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DE RUEHIL #0106/01 0171203
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171203Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1066
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9670
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4298
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9442
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 6626
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0896
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 5493
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM GENERAL PETRAEUS 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Pakistan has now acknowledged the Mumbai 
attacker in Indian custody is a Pakistani and has begun a 
formal investigation designed to lead to prosecution of 
detained Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa members here. 
President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani need to be 
encouraged to quickly address Indian doubts about the GOP 
commitment to prosecute.  You will hear genuine concern from 
the Pakistani military about Indian military moves along the 
Kashmir Line of Control and the GOI ability to launch an 
attack without warning.  Chief of Army Staff Kayani and the 
civilian leaders will want to hear from you a continued USG 
commitment to provide equipment for the Frontier Corps and 
police, COIN-related assistance for the internally displaced 
population that fled military action, and enhanced military 
coordination along the border as the U.S. increases force 
levels in Afghanistan.  Through SOC training for the Frontier 
Corps, we continue to make significant progress in improving 
military coordination and cooperation along the Pak-Afghan 
border.  Internally, Ambassador would like to review plans 
for a DOD Program of Record for Pakistan, the F-16 program, 
and the JSAT theater-wide review.  End Summary. 
 
Political Atmosphere 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) President Zardari continues to be the primary 
civilian decision-maker in the GOP; while Prime Minister 
Gilani is frustrated by this fact, he has little room to 
challenge the man who gave him the job.  After Gilani's 
ill-advised and hasty decision to fire National Security 
Advisor Durrani, the President and the PM have publicly 
mended fences but some tension between them still exists. 
Beyond personalities, there is a larger institutional 
struggle with political overtones.  Nawaz Sharif is 
introducing legislation to reverse Musharraf-era 
constitutional amendments that shifted power from the Prime 
Minister to the President.  Zardari would like to retain key 
presidential prerogatives, including the power to dissolve 
the National Assembly and appoint the military service chiefs 
and the governors. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to a recent IRI poll, opposition leader 
Nawaz Sharif's approval rating has risen to 83%, while 
Zardari's has fallen to around 20%.  This is largely due to 
continued (although declining) food inflation, growing 
underemployment, and pervasive electricity blackouts that 
have led to some rioting across the country.  Pakistan is 
meeting most of its IMF targets and the economy has begun to 
stabilize; a Donors' Conference to seek an estimated $4 
billion in additional support is tentatively scheduled for 
March.  Politically, Zardari is moving to shore up his 
position in parliament and consolidate his hold on power by 
bringing additional parties into the coalition. 
 
Mumbai Aftermath 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Zardari is convinced the Mumbai attacks were designed 
to both undermine his proposals to extend rapprochement with 
India and convince Pakistan to weaken its commitment to 
fighting militants in FATA by reinforcing the Pakistan 
military's focus on the Indian threat.  While the transfer of 
5,000-7,000 Pakistani Army troops from FATA to the Indian 
border was largely token, it demonstrated the Army's need to 
respond to its existential enemy. 
 
¶5.  (C) Both Pakistan and India continue to misread each 
other's signals in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks.  The 
GOP decision (six weeks after the event) to admit that Mumbai 
attacker Ajmal Kasab was Pakistani and to open a formal 
investigation leading to prosecution of detained suspects in 
Pakistan was welcomed by India and hopefully will defuse 
bilateral tensions.  However, the Indians are not convinced 
of Pakistan's commitment to prosecute those responsible, and 
the GOI continues to press for extradition that Pakistan will 
not support. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Both sides have moved some conventional and 
strategic forces to the Kashmir and Punjab border areas, and 
Pakistan is convinced that India has the capability to 
execute its "Cold Start" doctrine without warning.  The 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000106  002 OF 003 
 
 
Pakistani military clearly sees Indian force movements as 
threatening, but the civilian leadership appears to believe 
there is no urgency in responding to India's need for some 
concrete Pakistani movement against those responsible for 
Mumbai. UK FM Miliband came away from his recent visit to 
India worried that the Indians feel a military strike of some 
kind against Pakistan will be inevitable.  Both COAS General 
Kayani and President Zardari have stated flatly to Ambassador 
that the GOP would have no choice but to retaliate if 
attacked, and post has no doubt they are sincere. 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOP is struggling to come to grips with the 
consequences of an attack that exposed ISI's decades-old 
policy of creating and supporting Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as a 
proxy force in Kashmir.  The GOP has arrested or held 124 LeT 
and Jamaat-ud-Dawa leaders, closed some camps, and cooperated 
in listing LeT members in the UN's 1267 Committee.  Interior 
Minister Malik has agreed to quiet FBI participation in the 
investigation task force, and post continues to seek CIA/FBI 
access to Pakistani LeT/JUD detainees.  Zardari and Interior 
Minister Malik are clear that they intend to bring to justice 
those responsible in Pakistan, but they stress these were 
non-state actors.  However, GOP leaders have expressed 
concern that, to date, they do not have sufficient evidence 
to prosecute and that India's continued high-profile rhetoric 
is reducing the political space for the GOP to cooperate. 
 
¶8.  (C) Although India appears convinced of GOP involvement, 
there is no smoking gun tying the Mumbai LeT operation to 
ISI.  ISI DG Pasha has been cooperative in both giving the 
U.S. information about ISI interrogations of its detainees 
and allowing this information to be shared with India. 
Reversing the GOP/ISI mindset on the use of Kashmir proxies, 
however, will require time and a concerted effort by the 
military's leadership.  It is too soon to tell if the GOP's 
cooperation represents a new long-term policy. 
 
IDP's /Deteriorating Security 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) During his meeting January 10 with Senator Biden, 
Kayani raised five times his concern about conditions faced 
by internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled fighting in 
Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies (FATA).  There currently are 
about 50,000 IDPs in camps in the Northwest Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and more than 200,000 IDPs living outside of camps 
living with relatives in NWFP and Swat.  While the USG is 
providing assistance through UN agencies, there are serious 
food distribution problems.  We have engaged the appropriate 
international agencies to ensure they are working to resolve 
these issues so that IDP conditions do not undermine Kayani's 
COIN operations.  Through DOD humanitarian relief programs, 
we are reaching some communities in the FATA; USAID continues 
to provide non-food assistance and small-scale development 
projects in FATA and NWFP. 
 
¶10.  (C) Both Zardari and Kayani have openly admitted to us 
that the GOP has lost control of Swat in NWFP to local 
militants who are imposing classic Taliban-style rule.  Women 
have been told they may not enter the bazaars, and families 
will keep girls out of school in the face of threats against 
them.  Hunger and unemployment are growing, and currently 
only ICRC is able to deliver limited assistance in the area. 
After several beheadings of policemen, the NWFP police are 
refusing duty or deserting rather than serve in Swat, leaving 
virtually no law enforcement presence in the area.  Both the 
civilian and military leadership have assessed that, for now 
at least, Swat is too difficult to tackle given limited 
military and police forces, ongoing military operations in 
FATA, and the focus on the Indian border.  Fighting in Bajaur 
continues at a lower winter-level rate. 
 
¶11.  (C) Post is providing vehicles and protective vests for 
the Frontier Corps and the NWFP police; we have received 
authority to spend another $15 million for the police and are 
coordinating with the UK on a needs assessment for the NWFP 
police.  Improving basic law enforcement capability will be a 
critical component to implementing any viable COIN strategy 
in the border area.  Kayani has yet to articulate how he 
would fill the hold piece of COIN strategy; ideally, the 
Frontier Corps would take on that role, but they are serving 
as the primary fighting force to seize areas from the 
militants. 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000106  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Military Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Thanks to the support of the Frontier Corps, 
U.S./ISAF trucks are again moving through an increasingly 
troubled Khyber Agency to Afghanistan.  We continue to make 
exponential progress in working with the Frontier Corps 
through SOC forward trainers, who are moving the program to 
the Warsak Training Center and should resume training in 
February.  We expect the new ISR cooperation at the Torkham 
Border Coordination Center to be operational by the end of 
the month.  The Pakistan Air Force has expanded its requests 
for Close Air Support training at the February 16-27 Falcon 
Talon Exercise.  We have responded to their request for 
additional ammunition and are working to provide helicopter 
maintenance and spare parts for the Army's Cobra and MI-17 
helicopters. 
 
¶13.  (C) Despite repeated requests, Pakistan has yet to 
provide the increased documentation required to process the 
GOP's May claim for Coalition Support Funds.  Pakistan has 
yet to make the December payment due for the purchase of new 
F-16 aircraft and has requested that more of the program be 
paid through IMF.  Given current economic constraints, post 
does not believe that Pakistan can afford the $2 billion 
required to fully fund the F-16 program.  We have to present 
the new U.S. administration with a proposal on the way 
forward for this symbol of renewed post 9/11 cooperation. 
PATTERSON