VZCZCXRO2262
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0078/01 0220821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220821Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2736
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000078 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR MOPS ASEC SU
SUBJECT: UPPER NILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES - WITH ALLEGED POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ROOTS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 029 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: UNMIS/Malakal continues to report fresh violence 
following an altercation between Dinka and Shilluk tribal members on 
the margins of celebrations surrounding the 4th anniversary of 
Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  However, NGOs based in 
Upper Nile's state capital dispute the civilian displacement 
figures, and claim press reports have exaggerated an admittedly 
unfortunate incident.  Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) 
parliament members from the region maintain that political forces 
are manipulating "unabsorbed militias" in the state, and warn 
against classifying the incidents as inter-clan fighting.  Other 
Juba sources contend the weekend's violence is tied to restive 
tensions around a poorly-conceived land-grab by Dinka politicians in 
Upper Nile State, some of whom are supported by Khartoum-based 
agricultural cooperatives with deep-seated stakes in the outcome of 
the ongoing process to demarcate the 1956 North/South border.   END 
SUMMARY. 
 
DINKA-SHILLUK SKIRMISH ON CPA CELEBRATION DAY 
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2. (SBU) Police fired live ammunition over the heads of brawling 
ceremony participants and released tear gas into the Malakal soccer 
stadium mere hours before Government of National Unity (GNU) 
President Omar al Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir 
Mayardit arrived to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the CPA's 
signing on January 9 (reftel). The Shilluk King was the lone 
official whisked from a VIP pavilion packed with foreign diplomats, 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) ministers, and Sudan Peoples' 
Liberation Army (SPLA) senior command when violence broke out. 
Reports on the Skilluk King's movements were mixed: some maintain he 
was moved for his own protection, others contend that he was brought 
out of the stadium to call for calm between feuding Shilluk and 
Dinka factions.  GoSS Minister for Cabinet Affairs Luka Monoja told 
ConGen PolOff on January 10 that the groups were jostling for parade 
placement amidst the heightened excitement of Bashir's attendance. 
Malakal has been a historically Shilluk-dominated town, and Shilluk 
performers objected to arriving into the stadium after 
representatives from the state's Dinka sub-clans. When spears began 
flying outside the stadium's walls, the Southern Sudan Police 
Service fired on the crowd, wounding nine. Tear gas was also used. 
(NOTE: Media reports claiming that two civilians were killed are 
false. END NOTE.) 
 
CLASHES CONTINUE 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶3. (SBU) Tribal violence resumed in the early hours of January 10 
when Dinka from Banglai attacked the Shilluk village of Nagdiar, 
resulting in its near-total destruction.  According to GOAL staff, 
ten people burned to death in their homes, and survivors fled 25 
kilometers to the northern outskirts of Upper Nile's capital of 
Malakal.  UNMIS/Malakal reports that the Southern Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission registered 4,679 Shilluk IDPs (NOTE: GOAL 
manages a health facility in Nagdiar and estimates the village 
population to be approximately 1,500-2,000 people. END NOTE.) 
Although media reports claim that some SPLA have been linked to the 
violence, no one reached by ConGen PolOff either in Makalal or Juba 
on January 13 can verify this claim.  UNMIS Civil Affairs officials 
also noted their belief that such allegations were false. Later that 
same day, alleged Dinka tribesmen attacked the Shilluk village of 
Lul, killing two and displacing approximately 150.  On January 11, 
police opened fire to dispel a growing mob of Dinka refusing safe 
passage to Shilluks through a neighborhood. One police officer died 
during the ensuring altercation. 
 
POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (SBU) SSLA MP Henry Akolawin, of Fashoda constituency in Upper 
Nile State, emphasized to ConGen PolOff on January 13 that the 
Nagdiar incident was not to be mistaken as "routine tribal 
violence." Akolawin admits that Shilluk and Dinka tensions have been 
strained since November 2008 when local authorities, at the 
direction of NCP Governor Gatluak Deng Garang (a close associate of 
President Bashir), began exploring the possibility of annexing 
Malakal town from Malakal County into neighboring (and 
Dinka-dominated) Baliet County.  Akolawin maintains that the nature 
of weapons involved in the January 10 violence rule out clan clashes 
alone.  The MP contends that a failed national disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policy has allowed for "the 
continued presence of unabsorbed militias" in Upper Nile state.  As 
a result, the presence of a large number of weapons has become a 
virtual "guns-for-hire" program for "conniring politicians." 
According to Akolawin, the Upper Nile State Information Minister 
(and ex-militia commander) should be considered a chief suspect in 
the recent violence.  GoSS Cabinet Affairs Minister Monoja counts 
 
KHARTOUM 00000078  002 OF 002 
 
 
Khartoum among the possible instigators of the recent Malakal 
violence, noting that the Southern state "falls under Khartoum's 
jurisdiction, and people are there chiefly to disrupt the CPA at any 
cost." 
 
¶5. (SBU) While Akolawin contends that Khartoum's invisible hand 
could be at play in Upper Nile State, he also points to more 
localized and business-motivated roots to the violence.  The Fashoda 
representative alleges Dinka businessmen are trying to construct a 
"Dinka Kingdom" along the lucrative Renk-Malakal-Sobat corridor, 
exchanging high-quality agricultural tracts to "Northerners" for 
self-serving kick-backs. Akolawin alleged that land along the 
Renk-Malakal roadway has been sold to agro-consortiums with ties to 
Khartoum.  He claimed that the agro-consortium owners have advocated 
for incremental change to the Upper Nile State border. (NOTE: The 
South's ability to collect non-oil revenue has been most successful 
in Upper Nile state, due mainly to the GoSS's successful taxation of 
sorghum and other crops within Renk and Melut counties. END NOTE.) 
SPLM State Secretary General John Kor similarly alleged to ConGen 
PolOff that these same business interests were behind recent 
advocacy efforts to shift Malakal into Baliet County. Kor, a Dinka 
himself, considers the initiative a fool's errand. "Malakal County's 
borders have not changed since 1956.  Why shift them now?" 
 
A DDR PROGRAM COULD HELP 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU) Akolawin remains a vocal member of the SSLA contingent 
pressing for newly-appointed SPLA Affairs Minister Nhial Deng 
Nhial's to appear before the SSLA to explain SPLA efforts to move 
CPA implementation forward at Joint Defense Board meetings with the 
SAF.  He plans to use this last weekend's violence as fodder for a 
renewed push by the SPLM within the legislatures in Juba and 
Khartoum to advocate a renewed focus on the CPA's Security 
Arrangements.  "If anything, it was good that both Bashir and Kiir 
witnessed this," Akolawin noted, "because now both governments can 
turn to the question of disarmament so vital within every state 
along the North/South border. These are militia groups that are 
organized, using advanced weaponry, and that have had ties at one 
time or another to either the SAF or the SPLA.  They now refuse to 
integrate into the SPLA because they see no future, and they refuse 
to put down their weapons because they see no benefit -- this is a 
problem that extends beyond the GNU and the GOSS - it is a national 
problem. " 
 
¶7. (SBU) Prior to the Dinka-Shilluk violence on January 7, the Upper 
Nile State Council of Ministers decreed a program of "immediate 
disarmament" of the entirety of the state's civilian population. 
The SSPS Inspector General of Police, also present at the VIP 
Pavilion on the 9th, remained in Malakal through January 14 to 
assist in disarmament planning.  The Inspector General of the Police 
reports that 14 Dinka have been arrested to date, and credits the 
Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) with "significantly aiding" in the state 
government's response to the conflict. JIU, SPLA, and SSPS forces 
were deployed to form buffer zones between Shilluk and Dinka 
communities on January 13 and to restore calm.  State security 
officials told ConGen PolOff on January 14 that the situation "was 
under control."  However, despite the heightened security presence, 
there have been new reports of violence along the Nile's eastern 
banks, displacing Shilluk migrant families that have had largely 
undisputed roots to the area for the last decade. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The large number of automatic weapons in southern 
Sudan means that simple disputes can quickly turn into violent and 
bloody clashes.  While tribal violence is a perennial problem in 
Sudan, and some parts of southern Sudan are particularly prone to 
violence, the NCP often intentionally feeds the fire of distrust 
between different groups in order to create chaos among groups and 
divert attention and anger away from itself.  The Dinka-Shilluk 
violence in Upper Nile has an added economic dimension - the 
sell-off of land to rich northern agro pastoralists.  The fact that 
different groups resort to violence through the use of arms to 
settle their disputes, and that the GoS regime can capitalize on 
this when it suits its needs, highlights the need for a functional 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) campaign in 
Sudan.  To date, the formal DDR program has not gained momentum in 
southern Sudan, though UNMIS will begin its pilot program in Blue 
Nile on February 10, and several months later in Southern Kordofan. 
If these programs are successful, it may provide some incentive for 
the GoSS to finally allow the formal DDR program to move forward. 
The budget crisis may also encourage the GOSS in this direction, 
especially given the generous support for reintegration that is 
currently envisioned in the UN plan.  End Comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ