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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM40, WESTERN EQUATORIA GOVERNOR CALLS FOR ARMED CIVILIAN FORCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM40 2009-01-13 16:04 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
O 131604Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2675
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000040 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR MOPS ASEC SU UG
SUBJECT: WESTERN EQUATORIA GOVERNOR CALLS FOR ARMED CIVILIAN FORCE 
TO BE USED AGAINST LRA 
 
1. (SBU) Western Equatoria State Governor Jemma Kumba has requested 
that the SPLA arm her state's civilian population in the face of 
renewed and increasingly violent LRA activity in her state since the 
UPDF bombing of suspected LRA areas in Garamba Park in early 
December 2008.  SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak told ConGen 
PolOff on January 9 that he met with Kumbu on January 6 to discuss 
her dissatisfaction with "failed" SPLA efforts to repel LRA militias 
from Western Equatoria State (WEQ), which has seen more than fifty 
killings and at least seventeen abductions since January 1.  Ajak 
told ConGen PolOff that the SPLA has a sufficient supply of excess 
weapons to arm "qualified men and women" but that, as he noted to 
the governor, the decision to arm civilians would have to be taken 
by GOSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit.  In attempt to assuage the 
Governor's concerns about SPLA performance against the LRA, Ajak had 
seconded two officers, including Director for Operations MG Piang 
Deng (brother of Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng) 
to Kumbu's office in Yambio in order to provide her with daily 
briefings. 
 
2. (SBU) Governor Kumba told ConGen PolOff on January 12 that 
although she accepted that the SPLA was "trying its level-best 
against a challenging threat," she charged the Ugandan government 
with "merely dumping its trash into my backyard."  Ajak is similarly 
disenchanted with his Ugandan counterparts.  He complained to ConGen 
PolOff during a dinner with StaffDel Smith that the Ugandan Chief of 
Defense had abandoned a "well-coordinated plan" of joint SPLA/UPDF 
action against the LRA in Garamba, ordering aerial strikes well 
before SPLA infantry forces could get into place. "I'm very annoyed 
with him," Ajak said, terming the premature action "obviously doomed 
to fail" and noting that he was so angry about the disconnect that 
he was no longer accepting the Ugandan Defense Chief's calls. Asked 
on January 9 whether the bilateral relationship had improved, Ajak 
allowed that the Ugandans were pressing him to come to Kampala for 
consultations as early as the week of January 12th, but he was not 
optimistic about that happening until before the end of the month. 
(NOTE: In addition to briefing newly-appointed Minister of SPLA 
Affairs Nhial Deng and attending his brother's wedding, Ajak must be 
at a Joint Defense Board meeting on January 16. END NOTE). 
 
3. (SBU) While quick to defend the SPLA's record to Kumba, Ajak 
remains critical of SPLA operations along the Juba-Nimule corridor 
and along the Nile's western banks.  Seventeen SPLA soldiers have 
died in combat to date.  Repeat LRA attacks against Maridi town and 
attempted LRA incursions into Yei (only 100km from Juba) have left 
many in the Government of the Southern Sudan and SPLA rattled.  Ajak 
admitted to ConGen PolOff that he at first assumed that the forty 
minutes of sustained barrage of weapons fire (tht icluded 
fifty-calibers) on January 1 in Juba was the LRA entering the 
South's capital. (NOTE: The weapons-fire was actually to mark 
Sudan's independence day. END NOTE).  Southern Sudan Legislative 
Assembly MPs from LRA affected areas representing opposition parties 
and SPLM alike have taken to the floor of the assembly and to the 
local press to loudly accuse the SPLA of being incapable of 
protecting the South's civilian population. Floor testimony on 
January 7 alleged that SPLA were refusing to fight LRA rebels as a 
result of non-payment of salaries.  Ajak maintains this is false. 
While he admits that salaries continued to be paid late, there has 
not been mutiny or insubordination along the front-lines. 
 
4. (SBU) Kumba maintained in her discussion with ConGen PolOff that 
a government-supervised arming of the civilian population is 
necessary given the level of unrest in Western Equatoria State. "The 
organized security forces alone are not sufficient to meet this 
threat," the governor said, specifically citing the January 9 LRA 
axe attack near Mundri that left one member of the Southern Sudan 
Police Services dead.  "We need to make sure that people can defend 
themselves in the dark of night, issuing weapons to each home is the 
only viable method of protection." 
 
5. (SBU) COMMENT: Post strongly doubts that Kiir will accede to 
Kumbu's request, given efforts by GOSS to disarm the civil 
population throughout the South, but her call to arms, and Ajak's 
startling assumption of an LRA attack on Juba on January 1 are 
telling.  While the SPLA's senior-most leadership has consistently 
maintained it is capable of handling operations along two fronts 
(the 1956 North/South border and its Southern-most border) SPLA 
readiness levels have been compromised by ongoing logistical 
constraints, despite the relative ease of movement during the dry 
season. Some unhappiness with Kampala, still seen as among South 
Sudan's best friends, extends into the GOSS civilian ranks, as does 
surprise at the timing of the operation in December.  Ministers and 
SPLA commanders alike believe that had the SPLA been able to effect 
a cordon near Garamba Park as originally agreed with the UPDF, the 
present level of slaughter in Sudan's South would have been avoided. 
 To date, contacts in Juba maintain no explanation has been provided 
to SPLA leadership for the alleged premature action by UPDF.  While 
post understands that this is a one-sided view geared in part toward 
defending a troubled SPLA from any criticism, we pass along these 
complaints nonetheless as a measure of the irritation felt in Juba 
following the December UPDF attacks on the LRA, which according to 
the SPLA were less coordinated than advertised. 
 
FERNANDEZ