VZCZCXRO7917
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0102/01 0271257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271257Z JAN 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2779
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000102 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  -  GARBLED TEXT 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR HUMANITARIAN MECHANISM AND PROSPECTS FOR 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 92 
B) 08 KHARTOUM 1764 
 
KHARTOUM 00000102  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On January 24, the Center for Humanitarian 
Dialogue's (CHD) Theo Murphy told CDA Fernandez that Abdul Wahid 
Al-Nur's acceptance of CHD's proposed humanitarian monitoring 
mechanism was a "breakthrough."  Murphy also reported that JEM has 
accepted CHD's initiative "in principle," and that the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) continues to deflect CHD's requests for meetings and has 
not provided a response on the proposed mechanism.  Murphy also 
provided his evaluation of Darfur's rebel movements and the 
prospects for successful negotiations.  Kenny Gluck, a Senior 
Advisor to the United Nations-African Union Joint Mediation Support 
Team (JMST,) also provided his analysis of the same topics in a 
separate meeting with poloffs during the week of January 18.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
CHD'S HUMANITARIAN MONITORING MECHANISM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU) Murphy opened the meeting by stating that the CHD 
continues to plan for its "humanitarian equivalent of the ceasefire 
commission." (Note:  As described reftel A, CHD has been pushing the 
idea of a commission with rebel, GOS, and UNAMID representation in 
El-Fasher that would focus on investigating NGO and UN vehicle 
hijackings and other humanitarian violations in Darfur.  End Note) 
Murphy then related that he and CHD Humanitarian Advisor Dennis 
McNamara had to cancel their field visits to Darfur, planned for the 
week of January 25, because of the upsurge of violence there (reftel 
B.)  Murphy said that the commission will be based in El-Fasher, 
housed in the UN compound, and be under the supervision of UN'S 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  Murphy 
also reported that UN-AU Chief Mediator Djbril Bassole has been 
supportive of CHD's humanitarian proposal, and that "the minute he 
wants to take it over, we'll hand it over to him." 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Murphy said the mechanism "will address humanitarian 
concerns, but will still be nominally political."  Murphy added that 
he hopes the commission will provide the building block for a more 
sustained dialogue between the GOS and the rebel movements.  He said 
that the commission will focus on bringing "clarity and 
accountability" to the issue of carjackings.  The first major 
project for the commission will be to map areas of rebel control, 
and all rebels will be held accountable for carjackings in their 
areas of control. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Murphy reported that in January CHD made a "breakthrough" 
as leader Abdul Wahid Al-Nur agreed to participate in CHD's proposed 
mechanism.  Murphy also stated that the JEM has agreed "in 
principle" to the humanitarian mechanism, as long as UNAMID and the 
international community can guarantee the well-being of their 
representatives in the commission in El-Fasher.  Murphy reported 
that this is a particularly sensitive issue for JEM, as the GOS 
previously detained JEM's former representatives to the AU's 
Ceasefire Commission.  SLA/Unity, according to Murphy, should not be 
difficult to convince and will follow JEM and SLA/AW if both groups 
participate in CHD's proposed mechanism. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In contrast to the rebels, the GOS has not responded 
enthusiastically to CHD's proposal.  The GOS's Humanitarian Affairs 
Commission (HAC) has not replied to CHD's requests for meetilgs, and 
CHD has little room to initiate meetings with other government 
entities as this is a humanitarian endeavor.  CDA Fernandez remarked 
that even if CHD is able to make progress with the HAC, it will be 
necessary for CHD to receive permission for the plan from the 
Sudanese military as well as intelligence agencies.   Despite CHD's 
difficulty in working with the Sudanese Government, Murphy stated 
that he is "fairly optimistic" that CHD will be able to pull the 
commission together.  He said that the commission could be up and 
running in as soon as three months.  Conversely, if nothing happens 
in six months, then CHD will "probably let this idea go and move on 
to something else."  Murphi emphasized, however, that there is a 
need for this commission as UNAMID's contacts with the rebels are so 
weak, that their own ceasefire commission planning will be plagued 
by their poor reputation with the rebels.  "The rebels view UNAMID 
as disrespectful, incompetent, and 'in bed with the GoS' so I do not 
believe that UNAMID can pull off any ceasefire mechanism right now," 
stated Murphy.  Murphy reported that there has not been any 
coordination between CHD and UNAMID with respect to each others' 
respective proposals.  Murphy, however, believes that each mechanism 
can fulfill a specific need, and "we should not just consider each 
others' ideas to be threat because they sound similar." 
 
JMST'S ASSESSMENT OF CHD'S WORK 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  JMST Senior Advisor Kenny Gluck separately shared his 
assessment of CHD's proposal with poloff during the week of January 
 
KHARTOUM 00000102  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
¶18.  (Note:  Of all JMST members, Gluck has the most experience in 
Darfur.  Before his work with the Chief Mediator, Gluck worked for 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)in Darfur.  He traveled with CHD Theo 
Murphy and Dennis McNamara during their November 2008 meetings with 
JEM and SLA/AW. End note. )  Recalling his experience at MSF, Gluck 
stated that he believes it is necessary to separate humanitarian and 
political issues.  According to Gluck, CHD continues to blur the 
line between these two endeavors. Nonetheless, if CHD focuses solely 
on humanitarian issues (such as car jackings, child soldiers, or the 
treatment of wounded) this might build trust between the GOS and the 
rebels and provide a foundation for more substantive talks. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Gluck stated that he suspects that the GOS will be 
reluctant to participate in CHD's proposed commission, as it gives 
the rebels more credibility, and may encourage greater rebel unity 
and coordination.  Poloffs responded that such a commission could 
actually benefit the government as the rebels often sustain their 
movements through attacks on the humanitarian convoys.  Gluck 
agreed, but noted that Arab militias are also responsible for aQ 
large percentage of the carjackings in Darfur and that any 
commission will expose the GOS's tenuous grip over their proxy 
forces.  Gluck stated that CHD's major strengths are establishing a 
commission quickly, maintaining relaTionships with most rebel 
leaders, and having already performed the necessary groundwork for 
such an operation. 
 
ASSESSMENT OF REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  According to Murphy, Abdul Wahid Al-Nur of the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA/AW) is content to delay negotiations "as the 
hold-out strategy has worked for Abdul Wahid so far."  Murphy also 
told CDA Fernandez that "Abdul Wahid recognizes that a deal with JEM 
will not bring peace to Darfur, and any agreement will be a 
'DPA-style deal' that will 'neutralize' JEM."  According to Murphy, 
there is significant coordination between Abdul Wahid and some 
prominent SLA/Unity field commanders including Abubaker Kado, who 
"is ready to defect to Abdul Wahid's movement any day now."  Murphy 
also characterized SLA/AW's December-January meetings in Switzerland 
as a positive development that has the potential to help broaden the 
movement's leadership and decision making.  He noted that the Swiss 
view their initiative with SLA/AW as a way to become more active in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and that "they really appear to believe that 
Abdul Wahid is fighting for the cause." 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Murphy also asserted that although he views SLA/Unity as 
one of the strongest movements militarily, it appears as though 
Unity may soon disintegrate as Suliman Jamous and Sharif Harir 
become more publicly critical of SLA/Unity leader Abdalla Yehia. 
"Harir and Jamous are politicians, and they know what they are doing 
when they publicly criticize Yehia," stated Murphy.  According to 
Murphy, SLA/Unity's Yehia became the movement's leader because he 
was "the lowest common-denominator that everyone else could agree 
to."  Murphy believes that UN-AU Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole is 
taking the correct approach by focusang on JEM and SLA/AW and not 
pandering to SLA/Unity. He added:  "it is the common belief that 
SLA/Unity will accept any initiative that comes to them if one of 
the major rebel groups has already agreed to it." 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  JMST's Kenny Gluck gave a similar analysis of SLM Unity, 
saying that the movement is more of a "collection of commanders" 
than a unified rebel movement. SLM/Unity has the strongest military 
force on the ground in Darfur, asserted Gluck, but several of its 
prominent commanders such as Ali Karbino and Abubaker Kado are 
"loose canons."  Gluck also said he believes JEM's military strength 
may be overly-exaggerated, and that JEM is playing a game of "smoke 
and mirrors" to give the illusion that it is the dominant military 
force in the region.  JEM is not very popular in Darfur and 
compensates through its strong organization, media outreach, and 
interaction with the international community, said Gluck. 
 
DANGER FOR BASSOLE "TO TAKE THE EASY ROUTE" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU) There is danger, stated Gluck, in working solely with 
rebel leaders who are cooperative, accessible, and present a unified 
and relatively coherent position.  JEM fits all of these categories, 
but represents an extreme political position and constitutes a minor 
portion of Darfur's ethnic diversity.  According to Gluck, although 
it is incredibly frustrating to work with the illogical and stubborn 
Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, it is still necessary to focus on him and seek 
others who can represent the Fur.  Gluck was particularly interested 
in the reported meeting between Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and other SLA/AW 
leaders in Switzerland during early January.  Gluck said that it was 
unfortunate that the JMST did not participate in the meeting because 
"this meeting may have resulted in new leaders and decision making 
processes."   Gluck reported that he believes that Chief Mediator 
Bassole may be able to encourage a "light" agreement between the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000102  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
rebels and the GOS" within the next month. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶12.  (SBU)  In order for CHD to gain leverage with the GOS, it may 
be necessary for UNAMID, an agency of the UN, and/or the 
international community to intervene on their behalf.  CHD has been 
speaking about their humanitarian mechanism for months, and during 
their last visit to Sudan proposed that it could be up and running 
by January.  Despite the fact that CHD has no full-time 
representatives in Sudan, it  maintains some of the best rebel and 
field commander contacts of any international organization here. If 
CHD's  humanitarian mechanism does not end up going anywhere, the 
question remains how its experience, knowledge, and relationships in 
the region can be capitalized upon.  Gluck iS right tocautaon 
against taking the "easy path."  Cutting a deal with another Zaghawa 
movement Representing only a portion of Darfur's population will not 
bring peace and stability to the region. 
 
FERNANDEZ