds, while encouraging the SPLM to press 
clearly and publicly on the two percent issue. Washington 
policy-makers must continue to raise Abyei in any substantive 
discussions with Khartoum as one of a long list of unfulfilled 
agreements by the NCP.  End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ