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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM75, THE CHANGING DYNAMIC IN DARFUR: ZAGHAWA MOVEMENTS TURN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM75 2009-01-21 10:52 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1306
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0075/01 0211052
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211052Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2731
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000075 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: THE CHANGING DYNAMIC IN DARFUR: ZAGHAWA MOVEMENTS TURN 
AGAINST EACH OTHER WITH SOME ASSISTANCE FROM KHARTOUM 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 51 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: According to UNAMID, the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) now controls the key South Darfur villages of Labado 
and Muhajarriya after attacking SLM/Minnawi positions.  One UNAMID 
source claimed that the Government of Sudan (GoS) started bombing 
both JEM and SLM/MM on the periphery of the fighting on January 20. 
One SLM/MM contact said that SLM/MM has left its positions in its 
stronghold of Graida in the hands of the GoS, predicted more 
fighting in South Darfur, and alleged that the GoS is allowing JEM 
to stage attacks on rival rebel movements. END SUMMARY. 
 
JEM NOW CONTROLS BOTH LABADO AND MUHAJARRIYA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU)  On January 20, UNAMID contacts confirmed that JEM 
controls both Labado and the former SLM/MM stronghold of Muhajarriya 
following fighting in South Darfur beginning on January 15 (reftel). 
 UNAMID contacts also reported that they have credible information 
that Arab militia are gathering in Shariah, although the forces have 
not yet engaged in any fighting.  According to these sources, SLM/MM 
appears to be preparing for counterattacks against JEM and is 
located south of Muhajarriya. Another UNAMID security contact 
reported that he received reports that the GoS has begun aerial 
bombing "on the periphery of the fighting to attack both SLM/MM and 
JEM positions and kill two birds with one stone." This source 
claimed that fighting between SLM/MM and JEM was ongoing.  (Note: 
Both SLM/MM and other UNAMID contacts contradicted this statement 
saying that there had been no fighting in two days. Accurate 
information is difficult to obtain. End note.)  Both UNAMID contacts 
acknowledged difficulties in UNAMID's "information flow" as 
contradictory reports stream in from the GOS and rival rebel 
movements. 
 
ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU)  UNAMID Security and Political Affairs contacts stated 
that UN's OCHA and other humanitarian agencies have encouraged 
reconciliation efforts between JEM and SLM/MM.  UNAMID's Political 
Affairs Section has been actively encouraging the Zaghawa Shura 
Council to take the lead role in mediation. One SLM/MM 
representative, Adam Ali Ware, also independently stated that the 
Zaghawa Shura Council could play an important role in reconciliation 
efforts.  UNAMID contacts acknowledged that UNAMID's senior 
leadership (most notably the Joint Special Representative and his 
Deputy) have not been constructively engaged in finding a solution 
to the JEM-SLM/MM conflict. UN/AU Mediator Bassole has also come and 
gone without engaging in damage control. 
 
SLM/MM ON GRAIDA, THE CONFLICT'S START, AND JEM'S GOAL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  SLM/MM's former Ceasefire Commission Representative (CFC) 
Adam Ali Ware told poloffs on January 20 that SLM/MM forces left its 
stronghold of Graida in the hands of the Government of Sudan. 
According to Ware, the King of Graida encouraged SLM/MM to 
temporarily hand over its control of the village to the GoS forces. 
Ware stated, "This will free our forces up for other things, and it 
is better that we have an agreement with the Government now rather 
than have the Government turn on us later."  Ware said that Minnawi 
authorized this deal, and that discussions about this likely started 
between Minnawi and Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Hussein before 
Minnawi's departure for El-Fasher.  (Note: "Al-Ahdath" also reported 
on January 19 that, in coordination with SLM/MM, SAF had taken over 
control of Graida "to prevent the fall of the region to Khalil's 
forces."  End Note.) 
 
5.  (SBU)  This SLM/MM contact asserted that Minnawi is "very angry" 
about JEM's attack on SLM/MM ajd predicted that there will be 
further inter-rebel (and inter-Zaghawa) fighting in Dar Es Salaam, 
Labado, and Muhajarriya.  Ware said that it is not clear whether 
JEM's attack was directed by Khalil Ibrahim, or if it began as a 
personal conflict between former SLM/MM commander Arku Suliman Dahia 
and SLM/MM commanders in Muhajarriya.  Ware then repeated Minnawi's 
earlier charges  of GoS and Chadian complicity in JEM's attack on 
SLM/MM. 
 
6.  (SBU)  UNAMID Political affairs also reported that Minnawi 
continues to claim that the GoS has cooperated with JEM, allowing 
JEM units to pass through GoS checkpoints and military positions 
such as Sayah and Kulkul.  According to these sources, Minnawi told 
UNAMID that Khalil Ibrahim has promised to work with the GoS in 
return for a position of Vice-President and a GoS promise to spare 
the life of Abdallaziz Osher, a brother of Khalil Ibrahim who has 
been in custody in Khartoum since the May 2008 JEM attack on the 
capital. In exchange, JEM would guarantee that it would be the only 
military force on the ground and promise there would be no rebel 
 
KHARTOUM 00000075  002 OF 002 
 
 
attacks against Khartoum following negotiations. 
 
SUDANESE MEDIA FOCUS ON THE JEM-SLM/MM FIGHTING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
7.  (SBU) On January 16th Sudanese Television aired footage of the 
Wali of South Darfur, Ali Mahmoud, saying that "Minni's forces 
deserve what they got because the GoS offered to intervene, but 
Minni's forces refused.  Minni's forces should have re-integrated 
with the Government long ago and become part of SAF, but they 
delayed, and this is the result."  The report also presented an 
image of Muhajarriya with women crying and some destroyed JEM 
vehicles and wounded fighters.  Also on January 19, Sudanese media 
reported that both JEM and SLM/MM have suffered significant 
casualties from the inter-rebel fighting.  On January 20, Sudanese 
press reported that there were over 150 dead and wounded rebels from 
both SLM/MM and JEM.  Another report stated that Minnawi lashed out 
at the feckless and ineffective UNAMID and accused the hybrid force 
of "igniting the dispute between the rebel movements." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
8.  (SBU) These clashes are, like the recent Gaza conflict, an 
unexpected bounty for the Khartoum regime.  This latest episode 
demonstrates starkly the complexity of the current conflict in 
Darfur.  Battles are sometimes waged between the government and 
rebels; however, over the last year we have witnessed bitter 
conflict between the rebels themSelves, between pro-regime Arab 
tribes, and between insubordinate Arab proxy militias and government 
forces.  This is hardly the "grinding genocide" that some have 
described, but rather a chaotic and lawless situation that requires 
diplomacy to push toward security arrangements on the ground that 
will lead to a sustainable ceasefire. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment Cot'd: SLM/MM is in a particularly difficult 
position, and it appears to be a contradiction that Minnawi would 
simultaneously entrust one of his few remaining strongholds to the 
GOS and allege that JEM and the GOS are working together. Minnawi 
told CDA Fernandez on January 16 - as the fighting began - that his 
movement's strongholds are Muhajiriyya, Greida and Labado. He has 
now, at least for the moment, lost all three.  The wildly divergent 
UNAMID reports, once again, show the need for better information and 
a ceasefire mechanism or Darfur monitoring team. It also underscores 
the general operational passivity of UNAMID even with over 50 
percent of the force on the ground. The Sudanese Media are having a 
field-day with the inter-rebel fighting, and as the noxious Ali 
Mahmoud's comments illustrate, have gone so far as to use this as an 
opportunity to scold the one signatory of the DPA.  The GOS will 
undoubtedly continue to exploit this opportunity politically and 
militarily for its own cynical goals in war-torn Darfur.  It can 
only benefit Khartoum that the two largest armed Zaghawa movements 
(one a DPA signatory, one not) have turned against each other and 
are both (reportedly) relying on Khartoum for assistance. President 
Bashir must be laughing at this miserable folly where rebels fight 
each other and the people they are supposed to protect flee to 
GOS-controlled areas for safety. 
 
FERNANDEZ