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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM86, DARFUR PLATFORM: A 90-DAY PLAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM86 2009-01-23 11:05 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
O 231105Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2750
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000086 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/EX, AF/SPG, M, DS 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC AMGT ABLD UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PLATFORM: A 90-DAY PLAN 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 1660; B) 1/16/09 LAMB-LISENBEE TELCON 
 
1.  This is an Action Request.  See Paragraph 11. 
 
2. Summary: The purpose of this cable is to outline Post's 90-day 
plan for enhancing the USG's ability to pursue essential policy and 
program objectives in Darfur (See also reftel A).  Creating a secure 
platform for USG operations in Darfur is imperative to allow 
effective oversight of USG-funded humanitarian operations in Darfur, 
on-the-ground political information gathering, and enhanced access 
to the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur.  End summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
3. During January 10-12, a USG team traveled to Nyala and El Fasher, 
Darfur.  The team consisted of RSO Chuck Lisenbee, USAID's Chief of 
Overseas Management Services Beth Salamanca, USAID Sudan 
Construction Manager Bill Cherry, and USAID/OFDA Sudan Country 
Representative Sureka Khandagle.  The primary purpose of this visit 
was to develop a plan that would immediately move forward the 
development/construction of a USG Darfur platform. The team assessed 
current USAID and Embassy facilities, identified an interim facility 
in El Fasher for further review and development, and identified land 
in El Fasher suitable for a more robust, long-term platform. 
Following this assessment, the country team received a briefing on 
next steps. 
 
4. On January 14, the USAID Mission Director, OFDA Country 
Representative and USAID EXO met with the DCM, RSO and Management 
Officer to develop a 90-day plan for moving the Darfur platform 
forward.  The immediate objective of the 90-day plan is to allow (a) 
consistent oversight and management of USAID's $500 million dollar 
humanitarian program in Darfur; (b) project USG policy and political 
influence into this conflict zone that threatens regional stability; 
and (c) establish a more secure base of operations for further 
platform development. 
 
5.  Following are the next steps the team identified: 
 
Next Steps (El Fasher) 
A. Secure an additional Khartoum ARSO position to assist with 
RSO/ARSO coverage for Darfur. 
B. Secure a lease with the Agriculture Research Center (ARC) for an 
existing 12-person residential compound (soon to be vacated by PAE) 
identified for interim, TDY accommodations that would co-locate all 
USG personnel lodging in close proximity to the airport and UNAMID 
HDQs. The leases on the "green" and "blue" houses do not expire 
until the end of the year, and as such, would be maintained for FSN 
and TDY office space and outside meetings to allow separation of 
residential and office functions.  Moreover, the lease for the PAE 
residential compound is not yet assured. 
C. Secure land on ARC property for a secure, longer-term, 
multi-agency complex with on-compound housing. 
D. Hire and deploy a Darfur Platform Construction Manager or Project 
Manager. 
E. Begin making upgrades or improvements to the proposed interim 
residential compound and negotiate with PAE to leave behind the 
security apparatus already in place.  This space is ideal because it 
was initially constructed by USAID in the early 1980's, and has been 
enhanced by PAE, which has occupied it for the past three years. 
Located adjacent to the proposed land for construction of 
longer-term facilities, the interim building's proximity will afford 
better management oversight by the project and/or construction 
manager. 
F. Identify a contractor to undertake the longer-term construction 
project. 
G. Place an order for modular office and residential units that have 
been certified by DS/PSP as meeting OSPB standards. 
 
6. The Chief of Mission and Country Team are agreed on the sequence 
above, and USAID has the resources and authorities to undertake 
steps B-G immediately.  The Mission appreciates DS's consideration 
of additional RSO support, (per reftel B.) COM noted, however, that 
upcoming international and bilateral events, such as the fallout 
from an ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir, could delay or 
derail this plan. 
 
7. Next Steps (Nyala) 
A. Identify land for long term co-location facility. 
B. Make upgrades to the existing USAID office and residential 
facilities that are feasible within the constraints of 
poorly-constructed structures of low-grade material. 
 
The Chief of Mission and Country Team are agreed on the sequence 
above, and USAID has the resources and authorities to undertake 
steps A and B immediately. 
 
8. The immediate benefits of the 90-day plan are as follows.  Due to 
inadequate security at existing facilities, TDY visits to Darfur 
have been shortened.  This has had a negative impact on the USG's 
ability to monitor humanitarian programs in Sudan.  Similarly, while 
the Embassy has been able to send political officers to Darfur on 
short visits several times each month, longer visits enabled by a 
secure platform will further support our engagement with the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur and other political actors in the 
region. 
 
9.  The current travel policy (short-term intermittent TDYs) has 
reduced the ability of USAID to fulfill its humanitarian and 
political objectives in Darfur.  A phased return to Darfur based on 
the execution of key facility improvement benchmarks has been 
identified as the best approach forward.  By concentrating all 
official Americans in one location in El Fasher, the USG Mission 
would benefit from shared services, pooling of assets, and reducing 
the number of compounds that need to be secured to USG standards. 
The proposed location is also close to UNAMID, which is critical in 
the event of security incidents in El Fasher. 
 
10.  Humanitarian Oversight: This 90-day plan would significantly 
increase USAID's ability to provide consistent monitoring and 
oversight of DCHA programs in Darfur totaling $486 million dollars 
(OFDA - $100 million, OTI - $5 million and FFP - $381 million.)  If 
executed, the 90-day plan will increase the time allowed for USAID 
staff to be in Darfur to 2-3 week TDYs at significantly more secure 
facilities that have been improved.  It will allow DCHA to monitor 
programs and liaise with NGO/U.N. staff on a day-to-day basis in the 
field and increase DCHA's ability to make immediate programmatic 
changes and adjustments.  Increased presence allows fmr timely and 
essential information to be collected and used to have a direct 
impact on our ability to influence policy on humanitarian issues in 
Sudan.  In practice, a lack of presence means less access to 
real-time and ground-truthed information regarding partner programs, 
policies, challenges, and security and may negatively impact the 
USGs ability to execute key aspects of U.S. foreign policy. 
 
11. Action: Post requests the Department's and USAID's concurrence 
to begin implementation of this 90 day Darfur Platform Plan. In 
addition to favorable consideration by USAID and the Department, we 
also look forward to presenting this plan to DS/PSP Office Director 
Gentry Smith during his upcoming visit. 
 
FERNANDEZ