VZCZCXRO1840
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0021/01 0080323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080323Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1307
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0375

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000021 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET EAID PGOV PREL TI
SUBJECT: Power Politics: Uzbeks Hold up Critical Winter Energy 
Supplies 
 
Ref A: 2008 Dushanbe 1572 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Tajikistan concluded an agreement to buy a 
critical 1.2 billion Kilowatt-hours (KWh) of electricity from 
Turkmenistan from November 2008 through April 2009.  Although 
Uzbekistan agreed to transmit the first 400 million KWh through its 
grid in November and December, it has so far refused to allow the 
rest of the energy to pass to Tajikistan.  The Uzbeks also have 
failed to begin delivering an additional 600 million KWh as part of 
a separate multi-year agreement.  Without this energy, Tajikistan 
has cut back power to the population outside the capital, and even 
supplies to Dushanbe will dry up in February at current consumption 
rates.  The two countries have agreed on a 65% price hike for 
deliveries of Uzbek natural gas.  Uzbekistan would like to see 
Tajikistan's domestic power generation capacity dry up before it 
turns the taps back on, according to local contacts.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Most of Tajikistan's energy problems stem from the fact 
that its electrical system was never intended to be independent. 
The Central Asian electrical grid, built during the Soviet era, took 
for granted that low seasonal production levels in one area would be 
offset by increased generation elsewhere.  With independence, 
Tajikistan remains highly dependent for its energy needs on a 
neighboring country with which its relations have soured. 
 
Nurek Levels: Low and Lowering 
 
¶3. (U) Three-quarters of Tajikistan's domestic power supply is 
generated at the Nurek Hydroelectric Station on the Vakhsh River. 
More than adequate in summer, reduced winter water flows mean that 
Tajikistan faces an annual energy deficit.  Capable of operating at 
3 Megawatts, Nurek has been operating at a fraction of that capacity 
to husband the limited supply of water in the reservoir behind it. 
The water level is currently 879 meters above sea level, several 
meters below its level at this time last year, and only 22 meters 
above the "dead point" at which Nurek can no longer generate 
electricity.  The power station is consuming about a half-meter a 
day, which is partly replenished by inflow of 176 cubic meters per 
second from the Vakhsh.  A contact at Nurek says that at current 
consumption rates the dam can provide electricity to Dushanbe and 
the Talco aluminum plant through mid-February before running out of 
water.  This leaves out the rest of the country. 
 
Uzbekistan Turns Off Tap on Turkmen Transit 
 
¶4. (U) In 2007 Turkmenistan signed an agreement to provide 
Tajikistan with 1.2 billion Kilowatt-hours (KWh) of electricity 
every winter through 2012, at a cost of 3 cents per KWh.  Every 
year, however, Dushanbe must negotiate with Tashkent to arrange the 
transmission of the energy through Uzbekistan's power lines.  The 
two countries concluded an agreement in October providing for the 
transmission of the first 400 million KWh, at a transit cost to 
Uzbekistan of 0.3 cents per KWh, for November and December, but 
negotiations to transmit the remaining 800 million KWh have 
foundered.  A delegation from Dushanbe is due to depart soon for 
Tashkent; at the moment, Tajikistan is receiving no Turkmen energy. 
 
 
¶5. (U) Uzbekistan also has failed to begin transmitting an 
additional 600 KWh it agreed to provide Tajikistan this winter from 
its own sources as part of a multi-year arrangement in exchange for 
900 KWh from Tajikistan in the summer. 
 
¶6. (U) Officially, Tashkent is telling the Tajiks that the energy 
from Turkmenistan is being held up by technical problems in High 
Voltage Line number 512 between Sirdarya, Turkmenistan and Karakul, 
QVoltage Line number 512 between Sirdarya, Turkmenistan and Karakul, 
Uzbekistan.  According to a source at the Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry, the Ministry has already expressed to its counterparts 
in Tashkent and Ashgabat that it is willing to send specialists to 
help fix the problems, but the Turkmen and Uzbeks have declined the 
assistance.  In the meantime, the Ministry has reduced electricity 
supplies to the regions outside of Dushanbe from 6-8 hours a day to 
1-3 hours per day. 
 
Power Politics 
 
¶7. (SBU) Almost no one here believes the official explanation for 
the energy holdup.  An Embassy contact at Barki Tojik, the company 
that managed Tajikistan's electrical grid, said Uzbekistan's goal 
this year was to bleed the Nurek reservoir dry before releasing any 
electricity.  Uzbekistan intended to use the expanded outflow from 
Nurek -- which would be forced to run at higher capacity to make up 
for the deficits in Uzbek and Turkmen energy -- to feed its own 
reservoirs downstream.  More broadly speaking, he repeated an 
oft-heard view here that Uzbekistan wants Tajikistan to be entirely 
dependent for its energy on Tashkent.  Another widely believed 
assumption is that the energy will flow only if Tajik President 
Rahmon prostrates himself before Uzbek President Karimov. 
 
DUSHANBE 00000021  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Uzbeks Agree to Pass Gas 
 
¶8. (U) Tajikistan has reportedly reached an agreement on increased 
prices for natural gas imports from Uzbekistan.  According to the 
new arrangement, Tajikistan will pay $240 per 1,000 cubic meters 
(tcm) of natural gas, a 65.5% increase over this year's price of 
$145.  The Uzbek state gas producer Uztransgaz initially had 
demanded $300 per tcm, agreeing only on January 1 to lower the 
tariff by $60.  Some reports suggested that the Uzbeks had intended 
all along to fix the price at $240, and had only mooted the $300 
figure so they could appear to be compromising.  Analysts noted 
that, since Tajikistan has access to only one potential seller, 
Uzbekistan held all of the cards in the negotiation and could 
dictate its price. 
 
 
¶9. (U) Although the new figure is reported to be under world market 
prices, Tajikistan nevertheless still will have difficulty paying 
it.  Even with the $145 per tcm price, Tajikistan accumulated 
massive debts to Uzbekistan.  In late December, Uztransgaz reduced 
supplies from 70 tcm to 35 tcm per hour due to payment delays. 
Tajikistan responded by remitting $3 million, but acknowledged that 
it still owed an additional $8 million in arrears.  The Tajik gas 
company Tojikgaz reportedly cut delivery to its biggest non-payers, 
including the Dushanbe cement plant and the Tojikazot company. 
Supplies continued to the Talco aluminum plant and the Dushanbe 
central heating facility.  There are concerns that the latter, upon 
which many Dushanbe residents depend for winter heat, might not be 
able to afford the higher prices set by Uztransgaz.  The facility is 
said to be examining the possibility of converting to coal or 
low-grade mazut oil. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: While it is difficult to verify the claims that 
Uzbekistan is waiting for Nurek to run dry, it is certainly 
plausible.  Uzbekistan has made no secret of its desire to have a 
greater say in Tajikistan's exploitation of its energy and water 
resources, and ensuring Tajik energy dependence is one way of 
achieving this.  To escape its seasonal energy dependence, 
Tajikistan needs to develop more production and other transmission 
options to the north, south, and east.  A project underwritten by 
the Asian Development Bank to build a north-south transmission line 
to Afghanistan is one step in this direction.  End comment. 
 
JACOBSON