VZCZCXRO8169
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0114/01 0291504
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291504Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2799
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000114 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR MEDIATION: WE NEED A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BEFORE AN 
ICC INDICTMENT 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On January 28, George Zechariah, the primary 
staff assistant to AU-UN Chief Darfur Mediator Djibril Bassole, told 
poloffs that the Mediation needs to secure a framework agreement 
between the rebels and Government of Sudan (GoS) before the issuance 
of an ICC indictment against President Bashir.  Zechariah stated 
that the Chief Mediator hopes he can secure this agreement between 
at least one of Darfur's three major rebel movements (most likely 
JEM or, less likely, SLA/Unity) in the next two weeks.  According to 
Zechariah, this would provide a foundation for the peace process and 
supposedly put pressure on uncooperative actors such as Abdul Wahid 
Al-Nur. END SUMMARY. 
 
BASSOLE'S STRATEGY AND PRESSURE OF ICC 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2. (SBU) According to Zechariah, the Chief Mediator continues to 
pursue a strategy of "focusing on the largest and most powerful 
Darfur groups."  Zechariah stated that the Chief Mediator is 
focusing his efforts on securing rebel and GOS acceptance of both a 
framework agreement and traveling to Doha for initial talks. "If we 
can get this [i.e. the framework agreement and a GoS-rebel meeting 
in Doha] before the ICC moves, that would be really big for the 
process," stated Zechariah.  According to Zechariah, Bassole fears 
that an indictment of President Bashir will kill any momentum in the 
peace process.  "If an ICC indictment is issued against Bashir, we 
do not know if the Government will continue to engage with the 
international community or if the rebels will use the decision to 
stage a big attack," stated Zechariah. The JMST believes there are 
signs that the GoS may take a more aggressive and militant stance 
following an ICC indictment, such as the arrest and ongoing 
detention of Hassan Al-Turabi and some recent anti-Western rhetoric 
by the regime.  (Note: The comment about heightened regime rhetoric 
is somewhat overstated; what rhetoric there has been is related to 
the ICC. End note.) 
 
JEM 
- - 
¶2.  (SBU) Zechariah stated that the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) of Khalil Ibrahim continues to proactively engage with the 
Mediation, and that last week's meetings with JEM leadership in 
London were positive.  Zechariah stated that although JEM previously 
acknowledged the need to include other rebel movements in 
negotiations, JEM has "become more confident" following their 
January 6-14 visit to Washington and now "has started to talk again 
about entering into talks with the GOS alone."  Zechariah believes 
that JEM continues to gain strength and "is likely attracting more 
followers at this point than it is losing" (Note: JEM launched a 
major offensive in Darfur on January 15, still ongoing, which 
initially target DPA signatory Minni Minnawi's strongholds. End 
note). 
 
SLA/AW 
- - - - 
¶3.  (SBU)  Zechariah reported that Abdul Wahid Al-Nur of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement continues to be uncooperative, stubborn, and 
difficult to contact.  It is very unlikely, reported Zechariah, that 
Al-Nur would travel to Doha or sign any framework agreement in the 
near future.  Al-Nur refused to meet Chief Mediator Bassole in Paris 
last week, although Bassole did meet with one of his 
representatives.  "Even if JEM and SLA/Unity are ready to move 
forward and sign a framework agreement, we will leave the door open 
for Abdul Wahid," stated Zechariah.  He also speculated that if the 
Mediation is able to adequately address the concerns of IDPs, that 
this will put pressure on Al-Nur to cooperate with the Mediation. 
 
SLA/Unity 
- - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU)  Zechariah stated that their talks with SLA/Unity are 
positive and that "there is the belief that if other movements agree 
to attend negotiations, SLA/Unity will follow and come as well." 
(Note:  CHD's Theo Murphy repeated this same theory to poloffs the 
week of January 25. End Note.)  Zechariah questioned whether 
SLA/Unity is still one movement, or whether it has fragmented among 
the lines of Unity's top leadership (i.e. Suliman Jamous, Sharif 
Harir, Abdallah Yehia, and a number of prominent and unruly field 
commanders.)  Poloffs shared their recent conversation with Abdallah 
Yehia on January 17, where the SLA/Unity leader called his 
movement's rumored division "part of the Government's and JEM's 
propaganda war."  Poloff also stated that Yehia's perception of the 
Chief Mediator significantly improved since Bassole's meeting with 
SLA/Unity in the field in December, but that Yehia still does not 
understand the role of Qatar.  (Note:  Yehia told poloff that Qatar 
still has not directly invited SLA/Unity to any meetings in Doha and 
that he personally was confused about Qatar's role.  Poloff 
explained to Yehia that Chief Mediator Bassole is in charge of the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000114  002 OF 002 
 
 
peace process, but that the Qataris have been helpful in providing a 
venue and support to the Mediation.  Poloff encouraged Yehia to be 
proactive and to speak directly to both the Mediation and the 
Qataris about his concerns, and to consider sending a representative 
to Doha as JEM and other movements have already done. End note.) 
 
WHAT TO DO WITH MINNI? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU)  When asked about the status of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement of Minni Minnawi and how it will fit into future 
negotiations, Zechariah responded, "you tell me." Although SLM/MM 
member of Parliament Ali Traio and General Secretary Ali Dausa were 
meeting with JMST officials on January 28, Zechariah stated that the 
Mediation does not know how to include SLM/MM in the process. 
Zechariah also stated that JEM is not keen on including SLM/MM in 
negotiations, as "JEM leaders tell the Mediation that Minni is no 
longer a relevant force" (after JEM's recent sneak attack against 
SLM/MM). Poloffs responded that even if Minnawi has been 
significantly weakened and is still (at least officially) a 
government official, that he needs to be consulted, included in the 
process and given special recognition for being the first to sign a 
peace agreement in Darfur. 
 
U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE MEDIATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  Zechariah ended the meeting stating that he appreciates 
U.S. support for Chief Mediator Bassole and that the Mediation would 
appreciate USG support in three particular areas.  First, the USG 
can "continue to be helpful in encouraging Sudan's neighbors, 
particularly Egypt and Libya, to support Qatar's efforts and not 
undermine the process."  Second, Zechariah stated that the USG 
should remind JEM that it is not the only movement in Darfur and 
that other movements must be respected and included in the process. 
Third, Zechariah stated "there is probably not much the U.S. or 
anyone else can do about this, but from our perspective the later 
that an ICC indictment comes out, the better for the Mediation." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶7. (SBU) When compared to past UN and AU mediators, Bassole has been 
more active, developed better relationships with the rebel 
leadership, and expressed a clearer strategy.  The question remains 
whether this strategy of focusing on the problematic and aggressive 
JEM (especially as it is a minority Zaghawa movement with Chadian 
backing, little popular support in Darfur, historic ties to the 
Sudanese regime, and has an Islamist and regime change agenda) will 
encourage other movements to join the process.  While the USG should 
support Bassole in his work and maintain a dialogue with JEM, it is 
important to remind JEM that they are not the only movement, that 
their leader remains on specially designated U.S. sanctions lists, 
and that the U.S. is extremely concerned about JEM's past and 
current role in the recent upsurge of violence in Darfur and their 
presence in areas controlled by SLM/MM.  The recent violence in both 
South and North Darfur was entirely instigated by JEM, and we should 
be telling JEM that this is unacceptable at every opportunity, as 
well as making that clear in our public statements. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment continued:  The ICC continues to hang over Sudan 
and dominate political discourse.  While justice is integral to a 
final solution in Darfur, it is unfortunate that the delay in an 
announcement from the ICC (a warrant was originally expected in 
October and has been delayed repeatedly) has created a situation of 
political limbo for all of Sudan and has effectively halted progress 
on all fronts (not just Darfur, but also CPA) as the NCP's opponents 
wait to see what the result will be before engaging in negotiations. 
 The NCP regime itself is also relatively paralyzed at the moment, 
waiting to see how the dynamic may change after the ICC and focusing 
on little else besides defending President Bashir from the ICC. 
While the Chief Mediator should focus on pushing forward his 
framework agreement, he should also secure the commitment of all 
parties to engage in the peace process regardless of any 
announcement of an ICC decision on President Bashir. 
 
FERNANDEZ