VZCZCXRO5308
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0051/01 0130731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130731Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1330
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0391
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0283
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0222

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000051 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KTFN PTER ETTC PREL PINR KCRM TI
 
SUBJ: Tajikistan's - Ability to Research or Freeze Assets of Suspect 
Terrorist Entities 
 
REF: A. STATE 127070 
       ¶B. STATE 131885 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On January 8, Poloff met with Deputy Finance 
Minister Shavkat Shohibov to discuss Tajikistan's ability to 
investigate and freeze assets of entities,  listed in reftels, that 
have been identified as assisting in the proliferation of 
technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction or the 
financing of terrorist groups.  Shohibov said Tajikistan lacked the 
ability to effectively respond to these and other requests.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Shohibov explained that Tajikistan had no electronic system 
by which state and commercial banks could investigate requests to 
freeze assets of terrorist entities.  Shohibov said most USG 
requests went into a black hole; at best a small minority of 
demarches prompted the government to sift through some paper records 
and/or call banks to make basic inquiries.  No computerized link 
existed between the Ministry of Finance and any of the banks in 
Dushanbe, except the National Bank, although even this connection 
did not allow review of bank accounts to investigate requests. 
Shohibov added that ideally, Tajikistan would have the ability to 
track financial operations of targeted entities via a joint 
classified Commercial Bank/National Bank/Ministry of Finance 
computer system.  The situation was made worse by the absence of 
adequate links with banks outside Dushanbe.  While the Ministry 
maintained some telephonic communication with banks around the 
country, it normally relied on printed reports from district 
branches of the Ministry of Finance or local district authorities 
for information, rather than an automated system of accounts 
management. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Shohibov said the Ministry of Finance would start working 
over the next three years with the World Bank, British Department 
for International Development (DFID), and European Union to develop 
an interconnected, automated system of banking and finance in 
country.  He said the proposal for this system (which will be a part 
of the National Concept for State Finance Management Strategy of 
Tajikistan for 2009-2019) was nearing a final draft, and would be 
submitted to the World Bank in next couple of months.  Even if "only 
60%" of the project is approved, Shohibov said, it would greatly 
expand the government's ability to efficiently respond to Post 
action requests.  (Two years ago a group of World Bank specialists 
conducted a study of tracking country-wide financing operations and 
terrorism financing.  This report is available upon request from the 
World Bank.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Shohibov concluded that while the State Committee for 
National Security (GKNB) received a copy of all Post requests to 
freeze assets of entities of concern, very little joint work took 
place.  Shohibov said he was sure the GKNB used its own measures and 
systems to investigate these identities, however, no information was 
passed to the Ministry of Finance for action. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: Tajikistan's shortcomings in overseeing its 
financial sector was manifested in the Mutual Evaluation conducted 
by the Eurasian Group (EAG) of the Financial Action Task Force.  The 
ninth EAG Plenary Session reviewed the evaluation in Moscow in 
mid-December, 2008.  Essentially evaluated as failing in all major 
categories, Tajikistan representatives initially denied any problems 
and then claimed that Tajikistan could not comply with the forty 
anti-money laundering (AML) recommendations or nine special 
Qanti-money laundering (AML) recommendations or nine special 
counterterrorism financing (CTF) recommendations without major 
foreign donor assistance. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) These claims are more than a little disingenuous.  It is 
perfectly possible for the Government to do basic checks without 
having some kind of integrated global database of all accounts.  It 
is unlikely any country has such a thing.  All the banks have, or 
should have, their own database, even if it is paper, of their 
accountholders.  An e-mail to a listserv of all banks, or even a 
paper letter could ask them to check their account holders for 
specific names.  They could be required to respond, even in the 
negative.  It's not rocket science.  Just because the Ministry can't 
type a name into terminal and push a button to get an instant answer 
does mean they are not able to request banks to check accounts and 
get answers. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In general though, it appear political will is lacking to 
monitor financial transactions in a meaningful way.  Notwithstanding 
the recognized shortcomings, at least by the Tajikistani 
representatives at the EAG meeting, the Parliament renewed the 
amnesty of illegally or unregistered property until June, 2009 in 
contravention of all the AML/CTF conventions to which Tajikistan has 
acceded.  End Comment. 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00000051  002 OF 002 
 
 
JACOBSON