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Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL37, COMMENTATOR TALKS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRATIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISTANBUL37 2009-01-21 14:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Istanbul
P 211415Z JAN 09
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8714
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS ISTANBUL 000037 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE TU
SUBJECT: COMMENTATOR TALKS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRATIC 
 
REFORM IN TURKEY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 64 
     B. ANKARA 2118 
     C. ANKARA 833 
 
1.  Summary.  In a recent discussion with diplomats and media 
representatives, professor of political science and 
well-regarded newspaper columnist Sahin Alpay predicted that 
Turkey will achieve democratic consolidation with or without 
EU support, and offered a broad apologia for the lackluster 
performance the past three years by Turkey's ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP). 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
2.  (U) On January 10, the Journalists and Writers Foundation 
(of which controversial Turkish imam Fethullah Gulen is 
honorary president) sponsored a discussion titled "Why is AKP 
Disillusioning the Liberals," one of a series of talks being 
sponsored by the Foundation.  The speaker was Dr. Sahin 
Alpay, professor of political science at Bahcesehir 
University and well-regarded newspaper columnist for 
Gulen-affiliated newspapers Zaman and Today's Zaman.  While 
the newspapers generally are supportive of AKP, Alpay said he 
was not affiliated with any party and described himself as 
sometimes a critic and sometimes a supporter of AKP.  He said 
that he spent his senior year of high school in the United 
States, was a committed communist as a young man, and in the 
1990s worked briefly as an advisor to Deniz Baykal, leader of 
the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).  He is 
one of the signatories to the petition (strongly criticized 
by AKP Prime Minister Erdogan) apologizing for the events of 
1915 (Ref B).  Alpay considers himself to be a "social 
democrat in the Swedish model." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Turkish Democracy: Unfulfilled Promise and Hope 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3.  Alpay described Turkey as having among the world's oldest 
democratic traditions, rooted in the Tanzimat reforms of the 
late 1700s.  He outlined three important "dynamics" in the 
recent evolution of liberal democracy within Turkey.  First 
was the "Ozal Revolution" of the 1980s (named after then-PM 
Turgut Ozal), in which the Turkish economy was opened to 
global competition.  Second was the customs union with the 
EU, which in the 1990s created a new elite of religious and 
conservative people from the Anatolian heartland, who want 
further democratization and EU integration.  Third is the 
"liberal-critical discourse" conducted by liberal 
intellectuals.  As a result, a "period of silent revolution" 
has began, in which many legislative changes are occurring. 
Nevertheless, Alpay feels democracy has not yet been fully 
consolidated, and gave as "outrageous" examples the 
military's continued meddling in politics and the 
Constitutional Court's repeated "unconstitutional" behavior 
(e.g., it temporarily delayed the selection of Gul as 
president; it overturned the constitutional amendment 
permitting headscarves in schools; and it almost shut down 
the AKP). 
 
4.  Alpay said that intellectuals like him came from various 
"radical" backgrounds, but through their experiences became 
convinced of the value of liberal democracy.  At the same 
time, he said, "modernist Islamic thinking" (as manifested, 
for example, by Gulen and AKP) evolved along those same 
lines.  He emphasized that the Turkish Islamic movement has 
gradually reformed and liberalized itself and is nothing like 
those which exist in authoritarian regimes.  He called this 
"one of the greatest miracles" of the Turkish democratization 
movement and characterized AKP as the "most reformist party" 
since the Ozal days.  In response to a question, Alpay 
vigorously denied that either AKP or the Gulen movement had a 
"hidden agenda" to bring sharia law to Turkey (a common 
accusation of their opponents), and claimed that their 
conversion to liberal democratic values was sincere. 
 
5.  Alpay thinks even the military is beginning to see that 
democratic reform is necessary.  He believes the military is 
genuinely changing, thanks to the "broad debate" that is 
going on.  He had particular praise for TGS head Ozkok, whom 
he claims stopped a military coup.  He quoted Ozkok as saying 
"What the people want shows us the way." Alpay has no fear of 
a military backlash from the Ergenekon prosecution (Ref A), 
saying "authoritarian elements" will not be able to make a 
comeback and the trial is a very important turning point that 
is proceeding with at least the tacit consent of the 
military.  He conceded that there may have been "mistakes and 
improprieties" in the conduct of the investigation, but 
considers them to be "minor" compared to the principle being 
established. 
 
6.  Alpay said that the most important reform for Turkey at 
this point is a new constitution, that will "reformulate" 
Turkish identity in a manner that is acceptable to the Kurds. 
 He claimed even the military, which drafted the current 
constitution after the 1980 coup, recognizes the need for a 
new constitution.  Regarding the infamous Section 301 of the 
Penal Code (which criminalizes various acts of lese majeste), 
he noted that although he himself might be prosecuted under 
that section (for his participation in the Armenian apology), 
he thinks that the recent amendments to the section (Ref C) 
provide adequate freedom of speech.  He criticized the 
Turkish media for being very poor on standards, but said that 
there is adequate room for informed discussion. 
 
7.  According to Alpay, the two major stumbling blocks to 
democratization are the "positivist/materialist" secularism 
introduced by Ataturk, and the state's intolerance of and 
discrimination against any identity or culture other than the 
officially-sanctioned Turkish identity and culture.  He 
criticized the educational system for serving these two 
policies, and noted that increasingly parents are instilling 
contrary (i.e., liberal) values in their children at home. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Praise and Criticism for AKP and CHP 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.  Alpay called the AKP the first "mass party," with proper 
party organization and a "leadership cadre" much broader 
than, for instance, the opposition Republican People's Party 
(CHP), whose leader Deniz Baykal he called a "dictator."  He 
admires AKP's foreign policy, specifically mentioning its 
policy of Strategic Depth.  He says that AKP learns from its 
mistakes (implicitly, unlike other parties), and engages in 
intense internal discussions about its policies.  Alpay 
lamented that, in Turkey, a liberal democratic "discourse" 
does not engage the populace, who are mobilized only by an 
Islamic or nationalist "discourse," and noted that the AKP 
does not have a dialog with critical-liberal people.  He 
thinks that in the upcoming local elections the economy and 
efficiency of local government will be the two big factors, 
and that while the AKP vote will fall, it will still carry 
most municipalities, due to the weakness of the opposition 
parties. 
 
9.  Alpay noted that while CHP is currently sclerotic, its 
history indicates it could in the future become an agent of 
change:  In the 1950s, CHP introduced the concept of citizens 
rights and freedoms that could not be restricted by 
Parliament.  In the 1960s and 1970, CHP introduced the 
concept of the social welfare state.  In the 1980s and 1990s, 
CHP raised the idea of cultural rights.  And, in 1992, Baykal 
came up with a "magnificently" liberal party platform. 
 
--------------------------- 
Why EU Reforms Have Stalled 
--------------------------- 
 
10.  Alpay said some liberals have since 2005 begun to 
criticize AKP because of the slow pace of reform.  He said he 
does not share that criticism, and listed several reasons why 
AKP's efforts to make the reforms necessary for EU accession 
have stalled: (a) the enthusiasm of the EU has cooled; (b) 
the enthusiasm of the Turkish military (which, he said, at 
one time was a strong supporter of accession) has cooled; (c) 
CHP support has cooled; (d) PKK violence resumed in 2004; (e) 
relations with Washington deteriorated in the wake of the 
Iraq war; and (f) last summer AKP was nearly shut down for 
supposedly antisecular activities. 
 
11.  As proof of AKP's continuing commitment to liberal 
values, Alpay pointed to the recent beginning of state TV 
broadcasts in Kurdish and on the Alevi religion.  He further 
expects that public secondary schools will start offering 
Kurdish elective courses in the near future.  He also said 
that the recent appointment of AKP Vice Chairman Egemen Bagis 
as chief EU negotiator signals a "restart" of the EU process. 
 
12.  Alpay thinks Turkey is "very close" to consolidating 
democracy, and will do so with or without EU help, although 
he acknowledged that this will take longer and produce more 
internal conflict without EU help.  Indeed, he said, it would 
make a big difference if France would make clear that it 
supports Turkey's accession.  Unless EU shows more enthusiasm 
for the process than it has recently, Alpay does not think 
that Turkey will move further on Cyprus.  He finds it 
"amazing" that public support for EU accession is as high as 
49 percent, given the EU's lack of interest. 
 
13.  Comment:  The Istanbul leftist intellectual commentariat 
has for some time been chewing over the question of whether 
to continue to support AKP.  The larger question is, &Who 
cares?8  While leftist thought has some influence among 
Istanbul,s universities and think tanks, there is almost no 
support among voters for leftist parties, which undoubtedly 
explains why (as Alpay notes) the AKP has shown no interest 
in cozying up to the left even as it pursues policies that 
the left finds attractive.  End comment. 
 
 
Wiener