VZCZCXRO1009
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0031/01 0060921
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060921Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6619
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000031 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE FOR H PASS TO CODEL REED 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MCGRAW 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OREP AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL REED 
 
KABUL 00000031  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The coming year will take its identity from the 
Afghan presidential elections, and from increased US military 
deployments.  We continue to face tough challenges in 
Afghanistan, particularly on the security and governance 
front.  But conditions here are more nuanced than the 
negative drumbeat coming from the media.  Advances in 
security do not grab headlines the way a spectacular suicide 
attack does.  Progress in development continues.  National 
and international will is holding.  But poor governance, 
corruption, and a growing gap between President Karzai and 
the international presence, including the United States, are 
problems. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Presidential elections already influence nearly 
everything political here.  Karzai's popularity has fallen - 
dramatically in some areas and among some constituencies. 
But overall the Asia Foundation poll found that 66 percent of 
the population still thought the national government was 
doing a "very good" or "somewhat good" job (compared to 80 
percent in 2007).  In our view, especially in the absence of 
a credible opponent, it is Karzai's election to lose. 
Personal insecurity and corruption are Karzai's greatest 
vulnerabilities.  Karzai installed a new Interior Minister to 
turn up the heat on both problems.  Minister Atmar is working 
hard, but time is probably too short for dramatic improvement 
before elections. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Political jockeying between Parliament and the 
Independent Election Commission (IEC) over the election date 
is causing a stir.  The northern opposition, led by the 
Speaker of the Lower Chamber, Qanooni, is calling for 
elections no later than May, ostensibly to conform to the 
constitution (although they found this position more than six 
months after the Elections Commission had announced an autumn 
time frame).  We believe that this is posturing for political 
purposes and, in the end, the Election Commission's 
preference for a September vote will carry the day based on 
security and logistical imperatives. 
 
¶5. (SBU) More problematic is the insecurity in the south and 
east, which is prompting some - including Karzai, other 
Pashtuns and some RC-South partners - to raise the specter of 
Pashtun disenfranchisement and the possible illegitimacy of 
the vote.  It is too early to judge the prospects of failure. 
 Although there may be some disruption of voting registration 
in the south, we are confident that voting itself will be 
able to take place, not least because of the arrival of 
additional U.S. combat brigades and the growth of the Afghan 
army at more than 2500 troops per month.  We expect some 
violence, however. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Seventy percent of the violence continues to occur 
in about 10 percent of the 363 districts.  The Coalition and 
Afghan security forces have increased our area of control. 
The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from 
insurgency to terrorism, to challenge the will of Afghans and 
the international community.  Ordinary Afghans feel less safe 
as a result of this switch, and as result of rising 
criminality, especially kidnappings. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel 
for the foreseeable future.  Presently there are about 75,000 
Afghan army, 82,000 Afghan police, and about 37,000 
international military personnel to maintain security.  The 
army is growing at more than 2500 per month and should reach 
134,000 in 2011.  The international forces are expected to 
top 50,000 in 2010.  We are working with Minister of Interior 
Atmar to accelerate reform and training of the police, 
develop more intelligence-based policing, take action against 
corruption, and create vetted, specialized police units. 
 
¶8. (SBU) We and the US military are cooperating with 
President Karzai's initiative to energize renewed community 
responsibility for security in their locality, without 
re-creating local militias.  The pilot will be in Wardak 
Province.  District councils and local shuras will hire 
local, but tribally integrated, community guards with elected 
 
KABUL 00000031  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
councils and work with Afghan security forces to vet 
potential leaders.  US Special Forces will train and mentor 
the guards for local defense within the boundaries of the 
community. 
 
Governance 
---------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Karzai struggles to balance between institutional 
and traditional informal governance, in an environment of 
poverty, social exhaustion, illicit power centers arising 
from decades of political breakdown, governmental incapacity, 
criminality, and insurgency.  Electoral dynamics are further 
complicating the problem, leading Karzai to make expedient 
decisions on one hand, but also to appoint top-flight leaders 
like Atmar to deliver police services on the other.  There 
are no easy answers, and neither Karzai nor the international 
community can fight all battles all the time.  But we can do 
better. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on capacity building, 
creation of a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and 
delivery of services to the public.  Strong ministries 
include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education, 
Finance, Communications, Rural Development, and 
Counter-Narcotics.  The Central Bank is well-led.  Interior 
and Agriculture have new, better leadership.  We work closely 
with those entities.  We also work effectively with the other 
ministries, but mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness slow 
progress.  For instance, the Supreme Court and the Ministry 
of Justice suffer from the acute lack of qualified 
professionals, a history of law enforcement that combines 
elements of Sharia, tribal, and now Western law, and a lack 
of national consensus on the way forward. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
are aimed at strengthening local government at all levels. 
We work equally with traditional leadership structures, as 
well as those who gained power through force or wealth during 
the days of conflict, but have proven themselves ready to 
cooperate with constitutional government and rule of law. 
Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak connections 
between the capital and localities, long-standing rivalries 
and distrust among communities, and the presence of 
illegitimate insurgent or criminal spoilers complicate the 
task.  The goal is responsive, reliable leadership in local 
communities, which binds them to the capital in a reciprocal 
way. 
 
Taliban reconciliation 
---------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
leaders is controversial here.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability via a possible 
reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a 
Pashtun deal that could come at the expense of their 
interests.  So far, all reconciliation efforts have been 
premised on respect for the constitution, which has allowed 
us to support these initiatives.  Although the recent Saudi 
attempt to begin talks about talks generated much interest, 
there has been little concrete progress in that or any other 
initiative. 
 
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Poppy cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008, 
the first reduction since 2005.  Just as notable, poppy-free 
provinces grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of all 
provinces.  Poppy cultivation has died away in the north and 
east of the country, including in traditionally big poppy 
cultivating provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar. 
But the narcotics challenge continues in the south, where 
seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the country's 
opium, and trafficking is bound to the insurgency.  Helmand 
Governor Mangal is trying to change the game.  Together with 
the UK, we are backing Mangal's initiative to eliminate 
narcotics cultivation in a 100-square mile area of Helmand 
through an intensive information campaign, agricultural 
assistance, and Afghan army-protected eradication. 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
KABUL 00000031  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  International support is 
holding, as demonstrated by the promise of increased 
deployments at the April NATO Summit in Budapest, increased 
contributions at the June Donors' Conference in Paris, and 
support for a larger Afghan army at the September JCMB 
meeting in Kabul.  There is a real improvement in bilateral 
relations with the Zardari government of Pakistan, although 
there is some doubt in the Afghan mind that Zardari can get 
control of all elements of the military and intelligence 
apparatus there.  The UN presence is strong, but SRSG Kai 
Eide has not yet been able to play the key coordination role 
hoped for, not least because of insufficient budgetary and 
personnel commitment from New York. 
 
¶15. (SBU)  There are often disagreements between the 
internationals and the Afghan Government regarding issues of 
corruption, governance, rule of law, freedom of the press, 
and other areas.  Internationals bridle, for example, when 
Karzai attributes the bulk of corruption in Afghanistan to 
international aid donations.  The most important gap between 
the government and the coalition is over the issue of 
civilian casualties:  both sides agree it is a problem that 
needs to be fixed, but there is not yet agreement on the 
balance between necessary security operations and necessary 
protections for civilians.  General McKiernan, aiming to 
minimize civilian casualties, has directed substantial 
changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures. 
 
WOOD