P 261312Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7051
AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
OSD WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
DIA WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
DOJ WASHDC
DIR ONDCP WASHDC
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
CJCS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS KABUL 000201 
 
 
DEPT FOR INL, INL/AP, SCA, AF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER
SUBJECT:  2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT FOR 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: 08 STATE 100992 
 
¶1. SUMMARY:  Narcotics cultivation in Afghanistan declined in 2008 
by nearly 20 percent, after two years of record highs. Despite the 
drop in poppy cultivation, however, Afghanistan remained the world's 
largest grower of opium poppy, with cultivation largely confined to 
five contiguous provinces in the south of the country near the 
borders with Pakistan and Iran. The connection between poppy 
cultivation, the resulting narcotics trade, and funding of 
insurgency groups became more evident in 2008; nearly all 
significant cultivation now occurs in insecure areas with active 
insurgent elements.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), opium poppy cultivation decreased 19 percent from 193,000 
hectares (ha) in 2007 to 157,000 ha in 2008. This was due to a 
combination of poor weather conditions, decreased opium prices 
relative to other crops, and improved governance and security in key 
provinces.  Nangarhar province alone shifted from having the second 
highest area of poppy cultivation in 2007 (18,000 ha) to achieving 
poppy free status in 2008. This was primarily due to the 
high-profile law enforcement and incentives campaign implemented by 
the provincial governor. 
 
¶3. UNODC estimates that Afghanistan produced 7,700 metric tons (MT) 
of raw opium in 2008, a decrease of six percent from the 8,200 MT 
produced in 2007. The export value of this year's opium harvest, 
$3.4 billion, made up roughly a third of Afghanistan's total Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of $10.2 billion, which includes both licit 
and illicit activity. 
 
¶4. Narcotics cultivation in 2008 was largely confined to a small 
number of insecure provinces with active insurgent elements, and the 
narcotics industry continues to undermine efforts to establish 
security, governance, and licit economic activity throughout the 
country. The anti-government insurgency, most commonly associated 
with the Taliban, exploits all aspects of the narcotics trade for 
financial support.  In 2008, the UN estimates that approximately 
$100 million flowed from the narcotics trade to warlords, druglords, 
and insurgents. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and arms to 
the insurgents, who, in turn, provide protection to growers and 
traffickers and prevent the Afghan government from interfering with 
their activities.  Because of this symbiotic relationship, it is no 
coincidence that poppy cultivation is concentrated in the same 
regions where the anti-government insurgency is strongest. 
 
¶5. Opium poppy cultivation is almost entirely limited to five 
relatively high-income, agriculturally rich provinces along the 
Pakistan border: Helmand, Farah, Kandahar, Urzgan, and Nimruz 
together account for 95 percent of Afghanistan's poppy.  Helmand 
province alone cultivated 66 percent of the country's opium poppy in 
¶2008.  At the same time, poppy cultivation continues to decline in 
many of Afghanistan's poorer, but more secure, northern, central, 
and eastern provinces. In 2008, 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces 
were declared poppy free by UNODC, up from 13 in 2007 and 6 in 2006. 
 Nine other provinces cultivated less than 1,000 ha, and could reach 
poppy free status with relatively little effort. 
 
¶6. These statistics belie the misconception that most farmers grow 
poppy because they have no economic alternative; in fact, poppy is 
flourishing in the areas with the richest land and best developed 
agricultural marketing and distribution networks. Nationwide, UNODC 
estimates that nearly 10 percent of Afghans were involved in poppy 
cultivation in 2008, down from 14.3 percent in 2007. 
 
¶7. For the most part, farmers choose to plant opium poppy because it 
is a profitable, hardy, and low-risk crop.  Credit is available from 
narco-traffickers and the insurgency, abundant manual labor makes 
harvesting cheap, and it is easy to sell. Economic and development 
assistance alone is not sufficient to defeat the narcotics trade in 
Afghanistan; more comprehensive approaches are needed.  Alternative 
development opportunities can yield reasonable incomes, but must 
also be backed by measures to increase risk to those who plant 
poppy, traffic narcotics, and aid and abet cultivation and 
trafficking.  An increasing number of provincial governors have 
shown success in significantly reducing or completely eliminating 
poppy cultivation in their provinces through determined campaigns of 
persuasion, law enforcement, alternative development, and 
eradication. 
 
¶8. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
generally cooperates with the international community in 
implementing its national counternarcotics strategy.  However, more 
political will and effort, at the central and provincial levels, is 
required to decrease cultivation in the south, maintain cultivation 
reductions in the rest of the country, and combat trafficking in 
coming years. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
¶9. UNODC estimates that Afghanistan cultivated 93 percent of the 
world's opium poppy in 2008. Afghanistan is involved in the full 
narcotics production cycle, from cultivation to finished heroin, 
with drug traffickers trading in all forms of opiates, including 
unrefined opium, semi-refined morphine base, and refined heroin. 
Despite the strong increase in terrorist violence, such as roadside 
bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks on police throughout the 
country in 2008, the overall Afghan economy continued its brisk 
growth rate of nearly seven percent annually over the last five 
years.  Improvements to Afghanistan's infrastructure since 2002 have 
created more economic alternatives to poppy cultivation and enhanced 
the Afghan government's ability to combat drug trafficking in some 
parts of the country. These improvements, such as roads and modern 
communications, can also be exploited by narcotics traffickers. 
Growing insecurity in Afghanistan's south, where most poppy was 
grown, impeded the extension there of governance and law 
enforcement.  Narcotics traffickers also exploited government 
weakness and corruption.  Large parts of Afghanistan's best 
agricultural lands in Kandahar, Urzgan, Nimruz, Farah, and Helmand 
provinces suffered from Taliban and other insurgent activity. 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2008 
 
Policy Initiatives: 
 
¶10. In January 2006, the Afghan government inaugurated an 
eight-pillar National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), which 
articulated a coordinated, nationwide strategy in the areas of 
Public Information, Alternative Livelihoods, Law Enforcement, 
Criminal Justice, Eradication, Institutional Development, Regional 
Cooperation, and Demand Reduction.  The NDCS approach is similar to 
U.S. and UK counternarcotics strategies for Afghanistan.  While the 
NDCS is generally viewed as a sound strategy, the Afghan government 
has been unwilling or unable to fully implement it and has, in some 
cases, failed to provide adequate support to provincial leaders who 
have shown greater willingness to take serious steps to combat 
narcotics cultivation, production, and trafficking in their 
provinces. In the latter part of 2008, the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) which oversees the Afghan National Police (ANP), and the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD), agreed to work together to provide 
security forces to provinces undertaking eradication efforts in 
¶2009. This new willingness to work together and provide support to 
province-led eradication is encouraging, and hopefully will serve as 
a model for future operations. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics 
(MCN), which has direct responsibility for implementation of the 
NDCS, has less political influence and fewer resources than other 
government agencies (especially MOI or MOD), and is, therefore, 
depends heavily on their support to execute the policy.     On March 
1, 2008, the Afghan Parliament confirmed General Khodaidad Khodaidad 
as Minister of Counter Narcotics after a delay of eight months, 
during which he served as Acting Minister. 
 
¶11. Following UNODC's announcement of high poppy cultivation figures 
in August 2007, President Karzai convened the second annual national 
counternarcotics conference.  This meeting brought together 
representatives from key Afghan government Ministries, governors 
from the 17 largest poppy producing provinces, tribal elders, police 
chiefs, religious leaders, and members of the international 
community.  Afterward, the MCN held a pre-planting season planning 
session for the 17 governors that focused on the 2008 growing 
season.  The Afghan government instructed provincial and district 
leaders to launch pre-planting information campaigns to reduce poppy 
cultivation.  The response from governors was uneven.  Some 
governors (notably those in Balkh, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan) 
developed vigorous anti-poppy campaigns that dropped their poppy 
cultivation to zero or near zero, while others did little to 
discourage poppy cultivation. Several governors were unwilling or 
unable to implement successful poppy reduction programs due to the 
lack of security and high levels of insurgent activity in their 
provinces.  Throughout the year, the Minister of Counter Narcotics 
engaged in public information campaigns directed at key 
narcotics-producing provinces, which included holding anti-narcotics 
shuras and community councils with senior government officials. 
 
¶12. In mid 2007, the GIRoA Policy Advisory Group (PAG) added 
counternarcotics as one of its key policy pillars.  The PAG was 
formed in late 2006 by the GIRoA, in cooperation with the U.S., UK, 
Canada, the Netherlands, NATO International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), to deal with critical issues in the unstable southern 
provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Zabul, Nimruz, and Urzgan. 
In November 2008, the GIRoA agreed in the PAG to a 27,500 hectare 
national eradication target for 2009, a little more than 20 percent 
of the expected crop.  The GIRoA also agreed to arrest high-level 
traffickers and provide one battalion (600-700 personnel) of Afghan 
National Army forces as protection for Poppy Eradication Force 
eradication operations. Despite initial concern that the Afghan 
forces would be stretched too thin, the Minister of Defense 
established and trained a Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK) 
brigade, which is scheduled to provide force protection support to 
the MOI's PEF during the 2009 eradication season. 
 
¶13. The Good Performers Initiative (GPI), a U.S.-UK-funded 
initiative started in 2006 to reward provinces for successful 
counternarcotics performance, continued to provide strong incentives 
to provinces that were poppy free or reduced their poppy production 
by more than 10 percent from 2007.  In 2008, 29 of Afghanistan's 34 
provinces qualified for over $39 million in GPI development 
assistance projects.  To date, the U.S. government has contributed 
over $69 million to GPI, while the UK has provided approximately $12 
million. The efficiency of GPI disbursements improved during summer 
2008 with the transfer of the GPI fund and administrative 
responsibilities from the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) to the 
Ministry of Counter Narcotics.  In the past, inefficiencies at the 
CNTF frustrated governors with delays in approving and implementing 
GPI projects.  As of December 2008, at least $17 million in GPI 
funds were awarded by MCN to several provinces. In Nangarhar 
province, four micro hydro projects that generate electricity for 
rural villages have been completed with 20 more scheduled to be 
built in 2009. A watershed development project that will build three 
small dams to generate electricity and provide flood control for the 
district is also planned. In Panjshir province, GPI funds have built 
a greenhouse complex to grow produce during winter and 12 tractors 
were purchased to rent to farmers during the planting season. MCN is 
expected to build upon these increases as it gains additional human 
resources and experience managing the GPI process. 
 
Justice Reform/Criminal Justice Task Force: 
 
¶14. The Afghan government's Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and 
Counter Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) is a vetted, self contained unit, 
which consists of 30 Afghan prosecutors, 35 Afghan criminal 
investigators, 7 primary court and 7 appellate court judges. The 
CJTF/CNT is mentored by DOJ Senior Legal Advisors. It uses modern 
investigative techniques to investigate and prosecute narcotics 
traffickers under the December 2005 Counter Narcotics Law. The 
Counter Narcotics Law has Articles dealing with narcotics related 
corruption and wiretapping which the CJTF has implemented 
successful.  Narcotics cases are tried by the CJTF before the self 
contained CNT, which has exclusive national jurisdiction over mid- 
and high-level narcotics cases in Afghanistan. Under the existing 
law enacted in 2005, all drug cases from across Afghanistan, which 
reach certain thresholds, must be prosecuted by the CJTF before the 
CNT.  The thresholds are possession of two kg of heroin, ten kg of 
opium, and 50 kg of hashish.  Since its inception in 2005, the 
CJTF/CNT has convicted approximately 1,550.  From January to August 
2008, the CNT had 223 primary court convictions and 251 appellate 
court convictions.  To provide a secure facility for the CNT and 
CJTF, the United State has funded the construction of the Counter 
Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC) in Kabul. This facility is expected 
to open in the late spring of 2009. It includes a 56-bed detention 
facility, courtrooms, and office space for investigators, 
prosecutors and judges. Also funded and under construction at the 
CNJC are an additional 116 bed detention annex and a barracks. There 
are also plans for a DOD funded narcotics lab to be located adjacent 
to the CNJC. Once the CNJC facility opens, the United States through 
INL will fund all operation and maintenance costs for two years. At 
the end of this two year period it is hoped the GIRoA will assume 
all operation and maintenance expenses. 
 
¶15. The GIRoA, with assistance from the U.S. and UNODC, refurbished 
a section of the Pol-i-Charkhi prison to house 100 maximum-security 
narcotics convicts.  Additional U.S.-funded renovations for 
Pol-i-Charkhi are planned for 2009.  This prison is Afghanistan's 
largest and is the site of frequent disturbances and unrest due to 
poor conditions, poor prison management, and lack of resources. 
Through the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), the United 
States is helping to improve the corrections system with training, 
capacity-building, and infrastructure. The CSSP works closely with 
the U.S.-funded Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), which has 
over 60 U.S. and Afghan justice advisors in Kabul and four provinces 
providing training, mentoring, and capacity-building for 
Afghanistan's criminal justice system. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts: 
 
¶16. The number of hectares eradicated nationwide declined from 
19,047 ha in 2007 to 5,480 ha in 2008.  In 2008, governor-led 
eradication (GLE) accounted for 4,306 ha, and the PEF, a 
U.S.-supported, centrally-deployed police unit specifically trained 
and equipped for eradication activities, eradicated another 1,174 ha 
of poppy in Helmand and Kapisa provinces.  The decreased level of 
eradication is partly attributable to both the decrease in overall 
cultivation by 19 percent and the success of pre-planting programs 
that compelled farmers to self-eradicate or choose alternate crops 
to poppy.  Additionally, the high degree of insecurity in 
Afghanistan's southern provinces and the lack of GIRoA force 
protection for the PEF hindered eradication operations in the 
provinces of highest poppy cultivation.  For the most part, both GLE 
and PEF eradication were arranged through negotiations with 
poppy-growing communities, a practice that reduced eradication's 
deterrent effect.  Even so, eradication-related security incidents, 
including targeted shootings, mine explosions, and suicide bombings, 
increased significantly in 2008, resulting in 78 fatalities, up from 
17 in 2007. 
 
¶17. Narcotics law enforcement was hampered by corruption and 
incompetence within the justice system as well as the absence of 
effective governance in many regions of the country.  Although 
narcotics make up approximately one-third of Afghanistan's GDP, no 
major drug traffickers have been arrested and convicted in 
Afghanistan since 2006.  In addition, too few high-level drug 
traffickers served terms in Afghanistan's prisons during 2008. 
 
¶18. In 2003, the Ministry of Interior established the Counter 
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), comprised of investigation, 
intelligence, and interdiction units.  By the end of 2008, the CNPA 
had approximately 2,737 of its 3,777 authorized strength, including 
the 500-member PEF.  The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
has continued its close collaboration with the CNPA to offer 
training, mentoring, and investigative assistance in order to 
develop MOI capacity. 
 
¶19. The DEA utilizes permanently assigned personnel at the Kabul 
Country Office (KCO) and Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams 
(FAST) in Afghanistan.  The FAST teams, which consist of eight 
special agents, one intelligence analyst, and one supervisor, 
operate in Afghanistan on 120-day rotations and deploy around the 
country with the Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU).  During 
2007, FAST and the NIU deployed to Herat, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, 
Kunduz, and Nangarhar Provinces to conduct operations. 
 
¶20. From October 2006 through December 2008, KCO/FAST reported the 
following seizures: 4.099MT of heroin, 2.448MT of opium (which 
converts to 244 kg of heroin), and 238.935MT of hashish. During the 
same period, the CNPA/NIU also destroyed 17 drug labs. The CNPA 
seized 1,012 kg of solid precursor chemicals and 592 liters of 
liquid precursors. The CNPA/NIU also reported 75 arrests for 
trafficking under the provisions of the Afghan Counter Narcotics law 
where possession of 2 kg of heroin (or morphine base), 10 kg of 
opium, or 50 kg of hashish mandates automatic jurisdiction for the 
Counter Narcotics Tribunal. 
 
¶21. During 2008, the Afghan government, with DEA training, mentoring 
and support, made significant progress in developing its three 
specially vetted units: the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the 
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), and the Technical Intercept Unit 
(TIU), to investigate high-value targets.  These units gather 
judicially authorized evidence under Afghanistan's Counternarcotics 
Law and prosecute them through the Afghan legal system.  Personnel 
in these units are recruited from a wide variety of Afghan law 
enforcement agencies and have to pass rigorous examinations.  During 
2008, the NIU was capable of conducting its own operations, 
including requesting and executing search and arrest warrants, while 
the SIU was able to independently initiate and complete 
investigative and undercover cases.  The TIU continued to build its 
capacity during 2008, and with limited judicial intercepts in 
December 2008, will be capable of conducting judicial wiretaps in 
the near future. 
 
¶22. The aim of these specialized units is to have the cases and 
investigations developed based on judicially gathered evidence from 
the SIU and TIU culminate in the issuance of arrest and search 
warrants executed by the NIU.  The investigations conducted by the 
SIU and NIU with DEA assistance are being prosecuted at the Counter 
Narcotics Tribunal through the Criminal Justice Task Force, which 
consists of Afghan prosecutors and investigators mentored by 
experienced Assistant U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Department of Justice 
Senior Trial Attorneys.  The CJTF mentors have also been working 
with the Afghan authorities to create a formal legal process to gain 
authority for controlled deliveries of narcotics to trafficking 
suspects. 
 
¶23. During 2008, Afghan authorities assisted Department of Justice 
senior prosecutors in removing narco-terrorist Khan Mohamed from 
Afghanistan and delivering him to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, where he was convicted on the charge of 
narcotics distribution and the precedent-setting charge of 
narco-terrorism.  He had been arrested in Nangarhar Province in 
October 2006 and agreed to be transferred to the United States to 
stand trial in November 2007.  Mohammed was found guilty in May 2008 
of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. On December 22, 2008, he 
was sentenced to life in prison. 
 
¶24. In October 2008, suspected Afghan narco-terrorist Haji Juma Khan 
was arrested at Jakarta's airport shortly after his arrival from 
Dubai.  He was transferred to New York, where he will stand trial 
for producing and distributing large quantities of heroin and giving 
the proceeds of drug trafficking operations to the Taliban. 
 
¶25. In October 2007, major Afghan trafficker Haji Baz Mohammad was 
sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for running an 
international narcotics-trafficking organization that imported 
millions of dollars worth of illegal drugs into the United States. 
Similar to the indictment of Haji Bashir Noorzai, an Afghan drug 
kingpin who was indicted and then arrested in the United States in 
2005, Baz Mohammad's indictment also alleged that he was closely 
aligned with the Taliban.  Mohammad Essa, an insurgency-linked 
heroin distributor for Haji Baz Mohammad in the United States, 
volunteered to be transferred to the United States to stand trial in 
April 2007.  Essa pleaded guilty of the charges in 2008 and is 
awaiting sentencing. 
 
Corruption: 
 
¶26.  Although the illicit production and/or distribution of narcotic 
and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances is illegal, 
and the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions is 
illegal, many Afghan government officials are believed to profit 
from the drug trade.  Narcotics-related corruption is particularly 
pervasive at the provincial and district levels of government. 
Corrupt practices range from facilitating drug activities to 
benefiting from revenue streams that the drug trade produces. 
 
¶27. During 2008, several mid-level Afghan government officials were 
convicted of narcotics and narcotics related corruption charges. 
For example, nine public officials, including several Kabul police 
commanders were convicted in the Central Narcotics Tribunal on 
charges relating to heroin trafficking.  All the men received at 
least ten-year terms of imprisonment. Additionally, the ANP 
Commander of Takhar Province was convicted of drug related 
corruption and intimidation. 
 
¶28. In 2008, President Karzai and the GIRoA demonstrated a renewed 
commitment to fighting corruption by implementing the 
recommendations set forth by the interagency anti-corruption 
commission chaired by Supreme Court Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi. 
To this end, two new anti-corruption entities were established: the 
High Office of Monitoring, which oversees implementation of the 
Azimi Commission strategy; and a corruption oversight unit within 
the Attorney General's Office (AGO), which will ensure the AGO 
functions efficiently, fairly and independently. 
 
¶29. In accordance with the national anti-corruption strategy, the 
Afghan Parliament passed the Law on Monitoring the Implementation of 
the Anti-Administrative Corruption Strategy in August 2008.  The law 
increases ministerial transparency and accountability, tightens 
contracting laws, and increases legal access to information on 
high-ranking individuals' assets.  In addition, President Karzai's 
October 2008 appointment of Mohamad Hanif Atmar as Interior Minister 
was a powerful signal that the Afghan Government remains serious 
about addressing corruption at all levels within the Afghan National 
Police. Atmar is seen as a professional administrator who has a 
track record of fighting corruption within the Ministries he has 
headed. 
 
Agreements and Treaties: 
 
¶30. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 
UN Convention, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances.  Afghanistan is also a party to the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime. Afghanistan ratified the UN 
Convention Against Corruption on August 25, 2008.  The GIRoA has no 
formal extradition or legal assistance arrangements with the United 
States, but American mentors are working with the Criminal Justice 
Task Force to help draft such a law.  The 2005 Afghan Counter 
Narcotics law, however, allows the extradition of drug offenders 
under the 1988 UN Drug Convention.  Haji Baz Muhammad, mentioned 
above, was extradited to the United States under the authority of 
the 1988 UN Drug Convention in October 2005.  In 2006, however, a 
similar effort to extradite Misri Khan, a major trafficker, and his 
associates met with a request from President Karzai that the 
defendants first stand trial at Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics 
Tribunal, which subsequently sentenced the defendants to 17 years in 
prison. The defendants were still incarcerated in Afghanistan as of 
December 2008. 
 
Illicit Cultivation/Production: 
 
¶31. Based on UNODC data, the number of hectares under poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan decreased 19 percent, from 193,000 in 
2007 to 157,000 ha in 2008.  As a result, opium production decreased 
500 MT from 8,200 MT in 2007 to 7,700 MT in 2008 (770 MT of heroin). 
 The opium yield per hectare was the highest in six years, 
increasing from 42.5 kg/ha in 2007 to 48.8 kg/ha in 2008. UNODC 
attributes the high yield to favorable weather conditions in 
southern Afghanistan where the yield per hectare tends to be higher 
and where the overwhelming majority of poppy cultivation is 
concentrated.  Consistent with the decline in cultivation, the 
number of people involved in opium cultivation decreased 28 percent 
from 3.3 million in 2007 to 2.4 million in 2008 - or 9.8 percent of 
the total population.  Considered in terms of its estimated $3.4 
billion illicit export value, opium represented about one-third of 
Afghanistan's total GDP (licit and illicit).  On the other hand, the 
portion of narcotics money actually received by farmers was a small 
share of total GDP: opium poppy sold to traffickers brought in $730 
million at the "farm-gate," accounting for only seven percent of 
total licit and illicit GDP. Obviously, most small-scale farmers are 
not receiving the majority of benefits from the opium poppy trade. 
 
¶32. Poppy is a hardy, low risk crop. High profits, access to land 
and credit, and trafficker-facilitated access to illicit markets 
outside of Afghanistan make poppy immensely attractive to farmers in 
Afghanistan. However, the reduction of poppy cultivation in the 
poorer northern and central provinces and the explosion of poppy 
cultivation in agriculturally rich areas such as Helmand and 
Kandahar provinces, where poppy has displaced wheat and other 
legitimate crops, disprove the notion that most farmers grow poppy 
because they have no viable alternatives.  Eighteen of Afghanistan's 
34 provinces were declared poppy-free by the UNODC in 2008. This 
compares favorably to the 13 provinces that were declared poppy free 
in 2007 and six in 2006.  Nangarhar province, which went from having 
the second largest area of poppy cultivation in 2007 (18,000 ha) to 
achieving  poppy free status in 2008, presents a compelling example 
of the counternarcotics progress a provincial governor can achieve 
through a combination of persuasion, forced self-eradication and 
arrests.  Governor Sherzai of Nangarhar conducted a potent 
anti-narcotics campaign throughout the province.  The campaign 
included requiring farmers to sign pledges not to grow poppy and a 
series of public outreach events to inform tribal, religious and 
other community leaders about not growing poppy, and promises of 
development assistance and alternative livelihood programs in areas 
without poppy cultivation. 
 
¶33. Governor-led eradication in Balkh province cut opium production 
from 10,037 ha in 2006 to zero in 2008.  Many farmers in Balkh 
province reverted to planting marijuana, a traditional crop in 
Balkh.  UNODC estimated that 70,000 ha of marijuana were cultivated 
country-wide in 2007. The final estimates for 2008 are not available 
as of January 2009 but UNODC estimates that there was a 20-30 
percent reduction in cannabis cultivation. 
 
¶34. Afghanistan's poppy free provinces are in the relatively secure 
central and northern parts of the country.  In 2008, poppy 
cultivation was further consolidated in areas where the insurgency 
is strong and government authority is weak, particularly in the 
south and southwest.  The United States, UK, UNODC, ISAF and other 
major international stakeholders now acknowledge that a symbiotic 
relationship exists between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking 
in Afghanistan.  The Taliban taxes poppy farmers to fund the 
insurgency.  Traffickers provide weapons, funding, and personnel to 
the insurgency in exchange for the protection of drug trade routes, 
poppy fields, and members of their organizations.  For their part, 
narcotics traffickers thrive in the insecurity and absence of 
governance in areas where the Taliban and other insurgent groups are 
active.  The nexus between militants and narcotics trafficking was 
vividly illustrated when the Taliban gained control in February 2007 
of the Musa Qala district in northern Helmand.  When Afghan and 
coalition troops retook the district nine months later, they found 
that Taliban governance had deliberately sheltered a flourishing 
narcotics industry.  The full production cycle, from raw opium to 
finished heroin, was traded in Musa Qala's open narcotics markets, 
benefiting local traffickers and Taliban tax-collectors alike. 
 
¶35. The southern province of Helmand continued to be the world's 
leading producer of opium poppy.  In 2008, Helmand cultivated 
103,590 hectares of poppy or 66 percent of Afghanistan's total crop. 
Poppy cultivation has quadrupled in Helmand since 2005 and has 
almost entirely taken over a once prosperous agricultural region 
that formerly grew legal crops.  Helmand opium production is 
organized on a large scale, employing thousands of seasonal migrant 
laborers and supporting cultivation with systems of credit and 
distribution.  Massive amounts of development assistance to Helmand 
have not stopped the explosion of poppy cultivation and trafficking 
there. As the recipient of $282 million from FY 2002-2008, the 
Helmand province is one of largest recipients of USAID development 
assistance in Afghanistan. 
 
¶36. In advance of the 2009 cultivation season, Governor Mangal of 
Helmand province is implementing a plan to establish a "food and 
security zone" of 25,000 hectares around Lashkar Gah district in 
order to allow the extension of governance and development 
opportunities into a critical area for instability and poppy 
production.  The counternarcotics element of the Helmand plan 
includes an ongoing counternarcotics public information campaign, 
seed and fertilizer distribution, and eradication operations within 
the 25,000 hectare zone. The intention of the plan is to make this 
defined area completely poppy free, so that licit crops like wheat 
will be grown instead. The USG-funded Governor Led Eradication (GLE) 
program and the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) will work together 
during the eradication phase of the program to eliminate poppy crops 
from the "food zone." If successful, the Helmand plan will serve as 
a model for other provinces in the future. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit: 
 
¶37. Drug traffickers and financiers lend money to Afghan farmers in 
order to promote drug cultivation in the country. Traffickers buy 
the farmers' crops at previously set prices or accept repayment of 
loans with deliveries of raw opium.  In many provinces, opium 
markets exist under the control of regional warlords who also 
control the illicit arms trade and other criminal activities, 
including trafficking in persons.  Traders sell to the highest 
bidder in these markets with little fear of legal consequences, and 
gangsters and insurgent groups tax the trade. 
 
¶38. Drug laboratories operating within Afghanistan process an 
increasingly large portion of the country's raw opium into heroin 
and morphine base. This process reduces the bulk of raw opium by 
one-tenth, which facilitates its movement to markets in Asia, 
Europe, and the Middle East with transit routes through Iran, 
Pakistan, and Central Asia.  Opiates are transported to Turkey, 
Russia, and the rest of Europe by organized criminal groups that are 
often organized along regional and ethnic kinship lines.  Pakistani 
nationals play a prominent role in all aspects of the drug trade 
along the Afghan/Pakistan border. 
 
¶39. Precursor chemicals used in heroin production must be imported 
into Afghanistan.  Limited police and administrative capacity 
hampered efforts to interdict precursor substances and processing 
equipment.  Afghan law requires the tracking of precursor substances 
but the MCN has not created an active registry to record data. 
Progress in this effort requires the establishment of new laws, a 
system for distinguishing between licit and potentially illicit uses 
of dual-use chemicals, and a specialized police unit to enforce the 
new system. UNODC has established a five-man unit at CNPA that is 
charged with tracking precursor chemicals. 
 
Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction 
 
¶40. The GIRoA acknowledges a growing domestic drug abuse problem, 
particularly opium and increasingly heroin. In 2005, Afghanistan's 
first nationwide survey on drug use was conducted in cooperation 
with UNODC.  This survey estimated that Afghanistan had 920,000 drug 
users, including 150,000 users of opium and 50,000 heroin addicts, 
with 7,000 intravenous users. An updated report was due to be 
released in 2008, but has been delayed until 2009. Due to better 
methodology, this study is expected to show an estimated 2 million 
drug users in Afghanistan. 
 
¶41. The NDCS includes rehabilitation and demand reduction programs 
for drug abusers.  Given Afghanistan's shortage of general medical 
services, however, the government can only devote minimal resources 
to these programs.  To address demand reduction needs, the UK and 
Germany have funded specific demand reduction and rehabilitation 
programs, although the UK will cease funding their DDR programs in 
March, 2009 and has asked the US to assume the funding. Feasibility 
studies on six clinics are currently on-going. The United States 
currently funds eight, 20-bed residential drug treatment centers in 
Afghanistan, including the only two residential facilities in the 
country (Balkh and Kabul Provinces) dedicated to serving female 
addicts.  In 2008, the United States also supported 26 mosque-based 
drug education programs, two drop-in centers, five drug 
prevention/life skills pilot programs in Afghan schools, drug 
prevention public awareness programs, and a research study on the 
effects of second-hand opium smoke. In addition, five drop-in 
centers, formally run by UNODC are being converted into three 
residential clinics. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
¶42. Bilateral Cooperation/The Road Ahead.  In 2008, the United 
States continued to enhance its five pillar Afghanistan 
counternarcotics strategy, which calls for decisive action in the 
near term and identifies a more extensive array of tactics in all 
sectors, including: 
 
-- Use a public information campaign to win support for the Afghan 
government's counternarcotics program.  The U.S. Embassy will 
increase support for radio, print media, and person-to-person 
outreach campaigns. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
grassroots, person-to-person community outreach activities which 
engage local community, religious, and tribal leaders on 
counternarcotics issues. 
 
-- Attack the problem at the provincial level.  The U.S. will expand 
the Good Performer's Initiative to provide greater financial 
incentives to governors, including those who succeed in keeping 
their provinces poppy free.  Provincial counternarcotics planning 
will be integrated with military planning at local commands in key 
provinces such as Helmand and Kapisa. 
 
-- Engage in a stronger eradication campaign. Until such time as the 
GIRoA approves more efficient and safe methods of eradication, the 
United States will continue to support the centrally-led PEF 
program.  The PEF and GLE will continue to conduct non-negotiated, 
manual eradication targeted at large landowners and in areas where 
it will have the greatest deterrent impact. 
 
-- Develop alternative sources of income to poppy cultivation in 
rural areas.  USAID will continue its comprehensive Alternative 
Development Program (AD), which in FY 2008 provided approximately 
176,000,000 for AD projects in the major opium cultivation areas of 
Afghanistan.  Since late 2006, USAID has implemented a rural finance 
program that provides credit to farmers and small- and medium-sized 
enterprises in areas where financial services were previously 
unavailable. 
 
-- Accelerate narcotics-related investigations, arrests, 
prosecutions, and incarcerations. In keeping with the overall 
justice sector strategy pursued jointly by Afghanistan, the United 
States, and international partners, the United States will expand 
its training efforts in Afghanistan for provincial and 
district-level prosecutors during 2009. 
 
-- Destroy drug laboratories and stockpiles. The NIU and the 
UK-sponsored Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), in cooperation 
with the DEA, will continue to target drug labs and seize drug 
stockpiles. 
 
-- Dismantle drug trafficking/refining networks. DEA will work 
closely with the CNPA, NIU, and ASNF in pursuing criminal 
investigations and disrupting the narcotics trade. 
 
¶43. The tables showing the amount of drugs seized for 2008 will be 
sent via e-mail. 
 
 
Wood