VZCZCXRO3197
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0094/01 0230647
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230647Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1070
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0038

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000094 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: ADDRESSING JOINT MILITARY OPERATION'S 
HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES 
 
KAMPALA 00000094  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks 
against Congolese residents in retaliation for joint 
Ugandan-Congolese-Sudanese military operations have raised 
concerns about the protection of civilians.  Several 
assessment teams have traveled to the area of operations to 
make recommendations on additional protection and 
humanitarian assistant measures.  Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
analysts expressed support for the joint operations and will 
advocate for more international assistance to ensure the 
operation concludes successfully.  HRW will recommend that 
more pro-active measures are taken to rescue non-combatants 
and protect local villages from the LRA.  The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), UNICEF, and the Ugandan 
Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF), conducted a joint assessment 
to make recommendations to the UPDF high command on 
protection issues.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - 
BACKGROUND 
- - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) International and non-governmental organizations 
assessments of the humanitarian and human rights situation on 
the ground in eastern Democracy Republic of Congo (DRC) give 
a picture of the current status of operations.  UN 
organizations, led by the Office of the Coordinator of 
Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Watch, and IOM/UNICEF/UPDF 
visited the affected areas over the past month.  Their 
assessments track closely with one another.  Post debriefed 
the HRW analysts and the IOM/UNICEF/UPDF team. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On January 20, P/E Chief and DATT met with HRW 
analysts who had just returned from eastern DRC after three 
weeks in Doruma, Duru, Dungu, and Faradje.  Their mission was 
to examine the humanitarian and human rights situation in DRC 
in the wake of Operation Lightening Thunder, the code name 
for the joint military operations launched by Ugandan, DRC, 
and southern Sudan.  HRW interviewed escapees, defectors, 
local community leaders, UPDF, and Congolese units. The 
analysts traveled with missionaries to Doruma, Duru, and 
Faradje.  They said there was dried blood everywhere and 
bloodied clubs left behind.  Local residents who were not in 
the villages at the time of the attacks had to bury the dead. 
 In many cases, only one or two village residents remain 
alive. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) HRW reported that the LRA killed 800 and abducted 
460 Congolese citizens between September and early November 
¶2008.  Debriefs of two LRA sergeants that were in Camp 
Kiswahili during the initial attack confirm that on the day 
of the attack, all activities were normal.  The women and 
children had gone out to the fields at 0630 and the LRA 
fighters were awaiting their daily "parade."  LRA leader 
Joseph Kony left to hunt for the Christmas feast at 0900 with 
a number of his "concubines."  The sergeants said the first 
"bombs" hit at around 0910.  End Note.)  Many people fled the 
camp.  Most of the non-combatants who fled feared leaving the 
safety of the forests, according to the two sergeants. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) According to HRW, Kony,s rampage that started in 
September was a deliberate strategy to discourage defectors 
by turning local communities against them.  HRW found that 
the LRA attacks were a direct response to the LRA defections 
in August and aimed at penalizing and discouraging local 
communities that had helped escapees.  HRW views this wave of 
attacks as setting the stage for current LRA tactics being 
used against local populations.  HRW estimates that at least 
135 were killed and 300 abducted between September and 
November. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) LRA attacks from December 24-27 were coordinated, 
simultaneous, and particularly brutal, according to HRW. 
Three distinct LRA groups carried out attacks at Doruma, 
Duru, and Faradje.  HRW estimates that there are about eight 
groups of LRA operating, but that only three or four of them 
containing high command elements are killing in a coordinated 
manner.  Local residents and UPDF officers told HRW that the 
roaming LRA groups have GPS, Thurayas, and Motorolas for 
communication, which had been retrieved after LRA members 
went back into the destroyed camps before the arrival of 
Ugandan ground troops.  The LRA often subdivides into small 
groups and then reconstitute themselves after missions, 
according to eye witness reports.  HRW provided the following 
information about LRA configurations: 
 
 
KAMPALA 00000094  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
--Group 1: LRA Deputy Okot Odhiambo (ICC indictee) is with 
about 100 combatants in the forests near Gangala, Gamaya, and 
Nawaku, which the UPDF says it has surrounded.  Local 
residents say that this group is carrying a man on a 
stretcher who has some kind of leg injuries (Note: UPDF 
commanders believe this is Odhiambo, who was reportedly 
injured on the first day of attacks.  End Note.) 
 
--Group 2:  A group "managed" by ICC indictee Dominic Ongwen 
or members of his team, who killed 23 in Dijabe.  This group, 
according to locals, had left Garamba National Park, killed 
people in Duru and Bitima, and then was pushed back when they 
attempted to go north to Yambio, southern Sudan.  HRW said 
that local residents and UPDF believe this group is trying to 
link up with Odhiambo near Doruma. 
 
--Group 3:  Lt. Col. Charles Arop and a group of 70 carried 
out the attack on Faradje and four villages to the southwest. 
 UPDF believes this group is carrying out diversionary 
attacks that would allow Kony to rejoin Odhiambo or escape 
DRC. 
 
--Group 4:  General Joseph Kony and his bodyguards.  HRW had 
no information on where this group is located, but surmised 
he remained in DRC, possibly near Duru. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The pattern of the LRA attacks was to begin with a 
few members wandering into the towns, in some cases scouting 
out the presence of Congolese and Ugandan troops.  They 
sought out churches and other places where villagers had 
gathered for Christmas services and then called in waiting 
LRA attackers.  Men and boys were lined up face down on the 
ground and clubbed to death with axes and clubs.  Women and 
girls were raped and then suffered the same fate.  In 
Faradje, there was a bit more use of automatic weapons but 
followed the same pattern.  Children between ages 10-15 were 
abducted, children under 10 were used to carry things and 
then killed.  On the way out of Faradje, hundreds of homes 
were burned to the ground.  After the mass killings, the LRA 
ate the Christmas feasts that had been prepared and slept in 
the villages among the dead bodies.  HRW puts the numbers 
killed in Faradje at 143 with 160 abducted. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Local communities formed self-defense units, which 
are working with the allied forces.  The Congolese Republican 
Guard units in the area are getting high marks from the local 
community leaders, according to HRW.  These units have 
engaged the LRA without hesitation and have established good 
relations with community leaders. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
HRW RECOMMENDATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU) HRW said it is supportive of the military operation 
against the LRA, but is looking for ways to enhance the 
protection of civilians and rescue ex-combatants, women, and 
children from LRA hands.  Some of HRW proposed 
recommendations may include: 
 
--The international community should call for more 
MONUC-provided logistics support to the allied forces and 
provide financial assistance to protection efforts. 
 
--Allied forces should be more pro-active in search and 
rescue operations and place reception centers closer to LRA 
locations, such as Gangala which is on the outskirts of the 
forest in which the LRA is hiding.  New messaging should go 
out to those who want to escape about the locations of 
reception areas. 
 
--LRA supporters in the Diaspora and in Khartoum should be 
isolated and prevented from giving Kony a lifeline. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
IOM/UNICEF ASSESSMENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Kampala-based IOM and UNICEF offices are the lead 
humanitarian agencies for the protection and repatriation 
part of the operation.  From January 6-14, IOM, UNICEF, and 
the UPDF conducted a joint assessment mission to Dungu to 
make recommendations to the UPDF high command about rescue of 
non-combatants and other protection issues.  The assessment 
team found that there may be hundreds of escaped 
non-combatants hiding in the bush because they fear attacks 
by local Congolese communities.  Kony has been effective in 
countering leaflet drops.  Kony said that the leaflets have 
been printed with poison ink and that anyone who touches one 
 
KAMPALA 00000094  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
will die.  The team also found that LRA attacks on local 
communities were designed to punish those who have helped 
defectors and to pit the local communities against those who 
seek refuge. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) IOM, UNICEF, and the UPDF are recommending 
reception centers at Dungu, Kiliwa, and Rikwangba. 
Discussions are underway between the UPDF, Congolese 
military, and local community leaders on the best ways to 
help fleeing LRA and non-combatants.  Those who have made it 
to Dungu say it is important to get word out via radio and 
other means about the locations of UPDF units.  The fleeing 
LRA are afraid of local communities and now only trust the 
UPDF to protect them.  The UPDF is considering incentive 
packages for local communities that protect fleeing 
non-combatants.  Coordination between the UPDF and Congolese 
is very close, according to IOM.  There are daily briefings 
in the morning and sharing of reports.  Currently, rescued 
Congolese abductees are being handed over to COPI, an Italian 
non-governmental organization, which provides foster family 
care while family tracing is done. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Ugandan military officials are acutely aware of 
the need to provide protection for civilians and take 
additional steps to aid escaping LRA members.  Ugandan forces 
are concentrating on capturing or killing key LRA leaders, 
and could use additional logistics support to move Congolese 
troops around to provide protection for local residents.  The 
operation has been extended for an additional 21 days.  Post 
is waiting for the IOM's final report, which will outline the 
plans for stepping up protection activities. 
BROWNING