VZCZCXRO1048
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0007/01 0070714
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070714Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1029
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0761
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0034
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0515
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3521
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 000007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USAID AND OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREF ASEC EAID UG SU CG
SUBJECT:  NORTHERN UGANDA NOTES (DECEMBER 1-31, 2008) 
 
REF: 07 KAMPALA 1552 
 
KAMPALA 00000007  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  The following Northern Uganda Notes provide 
information on the situation on the ground and USG activities aimed 
at meeting Mission objectives in northern Uganda.  These objectives 
include promoting regional stability through peace and security, 
good governance, access to social services, economic growth, and 
humanitarian assistance.  Post appreciates feedback from consumers 
on the utility of this product and any gaps in information that need 
to be filled.  End Summary. 
 
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESSES 
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) On December 2, Government of Southern Sudan Mediator, Riek 
Machar, informed Congolese President Kabila and Ugandan President 
Museveni of the failure of Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader 
Joseph Kony to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA).  Machar, the 
U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano, and the 
parties had concluded that the formal phase of the Juba Peace 
Process had ended after four failed attempts to secure Kony's 
signature.  Machar stated that Kony continued to insist that he 
would not sign the agreement until the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) warrants are lifted.  Between December 4 and 8, Machar 
traveled to Kinshasa and Kampala with LRA delegation leader David 
Matsanga to further explain the failure of the Juba negotiations and 
discuss future options with Kabila and Museveni.  Matsanga told 
President Museveni that Kony wanted to speak to him directly. 
Museveni, who had given Kony three telephone lines on which to reach 
him as early as December 2006, reiterated that he would take Kony's 
call at any time. 
 
¶3.  (U) After Kony refused again to sign the FPA in late November, 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and southern Sudan 
launched a joint military operation against the LRA leadership on 
December 14.  "Operation Lightening Thunder" began with air-strikes 
against Kony's camps in Garamba National Park.  Museveni told a 
press conference that Kony escaped five minutes prior to the 
air-strike.  He claimed that Khartoum had provided Kony with 
equipment that enabled the LRA leader to intercept communications 
from the incoming helicopters.  Museveni stated that "victory is 
assured" and that Kony would not be able to escape the cordon 
surrounding him set up by the three allied armies.  Museveni said 
that Kony's only way out was to assemble his forces at Rikwangba and 
to sign the FPA. 
 
¶4.  (U)  The Congolese and Southern Sudanese Governments made public 
statements in support of the operation.  On December 15, Machar 
publicly stated that Kony needed to assemble his fighters in 
Rikwangba to avoid further military attacks.  Machar urged the LRA 
to respect the terms of assembly and to sign and implement the peace 
agreement.  The Congolese Government also issued a statement urging 
the LRA to assemble and sign the agreement.  The UN Mission in Congo 
(MONUC) stated its support for the operation, but urged combatants 
to respect international human rights and to protect civilian 
populations. 
 
¶5.  (U) Chissano presented his report on the peace process to the UN 
Security Council on December 17.  He outlined Kony's failure to show 
up for arranged meetings and continued attacks on civilians in the 
DRC in October and November that killed over 100 people, saw 200 
others abducted, and displaced thousands of Congolese.  Chissano's 
last face-to-face meeting with Kony was in April 2007.  During his 
briefing with Museveni after Kony failed to sign the agreement, 
Museveni informed him that he had Congolese President Kabila's 
agreement to undertake joint regional military action to compel Kony 
to assemble at Rikwangba and sign the peace deal.  Chissano 
concluded that Kony would not agree to a peace deal as long as the 
ICC warrants remained.  However, Chissano said that the LRA leader 
did not accept the provisions in the agreement that offered a "smart 
and robust" national solution combining both formal and traditional 
justice mechanisms. 
 
¶6.  (U) Chissano stated that throughout the peace process, Kony did 
not involve himself directly in the negotiations and gave an 
impression of lack of interest.  As a result, Chissano argued that 
"for any solution to be credible, it must either bring Kony to the 
table to sign the FPA or render him more marginal, thus curbing his 
ability to reverse the peace dividends which are currently being 
enjoyed in northern Uganda."  The Special Envoy concluded that "as 
long as Kony feels other options are still open to him, as long as 
he can venture into CAR, Sudan, DRC, and possibly Uganda, he is 
unlikely to sign the FPA."  Chissano argued that for these reasons, 
 
KAMPALA 00000007  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Uganda and its neighbors launched the joint regional military action 
to compel Kony to assemble in Rikwangba and sign the FPA.  He stated 
that "this military action will have to be a decisive one, rather 
than simple military pressure.  Ineffective military action would 
have devastating military, humanitarian, social, economic and 
political consequences in the DRC, southern Sudan, and possibly 
northern Uganda and CAR." 
 
¶7.  (U) Gains from the peace process need to be consolidated, 
according to Chissano.  He recommended that the Peace, Recovery, and 
Development Plan for northern Uganda be fully implemented and that 
the Ugandan Government implement the FPA, even without Kony's 
signature.  A UNSC statement, issued on December 22, welcomed joint 
efforts by Uganda, DRC and South Sudan to address the security 
threat posed by the LRA.  The statement demanded that the LRA cease 
recruitment and use of children and release all captives. 
 
¶8.  (U) LRA spokesperson Matsanga made several public statements 
during the month, appealing to the allied governments to end the 
military attacks on the LRA.  Matsanga said that Kony requested that 
he (Matsanga) appeal to President Museveni to declare a cease-fire 
in the on-going military offensive in the DRC and to resume peace 
talks.  Matsanga further requested that the venue of the talks 
should shift to South Africa, Tanzania, or Kenya.  He claimed that 
Kony wanted Machar and Chissano to be replaced.  Matsanga accused 
the Government of Southern Sudan of being biased after it joined 
forces with Uganda and DRC.  Machar shot back on December 23 and 
stated that there will be no fresh talks with the LRA rebels. 
Matsanga re-iterated the demands for a new mediator and venue on 
December 31. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
SECURITY UPDATE 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (U) The joint military operations in Garamba National Park 
against the LRA were ongoing at month's end.  The Ugandan Government 
stated that the initial air-strikes disrupted the LRA and put key 
leaders on the run.  Military spokesmen described current operations 
as a "cordon and search" phase of the operation, designed to flush 
out Kony. 
 
¶10.  (U) Various LRA groups have carried out atrocities in the DRC 
and southern Sudan, killing some 400 in attacks on churches and 
villages between December 24 and 27.  The Ugandan Peoples Defense 
Forces (UPDF) confirmed reports from the Catholic charity, CARITAS, 
of the deadly attacks on the Congolese villages of Bitima, Faradge, 
Gurba, and Doruma.  MONUC and the Ugandan military transported 
additional Congolese troops to these areas to provide protection for 
the civilian populations. 
 
¶11.  (U) The UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) reported similar mass killings in southern Sudan, but did 
not provide casualty numbers.  Press reports indicate one group of 
LRA was headed for Maridi, southern Sudan, and another comprised of 
wounded LRA members and women and children was headed toward the 
Central African Republic (CAR).  Military and Foreign Ministry 
spokesmen said that the Ugandan Government has contacted CAR about 
the LRA movements.  MONUC pledged continued support for the 
protection of civilians.  On December 31, Congolese Minister for 
Communication and Information, Lambert Mende Omalanga, stated that 
the government would deploy additional troops to protect the 
populations in areas under LRA attack. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (U) Ugandan officials and humanitarian organizations prepared 
for possible repatriation and returns of women and children from the 
LRA camps in the DRC, according to USAID's Northern Uganda office in 
Gulu.  The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNICEF 
are taking the lead on the return and repatriation of escapees and 
other non-combatants.  The Ugandan Amnesty Commission's Gulu office 
reported that reception facilities are available in Gulu, Kitgum, 
and Lira to accommodate hundreds of returned children.  Limited 
facilities also exist for adults.  Services available through these 
facilities include housing, medical support, psychological 
counseling, family tracing and community re-integration support. 
IOM and UNICEF believe that existing facilities should be able to 
accommodate any large influx of individuals, which have in the past 
processed even larger numbers of victims, escapees, and LRA 
defectors. 
 
 
KAMPALA 00000007  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Prior to the military operation, the World Food Program 
(WFP) had started to deliver food and emergency equipment into 
Dungu, a town in north-eastern DRC where thousands of people were 
displaced in October and November by LRA activities.  WFP estimated 
that about 70,000 people were in need of assistance in an area, 
which was cut off from supply lines by insecurity.  In Uganda, 
resettlement of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in Amuru 
District was suspended after renewed LRA attacks in DRC and south 
Sudan.  Rumors of possible renewed LRA attacks in northern Uganda 
continued to circulate, causing some IDPs to stay in the camps. 
 
¶14.  (U) USG Activities: In early December, USAID's Assistant 
Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, 
Michael Hess, visited northern Uganda to view the progress being 
made on the transition from relief to economic development.  In 
Pader, Gulu, and Lira Districts, Hess met with local government 
leaders and USAID implementing partners, observed WFP food 
distributions, visited USAID-funded buildings under construction, 
and commissioned an USAID Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance-funded bridge. 
 
¶15.  (U) On December 15, USAID's Peace and Security Advisor attended 
the graduation ceremony for operators of Hydraform brick-making 
machines in Teso.  The ceremony marked the first public 
commissioning of a project funded through the PRDP.  Over 100 youth 
from 40 districts were trained in brick-making, building 
construction, and small business development.  The Prime Minister 
emphasized that the cost-effective and extensive construction of 
houses using the Hydraform bricks would benefit returnees by 
providing shelter, employment, and other opportunities. 
 
¶16.  (U) The new USAID Northern Uganda Advisor arrived in Gulu.  She 
paid courtesy calls on local government officials and emphasized the 
U.S. Government's continued commitment to stabilization and 
development in the north. 
 
¶17.  (U) In December, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) 
in Uganda approved seven new activities for a total of $380,000 in 
Gulu and Amuru Districts.  These included the rehabilitation of a 
community market, Alero sub-county office building, health center 
housing, and the Gulu District administrative block.  OTI supported 
a cleansing ceremony through Ker Kwaro Acholi.  The Paramount Chief 
of the Acholi cleansed land where returnees have found human remains 
and are therefore unwilling to return home.  These traditional 
cleansing ceremonies pave the way for peace of mind and peaceful 
return to their communities of origin for the IDPs.  It is estimated 
that return rates in Gulu District are above 90 percent, while in 
Amuru, over 50 percent of the IDPs have returned to or near their 
homes. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FROM THE MEDIA AND THE WEB 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶18.  (U) The media among human rights organizations have been 
largely supportive of the joint military operation.  In northern 
Uganda, the news of the operation was met with mixed views, with 
most observers agreeing that Kony is not interested in signing a 
peace deal.  Parliamentarians Reagan Okumu and Livingston Okello 
Okello, members of the Acholi Parliamentary Group, spoke out 
vociferously against the attacks.  Other northern leaders are 
withholding judgment. 
 
¶19.  (U)  Prior to the operation, Gulu District Chairman Norbert Mao 
questioned Kony's commitment to peace in a "New Vision" editorial 
entitled "Kony's Failure to Sign Pack Raises Questions."  He wrote 
that most northerners do not see the connection between signing the 
peace agreement and the efforts to persuade the UN Security Council 
to suspend the warrants of arrest.  Also, Mao stated that many 
people do not know of the Government's efforts to allay Kony's fears 
that he would be required to disarm and be repatriated to Uganda 
upon signing.  (Note: The FPA provides for a 30 day transition 
period for the LRA to fully assemble and disarm.  End Note.)  Mao 
said that Kony gave three reasons for not signing: a text message 
from a top UPDF commander in the north threatening him with war (ref 
A), confirmation from Kony's home village that he would never be 
forgiven for his war crimes, and threats to cut-off support from 
members of the diaspora, who claim to be creating a new rebel group 
to fight Museveni.  Mao argued that these were only excuses and that 
Kony's real fear remains the punishment for his war crimes. 
 
¶20.  (U) On December 13, Human Rights Watch (HRW) wrote a letter to 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer urging the 
Bush Administration to take immediate steps that would help bring 
 
KAMPALA 00000007  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
LRA abuses to an end and would pave the way for the apprehension and 
surrender for trial of LRA leaders accused of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity before the ICC.  HRW further noted that suspected 
war criminals that are roaming freely between countries and 
committing new atrocities should not be tolerated.  HRW argued that 
the United States, as a key government engaged in northern Uganda 
and one with a strong capacity and commitment to ensure the 
protection of civilians and the apprehension of fugitives, has a 
vital and immediate role to play against the LRA. 
 
¶21.  (U) On December 17, "The New Vision" ran Opiyo Oloya's weekly 
perspective of a Ugandan in Canada entitled "Kony Should Have Been 
Attacked a Long Time Ago."  Oloya wrote that the attack on the LRA 
may not be popular in northern Uganda because of fear of resumption 
of hostilities.  He argued that in the two years since peace talks 
started in Juba there has been a restored calm, which enabled many 
to return to their villages.  For their parts, Machar and Chissano 
worked hard to bridge the gaps between the Government of Uganda and 
the LRA.   The Ugandan Government kept its part of the bargain. 
Opiyo noted that for all his bravado, Kony is a war crime suspect 
wanted by the ICC and nothing short of death can change his status. 
He argued that once the ICC stepped in, the Ugandan Government was 
no longer in any position to reverse the indictments.  Olaya 
concluded that the international military effort against the LRA 
involving Sudan, Uganda and the DRC must move swiftly with 
unshakable resolve. 
 
¶22. (U) On December 19, Resolve Uganda's LRA Update entitled 
"Protection of Abducted Children Concern as Governments Attack" 
noted that "there has been a decisive shift in conflict dynamics in 
the past week as the Ugandan government, in coordination with the 
Governments of Southern Sudan and DRC, launched a full-scale 
military offensive against LRA bases in eastern Congo."  This came 
after LRA continued attacks on Congolese civilians, as well as yet 
another public refusal by LRA leader Joseph Kony to sign the final 
peace agreement.  Resolve Uganda argued that it was imperative that 
military operations take full precautionary measures to protect the 
lives of civilians, including LRA captives, and have a high chance 
of achieving Kony's apprehension.  Resolve Uganda's recommendations 
to U.S. policymakers included: ensuring that the ongoing offensive 
against LRA rebels in the DR Congo is targeted only at LRA leaders 
and introduction of legislation addressing the needs for 
reconstruction and stabilization within northern Uganda. 
 
¶23.  (U) On December 21, the independent newspaper, "The Daily 
Monitor", ran an abridged statement from the HRW in the form of an 
editorial under the headline "Protect Civilians While pursuing 
rebels."  The Monitor urged that as the regional attack on the LRA 
camp in the DRC continued, all parties should respect international 
humanitarian law and LRA leaders accused of war crimes who surrender 
or are captured should be brought to trial. 
BROWNING