VZCZCXRO9286
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0116/01 0301329
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301329Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2804
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000116 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REMAINS TENSE AND JEM IS ON THE MOVE - BUT TO 
WHERE? 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 104 
B) KHARTOUM 95 
C) KHARTOUM 94 
 
¶1. (SBU) The North Darfur capital of El Fasher was quiet on January 
29 and 30, with no bombing reported.  According to several sources, 
GOS security forces had somewhat reduced their presence in the North 
Darfur capital.  No estimates of casualties from fighting earlier in 
the week (neither in Muhajeriya nor just outside of El Fasher). 
Speaking by telephone from Jebel Marra, SLA/Unity commander Gadura 
told emboff that the situation in the border area (and Fur homeland) 
that straddles the three Darfur provinces remains tense but calm. 
Gadura reported that a JEM convoy was spotted heading south through 
his area, presumably from northwest North Darfur.  He said his 
fighters intend to lay low for the time being and do not intend to 
engage JEM.  (Note: This information contradicts reports that JEM is 
now headed for the Chadian border. End note.) 
 
¶2. (SBU) UNAMID Human Rights conducted a site visit to Gereida, 
South Darfur, on January 28 following preliminary reports that 
janjaweed militia attacked the town with assistance from regular GOS 
forces on January 27.  UNAMID was not able to immediately confirm 
that the alleged attacks occurred, nor reports of the killings of 
two civilians, rapes and widespread looting.  (Note: The GOS took 
control of Gereida, a former SLM/MM stronghold, at Minni Minnawi's 
request so that he could attempt to defend himself from the JEM 
attack in Muhajeriya. End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Osman Adam Abelmawia, a Nyala-based lawyer with the 
independent Darfur Bar Association, told poloff via telephone on 
January 29 that the situation in Nyala continues to be quite tense. 
He repeated claims heard by poloff on a visit the previous week to 
Nyala (ref C) that the GOS is distributing weapons to Arabs, and has 
required Arab leaders to pledge their support to the NCP in the wake 
of the expected announcement of an ICC arrest warrant against 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir.  Yassin Adam Mohamed, a Fur IDP 
leader, confirmed to poloff by telephone on January 29 that heavy 
GOS security was seen throughout Nyala, with numerous armed convoys 
and heavy weaponry patrolling the city's streets. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Government-controlled press in Khartoum splashed 
accusations across their front pages directly implicating the 
government of Chad in supporting Khalil Ibrahim and JEM in their 
attacks in South Darfur.  GOS State Minister for Information Kamal 
Al-Obeid told state media on January 28, "Chadian forces have been 
attempting to sabotage a blockade imposed by the Sudanese government 
on the rebels of Muhajeriya by carrying food and fuel supplies to 
them." Accusing Chad of assisting JEM's crossing from inside the 
Chadian border to Muharjeriya (a distance of approximately 360 km), 
Al-Obeid claimed that Chadian Republican Guard forces had actually 
entered Darfur.  The independent, pro-SPLM Ajras al-Hurriya quoted 
Al-Obeid claiming that Chad was withdrawing from its security 
agreement with Sudan, and that the GOS was angered by Chad's recent 
support to JEM, as well as France's silence towards N'Djamena. 
(Note: It appears that the claim that Chad has withdrawn from the 
security agreement is false. End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Darfuri civil society leaders, speaking with poloff in El 
Fasher on January 24, agreed that JEM's recent aggressions have 
earned it an improved bargaining position vis-`-vis the GOS and 
SLA/MM in upcoming negotiations.  "JEM's negotiating position is 
stronger," Ahmed Adam Yousif, director of the independent Ajaweed 
NGO in El Fasher, told poloff.  "The situation on the ground in 
Darfur has changed considerably (in January), and this will be 
reflected in future negotiations."  With Fur leader Abdul Wahid El 
Nur popular but still aloof and resident in Paris, and with Minni 
Minnawi militarily sidelined, Yousif said that all sides are 
predicting new negotiations to reach a Darfur peace settlement, and 
JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim's military superiority will function as 
proof positive of his assured preeminence among all Zaghawa, and 
hence (since Zaghawa predominate among rebel field commanders), 
among all rebels in Darfur.  Khalil Tukras, a lawyer and IDP leader 
in El Fasher, agrees that JEM's recent actions have a more political 
goal.  Referring to the Zaghawa clan of Ibrahim and Chadian 
president Idriss Deby, Tukras said, "The Kobe believe they are the 
owners of the Kingdom of the Zaghawa.  They are working for the 
Darfur Vice President to be Khalil Ibrahim." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: It is questionable whether JEM's recent aggressive 
incursion into South Darfur represents a military victory or a 
strategic blunder.  JEM weakened SLM/MM but showed itself to be 
heavily reliant on Chad and gratuitously violent in attacking a 
fellow-Zaghawa for no reason other than to prove its pre-eminence 
among the Zaghawa.  However, it also demonstrated itself to be 
overly interested in clan warfare and played right into the hands of 
 
KHARTOUM 00000116  002 OF 002 
 
 
the GOS, which would like to portray the Darfur conflict as the 
result of age-old tribal and clan disputes.  Certainly, many inQ 
Darfur (especially the Fur), acutely fear Zaghawa dominance, whether 
it is Khalil, Minnawi, or anyone else. The increase in violence and 
civilian displacements in Darfur in January is due primarily to 
JEM's aggressive actions - combined with the government's 
disproportionate (and mostly ineffective) response in attempting to 
bomb JEM without much regard to civilian casualties.  At the planned 
discussions in Doha, Qatar next week (with JEM, the GOS, and Chief 
Mediator Bassole and participation from the USG) chastising both JEM 
and the government for their violent and gratuitous actions should 
be the first priority, before delving into the discussions of the 
merits of Bassole's framework. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ