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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM89, UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, JANUARY 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM89 2009-01-25 13:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4533
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0089/01 0251326
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251326Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2756
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000089 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, IO 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, JANUARY 2009 
 
REFS: A) 08 KHARTOUM 1810 
B) 08 KHARTOUM 1726 
C) 08 KHARTOUM 1694 
D) 08 KHARTOUM 1670 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The big news in UNAMID deployment for January 2009 
was the successful movement, with strong Embassy support especially 
from the Defense Liaison Office (DLO), of Rwandan troops and 
equipment by the U.S. Air Force.  The movements went flawlessly with 
full cooperation by the GoS and UNAMID. Several weeks earlier, 
UNAMID successfully met its 31 December objective of 60 percent 
deployment, but is unlikely to me%t its March 31 oal of 0"Percent 
detloymeoD.!0Fov#tje bIvst,4amE,syjm"5NB}KD/u@mnsg0dnb f%0z}]QIb(&\cbs/z#mkRQ"1;oDlp|i(p(Qn,Gx})zQ} nY+ O>rqhe1Q`Ogk,F"-:C]iQQkx,.dfadd 
additional troops before the next rainy season.  However, with 60 
percent troops and Ethiopian helicopters due to arrive within 
several months, UNAMID should focus on fulfilling its mandate and 
actually improving security in the region, not just deployment for 
its own sake.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On January 6-12 Poloff spoke with senior UNAMID officers 
and staff.  These included: General Martin Luther Agwai, UNAMID 
Force Commander; Colonel Noddy Stafford, Chief of Military Plans 
UNAMID; Lt Col Andrew Moeti, Staff Officer for Operational Plans; 
Ian Divers, UNAMID Logistics Officer; Col. Hussein Al Hasan, Formed 
Police Unit (FPU) UNAMID Coordination Officer; Col Shweta Ayman, FPU 
Coordinator Sector South; Superintendent Kamal Singh Bam, Commander 
of the Nepalese FPU; David Gatwick, UNAMID Contingent Owned 
Equipment Unit; Stephen NSubunga Chief, Joint Logistics Operations 
Center (JLOC); and Tony Mundell, JLOC Supervisor.  They informed 
Poloff that on December 31 UNAMID's force strength was 12,374 troops 
or just over 62 percent of its total mandated force strength.  The 
breakdown of personnel on that date was 373 staff officers, 175 
military observers, 72 military liaison officers and 11,754 military 
personnel from TCCs.  However, UNAMID will not reach 80 percent 
prior to March 30 due to the fact that several of the battalions 
scheduled for deployment in 2009 are not prepared to deploy (UNAMID 
does not have the load lists and shipment of contingent-owned 
equipment has not yet begun.)  During 2009, the following battalions 
are confirmed for deployment: Egyptian Battalion 2, Ethiopian 
Battalion 2, a Thai Battalion and a battalion from Burkina Faso. 
 
3. (SBU) UNAMID has scheduled the following movements for the next 
three months: 
 
January: 
The Senegalese Infantry Battalion will rotate from Um Barru with 650 
personnel departing and 800 arriving.  Load lists have been 
delivered to DPKO and COE is anticipated to arrive around March 15. 
 
 
The Egyptian Infantry Battalion 2 is anticipated to deploy a 
200-person advanced party to Ed Al Fursan in Sector North. 
 
February: 
The South African battalion is expected to bring in an additional 
175 troops. However, COE load lists have not yet been provided to 
DPKO. 
 
March: 
The Bangladeshi Sector Reserve Unit plans to deploy 150 troops to 
Nyala on March 31. 
 
4. (SBU) These additions will only raise the number of troops to 
13,249, or approximately 68 percent of UNAMID's authorized force 
strength.  Stafford offered some options to meet the 80 percent 
target: 1) Deploy three more battalions without COE and place them 
in the super camp, or 2) Deploy advance parties of 200 troops each 
from three or four battalions and place them in the super camps 
without COE.  However, Stafford acknowledged that there is simply no 
realistic way for UNAMID to meet the 80 percent target by the end of 
March. The main problem is that there are not enough troops ready to 
deploy in the pipeline. (Comment: Several TCCs delayed deployment 
last year while UNAMID went through its growing pains, and now must 
be reconfirmed for deployment this year.  There is a risk that they 
will not be ready to deploy before the rainy season, which means 
UNAMID may not reach 80 percent or greater deployment until the end 
of 2009.  Under such a scenario, and with Ethiopian helicopters 
expected to arrive within several months, UNAMID should focus on 
improving its operational capacity and effectiveness using the 
assets currently at its disposal, while it continues to push ahead 
with deployment. End comment.) 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000089  002 OF 003 
 
 
Equipment Needs 
--------------- 
5. (SBU) UNAMID Force Commander General Agwai voiced familiar 
concerns over the lack of Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and 
inadequate facilities.  A status slide shown during the Force 
Commander's briefing revealed that less than half the current 
Canadian APCs are serviceable.  New APCs coming from Russia and 
China have been delayed for reasons that are unclear (apparently due 
in part to delays in shipping them from their country of origin and 
further transportation delays) but should be arriving in the coming 
months.  The contract for Canadian-provided maintenance expired in 
December, but the Canadians have agreed to continue their support 
until the new APCs arrive. 
 
Contingency Plans 
----------------- 
6. (SBU) Agwai said that while the withdrawal of UNAMID is not 
anticipated, contingency planning remains a priority in expectation 
of an ICC arrest warrant for Sudan's president.  Under an evacuation 
scenario, the plan is to consolidate troops from field sites to 
sector and battalion headquarters and from there to the super camps 
in El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geniena.  The final step is to evacuate 
to Entebbe, Uganda, though some units in West Darfur may evacuate to 
Chad if necessary.  Trip wires for activating the contingency plan 
are being developed by UNDSS in conjunction with DPKO and have yet 
to be finalized. As troops are withdrawn from field sites, those 
sites are abandoned and would not be re-occupied. 
 
IDPs Concerned That UNAMID Might Withdraw 
----------------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) IDPs are concerned that UNAMID may depart and leave them 
defenseless.  Poloff visited Abu Shouk IDP camp outside of El Fasher 
and spoke with community leaders Hussein Sajo and Ahmed Abu Al 
Basher.  Sajo explained that IDPs of Abu Shouk are increasingly 
worried about the potential consequences if President Bashir is 
indicted by the ICC. He is also concerned about SAF military 
exercises apparently being carried out in preparation for the ICC 
announcement.  (Note: On January 1, Sudanese Independence Day, the 
Western Area Military Command Headquarters in El Fasher staged a 
military parade exhibiting weaponry including heavy artillery and 
air assets. End Note.)  Sajo is concerned UNAMID will not be able to 
protect them from GoS-supported militias, so they are maintaining 
contact with rebel leaders from the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdel 
Wahid faction (SLA/AW) to intervene if they are targeted.  SLA/AW 
has a "base" 50 km west of El Fasher (though SLA/AW has very few 
operational vehicles.)  Abu Al Basher said that IDPs are aware of 
the UNAMID evacuation plans and voiced disappointment that UNAMID 
would consider "leaving us in a helpless situation."  Abdul Basher 
added, "UNAMID was established to protect us, not to escape when the 
real time for protection comes." 
 
FPU Issues 
---------- 
8. (SBU) Poloff met with Colonel Al Hasan, the new UNAMID FPU 
Coordinator, recently-arrived from Jordan, where he was in charge of 
security for the diplomatic corps in Amman.  He declared that UNAMID 
is "fully committed" to the goal of accommodating the mandated 19 
FPUs in Darfur this year to provide protection for the IDP camps and 
UNAMID installations.  Current staffing stands at 700 officers from 
4 FPUs from Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Nepal. Al Hasan 
anticipates that two FPUS from Egypt and one from Jordan will arrive 
before June, 2009.  The goal is to have seven FPUs by June 2009. 
(Comment: The goal of reaching 19 FPUs by the end of 2009 is 
probably unrealistic, as UNAMID has yet to line up solid commitments 
for the remaining 12 FPUs, though they exist on paper. The cost of 
equipping and deploying an FPU is prohibitive, and FPU-contributing 
countries will likely need encouragement and assistance. End 
comment.) 
 
9.  (SBU) Al Hasan plans to focus on training for incoming 
personnel, including scenario-based training focusing on checkpoint 
control, patrolling methods in camps, and IDP escorts.  He also 
plans to implement monthly workshops for FPU commanders to share 
best practices. 
 
COE Movement Status in Detail 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) UNAMID has made good progress in recent months moving COE 
into Darfur from both El Obeid and from Port Sudan.  UNAMID's order 
of priority for moving COE is: 1) Nigerian Level 2 Hospital, 2) 
Ethiopian Infantry APCs, 3) Ethiopian COE, 4) Nigerian FPU COE. 
UNAMID expects to complete these four priorities by early February. 
 
 
11. (SBU) The Chinese Engineers have moved almost all of their 256 
COE units to their final destination in Nyala with only two 
 
KHARTOUM 00000089  003 OF 003 
 
 
containers left in El Obeid. 
 
12. (SBU) The Egyptian Engineers are moving 42 pieces of equipment 
to El Fasher.  Three trucks will move the remaining equipment by 
convoy which is estimated to arrive in Nyala on January 18. 
 
13. (SBU) The Egyptian Battalion 1 Advanced Party is moving 41 
containers and two vehicles to Um Kadada.  Twenty-nine containers 
and two vehicles have already arrived in Um Kadada.  A convoy has 
been scheduled consisting of 20-30 trucks to move the rest of the 
equipment.  Estimated completion date for material movement is 
January 20. 
 
14. (SBU) The Egyptian Battalion 1 "Main Body" has received almost 
all of its 385 pieces of equipment in Um Kadada. 
 
15. (SBU) The Egyptian Transport Company has received all of its 183 
containers and 258 vehicles in Nyala.  Only a 35-ton forklift is in 
Port Sudan.  UNAMID is collaborating with DPKO to determine if the 
forklift can be used at the port and Egypt can send two smaller fork 
lifts for Nyala and Um Kadada. 
 
16. (SBU) The Ethiopian Infantry Battalion is split between 
operations in El Geneina and Kulbus.  All containers and 258 
vehicles have been sent to El Geneina.  Ninety-eight additional 
vehicles including 17 APCs are in transit by the Sudanese Railroads 
to Nyala where they will require a military/UN escort to El Geneina. 
 Thirty-seven containers and five vehicles were delivered to Kulbus. 
 Seven containers remain in transit to Kulbus.  (Note: The Ethiopian 
Battalion at Kulbus has gone for almost four months without 
electricity as generator parts are still in-bound.  This delay was 
caused when the Ethiopians combined the COE for four separate units, 
which then had to be sorted out in El Obeid. End Note.) 
 
17. (SBU) The Pakistani Engineer Company is slowly receiving its 356 
pieces of equipment with 142 pieces of equipment having already been 
delivered to El Geneina.  Thirty-five containers are in transit and 
the rest of the equipment still in El Obeid.  Sixteen containers 
arrived with Level III hospital equipment. 
 
18. (SBU) The Bangladeshi Multi-Role Logistics Unit has received 
almost all of its 413 pieces of equipment in Nyala. 
 
19. (SBU) The Nigerian Level II Hospital has received over half of 
its 65 pieces of equipment in El Geneina.  Currently no equipment is 
in transit.  Five containers including 12 water tanks and three 
communications towers are in El Obeid and are anticipated to be 
received in Nyala in mid-January. 
 
20. (SBU) The Senegalese COE is still in El Obeid and is being 
loaded onto trucks for Um Barru in North Darfur. The Senegalese will 
then move it to Tine. 
 
FPU Movement Status in Detail 
----------------------------- 
21. (SBU) Indonesian FPU:  Of the 191 pieces of equipment scheduled 
for delivery to El Fasher, almost all have been received. 
 
22. (SBU) Nigerian FPUs 1 and 2:  The equipment contract is being 
handled by the Mercur Company and almost all of its COE has arrived 
in Zalingei and El Geneina except for seven trucks that await 
escort. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
23. (SBU) With the December 31 goal of 60 percent deployment now 
behind it, UNAMID needs to re-prioritize its goals.  The first goal 
should be to seek to fulfill its mandate with the assets currently 
deployed and actually improve security for vulnerable populations. 
The second goal should be to quickly prepare for remaining 
deployments including the long-delayed Ethiopian helicopter company. 
 Third, UNAMID and DPKO must aggressively demand load lists and 
begin shipments now for incoming battalions and units, otherwise 
significant additional deployment will not occur until late 2009 
after the rainy season.  UNAMID has a long way to go before it 
becomes fully operational.  However, an invigorated focus on 
verification and monitoring as part of a ceasefire plan, along with 
enhanced protection of IDPs with the arrival of additional FPUs, 
should allow UNAMID to make a greater contribution to providing 
security and protection to the people of Darfur if the peacekeeping 
operation can demonstrate the initiative and leadership needed to do 
so. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ